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ABSTRACT

Disorderly Histories: An Anthropology of Decolonization in Western Sahara
by
Mark Drury

Advisor: Gary Wilder

This dissertation situates the disputed geopolitical territory of Western Sahara in a broader,
regional history of decolonization. Eschewing the conceptual framework of methodological
nationalism, and pushing beyond the period of Moroccan-Sahrawi political conflict, it examines
how decolonization has generated multiple, unresolved political projects in this region of the
Sahara, dating back to the 1950s. These formations, encompassing southern Morocco,
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, and northern
Mauritania, include a zone of militarized occupation, a movement for nation-state sovereignty
based in refugee camps, and the borderlands in between. By considering the overlapping
processes that emerge through these unresolved political projects, this study considers how the
“disorderly histories” of decolonization have produced multiple forms of political space, time
and subjectivity in the Sahara, from the late 1950s, through the 1970s, and to today. The ongoing
effects of these projects in the Sahara bring several tensions underlying post-World War II
political formations – between borders and belonging, dependence and autonomy, sovereignty
and international law – into particularly sharp relief.
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A Note Regarding Transliteration
In a context where different spellings of the same place name (“Laâyoune/El Aaiún”) reflect
overlapping and competing political projects, trying to adhere to a single standard of
transliteration may be, to a certain extent, futile. However, for ease of reading, this text follows a
modified version of IJMES transliteration standards for formal Arabic terms, with minimal
diacritical markings. Only those diacritical marks indicating the hamza (’) and the ‘ayn (‘) are
used here.
There are two, significant sets of exceptions to this standard. First, spelling of proper
nouns foregoes even these minimal diacritical marks when they are not commonly included in
conventional spelling (e.g.: Bucraa). The second exception involves terms from Hassaniya
Arabic, or Moroccan Colloquial Arabic (darija). Because Hassaniya Arabic and darija differ
from formal Arabic in certain, significant ways, transliteration of terms from these colloquial
forms of Arabic reflects norms of pronunciation (e.g.: melga l-’ahkama), rather than IJMES
standards.
Regardless of formal or colloquial use, all Arabic words have been italicized save for
those that have entered the English language, such as intifada, or shaykh, and proper nouns. All
translations, unless otherwise noted, are my own.
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Introduction: Western Sahara, Western Sahara (1975) and Decolonization
“But there has also grown up through the vast majority of cases a clear pattern of orderly
decolonization through freely conducted elections or plebiscites, often under UN supervision, in
which the local population has had the opportunity to choose its own national destiny. It is this
pattern which is so dramatically broken in the case of the Spanish Sahara.” Franck, Thomas M.
“The Stealing of the Sahara.” American Journal of International Law 70, no. 4 (1976): 701.
"…I refer to what Rhodesia rebelled against as the orderly process of decolonization. By orderly
I do not mean a political process free of riots and repression, but orderly in terms of the idea of
African territories crossing a threshold by which they would become nation-states and take a
newly claimed rightful place in the community of nations, the UN, the Commonwealth, and even
the Organization of African Unity (OAU).” White, Luise. Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian
Independence and African Decolonization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015: 22.
Western Sahara and the 1975 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion: An
Introduction
In December 1974, the UN General Assembly solicited a non-binding advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice (the UN’s main judicial arm) concerning the
decolonization of Western Sahara. Since 1884 a Spanish colony on the northwest coast of Africa,
Western Sahara had, by 1974, already been the subject of UN deliberation for over a decade.1
But as Spanish withdrawal appeared imminent, Mauritania and Morocco initiated the request for
the advisory opinion in an attempt to forestall a potential referendum, and to validate their claim
that a decolonized Western Sahara should be divided between the two countries. Driven largely
by Morocco’s King Hassan II2 – and with clandestine US advice and support3 – this claim was
based on the position that Morocco’s and Mauritania’s respective sovereign ties with the people
of Western Sahara predated Spanish colonialism and therefore necessitated the restoration of
1

Thomas M Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,” American Journal of International Law 70, no. 4 (1976): 701.
The UN Special Committee on Decolonization had been discussing the question of Spanish Sahara since October
1963; the first UN General Assembly resolution on the matter was passed in 1965.
2
Although Mauritania joined Morocco as claimant to the ICJ Opinion, the political impetus to prevent independence
in Western Sahara was driven by King Hassan II. David Seddon, Morocco at War: Military, Political and Economic
Dimensions of Intervention in the Western Sahara (Norwich, Great Britain: School of Development Studies,
University of East Anglia, 1986).
3
Jacob Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish
Sahara,” The Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 3 (2006): 275–306.
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both countries’ territorial integrity. Whereas by 1974 it had become customary for
decolonization to be effected through self-determination under UN oversight, Hassan II sought a
favorable opinion that would pre-empt self-determination and legitimate Moroccan and
Mauritanian annexation. As it turned out, the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on
Western Sahara, published October 16, 1975,4 did not grant legal recognition to either country’s
claim to pre-existing sovereign ties with the region, affirming the right of the people of Western
Sahara to self-determination, instead.
Although Western Sahara (1975) affirmed the right to self-determination for the people
of Western Sahara, no sooner was it issued than Morocco and Mauritania disregarded the
Advisory Opinion.5 Two days after the publication of Western Sahara (1975), on October 18,
1975, Morocco announced its intention to send 350,000 unarmed civilians marching into the
Sahara.6 Morocco’s armed forces, massed at the northern, desert border of Spanish Sahara, had
already infiltrated the territory by the time the civilian march, celebrated in Morocco as the
Green March, took place on November 6, 1975.7 Under pressure from Morocco’s civilian and
military incursion, and with General Franco on his deathbed, Spain reneged on previous
commitments to self-determination.8 Instead, Spain agreed to transfer authority over Western
Sahara to Mauritania and Morocco through the tripartite Madrid Agreement. No sooner was this
4

Hereafter, Western Sahara (1975).
Morocco went so far as to misrepresent the decision to its people, and before the UN, as affirming its legitimacy.
Jacob Mundy has pointed out that Henry Kissinger, in close contact with Hassan II during this time, similarly
misrepresented the decision to President Ford during a White House meeting. Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,”
711; Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity?,” 294–95.
6
Franck, 711. For an analysis of the Green March and its legacies in Morocco, see Emilio Spadola, “‘Our Master’s
Call’: Mass Media and the People in Morocco’s 1975 Green March,” in Anthropology of the Middle East and North
Africa: Into the New Millennium, ed. Sherine Hafez and Susan Slyomovics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 2013): 261-283.
7
Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity?”; Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and
Conflict Irresolution, 1st ed. (Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2010), 4–9. More on this in Chapter 1.
8
These commitments had been made before the UN, as well as al-Jema‘a, the Sahrawi political council set up under
Spanish colonial rule, and Polisario, the Sahrawi national liberation front that had been gaining concessions from
Spain since beginning its insurgency in 1973.Franck, “The Stealing of the Sahara,” 704–5; Mundy, “Neutrality or
Complicity?,” 283.
5
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transfer completed than Morocco began a brutal military campaign in January and February 1976
across the northern region of Western Sahara, known as Saguiet al-Hamra, precipitating the
exodus of thousands of Sahrawis to refugee camps in southwest Algeria, where many remain
today.9 Since Spanish withdrawal at the beginning of 1976, the general contours of the Western
Sahara conflict have remained largely in place: Morocco continues to claim (and, since the
1980’s, effectively occupies) the region as its own, but lacks international legitimacy;10 Sahrawi
nationalists, led by the Polisario Front and governed by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic,11 a state-in-exile backed by Algeria, maintain the right to self-determination; and,
although the UN Security Council continues to recognize the right of the people of Western
Sahara to self-determination, a referendum has never been held and the UN remains
peacekeeping steward to a stalled process of decolonization.12
One international legal scholar distilled the divergence between Western Sahara (1975)
and Western Sahara to the following pithy observation:

9

For journalistic coverage and detailed summaries of these events, see: Jim Paul et al., “With the Polisario Front of
Sahara,” MERIP Reports 53 (December 1976): 16–21; Tami Hultman, “The Struggle for Western Sahara,” Issue: A
Journal of Opinion. - 7 (1977): 27–32; Tami Hultman, “A Nation of Refugees: Western Sahara,” Response 9, no. 3
(March 1977): 4–7, 42; Anne Lippert and Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, The Struggle in
Western Sahara and Foreign Intervention: Presented at the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the African Studies
Association, Baltimore, Maryland, November 1-4, 1978 (Baltimore, Ma.: African Studies Association, 1978); Teresa
K. Smith, “Africa Rights Monitor: Human Rights and the Western Saharan War,” Africa Today 34, no. 3 (1987):
61–73.
10
Mauritania’s involvement in the conflict over Western Sahara ended in 1979, when it declared a ceasefire with
Polisario, and withdrew from Rio de Oro, the southern strip of Western Sahara. Morocco immediately occupied that
territory. Since the ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario in 1991, Morocco has controlled an estimated 75-80%
of the territory. Alice Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile: A Saharan Liberation Movement Governs (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 6.
11
Polisario Front is technically the liberation movement for Sahrawi nationalism, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) is the state-in-exile that governs the refugee camps in Algeria. As Alice Wilson notes, however,
the two operate in “sometimes indistinguishable fusion.” In following Wilson’s usage, I will hereafter refer to them
in tandem “Polisario/SADR” unless discussing an activity that solely involves one or the other. Wilson, 2.
12
For histories of the conflict, see Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War (Westport Conn.: L.
Hill, 1983); John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute (Stanford Calif.: Hoover
Institution Press, 1983); Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara; Raquel Ojeda-Garcia, Irene Fernández-Molina, and
Victoria Veguilla, eds., Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization:
When a Conflict Gets Old (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2017).
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The Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975 did more for the legal fortunes of
the right of self-determination of peoples than it did for the political fortunes of
the people of the Western Sahara.13
This bitter irony revolves around the gap between legal norms and political realities, a gap that
applies to a wide range of political contexts. As such, this observation is as much a commentary
on international law as it is about Western Sahara, or Western Sahara (1975). Indeed, in
reinterpreting or reinforcing legal concepts such as terra nullius and self-determination, Western
Sahara (1975) has subsequently become an important point of reference among scholars of
international law. From one perspective, the decision has contributed to the emergence of a more
inclusive, multicultural international law characterized by a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus”
between European and non-European concepts, thanks to its narrowing of terra nullius.14
Conversely, others have contended that, given its very reliance upon terra nullius, a concept used
to justify colonial occupation throughout the 19th century, Western Sahara (1975) participates in
reproducing international law’s irrevocable Eurocentrism.15 Still others see an “ambivalent
compromise” in the case’s reinforcement of self-determination and, by association, normative
concepts of territorial sovereignty, even as it engaged with non-Western political formations.16
These approaches all point to how Western Sahara (1975) probed the limits of
international law, yet none of them capture the paradox between Western Sahara (1975) and
Western Sahara. Even as the decision established a legal norm and political form for orderly
decolonization, Western Sahara (1975) – from the operative decision to the Oral Pleadings and
13

Catriona Drew, “The Meaning of Self-Determination: ‘The Stealing of the Sahara’ Redux?,” International Law
and the Question of Western Sahara International Law and the Question of Western Sahara / Ed. by Karin Arts,
Pedro Pinto Leite, 2007, 90.
14
Karen Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 116–67.
15
Antony Anghie, Colonialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (Cambridge UK; New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 112.
16
Michelle L Burgis, “Determining the Limits of Law in the Western Sahara Case,” in Boundaries of Discourse in
the International Court of Justice Mapping Arguments in Arab Territorial Disputes (Leiden, NL: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2009), 192.
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dissenting statements – contains within it all of decolonization’s disorderliness.17 Western
Sahara (1975) grapples with broader questions regarding the relationship between people,
territory and political authority, on the one hand, and past, present and future, on the other. In
contending with historical, anthropological and sociological information presented by Morocco,
Mauritania and Spain, Jurists involved in the case were forced to consider wide-ranging issues
surrounding the constitution of sovereign ties, and whether the criteria defining these ties have
changed over time. What forms of political authority can be recognized as sovereign? Is
sovereignty a matter of control over territory, or a relation between people for control over
things? To what extent do claims based on historical ties determine political futures? Do 19th
century normative political concepts inform 20th century international law? To what extent does
international law determine sovereignty?
The Jurists involved in the case were addressing these questions in order to determine the
outlines of a political formation “Western Sahara.” To a certain extent, this dissertation is
engaging with a similar problematic. Rather than assuming that Western Sahara is a known
entity, geographically, juridically or politically, this dissertation begins with the contemporary
political formation by engaging with it as an object of inquiry in need of explanation. Western
Sahara (1975) provides an ideal point of departure precisely because, at the very moment when
Western Sahara became paradigmatic in defining self-determination as an international legal
right, its political history diverged drastically from this formal, orderly process.18 How could

17

A fuller analysis of the Case, and the international legal scholarship surrounding it, can be found in the Appendix.
Several studies incorporate Western Sahara (1975) within broader appraisals of international law. See Knop,
Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law; Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The
Structure of International Legal Argument: Reissue with a New Epilogue (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2005); Anghie, Colonialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law; Franck, “The Stealing of the
Sahara”; Malcolm Shaw, “The Western Sahara Case,” British Yearbook of International Law 49, no. 1 (January 1,
1979): 119–54; Drew, “The Meaning of Self-Determination”; Burgis, “Determining the Limits of Law in the
Western Sahara Case”; Jacques Eric Roussellier, “Elusive Sovereignty—People, Land and Frontiers of the Desert:
18
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Western Sahara (1975) become paradigmatic for defining de jure decolonization by selfdetermination, while Western Sahara has, in fact, become something else entirely? How might
this divergence between de jure and de facto decolonization inform our conceptualization of this
transformative process? What if we take Western Sahara as it exists today – in all of its
complexity, conflict, disaggregated authority, overlapping sovereignties, and unresolved political
projects – as paradigmatic of de facto decolonization? How might we be forced to
reconceptualize both Western Sahara and decolonization?
I introduce this study of Western Sahara by way of Western Sahara (1975), because I
find it significant that the geopolitical territory and legal case emerge as pivotal to both the
consolidation and disruption of the “pattern of orderly decolonization.” A broader reading of
Western Sahara (1975), along with a broader contextualization of the history of Western
Sahara’s decolonization, raise questions about this “orderly” decolonization. What constituted
this “pattern,” or process? And why do the conflict and ICJ decision appear to mark both its
consolidation and its end? By questioning the assumed historical complementarity between the
end of “orderly decolonization” and the origin of the Western Sahara conflict, this dissertation
presents the ongoing political conflict over Western Sahara, and the concept of decolonization,
as problematics requiring further explanation. And, despite beginning with the events and legal
decisions of 1975, this dissertation – like Western Sahara (1975) – looks both to the past and
future of this inflection point and moment of crisis, situating the formation of Western Sahara in
a broader history of decolonization dating back to the 1950s, while also tracing this process
through to – and from – the present. Thus, like Western Sahara (1975), this dissertation
examines how the terms of decolonization are necessarily a part of the formation of Western

The Case of the Western Sahara and the International Court of Justice,” The Journal of North African Studies 12, no.
1 (2007): 55–78.
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Sahara. The mutual imbrication of decolonization with the formation of Western Sahara also
invites the following question: from the standpoint of western Sahara, “What is decolonization?”
By beginning with the Morocco-Sahrawi conflict in 1975, Western Sahara as an object of
struggle is already taken for granted, as is nationalist struggle. The nationalist conflict as
framework for analysis begins by assuming the normative form of post-World War II nationstate sovereignty, and the legal framework of national self-determination. It assumes, in other
words, the “orderly process of decolonization.” By contrast, I assert that this problematic of
“orderly decolonization” is precisely what requires explanation.

The Decolonization of western Sahara, and the Production of Western Sahara as a
Geopolitical Space of Contention
Western Sahara as a geopolitical space was carved out of the northwest coast of Africa in 1884 at
the Berlin Conference, and granted to Spain as protection for its claims to the nearby Canary
Islands. The territories surrounding Western Sahara were colonized by France, although these
French colonies were divided administratively between the French Protectorate in Morocco,
French Algeria, and French West Africa. Much of this region was only nominally under colonial
rule well into the 20th century. This is particularly true of Spanish-controlled Sahara where, at the
turn of the century, the shaykh Ma al-Aynayn established the city of Smara, from which he
rallied followers to attack French colonial forces.19 While the French military established its
presence by 1934 (an event known colloquially in Hassaniya Arabic as “melga l-’ahkama,” or
the “meeting of the rulers”), Spanish rule was largely limited to coastal fishing enclaves until
after World War II. The central regional trading hubs – Goulmime in southern Morocco, Tindouf

19

Later, Ma al-Aynayn attempted to overthrow the Moroccan Sultan Abdelaziz, after the Sultan capitulated to
French rule. G.M. Désiré-Vuillemin, “Cheikh Ma El Aïnin et le Maroc, ou l’échec d’un moderne Almoravide,”
Revue d’histoire des colonies, 1958, 29–60.
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in southwest Algeria, Atar in northern Mauritania – all lay outside of Spain’s colonial territory.
Some of the best seasonal pasturage for pastoralists, however, was found in the southern part of
Spanish Sahara known as Tiris, while a number of the most important shrines and affiliated
zawaya for certain tribes were concentrated in the northern part of Spanish Sahara, known as
Saguiet el-Hamra’. According to interlocutors during fieldwork, it was typical to refer to oneself
or one’s kin group during colonialism as “registered with the French” or “registered with the
Spanish,”20 while still moving throughout the region with little regard for colonial borders. The
geopolitical form of Western Sahara, in other words, had very little bearing on the socio-cultural
space of Saharan life until decolonization emerged as a horizon of expectation in the 1950s.
When the horizon of decolonization emerged during the mid-1950s, it transformed
political and social life across western Sahara. And, I argue, these transformations in many
respects precipitated Spanish colonialism in the Sahara, rather than the inverse, while also
preceding the emergence of Sahrawi national identity. At that time, I contend that the region of
western Sahara was not yet structured by national identities, or territorial boundaries, in the same
way that it has been since the 1970s. For this reason, the scope of this study exceeds the
boundaries of nationalist conflict in spatio-temporal, as well as conceptual, terms. The region of
western Sahara, then, is not coterminous with the geopolitical territory of Western Sahara: rather,
it encompasses parts of southern Morocco, southwest Algeria, northern Mali and all of
Mauritania. My use of the term western Sahara follows from the French “L’ouest saharien,” with
an historical, geographical and cultural referent much broader than the political label “Sahara
occidental,” or “Western Sahara,” which references the geopolitical territory.21

20

“makatib bifaransa,” “makatib bisbaniya”
See, for example, the journal Revue l’Ouest saharien, as well as Mustapha Naimi, La dynamique des alliances
ouest-sahariennes: de l’espace géographique à l’espace social (Paris: Éditions de la Maison des sciences de
l’homme, 2004); Mustapha Naimi, L’Ouest saharien: la perception de l’espace dans la pensée politique tribale
21

8

While the terms “Western Sahara” and “western Sahara” are clearly quite similar, my aim
is that their proximity and difference as terms will contribute to a sense of the multiple,
overlapping registers of identification and belonging which exist for Saharans living throughout
this region. In referring to a geography that surpasses geopolitical boundaries, “western Sahara”
encompasses a socio-cultural space associated with speakers of the Hassaniya dialect of Arabic,
whose seminomadic pastoralism and bidani cultural identity distinguish them from neighbors to
the north, in the Maghreb, and those to the south, in the Sahel. This is the space that, in the ICJ
Opinion Western Sahara (1975), Mauritania claims under the historical name of Bilad Shinguiti,
or what is also commonly referred to as “Land of the Bidan,” [trab al-bidan]. In recent literature
on Western Sahara, authors often refer to this cultural space as “Hassanophone Sahara,” utilizing
the related identity marker, “Hassani.”22
Indeed, there are multiple names for this cultural space, but in this dissertation I have
focused on the bidani cultural identity as its most encompassing marker. Defined in
contradistinction to Amazigh/Berber (chilha, pl. chleuh) and non-Arab Black African identities
(kury, pl. l-kwar), bidani identity corresponds to the socio-cultural space of Hassaniya-speaking
Saharans described above. As I show in an interpretation of a poem in Chapter 3, however, the
bidani identity is complex, with genealogical and racial referents that do not simply correspond
to bounded concepts of ethnicity. My reasons for using bidani over other terms are largely
(Paris: Karthala, 2013). The term “Western Sahara” has also been used in scholarly literature to refer to this broader
historical and geographical region, which is generally coterminous with the cultural space of Hassaniya-speaking
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Lebanon: Longman; Librairie du Liban, 1986). “Bilad Shinguitti” refers to a similar cultural space: Harry Thirlwall
Norris, Shinqītī Folk Literature and Song. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). The term “Atlantic Sahara” is
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legitimating the term “Western Sahara” as an object of knowledge: Rahal Boubrik and Colloque International la
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ethnographic: from the 1950s poem to a variety of fieldwork interactions, the term carried a
significance to my interlocutors that encompassed everything from language to pastoral living to
the cultivation of moral behaviors and cultural practices. The term named, in short, a form of life.
I use bidani, then, because it references a form of life historically associated with the sociocultural space of western Sahara, while also remaining salient in the present as a form of
identification that surpasses the border-making processes of decolonization.
This focus on decolonization, and the political formations that it has engendered, has
important implications for the framework of this study. In Disorderly Histories, I conceptualize
decolonization as a horizon of expectation that has generated a series of unresolved political
projects. This dissertation examines the decolonization of western Sahara through these political
projects, while, conversely, also examining these political projects through the lens of
decolonization. From the 1950s to the present, the study looks at several moments of this history,
while considering how the afterlives of these multiple, unresolved projects manifest themselves
in the political formations that structure the region today. These formations include: Morocco’s
militarized occupation of Western Sahara; Polisario/SADR-governed refugee camps in Algeria;
the regions at the margins of this conflict, including northern Mauritania and southern Morocco;
and human rights advocacy throughout the region. In moving between historical moments and
political formations, there will be shifts in emphasis or use between bidani or Sahrawi, or
between “Western” and “western” Sahara. When writing about 1950s decolonization, for
example, I will use the term bidani rather than Sahrawi, since this period preceded the
emergence of Sahrawi national identity. While there is a historical distinction to using bidani or
Sahrawi, and a geographical distinction between “Western” and “western” Sahara, there is also
an overlapping relation between these terms. Used in the present day, one term does not exclude
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the other; rather they overlap while also operating on different registers. Similarly, I suggest that
many of the political projects engendered by decolonization overlap across the disaggregated
political geography of western Sahara today.
The ambiguity produced by competing political projects is precisely what characterizes
the de facto decolonization of western Sahara in the present. Many of the political formations
that constitute western Sahara today, from occupied territory to refugee camps to contested
borderlands, are familiar to a wide range of contemporary situations, and yet their particular
features in a region that has never been fully resolved into a nation-state invite futher description.
Sedimented throughout this political landscape are the histories of political projects – of
anticolonial irredentism, of humanitarian nationalism, of human rights activism for selfdetermination – that point to the overlapping co-presence of colonialism and decolonization,
human rights and national self-determination, as well as multiple, competing forms of authority.
Placed in tension with “orderly decolonization,” which privileges both a sequential process
(colonialism, anticolonial nationalism, decolonization) and a given outcome (territorial nationstate sovereignty), the disorderly histories of western Sahara often stand in disjunctive relation to
the nationalist narratives that structure contemporary political conflict. Requiring further
examination and explanation, these disorderly histories provide the threads through which this
dissertation attempts to unravel, unpack and understand decolonization in Western Sahara.

Sovereignty and the Sahara
As George Joffé noted in a brief essay, “the attribution of sovereignty” is “the basic
theoretical problem posed by the Western Sahara dispute.”23 Danilyn Rutherford suggests that
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the relation through which sovereignty may be granted is often unstable and shifting. Drawing
upon the context of West Papua, another political formation that, like Western Sahara, has
struggled for the right to self-determination since decolonization, Rutherford notes that:
would-be sovereigns…are often caught off balance when the power they seek
suddenly appears as dispersed across a shifting political terrain.24
Rutherford’s notion of multiple audiences “dispersed across a shifting political terrain” evokes
both the increased role of international law in granting or attributing sovereignty after World
War II, as well as an increasingly dispersed “international community” after the Cold War. In a
global political context where the power associated with gaining and granting membership to the
community of sovereign nation-states may be disaggregated, rather than centralized, the struggle
for self-determination emerges over the longue durée as a “shifting political terrain.”
Joffé’s observation points to the limitations of any analysis of the Western Sahara dispute
that begins and ends with the competing parties’ interests and power relations: rather, the
political terrain which constitutes this dispute must first be understood. Rutherford’s attention to
the elusive pursuit of the attribution of sovereignty suggests that, if the audience for granting
sovereignty is ever-changing, so, too, is this political terrain. But how, and in what ways? Joffé
suggested that sovereignty as a principle of political control had, since the 1975 ICJ decision,
diminished significantly. Joffé’s perspective on sovereignty follows a vast swath of literature in
political theory, international relations, and beyond, that analyzes the widening gap between
“classic” sovereignty and its contemporary practice. In conceptualizing these changes, this
literature historicizes these departures from classic sovereignty variously, locating the origins of
this shift in neoliberalism, shifting norms post-Cold War, increasing mechanisms for intervention
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in the name of international order, and/or the deterritorializing effects of the War on Terror.25
Without specifically singling out any of these changes, Joffé asserted that post-Cold War
sovereignty had been “hollowed out.” By this view, the dispute over Western Sahara “seems part
of a distant past, a relic from a realist world” from when sovereignty was still something worth
fighting for.26
In his study Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World,
Robert H. Jackson provides an alternative perspective. Suggesting that decolonization and the
post-World War II political order constituted a fundamental shift in “international outlook,”
Jackson notes that the change was less a transfer of power from the Global North to the
postcolonial South, than an expansion in the application of a moral and legal framework to
support nation-states. Where state sovereignty had previously manifested through the de facto
capacity for occupation and self-defense, postcolonial sovereignty (or what Jackson terms “Third
World sovereignty”) ended up “consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic
foundations – like separate buildings – but of territorial jurisdictions (supported from above) by
international law and material aid – a kind of international safety net.”27 Jackson, like Schmitt,
believes that the European state system was premised on unitary, equal sovereigns that operated
“like separate buildings.” This positivist view considers international law antithetical to the
inviolable basis of state sovereignty. Where Schmitt noted how a moral, legal regime of
international governance first punctured the European system of sovereignty in the late 19th
century, Jackson expands upon Schmitt’s perspective by showing that decolonization effectively
25
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deflated this system, inverting the basis of sovereignty from a state supported from “below” (i.e.,
domestically) into a juridical form supported from “above” by an international moral-legal
framework. In place of inviolable state sovereignty, the states emerging from decolonization
enjoyed what Jackson terms “negative sovereignty,” a formal right to membership in the
international community, supported by aid in lieu of substantive power.28
Jackson’s realist perspective is useful for reconceptualizing decolonization not as a shift
in power between the Global North and South (or, between the West and the Third World), but
as a shift in the constitution of nation-state sovereigns from empirical to juridical entities. The
“orderly process of decolonization” mentioned previously was based on a certain temporal
perspective that viewed this shift as complete with Western Sahara (1975). And yet, the ICJ
decision and the Western Sahara political conflict together reflect the unresolved nature of this
shift. Joffé recognized this in pointing to sovereignty as the fundamental issue underlying the
conflict. Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara is an expression of “classic” sovereignty, but
one constrained by the recognition of rights to the expression of popular sovereignty on behalf of
Sahrawi nationalists. In contradistinction to Joffé’s historicization, however, Jackson shows that
decolonization was integral to the 20th century transformation of sovereignty. In the chapters
below, I show how Western Sahara has been the site of multiple political projects engendered by
this transformative process. Far from resulting in the expected outcome of the territorial nationstate, however, the political projects of decolonization in Western Sahara have defied resolution.
In doing so, these projects bring the unresolved tensions and contradictions of post-World War II
political formations – between borders and belonging, dependence and autonomy, sovereignty
and international law – into sharp relief. Neither part of a prior “realist world,” nor of a
subsequent world of “simulated sovereignty,” Western Sahara – like Western Sahara (1975) – is
28
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a manifestation of the unresolved contradictions in territorial nation-state sovereignty produced
by decolonization itself.
Jackson’s Schmittian perspective suggests that, far from resolving the issue of
sovereignty, decolonization replicated the juridical form of nation-state sovereignty throughout
the postcolonial world, while simultaneously hollowing out the capacities underpinning positive
sovereignty. In this sense, he serves to resituate decolonization as constitutive of the dilemma of
sovereignty identified by Joffé. However, as political theorists and scholars of international
relations, Jackson, Schmitt and Joffé all assume the state as the normative form of sovereign
power. This assumption misses an important dimension to the dilemma of sovereignty, which is
at the center of Western Sahara (1975), wherein the Jurists grapple with applying this normative
form of state sovereignty to the nonconforming social and political formations of the Sahara.
In this respect, anthropological approaches to sovereignty provide a useful antidote
through a more elastic, and less normative, approach to understanding relations of authority.
Emerging concurrent with the previously mentioned wave of efforts to re-evaluate state
sovereignty after the end of the Cold War, recent and contemporary anthropological
contributions on the subject have been characterized as critiques of “formal and legal notions of
sovereignty.”29 Many of these works, inspired by Foucauldian biopolitics and Agamben’s theory
of the exception, seek to demonstrate that sovereignty is not simply an achieved fact, but a
process involving ongoing and emergent instantiations of violence.30 Alternatively, working in
the vein of postcolonial theory, anthropological approaches often seek to provincialize the
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concept sovereignty as “a category of Western political thought.”31 Perhaps most importantly,
anthropological studies have shown how multiple forms of sovereignty often existed within
colonial territories where “the reach and efficacy of colonial states was uneven and often
severely limited.”32
This last observation is particularly relevant to Alice Wilson’s study of the Sahrawi
refugee camps in Algeria, governed by Polisario/SADR. In a deeply insightful approach that
echoes many of the questions raised by Western Sahara (1975), Wilson develops a definition of
sovereignty that foregrounds social relations:
The approach taken in this book, prompted by the ethnographic context of
Sahrawi refugees, is thus to conceptualize sovereignty as social relations between
governing authorities and governed constituencies played out in relation to
resources, not necessarily in territorial form. A social relations approach to
sovereignty allows us to make such connections between extraordinary and
ordinary projects of sovereignty.33
By analytically foregrounding social relations, Wilson’s definition avoids a preoccupation with
legal definitions and abstract institutional forms – in Western Sahara (1975), the question of an
“entity” – from overtaking her framework. Rather than taking recourse to normative definitions
based on “kingship” or the state, Wilson’s definition remains open to conceptualizing forms of
authority as they are constituted “on the ground,” so to speak.
One of the strengths of Wilson’s social relations approach is that it remains open to
recognizing different forms of sovereignty. In contrast with many other anthropological
approaches to sovereignty, her definition “decenters state power from discussions of
sovereignty.”34 Just as impressively, Wilson’s approach displaces the direct relation between
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sovereign and territory that underpins normative conceptions of modern nation-state sovereignty.
In doing so, Wilson appears to draw inspiration from Katherine Verdery, who defines property as
a social relation between persons by means of things.35 Situated first among social relations,
sovereignty is made operative through control over “things” that may, or may not, be territorial
in nature. Wilson’s understanding of sovereignty as constituted by social relations and effected
“in relation to resources, not necessarily in territorial form” presents a framework particularly
apposite to the context of the Sahara where what is often at stake in matters of authority “is not
landownership in itself but control over people and labour that is its indispensable
precondition.”36 Here, the knot that confronts the Jurists of Western Sahara (1975) between legal
ties, in relation to persons, and sovereignty, defined by international law in relation to territory, is
untied.
This approach allows Wilson to examine a spatiotemporal context of multiple, coexisting
projects of sovereignty. Specifically, in Sovereignty in Exile, Wilson examines competing tribal
and what she terms “state-movement” forms of authority within the Sahrawi refugee camps in
Algeria. Moving beyond the question of whether there are one or multiple forms of sovereignty,
she carefully traces the dynamic between both projects as they have been constituted –
sometimes mutually, sometimes antithetically – throughout the history of the Sahrawi nationalist
movement’s governance of refugee camps in Algeria starting in 1975. Perhaps most
convincingly, Wilson shows how Polisario/SADR transformed the site through which political
subjects were produced from households to political committees beginning in the late 1970s with
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the formation of the refugee camps under their governance.37 Here she connects the shifts in
sovereignty during the Polisario/SADR’s governance to the production of new political subjects.
As useful as Wilson’s definition is, this dissertation will attempt to build upon and
expand her approach beyond the tribe-nation nexus of the refugee camps, which is the focus of
her work. Whereas Wilson’s ethnographic approach focuses on competing political rationalities
within a specific site – the refugee camps established in the wake of Moroccan invasion in the
mid-1970s – I argue that the contemporary landscape of disaggregated authority across western
Sahara encompasses multiple, competing projects and claims. These claims to authority are often
overlapping and therefore defy reduction to a single site, or specific relational dyad (whether
colonizer-colonized, Moroccan-Sahrawi or nation-tribe). For precisely this reason, I introduce
Western Sahara by way of Western Sahara (1975). Contending with multiple, competing claims,
the case must engage with Moroccan, Mauritanian, Sahrawi – and, to some extent, Algerian –
claims to Western Sahara, as well as evidence of multiple, changing forms of social and political
authority.

Time and Temporality
Joffé’s analysis of Western Sahara is telling in another respect, beyond his observation that
sovereignty lies at the heart of the conflict. In noting that the Western Sahara dispute “seems part
of a distant past, a relic from a realist world,”38 Joffé makes an observation that is not uncommon
to depictions of Western Sahara. The documentary film Territoire Perdu portrays the Sahrawi
refugee camps in Algeria as a place outside of history, populated by refugees and soldiers
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engaged in a Godot-like state of existential waiting.39 Journalistic depictions often accentuate the
features of Western Saharan politics that appear anomalous, or even alien to our times: video
reportage, for example, that features the military exercises of a national liberation movement that
still exists decades after the “end” of decolonization.40 There are, of course, a wide range of
documentary and journalistic depictions that focus less on the peculiar, but these examples show
how the sense of Western Sahara being “out of step” with world politics serves as an easy point
of reference. Although Joffé uses the phrase as part of a broader, insightful argument about
sovereignty and Western Sahara, it is nonetheless symptomatic of a chronotope for
representations of Western Sahara.
It is important to note, however, that this sense of Western Sahara's anomalous
temporality in world history depends upon a concept of the global political community as a
collection of nation-states. From this perceived totality, Western Sahara appears out of step
either because its political status remains unresolved, or because, as in Joffé’s example, nationstate sovereignty would hardly seem worth fighting over in an ostensibly globalized world. This
view of the past in the present itself depends upon an “orderly” history of decolonization, which
assumes a sequential transition, from colony to anticolonial nationalism to nation-state. A
particularly seductive aspect of this “orderly” historiography of decolonization involves the
assumption of synchronism, or the idea that anticolonial struggle coincided with the achievement
of national consciousness, culminating in a wave of newly independent nation states.
A number of recent scholars have turned their critical attention to decolonization in order
to question this orderly process. Gary Wilder suggests that “to presuppose that national
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independence is the necessary form of colonial emancipation is to mistake a product of
decolonization for an optic through which to study it.”41 From the context of the Caribbean,
Yarimar Bonilla writes:
I argue that we need to examine how the postwar project of decolonization
operated similarly to other projects of political modernity, such as modernization
and secularization. Like secularization – which as a project of government
produced the idea of religions as discrete and transhistorical spheres of life – I
argue that decolonization also operated as part of a larger project that sought to
naturalize the idea of nation-states as discrete and necessary units of political and
economic organization, while silencing and foreclosing other forms and
alignments.42
In arguing against methodological nationalism, both Bonilla and Wilder are also making a call to
historicize the concept decolonization, in order to excavate the futures past that animated a
variety of anticolonial projects in the postwar era. As I will argue throughout this dissertation,
western Sahara defies this assumed synchronism when it comes to the relationship between
decolonization, colonialism and nationalism. Precisely because of its “nonsynchronous” relation
to decolonization, this region provides a context particularly well-suited to historicize the
concept of decolonization.
In recent literature, historical materialism as a philosophy of history has been used to
show that naturalized concepts of modernity contain within them the sedimentation of multiple
temporalities. The resulting geological metaphor suggests that “historical forms do not follow a
linear model of past and present, but they become ‘geological formations’ in which the alreadybeen coexists with the now, allowing us to think the co-presence of temporalities on a surface
and not according to a linear vector.”43 The sedimented layering of past social and political forms
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provides a concept-metaphor, and methodology, for practicing a history of the present that
accounts for the co-presence of multiple historical processes. In the context of western Sahara,
the co-presence of multiple relations to authority along with competing projects of national
sovereignty have defied resolution into the nation-state form. This region, then, holds nationstate sovereignty – often presumed to be the universal political formation of a modern,
decolonized world – in abeyance.44 I practice this kind of history of the present in Chapter 1 by
exploring how past projects of decolonization remain sedimented in the nomenclature and built
environment of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the largest city in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara and
the epicenter of political conflict, in Chapter 1.
Drawing upon this concept-metaphor of a vertically stratified past-in-the-present, I
suggest that the history of decolonization in the Sahara during the 1950s, involving the
Moroccan Liberation Army in the Sahara, appears as a “nonsynchronous contradiction,” to
borrow Ernst Bloch’s term, in relation to the present nationalist conflict in Western Sahara. I use
Bloch’s term advisedly, because he describes a “real nonsynchronism” as an “unsettled past” that
is “alien to the times” of the present.45 In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I explore how the MLA’s
past can neither be buried nor resolved under the present conditions in Western Sahara, precisely
because the conditions which gave rise to this political project remain in disjunctive relation to
Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalist histories. The mobilization of Sahrawis and Moroccans
around the MLA involved a set of complex relations of autonomy and dependence that belie
notions of either sovereign unity, or two independent, separate peoples. As a result, the history of
Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), who notes "a history derived from the present inclines
toward verticality and its appearance is always changeable, brought to the surface by excavating and digging into the
layered depths of different historical times…" (23).
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the MLA generates ongoing controversies in the Moroccan context, which nonetheless fail to
confront the underlying conditions of this anticolonial armed movement, while this history is
largely ignored in the Sahrawi context. This “unsettled past” of western Sahara’s decolonization
sits in disjunctive, or nonsynchronous, relation to both Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalist
narratives that otherwise structure understandings of the past in the present context of ongoing
political dispute.
If 1950s decolonization in the Sahara illustrates how the appearance of “unsettled pasts”
may appear out of step in the present only in relation to nationalist historical narratives,
decolonization has also shaped the experience of time, or temporality, as a political terrain in the
Sahara through a dynamic relationship between present and future. The emergence of political
possibility at a specific historical conjuncture assumes a changing relationship between present
and future. Understanding the significance of these changing temporal horizons entails a broader
understanding of time itself as a political terrain. This approach incorporates insights from
critical theory relative to the multiple temporalities of historical change that exist in tension with
progress-oriented modern historical time. Drawing upon Reinhardt Koselleck’s concepts of
horizon of expectation and space of experience, Chapter 4 notes how the expectation for
imminent change animated a constellation of political movements from Mauritania to Western
Sahara to Morocco a generation following the MLA.46 In this chapter, oral histories with
members and former members of national liberation and anti-imperial movements in Mauritania
and Western Sahara in the 1970s reveal how a horizon of imminent change shaped the
temporality of political action throughout the region during that period. This expectation for
change, which structured a temporal sense of culmination for a generation of Sahrawis,
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Moroccans and Mauritanians, stood in tension with a major shift in global politics during the
1970s from Third World national liberation, to a global ethic of humanitarianism.47
These disorderly histories evince three kinds of “nonsynchronism.” The first
nonsynchronism challenges the stagist conceptualization of “orderly” decolonization: first
colonialism, then anticolonial nationalism resulting in, finally, postcolonial nation-state
sovereignty. That this sequential ordering is inapplicable to western Sahara has already been
discussed in terms of the overlap between colonialism and decolonization across the region. This
kind of nonsynchronism becomes most evident in the the Moroccan Liberation Army of the
1950s, which could be described in terms of “anticolonial irredentism.” The second
nonsynchronism exists in the relation between anticolonial political projects across western
Sahara and the prevailing global conditions of possibility for realizing these projects. This
appears most starkly through the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism during the 1970s, precisely
as the political imperative for anticolonial self-determination was displaced by a global ethic of
humanitarianism. This nonsynchronism remains evident today in the contemporary form of
Sahrawi nationalism, which becomes legible simultaneously as a project of both national
sovereignty and humanitarianism, or a “nation of refugees.” And, finally, the third aspect of
nonsynchronism can be found in the coexistence of multiple political projects in the present.
Without denying its global impact, decolonization, from the vantage point of the Sahara,
has engendered political processes that have not resolved into the nation-state form and that
disrupt an “orderly” or sequential understanding of its events. Moreover, a number of these
Saharan political formations overlap with multiple political processes at once: colonization and
47
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decolonization, national liberation and humanitarianism, sovereignty as material occupation and
as legal attribution. Captured by the terms “anticolonial irredentism” to describe the Moroccan
Liberation Army (MLA) in the 1950s, and later “humanitarian nationalism” to describe
Polisario/SADR’s national liberation project based out of refugee camps in Algeria, several
political formations that emerged from the Sahara straddle multiple political terrains at once.
Even the prolonged death of General Francisco Franco, which played a key role in Morocco’s
ability negotiate the backdoor Madrid Agreement with Mauritania and Spain and to pre-empt the
application of Western Sahara (1975), can be seen as bridging a kind of transition between two
forms of sovereignty. As Michel Foucault notes in Society Must Be Defended, the management
Franco’s death by keeping him alive “symbolizes the clash between two systems of power: that
of sovereignty over death, and that of the regularization of life.”48 This suspension between
forms of sovereignty also inaugurated the much longer, suspended status of Western Sahara,
which has continued since Franco’s death. Brought together, these overlapping processes point to
the need for a framework that contends with decolonization in Western Sahara in all of its
complexity and disorder.

Pursuing New Analytical Frameworks for Western Sahara
The limitations to a nationalist conflict framework manifests itself in recent literature on
Western Sahara. Representing some of the first studies to conduct research in the region after the
ceasefire in 1991, this literature has been based upon research carried out primarily in the
Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.49 With its attention to life on the ground in these camps (some
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of these studies are based on longterm, intensive fieldwork) this literature has pushed scholarship
on Western Sahara well beyond the institutional analysis of national and international actors
which characterized earlier studies on the topic.50 In one of the most compelling products of this
research, Jacob Mundy wrote:
Since 1975, the analysis of Western Sahara, with a few notable exceptions, has
been dominated by macro-level political analysis. Just as the conflict remains
stalemated, the discourse on the subject remains fairly monolithic, preoccupied by
one question: Who will win the Western Sahara? One of the goals of this paper is
to re-locate the Western Sahara problem in a variety of disciplines and a number
of analytical frames.51
The political significance of the work by Mundy and others, which included important
contributions to understanding the roles of the United States and France in the history of the
conflict, cannot be understated.52 By focusing on the emergence and resilience of Sahrawi
nationalism as a social fact, this scholarship also plays an important role in the face of Morocco’s
refusal to acknowledge Sahrawi nationalism as either a popular movement or the project of an
institutional state-in-exile. And yet, it also emphasizes the supposed autonomy of the Sahrawi
people as reflected in the form of the refugee camps. Studies situated entirely in the camps
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2 (2007): 275–98; Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara; Manuel Herz, From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the
Western Sahara (Zurich, Switzerland: ETH Studio Basel, Lars Muller Publishers, 2013); A Wilson, “Democratising
Elections without Parties: Reflections on the Case of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,” Journal of North
African Studies 15, no. 4 (2010): 423–38; Alice Wilson, “Refracting Custom in Western Sahara’s Quest for
Statehood,” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 38, no. 1 (2015): 72–90; Wilson, Sovereignty in
Exile.
50
Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa; Yahia H Zoubir and Daniel Volman, International Dimensions of the
Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1993); Yahia H. Zoubir, “Western Sahara: Political Economy
of a Conflict,” in Economic Crisis and Political Change in North Africa, by Azzedine Layachi (Westport Conn.:
Praeger, 1998), 149–63; Khadija Mohsen-Finan, Sahara occidental: les enjeux d’un conflit régional (Paris: CNRS
éditions, 1997); K Von Hippel, “Sunk in the Sahara: The Applicability of the Sunk Cost Effect to Irredentist
Disputes,” Journal of North African Studies 1, no. 1 (1996): 95–116.
51
Jacob Mundy, “Colonial Formations in Western Saharan National Identity,” in North African Mosaic: A Cultural
Reappraisal of Ethnic and Religious Minorities, ed. J. H Krause and Nabil Boudraa (Newcastle (UK): Cambridge
Scholars Publishing, 2007), 299.
52
Mundy, in particular, has shed light on the role of the United States and France in perpetuating the historical and
ongoing injustices of Morocco’s occupation of Western Sahara. See Jacob Mundy, “‘Seized of the Matter’: The UN
and the Western Sahara Dispute,” Mediterranean Quarterly 15, no. 3 (October 1, 2004): 130–48; Zunes and Mundy,
Western Sahara.

25

reproduce the normative fictions of bounded national sovereignty, rather than examining the
complications involved in forging an autonomous territorial political entity in the Sahara.
Therefore, in following up on Mundy’s call for “a number of analytical frames” for
understanding the situation in Western Sahara, I ask: Why has the opening created by this
intervention produced scholarship that remains oriented almost entirely by methodological
nationalism?
A new edited volume on the Western Sahara conflict, entitled Global, Regional and
Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: When a Conflict Gets Old,
adeptly illustrates how the conflict’s oft-noted intractability entails not only continuity over time,
but also the emergence of new dynamics. Bringing together a range of perspectives, the
collection provides a broad and comprehensive view of recent developments in this prolonged
and ongoing political conflict. Through a collection of articles that reflect multifaceted analysis
among scholars from across disciplines and countries, this collection demonstrates that, although
the conflict remains unresolved, it does not remain unchanged, with contributions that show how
the complexities of the Western Sahara conflict intersect with and have been shaped by a range
of developments, institutions, and forces, including the Arab Spring, the European Union, the
post-Qaddafi security politics in the Sahel, and even United States hegemony. In showing how
the conflict continues to change, the volume’s introduction foregrounds the question of time,
noting how the conflict’s intractability invites further inquiry into “the actual traces of the
passage of time” on the conflict itself.53 And yet, the vast majority of articles for the edited
volume are weighted toward the recent past, with little attention to how this past has been
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historicized, leaving questions of time and temporality by the wayside. This appears to be a
curious omission, if only because a conflict as long-lasting as the Western Sahara conflict is
bound to produce a wide range of narratives, counternarratives, conjunctures, generational
perspectives, archives and temporalities. This preoccupation with scale, to the exclusion of time,
is perhaps oriented by the conflict resolution framework, which focuses on comprehensively
identifying the factors that may be preventing resolution of this political dispute.
Thus, we have two frameworks: one of methodological nationalism, and another of
conflict resolution. But what if we take the Western Sahara not to be an incomplete political
formation, or an unrealized process, but a full manifestation of decolonization – in all of its
complexity and unresolved contradictions? Beginning from this framework, I suggest, helps to
raise a different set of questions about both Western Sahara and decolonization. What if the
decolonization of Western Sahara weren’t approached as a “failed,” “interrupted” or
“unrealized” process of decolonization, but an exemplary political formation of decolonization?
This would force us to ask, what is decolonization? What forms of political space, time and
subjectivity do we find here? What do these heightened tensions reveal about the conceptual
grammar underpinning a concept of “orderly decolonization”? And how might the complexity of
this formation in the Sahara inform our understanding of the tensions underpinning post-World
War II political formations more broadly?

Chapter Summaries
Set in the contested territory of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Chapter 1 examines
how the poles of loyalty and betrayal structure everyday life in a city where competing
sovereignties operate within a single space. As the largest city in the disputed territory of
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Western Sahara, Laâyoune/El Aaiún is located at the nexus of conflict and epitomizes the
polarizing effects of contested sovereignty. Through reflexive ethnographic writing that accounts
for the conditions of widespread surveillance and suspicion in which I conducted research, I
suggest that competing Moroccan and Sahrawi sovereignties affect residents’ subjectivities
through the very names used to designate the spaces in which they move. The composite spelling
of Laâyoune/El Aaiún foregrounds this dichotomy: the dual spellings denote the same name in
Arabic [el-‘ayun] but, in the context of the dispute between Morocco and Polisario, connote two
different political regimes. My use of both names is a redundancy and exaggeration. But I hold
onto this split nomenclature to show how competing sovereignties have for decades divided the
attention, allegiances and subjectivities among people sharing the same absolute space of the
city.
In Chapter 2, “Subjectivity in Abeyance,” I move from the nexus of Moroccan-Sahrawi
conflict to its margins. While national identities such as “Sahrawi,” “Moroccan,” “Algerian” and
“Mauritanian” are frequently taken for granted in literature on Western Sahara, this chapter
critiques methodological nationalism for assuming a homology between territory, nation and
identity in a region long characterized by many borders, and much mobility. In order to counter
the use of categories that analytically “fix” the political subjectivities of people in this region of
northwest Africa, this chapter foregrounds multiplicity, movement and overlapping identities.
Beginning from Nouadhibou, a Mauritanian coastal enclave that attracts people from across
western Sahara during the summer, I present a geography of movement and mobility in a context
of political fragmentation and confinement, focusing on the figure of the ‘ai’d, or “returnee.”
The “returnee” is a subject position produced by the conflict between Morocco and Polisario that
is defined by movement, or “defection,” between the parties to the conflict. Despite the cynicism
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and stigma of betrayal frequently associated with this figure, I suggest that the “returnee”
provides an example of a subject that occasionally escapes the nationalist political epistemology
upon which the conflict is based, thereby illustrating the tension between ambivalence and
commitment underlying seemingly fixed political identities in this region.
Chapter 3, “Home Is Knocking on the Mind,” follows another figure in the contemporary
political landscape of northwest Africa, the veteran of the Moroccan Liberation Army of the
Sahara, to explore how and why this little-known anticolonial movement of the 1950s remains
politicized today. Though led by Moroccans, many of them young, nationalist and socialist, the
armed movement was composed largely of Saharans. The subsequent conflict between young
Moroccan freedom fighters and Saharan combatants mobilized by genealogical structures of
authority and jihad contributed to the demise of this fleeting movement, and is the focus of this
chapter’s analysis. I suggest that the MLA as an anticolonial armed movement captures how
1950s decolonization in the Sahara constituted a historical moment involving the convergence of
several political projects – of nationalism and jihad, for example – subtended by a single horizon
of expectation. I also note that the history of this moment sits in disjunctive, or nonsynchronous,
relation to competing Moroccan and Sahrawi national histories in the present, both of which
attempt to erase important aspects of this 1950s moment of decolonization. I suggest that this
erasure indicates how national narratives fail to capture the complex dynamics of autonomy and
dependence that characterize longstanding relations between people of the Sahara and their
neighbors to the north.
If the 1950s highlight a disjuncture between the Sahara and surrounding regions, the
1970s foreground how the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism was shaped by contemporaneous
regional and global politics. Chapter 4, entitled “Open Horizons of Change, Narrow Spaces of
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Dissent” traces how Sahrawi nationalism, in the form of the Polisario Front, emerged in the early
1970s contemporaneously with a constellation of rising anti-imperial movements from across
northwest Africa. Through oral histories gathered from across the region, I show how this open
but contested horizon of expectation rendered Western Sahara an object upon which multiple
futures, shaped by competing political ideologies, were projected. Furthermore, I show how the
tensions underlying Western Sahara’s future were resolved only after Morocco’s invasion of the
territory in 1975, which forced many Sahrawis to flee to refugee camps in Algeria, where
Polisario, a state-in-exile, remains in place today. In the process, I suggest that this violent
rupture transformed Sahrawi nationalism from an anticolonial project into a humanitarian one.
This transformation constitutes another “nonsynchronous” aspect of Saharan decolonization, I
argue, since Sahrawi national liberation emerged as the prevailing moral framework of global
politics was shifting from anticolonial self-determination to human rights and humanitarianism.
Chapter 5 returns to the present to examine how human rights discourse has emerged as a
political terrain across Western Sahara. This chapter traces the proliferation of human rights
activists, or huquqiyyin, representing parties on all sides of the conflict since a ceasefire in the
early 1990s. Examining the emergence, deployment and proliferation of human rights discourse
in the Western Sahara conflict since the 1990s, the chapter then moves across multiple sites to
consider the uses and effects of human rights practice throughout the region’s disaggregated
political geography. In New York City, I reflect on the media, narrative and enframing devices
used in an attempt for the documentation of human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied
Western Sahara to find publicity and audience. In Marrakesh, I describe the spectacle of an
international human rights forum and how it reveals the ways in which the Moroccan state
utilizes human rights discourse to serve its own security agenda. In the refugee camps in Algeria,
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I consider the intersection between human rights activism and the gendered politics of
Polisario/SADR. And, finally, in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, I consider the huquqiyyin as both avatars
of Sahrawi resistance, and prone to being judged by those who view human rights in the context
of nationalist conflict in cynical and instrumental terms. Across these different contexts, I
consider the manifold versions of human rights activism operating as a tactic embedded within a
broader political struggle. Depicting the practice of human rights in a context of political conflict
where sovereignty and self-determination remain the ultimate aims, I show how human rights
discourse has become an extension of political conflict, or war, itself.
This returns the study to Western Sahara (1975), which is discussed in greater detail in an
Appendix. A sustained analysis of Western Sahara (1975) engages with the forms of reasoning
and regimes of evidence presented in the operative decision, oral pleadings, as well as dissenting
opinions. In contrast to much of the existing legal scholarship on the decision, which situates this
decision in relation international law and its Eurocentrism, I argue that the decision foregrounds
the tensions inherent in fashioning a formal legal process of decolonization around the
realization of territorial nation-state sovereignty. Despite consolidating the legal right to selfdetermination, Western Sahara (1975) paradoxically expresses the limits to “orderly
decolonization.”
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Chapter 1 –Sedimented Histories and the Competing Sovereignties of Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara
Tonight I am dining in occupied territory.54 In a simple apartment on the second floor of one of
the cavernous concrete edifices known as “Batimat” (from the French bâtiment, or building), off
a main thoroughfare in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the largest city in Moroccan-occupied Western
Sahara, I am hosted by a young man and his mother. The mother is telling me about the heavily
mythologized Green March of November 6, 1975, when, as a state-sponsored act of protest,
some 350,000 Moroccan civilians crossed en masse into Spanish Sahara from the southern
Moroccan region of Wed Nun. But far from celebrating this event as it is memorialized in
Moroccan nationalist doctrine, she is recounting the arrival of Moroccan soldiers into
Laâyoune/El Aaiún ahead of the much-publicized civilian march. In an attempt to annex the
territory and preempt the flight of Saharan people who had been anticipating a vote on selfdetermination, Moroccan soldiers began encroaching on the territory from the east, beginning in
October 1975.55 After the tripartite Madrid Agreement was signed on November 12, finalizing
Spanish withdrawal and handing de facto authority to Morocco and Mauritania,56 many Sahrawi
men serving in the Spanish colonial army fled the city to join the Polisario Front,57 the armed
national liberation movement that had emerged two years earlier to fight Spanish colonialism.
Residents who stayed behind moved their livestock from the pens surrounding their homes up to
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the roof. When this woman, then six or seven years old, accompanied her grandmother to the
roof of her family’s house, they encountered a Moroccan soldier. Upon seeing them, the soldier
promptly knocked this woman’s grandmother over with his rifle, spilling a kerosene lamp she
was carrying and burning the young girl in the process. This, for her, was how decolonization
took place, and how the Moroccan occupation began.
As we talk, propping ourselves up with pillows on the carpet-covered apartment floor, the
son makes round after round of tea. Eventually, he begins recounting the litany of beatings,
arrests and torture that pro-independence Sahrawi presently suffer at the hands of the Moroccan
security forces. His reports of abuse are interspersed with the mother’s narrative when she joins
us between trips to the kitchen preparing dinner. Her interjections take us back in time, recalling
the conditions of living in Laâyoune/El Aaiún in the early years of the military occupation, when
the Moroccan Army and Polisario were fighting in the surrounding desert countryside, or badiya.
For five years, she says, no one was allowed to leave the city and go to the desert, an inversion of
the norm for many Sahrawis for whom city life represented little more than a pause from pastoral
or nomadic life in the badiya. She recounts the horrors of people disappearing, the rumors of
bodies being thrown into the ocean from helicopters and of being buried in mass graves, and the
terror that “If you say ‘Polisario,’ tomorrow you’ll end up in M’gouna.”58
The mother’s sister, who joins us in the sparsely furnished room as the son prepares tea,
begins recounting the chaos and uncertainty endured by people who fled east during this time,
embarking on a journey that, for some, involved Moroccan aircraft strafing them with napalm.
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This epic of violence, displacement, deprivation and loss has itself become foundational to the
national narrative of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), a state-in-exile established
in 1976, based out of refugee camps in Algeria, and run by Polisario with humanitarian and
Algerian support. Before the aunt can finish, however, the sound of pattering footsteps from
outside the building interrupts her story. The voiceless, arrhythmic syncopation of small feet
hitting the ground reaches us with the suddenness of unexpected rainfall as a group of kids try to
escape the police van’s headlights, running along one of the dirt paths that connect the buildings
of this apartment complex. Testimonials of the past, recounting the violent origins of Morocco’s
occupation, are interrupted by its ongoing presence. The dynamic exchange between mother and
son, a contrapuntal narrative weaving a history of injustice with today’s ongoing resistance,
gives way to a silent pause. “Stay down,” the mother tells everyone. “Stay down.”
From this point on, I try to speak very little and we all converse in hushed tones, except
for the son at whose invitation I had come to dinner. He has too many arrests, confiscations,
beatings and confrontations with the police to recount, and whatever fear he may have doesn’t
seem to modulate the anger and excitement in his voice. He tells me about Sahrawi students at
university in Moroccan cities who had been attacked and then jailed in the aftermath of
celebrating Algeria’s success in a World Cup match last month. He names the leader of an
activist/media crew in Laâyoune/El Aaiún who was arrested just last night, a fellow videographer
whose equipment was taken and destroyed. Just before Ramadan, he says, two women were
treated roughly by the police, which, he suggests with foreboding but also not without
excitement, portends an upcoming “hot month,” fraught with the potential for escalating rockthrowing confrontations between young folk and the security forces. He shows me a sheet of
paper that lists, day-by-day, the locations where protests are set to take place in the coming
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weeks. The kids running in and around Batimat in their game of cat-and-mouse with the police
vans have become a nightly presence, and their footfalls pass beneath the apartment several more
times before the evening is over.

Chapter Overview: History, Geography and Subjectivity in Laâyoune/El Aaiún
Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the capital of a Non-Self-Governing Territory, a politically isolated
urban space at the epicenter of an international conflict, a city populated largely as a
consequence of coercion and necessity, is, above all, a place of competing sovereignties. These
sovereign forces concentrated within the single absolute space of the city produce a highly
structured political field. The machinery of the Moroccan military state – soldiers and police in
riot gear, undercover mukhabarat of Moroccan state intelligence services, and informants
embedded in every neighborhood – represses any sign of visible support for Sahrawi nationalism.
Unsurprisingly, the tight control begins before entering the city limits. Two military checkpoints
stationed north of the Saguiet al-Hamra river greet travelers coming overland from Morocco.
Security coming through the Laâyoune airport can be similarly, and selectively, tight, as
Morocco restricts foreign journalists from traveling to the city in an effort to maintain a media
blackout.59 Much of the territory to the east of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, toward the sand berm where
most of the estimated 100,000 Moroccan soldiers are stationed60 and the refugee camps beyond,
remains off-limits to civilian travel.
Pro-independence Sahrawis find spaces within the crevices of this machinery – the inside
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of a cab, the interior or rooftop of a home – to carve out shared spaces of resistance to Moroccan
occupation and to affirm their commitment to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The
barely hidden presence of this affiliation exists everywhere: people’s homes may be tuned to
SADR television and radio broadcasts from the refugee camps in Algeria, or even decorated with
SADR flags for Sahrawi national holidays. A cab driver with like-minded passengers may play
songs or poems that are explicitly pro-independence (“Every day we will rise up under the feet of
the invader…”61). At the same time, pro-independence activists devise tactics to confront the
coercion of Moroccan rule and make it visible by staging a street protest and videotaping it from
a nearby rooftop or apartment window. The refugee camps where Polisario’s state-in-exile
maintains television and radio broadcasts give the protesters an outlet and an audience, and
Polisario’s Ministry for the Occupied Territories coordinates political strategy between the
camps and the city, including money transfers that reportedly pass through expatriate Sahrawis
living in the nearby Canary Islands.62 Gaining international attention remains the ever-present, if
elusive, goal.
The conflict’s polarization seeps into daily life and overdetermines public activity. Even
public gatherings that, on the surface, may not involve protest of any kind get drawn into the
field of political conflict. Soccer matches that draw the largest crowds to the cafés (BarcelonaReal Madrid, in particular) sometimes end in clashes where flags for Morocco, SADR or Algeria
(Polisario’s main backer) are raised. Police and soldiers are also quick to descend upon
unemployed college graduates demanding work under the pretense that their protest might
“become political.” This threat of “the political” is so pervasive that residents sometimes refer to
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Laâyoune/El Aaiún in dark, even foreboding terms: “the belly of the beast” (kersh al-duba‘) or
“the mouth of the volcano” (fuhat al-burkan). Sahrawi activists have compared it to being
trapped inside a box wrapped in darkness, such that no one can see in from the outside.63 Even
Moroccan officials have complained that being assigned there is akin to punishment, despite a
wage bonus (reportedly fifty percent, for public functionaries).
The structuring effects of competing sovereignties within a single urban space evoke the
confusion, suspicion and disciplining of subjects described in China Miéville’s The City & the
City. In Miéville’s fictional account, an historical rupture has produced a political formation in
which two, politically separate cities exist on top of one another. Everyday life for the residents
is carried out on the same streets and in the same built environment, but the citizens of the two
cities must discipline themselves to “unsee” the people, signs and architecture of the “other” city.
When the borders between these two cities are transgressed, a shadowy, interstitial force asserts
itself, known as the “Breach.” Miéville’s masterfully rendered fictional world evokes what Gil
Hochberg has called, in reference to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, “parallel geopolitical
realities invisible to each other.”64 For Hochberg and Miéville, a political field structured by
competing sovereignties produces subjects disciplined by distinct “ways of seeing,” where the
salient boundaries are less geographical than social, concerning what can be seen and who can
see it. This conceptualization of the political field draws from Jacques Rancière’s formulation of
the distribution of the sensible through which politics revolves around “what is seen and what
can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the
properties of space and the possibilities of time.”65 In these contexts, political geographies can
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only be discerned through an examination of how competing sovereignties shape and structure
political subjectivity in a given political field.
The first half of this chapter explores some of the effects of contested political authority
on everyday life in the city. The competing sovereignties of Morocco and Polisario/SADR
structure this disaggregated political space into a polarized political field characterized by intense
surveillance and pervasive suspicion. In addressing the challenges that this surveillance and
suspicion presented for conducting ethnographic research, this section frames the methodological
situation of being subjected to surveillance in terms of “observed participation.” In examining
the pervasiveness of surveillance and suspicion in everyday urban life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, I
describe how this longstanding, polarizing national conflict destabilizes epistemological
hierarchies of truth both at the level of subjectivity, but also by destabilizing discursive fields of
memory. Despite these methodological challenges, I suggest that this condition of “observed
participation” can contribute ethnographically to conceptualizing how surveillance shapes
political subjectivity in what Ilana Feldman terms “security society.”66
The second half of this chapter will examine the structuring effects of competing
sovereignties in Laâyoune/El Aaiún through the sedimentation of the city’s history, tracing this
history back to the 1950s and the emergence of decolonization as a horizon of political
possibility. This history involves a series of contested, unrealized political projects that include:
joint Moroccan-Sahrawi anticolonial armed struggle in the 1950s; Spanish counterinsurgency
and colonialism in the 1960s and 70s; the emergence of Sahrawi nationalism led by the Polisario
Front in the 1970s; and the shifting terrain of Moroccan-Sahrawi conflict since the 1970s.
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Attending to this history is important, I suggest, for several reasons. First, I suggest that the
prolonged and ongoing history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s decolonization is also the history of the
city’s formation. In this way, attending to the city’s history points to urbanization as a nexus
through which postcolonial sovereignty has transformed the relationship between people,
authority and territory in this region of the Sahara. Rather than a unitary political entity, however,
the formation and history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún epitomizes the unresolved contradictions
inherent in post-World War II sovereignty under the United Nations: is sovereignty itself
legitimate occupation, or a matter of legal recognition? And, finally, the afterlives of these
unresolved political projects are referenced through a variety of place-names still in use
throughout Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Together, I suggest, the different political projects referenced
through a concatenation of names in Laâyoune/El Aaiún describe a layered history of unresolved
political projects sedimented in the city’s built environment and nomenclature.
Section I – “Observed Participation”: some notes on participant observation in a “security
society”
Note A – The Immediacy of Surveillance: a knock on the door, a call from police
Early in my fieldwork, I came to know several different ‘a’idin (sing. ‘a’id), or
“returnees,” many of whom grew up under Spanish colonialism, joined the Polisario Front in the
1970s, and fought against Morocco throughout the 80s, only to return to Moroccan-occupied
territory after the ceasefire in 1991. The designation of ‘a’id refers to former members of the
Polisario Front who left the refugee camps to live, with Moroccan state support, in either
Moroccan-occupied territory or Morocco proper. Though ‘a’idin and their changing position
within the field of contemporary political conflict will be discussed more in Chapter 2, for the
purposes of this example it should be noted that they are typically assumed to be “defectors”
from Polisario and therefore loyal to Morocco.
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The subject position of the ‘a’id lent itself to a particular narrative of Western Sahara’s
history, which many ‘a’idin were eager to share in their own cautious way. As a result, I found
myself visiting their homes several times.67 In order to refer to these experiences without
singling out an individual ‘a’id, I will refer to a composite figure throughout this chapter as
Lahcen. It should be noted, however, that ‘a’idin are not exclusively men; women and families,
including children, have followed this trajectory of “return.” On one occasion, Lahcen and I were
reviewing my written account of his historical narrative when there was a knock on his door. He
went downstairs to answer and, following a brief conversation that I did not overhear, he
returned and peeked his head out through the shuttered, second-story window overlooking the
street. Once he was satisfied that the unexpected visitor had left, we resumed proof-reading
Lahcen’s historical narrative. When we were done, he mentioned that the person at the door had
been a clerk from the qa‘id’s office, which serves as the most local jurisdiction for government
administration. The clerk, he mentioned, had reported that the office had been made aware of an
Arabic-speaking foreigner visiting Lahcen’s house and was checking to see if the visitor was still
present. Lahcen said that he had covered for me, telling this low-level government official that
we had met one another through a friend, but that I was not at Lahcen’s house at that time. For
the rest of my visit that evening, we left our historical review aside, and instead Lahcen provided
cautionary advice for how to stay safe and look after my belongings. Some of this advice seemed
curious (“Address anyone questioning you firmly and confidently”), while other suggestions
seemed utterly necessary (“Don’t carry your notes with you – put them somewhere secure, like
under a bed mattress”). At the same time, Lahcen tried to reassure me that government
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surveillance was unusually tight at that moment, given the pending visit of the Princess of
Morocco, Lalla Meriem, to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. After we wrapped things up,
rather than walking to the nearby mosque to catch a cab as I had done previously after visiting
his house, Lahcen called for a friend to take me home by car, and came along for the ride as his
friend took a roundabout route through dark, side streets.
On another occasion, the police called me after I had returned from conducting an
interview with officials from MINURSO, the UN mission tasked since 1991 with monitoring the
cease-fire established between Morocco and Polisario. A security perimeter lines MINURSO’s
headquarters in lower Laâyoune/El Aaiún, a modest campus converted from a school. Dark blue,
Moroccan police vans park across the street from MINURSO’s headquarters, monitoring the
monitors at all times.68 Despite the constant police presence, I was caught by surprise when I
received a call the day following my visit. The caller, speaking carefully in English, sought to
remind me that we had met previously at the city’s wilaya, or central administration. I had gone
to the wilaya several months prior to register in an attempt to procure my research authorization
but, instead, ended up in a room for over an hour while different security officials cycled through
repeating the same questions, presumably to get a good look at my face. While the caller
remembered me, I could not seem to put a face to his name. After dispensing with the chit-chat,
he asked if I had been to MINURSO the previous day and wanted to know my reasons for the
visit. I told him that I had been to MINURSO to learn about its role in regional governance, and
that I had taken the opportunity to go because daytime appointments were otherwise hard to
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come by during Ramadan. He asked if I had changed my research topic, expanding into other
matters “such as the Green March,” he suggested, but I told him no. He asked how long I was
planning to conduct research (I told him until the end of the year) and whether I had received my
research authorization (I was still waiting).
These occasions when I interfaced directly with the Moroccan state security apparatus
were infrequent and always unanticipated. In the case of the knock at Lahcen’s door, my first
thought was to suspend contact with all of my interlocutors, for fear that state security agents
would be following up with whomever I met. With the phone call following my visit to
MINURSO, I realized that, no matter how many unsolicited warnings that I received to avoid
certain people or neighborhoods, the trip wires that put the state on alert were difficult, if not
impossible, to know in advance. Though irregular in their occurrence, the moments when state
surveillance became manifest – a knock on the door, a phone call from a government official –
were significant. In confirming that the state was, indeed, following me, these interventions
provided empirical proof to validate the warnings and rumors of state surveillance that were so
pervasive to daily life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún.
In this sense, such events constituted moments of clarity: here is when the klieg lights
became bright enough to pierce the fog of suspicion. Although they punctuated the everyday
rumors and warnings with more immediate forms of contact with the state security forces, the
confirmation that these moments of direct contact provided was anything but reassuring. As I
wrote in my fieldnotes following the phone call from the government official:
I’m beginning to think that my participant-observation activity might just
involve “being observed.” Nevermind the countless police vans and quwwat almusa‘ida69 trucks that I walk past everyday on Avenues Tan-Tan and Smara. It’s
the second-hand joking response to a question (“What are you, mukhabarat?”),
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unsolicited advice from a friend (“don’t talk to people you don’t know; eyes are
on you”) and/or statement of the obvious to everyone involved (“you know they
know exactly where you are right now…”)
But the really unnerving thing about it all is not knowing what they really
know and what sets them off. I know that the organized groups around hr [human
rights] activism (CODESA, Agdim Izig Coord Committee, etc.) are under close
surveillance, and so too are these “Media” groups. But I wouldn’t have guessed
that going to see MINURSO would set them off. But not knowing has been
what’s made me nervous…
The other aspect is not knowing just how sophisticated and thorough their
oversight really is. Do they basically know everywhere I am at all times, which is
the impression given by most people’s comments, like, “They know that you’re
here, right now, for sure.” But if that’s the case, then is going to MINURSO really
more telling or controversial than some of the other people I’ve been meeting
with over the last months?70
In its diffuse prevalence, the panopticon has a felt presence in Laâyoune/El Aaiún: a constitutive
element of the city’s social fabric, built environment, and communications infrastructure. State
surveillance creeps into the walls, the phones, the air. The resulting suspicion is everywhere, too.
This fieldnote conveys how the invisible aspects of the militarized state are more unsettling than
its readily apparent presence in the form of, for example, armored vehicles (“police vans and
quwwat al-musa’ida trucks”) stationed throughout the city. Coming several months into my
fieldwork experience in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, this note also reflects how the state’s occasional
manifestation only served to amplify my sense of suspicion rather than clarifying the outlines of
its presence.
There are several dimensions to being observed in this manner and, as in many
ethnographic situations, the implications are both subjective and methodological. The first
involves the immediacy of those moments when the state contacted me directly. I found that the
immediacy of fear, uncertainty and disorientation produced in these moments defied
rationalization. This includes the self-analysis intended by reflexive anthropology, which
foregrounds the relational experience between anthropologist and interlocutor at the heart of
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ethnographic research. These well-meaning approaches help to deconstruct colonial forms of
knowledge and power, which underpin much of the anthropologist’s authority when writing
ethnography. However, a reflexive analysis assumes that this dynamic can be resolved by
attending to the dialogic encounter between anthropologist and interlocutor.71 The crisis of
authority engendered by conducting ethnographic research under close state surveillance,
however, does not lend itself to the same reflexive analysis based on dialogic encounter. As the
examples above illustrate, in the moments of hearing a knock on the door, or receiving a phone
call, I experienced a sense of both disintegration, and an impulse toward self-preservation. These
encounters were neither dialogic, nor between individuals per se; rather, they entailed the
interpellation of a subject by institutional agents. While these moments are not productive in a
dialogic manner, in the ethnographic sense of reflexive anthropology, they may be productive of
a relation to authority – an experience, in other words, of subjection.
Being made aware of the presence of surveillance is not strictly dependent upon these
moments of direct contact with security and intelligence forces. On the contrary, the pervasive
suspicion and occasional manifestation of surveillance work in complementary ways to amplify
the state’s seemingly all-encompassing presence and arbitrary interventions. Constantly being
made aware of state surveillance is generative not simply of fear, but paranoia. Early in my
fieldwork, I was walking along a street during a busy part of the evening when a car slowed
alongside me, tinted windows rolled down, and a young guy in the passenger seat asked me for
directions. I pointed in the opposite direction and, in somewhat broken Arabic answered “another
direction” (“tija l-akhur”). The passenger corrected me in mock seriousness - “tijah al-mu‘akis,
you mean?” – rolled up the window and drove off. There was no particularly good reason why I
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should have interpreted this interaction as anything other than some young guys exploiting an
easy target for amusement during their drive around the city at night. But in the aftermath of that
brief encounter, I was sure that someone was sending me a message. For the rest of that walk
home, I somehow convinced myself that, rather than asking me for directions, these were agents
of police or intelligence or security, letting me know that they knew exactly where to find me.
Months later, as much as I would have liked to say that I had developed a more reliable
sense of equanimity, I remained susceptible to this paranoia. One fine afternoon, seated at a café
on Avenue Mekka in an area not far from the Moroccan-dominated lower part of the city, I
became acutely aware of security personnel on all sides of me. I remember sensing a stillness to
the scene, even as the afternoon wind was gaining its usual strength. A couple of National
Security vehicles – one jeep and one van – pulled up onto the sidewalk down the street from
where I was sitting. A man standing in the doorway behind me was checking his phone. A BMW
and a black Renault minivan - the kind the undercover ride around in – then parked in front of
the National Security vehicles. An official-looking man stepped out of his BMW and walked
over with a big Samsung smart phone, greeting his friends a couple tables over from me. He sat
down, sunglasses on, facing my direction. I looked up: a man in a hotel room across the street
was surveying the scene from his hotel window. Fifteen minutes later it would seem absurd, but
at that moment I thought: this is it, they’re going to arrest me. Would I call the US Embassy
first? Would that be shameful? If not, who would I call? What is worse, I had just run out of
minutes on my phone.
The two National Security vehicles pulled out onto the street and drove away, up Avenue
Mekka. The black Renault van pulled up the street and only then I saw it had civilian plates: just
a father and his son, who had possibly made a stop at the patisserie nearby. The man in
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sunglasses was still facing me, but he and his friends were engrossed in conversation. At that
point, I could reinterpret my whole frame of reference as a misguided conspiracy theory.
Reframed in this way, the acute pang of anxiety I had felt also became an embarrassing moment
of narcissism: I was not nearly as central to the plot as my mind would have had me believe. And
yet, repeated over weeks and months, this constant need to check my frame of reference only
compounded the subjective sense of instability: whether before or after the reinterpretation, I
could no longer trust myself to know what to think – nor who to trust. And in this way, a kind of
paranoia takes root and engenders a need both for constant vigilance to reassert my own sense of
reality, and a constant sense that the hierarchies of truth could be shifted by a single, punctuating
event that could decisively rearrange my own position within this field of suspicion and
surveillance.
In his account of losing his wife unexpectedly during ethnographic fieldwork, Renato
Rosaldo describes how the personal experience of loss within his own family profoundly shaped
his subsequent ability to relate to his interlocutors’ expressions of anger, grief and rage. While
Rosaldo’s experience of loss was not directly related to the “dialogic encounter” of ethnographic
research, it was an emotional and deeply personal experience that, in shaping his subjectivity,
provided him with insight into the experience of rage. While he would never claim to fully grasp
his interlocutors’ experiences based on his own, Rosaldo noted that through his own subjective
experience he was able to recognize that “Ilongot anger and my own overlap, rather like two
circles, partially overlaid and partially separate. They are not identical.”72
Similarly, I suggest that the immediacy of state interventions was significant to my
ongoing analysis because it imparted an emotional, subjective experience through which I could
relate – however provisionally – to some of the stories that Sahrawis relayed about Moroccan
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police, soldiers, or intelligence officers appearing at their homes. Sometimes, these stories were
framed in terms of finding one’s agency and pushing back against different forms of state
intimidation. In one case a Sahrawi man living in Mauritania was visiting family in Laâyoune/El
Aaiún when he answered the door at his relatives’ house and encountered a Moroccan security
officer demanding identification. Refusing to capitulate, this man confronted the officer and
demanded that he leave him and his relatives alone. Whereas certain encounters engender the
space for political action, other memories demonstrate how contact with the police lead to the
imprisonment and even disappearance of family members. One media activist recounted his
vivid memory of an early morning raid in the early 1990s when Moroccan police broke into his
family’s home and hauled off his older brother, allegedly for spray-painting pro-Polisario graffiti
on a public wall. While I want to be clear that my life never in any way felt endangered in the
way many Sahrawis experienced, the anxiety and loss of perspective that I felt in the moments
where I directly encountered state surveillance punctuated the regularly occurring narratives and
warnings of surveillance and suspicion with the immediacy of subjective experience. In these
moments, I could relate, however provisionally, to certain shared, subjective effects of living
under state surveillance – of “observed participation” in a political field shaped by contested
sovereignty.73
As it shaped my partial understanding of certain aspects of my interlocutors’ subjective
experiences, “observed participation” also provides a framework for unpacking the relationship
between individual experience and historical process. Where Renato Rosaldo draws upon
personal experience to mediate between the particularity of his interlocutors’ experience and a
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broader, anthropological interpretation, Theodor Adorno draws upon the immediacy of personal
experience to consider the relationship between history and the individual. Writing about the
experience of having his house searched by Nazi police officers, Adorno notes that subjective
immediacy supersedes political or historical analysis:
A fact like a house search in which you do not know whether you will be taken
off somewhere or whether you will escape with your life has a greater immediacy
for the knowing subject than any amount of political information, itself on the
level of the facts, to say nothing of the so-called larger historical context to which
only reflection and, ultimately, theory can give us access.74
At the same time, Adorno writes that the house search posed such a threat precisely because of
the historical context of National Socialism in which it took place:
If all that had happened was that two relatively harmless officials belonging to the
old police force had turned up on my doorstep, and if I had had no knowledge of
the complete change in the political system, my experience would have been quite
different from what it was. And, in the same way, no one can appreciate the
terrors of a totalitarian regime if he has not personally experienced that ominous
knock at the door and opened it to find the police waiting outside.75
Nothing that I experienced approached the level of threat or terror that confronted a Jew living
under National Socialism, or even a Sahrawi nationalist living in Moroccan-occupied territory.
But I reference Adorno because he draws upon personal experience to illustrate that the
immediacy of subjective experience is still mediated by historical context and, likewise, that
context is itself constituted by the immediacy of subjective experience. One of the tasks of this
dissertation is to unpack the dialectic between individual experience and historical context. In an
effort to understand the structures that mediate between the two – between the experience of the
knock on Lahcen’s door, and the circumstances that produced this knock – this anthropology of
decolonization is also, then, a history of the present.
While my direct interactions with Moroccan state surveillance proved to be significant in
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shaping my experience of “observed participation,” these moments were relatively few and far
between. Though they may have had the effect of amplifying suspicion and fear through the
occasional, punctuating event, the vast majority of my time spent in “observed participation” was
refracted through others. This includes the constant warnings mentioned above, which served as
a kind of fog machine for state surveillance, producing effects of this surveillance while at the
same time obscuring the “real” presence of the state by making it seem like the state was
everywhere, all of the time. Like the punctuating events of direct contact, the refracted
experience of state surveillance served to amplify its effects, ultimately producing a pervasive
suspicion to which I became more vulnerable the longer I stayed in Moroccan-occupied Western
Sahara. In what follows, I will provide some examples of the different figures through which this
suspicion is refracted.
Note B – Refracted Surveillance and Three Figures of the Moroccan Security State
Today, I am meeting Salih and an acquaintance of his at a café. The resumption of construction,
welding and auto repair activities, along with foot- and car-traffic filling the markets and streets,
has brought the stillness of the afternoon gayl, or nap, to a clattering end. By the time I arrive,
my friend and his acquaintance are sitting out front of a large, four-story building, known as
Agjijimat, which houses a couple of popular cafés on the outskirts of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Today
the weather is unusually serene: the blustery wind hasn’t kept its usual, late-afternoon
appointment, leaving the day’s heat to dissipate slowly as the sun goes down. This lends a more
relaxed feel to the daily welter of activity that emerges out of the afternoon prayer and
crescendos at sundown. On a clear, placid day like this, men fill café sidewalk seating across the
city. Here at Agjijimat, recorded music of a woman’s voice and electric guitar – with the
patented distortion that, to an outsider, gives the music of the Sahara, or azawan, its psychedelic
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sound – emanates from inside the building. We are far from the Moroccan-dominated lower city.
Across the wide avenue that heads east to Smara, older men dressed in light blue robes, or dra‘a,
gather in groups of 15 to 20, sitting on the ground outside of apartment buildings to play cards
and other games. At its eastern reaches where the expanse of the desert countryside appears
through gaps of undeveloped building lots and wide avenues, the urban landscape is
foreshortened. Here, where (and when) the city exhales, the setting would seem to be perfect for
chatting over tea.
The ambiance is so pleasant that Salih’s apology (he had planned to host us at his
family’s house, but relatives were visiting) barely registers. The man who has accompanied Salih
appears at ease in a way that I have come to recognize as the disposition of someone who has
nothing to hide from the authorities. No glancing around, no hunching over to speak: he has no
affiliations with, nor any leanings toward, Sahrawi independence. As soon as Salih finishes
introducing us, his acquaintance, who is at least twenty-five years older than either of us, wastes
no time in cutting to the chase. Pausing only to retrieve and light a narrow metal pipe from his
leather pouch, the older man begins narrating his experience working as a policeman under
Spanish colonialism, speaking eagerly about all of the history he has lived through, and how
happy he is to tell me all about it. The ease with which he begins sharing his personal history
catches me off-guard and, as if to regain my bearings so that he might start from the beginning
and go through his biography chronologically, I pose an innocuous question:
“When were you born, and where?” I ask.
“Sidi Ifni,” he says, “then I moved to Laâyoune/El Aaiún in 1961."
“Where did you live in Laâyoune/El Aaiún?"
“Hay al-Masira,” he says. “Or Khasriatou."
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Khasriatou? The Spanish name from colonial times for the neighborhood al-Massira? This is not
something I had heard of before. Gingerly, I reach for something to jot that down, pulling out a
rectangular, legal notebook. The gesture itself feels strange – typically, I would use a pocketsized pad for casual conversation in public space – but since we are far from the lower city, or
even the center of town (where the visible presence of state functionaries and members of the
Moroccan state security apparatus overdetermine what can be said), I overcome my hesitation.
Besides, after this man’s willingness to talk caught me by surprise, I am scrambling to keep up.
My notebook is out just long enough for me to jot down “Khasriatou” when I observe a
shift in Salih’s and his acquaintance’s demeanor: it comes over them like a shadow, suddenly
and in concert, as they lean back in their seats, eyes widening. The man stops talking, moving
with measured understatement as our collective attention shifts away from his narrative and
toward the notebook in my hands. There is no sudden start, no reflexive command to “put that
away,” but the looks on their faces indicate clearly enough that something going on behind me
altered the space. The bright white of my notepad now feels like it is screaming, so I put it away
and ask about Salih’s houseguests. The music goes on, but for us, the conversational ease of our
interaction has dissipated, and the late afternoon ambiance has been interrupted. We agree to
move somewhere else to do the interview, taking a taxi to my apartment.
***
The Moroccan state makes its presence felt in Laâyoune/El Aaiún in multiple ways. The
combined presence of the police and auxiliary forces make the politics of control visible
throughout the city: dark blue police vans, sheathed in protective grating and sometimes pockmarked from numerous past encounters with rock-throwing protesters, patrol the neighborhoods.
Auxiliary forces’ bulbous white vans sit parked at sensitive intersections, grouped by the half-
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dozen and ready for rapid deployment. These vans and the riot-helmeted security forces they
transport mark the most visible elements of a militarized state governing without consent. They
manifest the overbearing presence of the state in its struggle to establish its sovereignty and quell
dissent. Their purpose is to repress the visible manifestation of pro-independence protest, and
therefore their targets are fairly clear. Indeed, from the moment I arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún,
interlocutors told me to avoid certain types of people (human rights activists, known as
huquqiyyin), neighborhoods (Hay Mu‘atalla), and situations (organized protests).76 In this respect,
the conflict made certain lines very bright.
But state surveillance reached far beyond the sites of regular political protest and specific
hubs of activism. This became clear to me one day as I was walking on a busy commercial street
in the direction of Avenue Smara, the central artery bisecting the city’s eastward expansion.77 A
relatively high-profile protest had been planned that day, one coordinated by pro-independence
Sahrawi groups such as CODESA and ASVDH.78 After stopping at a bookstore, I walked to the
corner of Avenue Smara. Young women were walking in my direction, some looking back over
their shoulders toward a band of helmeted officers on the next block. From the confused air and
lingering crowd, it appeared as though I had reached a protest at mid-dispersal. I did not see any
batons raised, nor anyone on the ground, but some kind of confrontation had just taken place and,
in the aftermath, some people milled around, watching, while others were running. I turned off
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onto the first side street I could find, behind a supermarket, and checked my phone. When I
looked up, two plainclothes men were standing before me. I had not seen them arrive, but one of
them had his hand extended and was already introducing himself. He had a thick mustache.
Behind them was parked a late-model, black Citroën minivan. The mustachioed man began
peppering me with questions in formal Arabic: he said that the police had reported my
whereabouts, asked how I was doing, demanded to know where I was going, and what, exactly, I
was doing with my phone. I told them I was going to shop at a supermarket, and that I had a
missed call. They told me to go inside the supermarket, already, and escorted me to its entrance.
These are the mukhabarat, members of Morocco’s bevy of intelligence agencies. They
may accompany police and soldiers to protests, in plainclothes, for the purposes of singling out
specific, known activists for arrest or beating. For reasons evident from the experience above, I
rarely witnessed protests first-hand unless they took place directly outside my apartment.
However, Sahrawi activist media teams such as Equipe Media and others often record protests
from the rooftop of a building or an apartment window, and their videos frequently show
plainclothes officers at the frontlines of protest interventions.79 Their presence carries more
sinister implications since, unlike the police and soldiers who simply use force to repress and
arrest protesters, the mukhabarat are responsible for interrogating and torturing activists arrested
for their political activities. As one Sahrawi activist whom I met in the Moroccan capital of
Rabat told me, anytime he went to certain city government offices to take care of an
administrative issue for his family, he would recognize the men who had tortured him from a
previous arrest.80 Thus, the mukhabarat occupy a position within the coercive state apparatus
that, though ostensibly unmarked, remains only partially concealed.
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The sheer size and intensity of the intelligence-gathering state apparatus manifests itself
in peculiar ways, as well. One day, while chatting with a friend at a neighborhood café, a black
Citroën minivan pulled out of a side street across from us. The minivan had been parked at a
neighborhood branch for the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), the ruling party at the
national level of Moroccan politics since 2011.81 Shortly thereafter, the Citroën minivan returned,
accompanied by a black Mercedes, and swept by the party offices again where a meeting was
being held. My friend interrupted our conversation and shook his head, unable to overlook the
banality and absurdity of what we had just witnessed. In keeping tabs on a local meeting of the
national ruling party, the intelligence officers, as agents of the state, were spying on the state.82
***
At Agjijimat, sitting with my back to the café, I could not see what Salih and his
acquaintance had seen. But their looks captured, and reflected, the emergence or manifestation of
yet another, still more submerged layer of Moroccan state surveillance, one that was constantly
referenced but rarely defined. Unlike the ever-present police and soldiers, and my encounters
with the shadowy mukhabarat, I had only experienced this least visible layer of surveillance
refracted through my interlocutors’ warnings, suggestions, and advice. But when Salih turns to
the older man and says something about bergag83 (pl. braguig; the word comes from Moroccan
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Colloquial Arabic, or darija), I realize that a particularly embedded and diffuse, yet
technologically rudimentary, form of this surveillance emerged before their very eyes in the
moment when I pulled out my notebook. Neither police nor necessarily mukhabarat, the state
uses (and, perhaps, pays) braguig to inform on people to the state.
The bergag could be a neighbor, a teacher, a café server, a Sahrawi, a dakhili84 – they
could have been any one of the customers drinking tea or coffee in front of the Agjijimat
building. I constantly received warnings about braguig, and while I could infer from certain
interactions that specific small shop owners, café servers – or even interlocutors – were likely
serving as government informants, their embeddedness in the social fabric of the city itself made
it difficult to confirm their presence with any certainty. For that same reason, they were always
on the mind. Months earlier, when I was still beginning fieldwork, a friend lingered with me in
the street not far from my apartment, pointing up and down the block. Warning me about the
perils of conducting research in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in
general, he suggested ominously that, on this block, alone, at least 15 people were under the
employ of the state. These were the braguig whom Salih and his acquaintance saw emerge
outside the Agjijimat café one late afternoon in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. And in that moment of
emergence, refracted through their reactions, I felt as though the mutually imbricated relationship
between “state” and “society” in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, and its diffuse effects in producing
suspicion, manifested itself most fully.
***
This pervasive sense of suspicion sometimes meant that my interlocutors were speaking to an
audience that was at once invisible and immediately present. On one occasion, after a
Moroccan equivalent, someone told me, is “land of 6 million bergag.” (Mauritania, meanwhile, is the “land of 1.5
million poets.”)
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conversation in his taxi, a driver invited me to call and meet up at a later date. After several
weeks passed, we met at a café on Avenue Mekka, which had been known as Avenida Galicia
before Spanish withdrawal and now sits at the heart of the city’s more upscale commercial
district. While not as overwhelmingly Moroccan as the military and police neighborhoods in the
lower city, this part of Laâyoune/El Aaiún attracts a mixed crowd at night with the well-lit streets
and shiny cafés. In our first encounter in the cab, the driver had proffered the kind of impromptu
historical narrative – of the Sahara having been colonized not once, but twice (first by Spain,
then by Morocco), the second time being much worse than the first – that became a hallmark of
entering alone into a cab with a Sahrawi driver. This time, however, as we entered the public
space downtown, the taxi driver opened our conversation by asking me about my religion and
extolling the virtues of Islam. For the next hour and a half, he spoke to me about the sunna and
Qur’an in an almost unbroken monologue, continuing even after we left the café and reached the
outer neighborhoods where we both lived. It wasn’t until sometime later that I realized that his
monopolization of discourse and his choice of topic was related as much to his discomfort with
the surroundings as to his interest in proselytizing (which was not unusual as far as a topic of
conversation, but usually was brought up by people whom I had only just met). In this way, the
Moroccan state’s far-reaching surveillance and the pervasive sense of suspicion that it produced
created a general, impersonal third party to many conversations, and shaped what people did, and
did not talk about, in substantial ways.
Widespread suspicion, and tight surveillance, had broad ramifications for carrying out
fieldwork in what I have been calling, in borrowing a phrase from Ilana Feldman, a “security
society.” On one level, I was constantly preoccupied with the ethical concern about exposing
someone I had met to retaliation by the state. On another level, I was worried that the creeping
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fear which resulted from regularly hearing about the state surveillance would make me shy away
from connecting with pro-independence Sahrawi activists. If I too closely followed the advice to
steer clear of those bright lines demarcating people and places which the Moroccan state
considered particularly sensitive (human rights activists, Hay Mu‘atalla, organized protest), then
I risked letting the machinery of the state influence my research.
But in a context as politicized as Laâyoune/El Aaiún, where different sets of names and
vocabulary had to be used with different interlocutors, I was concerned with more than just
access. I realized with time that, through sheer overexposure, I actually risked internalizing one
propaganda discourse over another: there was no neutral space. Over time, it became surprisingly
and dangerously easy to conflate the Moroccan view that the “separatists” (“al-infissaliyyin,” or
pro-independence Sahrawis) posed a “nuisance” (resistance) as if they – and not the state –
necessitated the constant surveillance, and that therefore the “separatists” – and not the state –
were the cause of the fear, instability, and suspicion that permeated my experience of
Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In this sense, the activity of fieldwork research felt as though it were
working not only against the interference of the state security apparatus, but against the felt
weight of sovereignty, that authority which, in Carl Schmitt’s words “turns a part of the earth’s
surface into the force-field of a particular order.”85 Schmitt’s nomos is a force of both order and
orientation, naming the enemy and shaping politics not just as a struggle between factions and
institutions but through, in Jacques Rancière’s terms, “the distribution of the sensible,” through
which “[p]olitics revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the
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ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of space and the possibilities of
time.”86
This posed a number of methodological challenges, which, as I have outlined in this
section, were both logistical and, in Rancière’s terms, sensible. On one occasion, for example, a
friend arranged for us to conduct an interview with a pro-independence activist in what
amounted to a kind of “safe house” about ten minutes outside the city; another time, I climbed
into someone’s car thinking that I was going to a standard interview, only to find that we wove in
and out of side streets as the other passengers looked out the back to see if we were being tailed
by state intelligence. Aside from the difficulties and anxieties that attended the logistics of
arranging interviews, the ever-present awareness of surveillance had various effects on what
could be said. On the one hand, it was not uncommon to encounter someone and be spoken to on
a quasi-diplomatic register. In these instances, people were reciting political scripts to counteract
an enemy discourse. This diplomatic register reflects the degree to which the conflict, as a
struggle over sovereignty, has long been imbricated in the politics of international recognition.
Indeed, despite its political isolation under Morocco’s media blackout, and its relative obscurity
beyond regional, North African politics, the pivotal role of the international community in
resolving the conflict dates back to the 1950s, when the question was first put before the United
Nations’ Committee on Decolonization.87
The absent presence of a third party – whether the fear of Moroccan surveillance, or the
appeal to international attention – shapes what can and cannot be said in Laâyoune/El Aaiún,
much the way that a shadowy force known as the “Breach” upholds the overlapping
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sovereignties in Miéville’s The City & the City. Together with the contemporary conditions of
intensive policing and surveillance, everyday life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún is structured by the
binary field of national conflict, and is shot through with suspicion. This suspicion continues to
shape the construction of Sahrawi political subjectivity in important ways, with the opposition of
Moroccan to Sahrawi, and of political loyalty to opportunism. The longstanding struggle over
sovereignty that has marked decolonization in the Sahara continues to shape both everyday life
in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, as well constructions of the past. With the polarization of national conflict
structuring everyday life in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara today, the evocation of different
historical narratives and memories capture the ways in which this past is structured by the binary
oppositions of the present.

Section II – Suspicion, Contestation and Historical Memory: El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid and
Agdim Izik
The longstanding struggle over sovereignty that has marked decolonization in the Sahara
has shaped both the built environment of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, as well as constructions of the
past. With the polarization of national conflict structuring everyday life in Moroccan-occupied
Western Sahara today, the evocation of different historical narratives and memories capture the
ways in which this past is structured by the binary oppositions of the present. Two examples, in
particular, illustrate how this pervasive surveillance/suspicion produces competing narratives
about past events and figures. The first involves El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid. El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid
occupies a singular place in popular and official narratives as a founder, leader and martyr of
Sahrawi nationalism. Because of drought and the political instability wrought by the Liberation
Army of Morocco, Sayid’s father, like many Sahrawis, settled in Tan Tan, in the Wed Nun
region, in the late-1950s. El-Ouali was among the first generation of Sahrawis schooled in
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southern Morocco. El-Ouali then matriculated at Mohamed V University in Rabat and became
involved in leftist student politics in the late-1960s. Affected by the experience of his father’s
generation, many of whom were disillusioned by their experience with the 1950s Liberation
Army of Morocco, and by news of the 1970 Intifadat al-Zemla in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, El-Ouali
was at the center of a growing conversation among Sahrawis living in Rabat who were
concerned about the political future of Spanish Sahara. El-Ouali is said to have consulted broadly
with leaders of Moroccan political parties in the 1970s, while also participating in the student
branch of UMT (L’union marocaine du travail), the labor union affiliated with the socialist
Moroccan party, USFP. El-Ouali also helped to write a polemical piece in the publication Anfas,
linked to the radical leftist group, Ila al-Amam, which declared “A New Palestine in the Land of
the Sahara.”88
In May 1972, El-Ouali and a group of fellow Sahrawi students in Rabat organized a street
protest during the yearly festival, or moussem, in Tan Tan. In what is popularly seen as a
formative moment in what was to become Polisario, local Moroccan authorities imprisoned the
students, who, eschewing direct engagement with the Moroccan state, subsequently moved to
northern Mauritania and began organizing Sahrawis living outside of Spanish Sahara, while also
establishing international contact with figures such as Mu‘ammar al-Qaddafi. Learning from the
nascent movement which had been destroyed after Intifadat al-Zemla, the goal was to organize
working cells across the Sahara into a decentralized national liberation front. The students were
remarkably successful, putting Spain on the defensive with insurgent attacks on military outposts
beginning in 1973, and organizing pro-independence rallies in front of UN delegations visiting in
the spring of 1975 (Chapter 4). When Morocco and Mauritania jointly annexed the territory later
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that year, Polisario shepherded large numbers of Sahrawis fleeing the conflict to take refuge in
camps near Tindouf, Algeria, and later captured more during their attacks on their new
adversaries.
As a leader of the movement during this critical, formative phase, El-Ouali Mustafa
Sayid remains a uniquely outsized figure in the history of the region. He remains revered as a
charismatic leader, a hero and a martyr. Not unlike Che Guevara in Latin American leftist
movements, the face of El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid has become emblematic of Sahrawi liberation
and, besides perhaps the flag itself, remains the preeminent symbol of Sahrawi selfdetermination. For that very reason, narratives about his life are mediated by the politicized
situation in the region at present. For many Sahrawis, whether they support Polisario, Sahrawi
nationalism, or not, El-Ouali represents the irrepressible spirit of freedom which the Moroccan
state cannot eradicate.89 The story which most reflects this dynamic, and which is almost always
told when El-Ouali’s name comes up, whether in a formal or informal setting, concerns his
achievements in higher education. While studying at Mohamed V University in Rabat, the story
goes, El-Ouali achieved the highest score ever on a math exam, earning the honor of having his
name engraved on a wall at the university, which has since been erased. This story reveals
several tensions in the relationship between the Moroccan state and the people of the Sahara.
Whereas the Moroccan government frequently tries to undermine any autonomous Sahrawi
identity by pointing out that even the leaders of Sahrawi nationalism were products of the
Moroccan education system, this story inverts such a narrative to suggest that El-Ouali was,
instead, disavowed by Morocco even though he proved more than capable of excelling in
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postcolonial society. Besides emphasizing the singular intellectual genius of their nationalist
leader, the story foregrounds the erasure of Sahrawis, despite their ability to contribute as
modern citizens on par with other Moroccans. This disrespect references a central point of
tension between bidani people of the Sahara, and their neighbors, the chleuh, to the north.90 A
couplet from one of Polisario’s rhymes, which circulated in the 1970s and served to mobilize
people across the region to rally to their cause, references this sense of being looked down upon
by the Moroccans:
We climbed the mountain to the summit
To expose those who call us sheep herders
The reference to El-Ouali’s legendary achievement at university similarly emphasizes the
organic intellectual capacity of the Sahrawis, and their ability to surprise anyone who
underestimates them.
Texts about El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid remain heavily censored; an activist I met in
Laâyoune/El Aaiún mentioned that authorities confiscated a book about El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid
from him after finding a copy while he was riding a bus back to Laâyoune/El Aaiún from
college. For this reason, I eagerly took up a friend’s offer to procure a text about El-Ouali as we
were driving through Goulmime in the Wed Nun region of southern Morocco. As it turned out, a
copy of the text, a memoire of sorts by the Libyan political operative Mohamed Said Qashshat
about his time spent fomenting revolution in Mauritania and Western Sahara in the early 1970s,
was delivered like sensitive contraband. We pulled over on the highway in Goulmime just long
enough for my traveling companion’s friend, a former classmate from college, to pull up on his
motorbike and hand the photocopied text over. The fellow on the motorbike barely lingered long
enough for a greeting, and we promptly buried the text in the car trunk, beneath the rest of our
90
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luggage.
Respect for El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid within the Sahrawi community is unparalleled.
Perhaps uniquely, he transcends deep tribal divisions that have historically riven the community,
and which the Moroccan state relentlessly tries to exploit.91 A member of the most populous tribe
in the region, the Reguibat, El-Ouali led a number of successful military campaigns, first against
Spain, then against Morocco and Mauritania following Spanish withdrawal in 1975. During this
time, El-Ouali was also traveling between Libya, Algeria, Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle
East in an attempt to garner material and diplomatic support for Polisario. Though initially close
to Mu‘ammar al-Qaddafi, Polisario developed particularly close institutional ties to Algeria,
which has permitted Polisario’s state-in-exile to operate from refugee camps on its territory. ElOuali was the point person in all of Polisario’s diplomatic missions. And yet he insisted on
leading attacks at the front lines of battle, as well. As Polisario fought a war on two fronts against
both Morocco and Mauritania during the period between 1976 and 1980, it made the strategic
decision to focus its attacks on “the weakest link,” Mauritania, which increasingly relied on
French air force support. Between 1976 and 1979 Polisario carried out direct incursions into
Mauritanian territory, the most audacious of which involved an attack on the Mauritanian capital
of Nouakchott. During this raid in July 1977, El-Ouali was killed by air strikes.
During this same period, however, the leadership of the Polisario movement underwent
significant turmoil. The composition of the political bureau went through multiple changes, with
dissenters imprisoned or, occasionally, executed. Facing extremely difficult conditions on the
military front, Polisario became increasingly reliant on, and tied to, Algerian support and certain
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changes during this time are attributed to Polisario leadership having “sold” the national cause to
Algeria. It was during this period of turmoil that El-Ouali was killed during a Land Rover-led
attempt to strike Nouakchott. Whether due to the recklessness which led to his death, or the
persistent obscurity surrounding his remains (the Mauritanian government has never identified or
handed over El-Ouali’s body), a story persists which suggests that El-Ouali was “sacrificed” by
members of Polisario leadership precisely because he would not submit to Algerian command.
Like the story about El-Ouali’s academic achievements, the story about his death may be
apocryphal. Or, put another way, it may as well be apocryphal, since its persistence reflects a
political position more than anything. On the first count, no matter how much Morocco tries to
undermine his accomplishments, much less erase them, the spread of Sahrawi national
consciousness remains a social fact. Whether attributed to the work of a charismatic leader, or to
a cohort or generation, this achievement, like El-Ouali’s score on a university math exam, cannot
be erased. Or, as a man in the refugee camps in Algeria put it, “For better or worse, we put this
train on its tracks.” In this sense, El-Ouali serves as a transcendent figure for the Sahrawi people
in the face of Moroccan repression.
The second story, meanwhile, is somewhat more complicated. In this narrative, El Ouali
remains a transcendent figure of Sahrawi nationalism, but one sacrificed by the state-in-exile that
purports to represent his legacy. In this sense, the persistence of this story matters most to people
who dissent from both Morocco and Polisario, and therefore have little institutional purchase
within the political conflict. This may include Sahrawis in Moroccan-occupied territory, refugees
in Algeria who are disillusioned with Polisario leadership, Mauritanians of Sahrawi origin, and
Sahrawis living abroad in Europe. In particular, it includes a certain contingent of ‘a’idin, or
“returnees,” who joined Polisario only to suffer imprisonment or, in some cases, torture, during
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the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. Many ‘a’idin left after the ceasefire in 1991, but others
remained in the camps until recently. For them, the story of El-Ouali’s death is a repudiation of
Polisario leadership that, in continuing to revere El-Ouali, refuses to align itself with Moroccan
propaganda. Here, the conditions of suspicion and uncertainty that allow for alternative historical
narratives to persist also provide the space for political dissent.
***
This dynamic also plays out in relation to how much more recent events are remembered.
In the fall of 2010, a Sahrawi protest encampment in an area outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún,
known as Agdim Izik, grew into the thousands. After months of protest, Moroccan security
forces laid siege to the tent encampment, estimated to include 6000 tents and upwards of 10,000
Sahrawis.92 During the siege, carried out the morning of 8 November 2010, eleven members of
Moroccan security forces, as well as two civilians, were killed. Rather than seeking the
perpetrators, Morocco targeted activists involved in media teams, and brought them to trial. The
accused were tried before a military trial (since made unconstitutional), and the group of 25 (now
known as the Agdim Izik 21, given that one was sentenced in absentia, and three others have
been released) was given sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment.93
For many supporters of Sahrawi independence, the Agdim Izik protest represented a
precious breakthrough in popular efforts to make the Sahrawi nationalist cause and resistance to
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Moroccan oppression visible before an international audience. The largest protest to take place in
the occupied territories since the intifada of 2005, Agdim Izik represented a continuation,
escalation and renewal of popular Sahrawi resistance to Moroccan occupation. Whereas major
uprisings in 1999 and 2005 had involved protests of various kinds within the city, the Agdim Izik
protest took form as a tent settlement that expressed dissent by moving outside the city of
Laâyoune/El Aaiún. As such, it represented a rare instance where popular mobilization actually
outmaneuvered the Moroccan state, in this case by moving beyond the confines of the city. In
addition, the move to tents and the physical act of displacement resonated with longstanding
practices in the Sahara where simply leaving a settlement constituted a fundamental rejection of
authority.94 Although the violence precipitated by the Moroccan siege led to a measure of
international coverage, Noam Chomsky’s claim that Agdim Izig marked the real beginning of the
Arab Spring gave the most sought after kind of recognition to Sahrawi nationalism: a recognized
place in world history.95 Furthermore, Agdim Izik has continued to attract attention from
Amnesty International and other groups after Morocco conducted a military trial to convict
media activists for the deaths of several Moroccan soldiers who were killed during the siege.96
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In this manner, Agdim Izik has taken its place in a chain of events constituting the
national history of Sahrawi popular struggle, from Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970, to protests in 1999
and the Intifadat al-Istiqlal launched in 2005. Scenes from Agdim Izik, either featuring crowds
gathered in the tent city listening to speeches and waving SADR flags, or depicting its violent
dispersal, are constantly played on SADR television broadcast out of the refugee camps,
generally with reference to the “epic” [al-melhama] of Agdim Izik. Perhaps surprisingly, then,
there was also a counternarrative of this event that emphasized its origins as a protest started by
disillusioned, unemployed college graduates who sought jobs, with no other political aims. This
take on Agdim Izik suggested that security forces did not immediately close down the
encampment because of a lingering power struggle between Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s Wali, or
governor, and the longtime president of the regional council and member of a powerful family,
Hamdi Ould Rachid. What is more, this counternarrative suggests that Ould Rachid and other
members of the Sahrawi elite actively provisioned the encampment with water, gas and other
supplies as it grew. As the encampment developed, one member of the camp’s original
coordination committee told me that they developed careful rules governing the behavior for
those living in the camps, which included banning the raising of a SADR flag, knowing that such
an act would give pretext to the Moroccan state to intervene. In this telling, it was an informant
for the Moroccan state who first raised a SADR flag, sparking what turned into days, if not
weeks, of political protest.
It should come as no surprise that, in a place at the center of an ongoing political dispute,
there would be competing narratives of the past. But what is striking about the counternarrative
concerning Agdim Izik is how the epistemological basis of political commitment can be inverted
by a hermeneutics of suspicion. Any visible political act may be attributable to the work of an
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/01/morocco-tainted-trial-sahrawi-civilians
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informant, or an agent. Any outward expression of support for a cause may be interpreted as an
opportunistic act to ingratiate oneself with the machinery and political economy of the conflict.
Yet, similarly, the version of Agdim Izik protest that garnered international attention, and which
focuses on the Sahrawi nationalist resistance to Moroccan repression, leaves no room to read
political action outside of the grammar of conflict. Like so much that takes place in Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, there is an endless, ongoing struggle over the very basis of reality: if pro-Sahrawi graffiti
appears on walls around the city, someone will claim that it is the work of Moroccan security
forces looking to create more work for itself. Some of these assertions are less plausible than
others, and appear more blatantly propagandistic. But with so much surveillance embedded in
everyday life, and with the pervasive sense of suspicion that arises, the relentless struggle in
shaping discourse over the unfolding past and present of political conflict, act like a blustery
wind that creates an ongoing sandstorm. This creates the conditions in which political claims to
truth are frequently destabilized and, as a result, ongoing efforts to produce and sustain political
legitimacy are constantly churning and muddying the surface of things.
***
In this next section, I suggest that Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s political geography and built
environment reflect the sedimentation of a prolonged struggle over political authority and
sovereignty, ushered in by the arrival of decolonization as a horizon of political possibility
beginning in the 1950s. As this history of decolonization has shifted from anticolonial struggle in
the 1950s, to Spanish withdrawal and Morocco-Polisario armed conflict in the 1970s, to new
arena of struggle following a ceasefire in the 1990s, the city of Laâyoune/El Aaiún has become
increasingly pivotal to the political dispute. This next section will examine how a history of
decolonization marked by three unresolved political projects is sedimented in the political
geography of the city itself.
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Sedimented histories: the political geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún
Near El Ayun, a shed in ruins caught my attention:
“That was a phosphate prospecting company,” an officer told me.
“Why is it abandoned?”
“I don’t know. Military matter.”
“But the soil certainly is quite rich, why isn’t it being exploited?”
“Military matter.”97
Laâyoune/El Aaiún is, and has long been, a heavily militarized place. The largest city in
the disputed territory of Western Sahara, the city has been at the heart of efforts to decolonize the
region dating back to the 1950s. In 1957, when the anticolonial Liberation Army of Morocco led
an uprising throughout Spanish Sahara,98 the Spanish colonial administration kept Laâyoune/El
Aaiún on lockdown, even as it temporarily retreated from the rest of the region.99 In 1970,
Spanish soldiers shot and killed between two and twelve Sahrawi protesters on a small rise
known as al-zemla,100 an event widely seen as marking – and, in its violence, amplifying – the
public emergence of Sahrawi nationalism.101 But the events of 1975 and 76 – Spanish
withdrawal, Sahrawi flight, and Moroccan annexation – are widely considered decisive in
shaping the history of conflict that has followed. Since that time, the broad outlines of the
conflict have remained largely in place: Morocco has effectively occupied the region since the
Green March and military invasion in 1975; a Sahrawi independence movement, represented
internationally by Polisario, has been based out of refugee camps in Algeria since 1976; and
many (but not all) Sahrawis living in Moroccan-occupied territory support Polisario, Sahrawi
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nationalism, or both. While the conflict between Morocco and Polisario has continued without
resolution for decades and remains ongoing, the locus of struggle has shifted several times: from
1975 until a UN-brokered ceasefire that took effect in 1991, the two parties were engaged in
armed struggle; from the ceasefire until 2005, the conflict was displaced onto UN-mediated
efforts to hold a referendum or, barring that, reach a peace settlement. And, since efforts to reach
a settlement or hold a referendum have been stalled, if not abandoned, the conflict has shifted
again, this time onto the moral-political terrain of human rights.102 Each shift in the terrain of
struggle has transformed Laâyoune/El Aaiún while magnifying its importance within the broader
landscape of conflict. At the same time, the city’s history is marked by the repeated use of
incentives and coercion to populate the city, and a mutually imbricated relationship between a
militarized “state” and a “society” of surveillance, which produces widespread suspicion.

Unfinished Political Project 1: Spanish colonialism, Moroccan contestation, 1956 to 1975
This shifting terrain of struggle, from Spanish colonialism, to Moroccan military
intervention, to the past two decades of sustained conflict within the framework of a ceasefire,
are etched in the three-part political geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. The city first took form as
a city after World War II, under Spanish colonial rule. Following the discovery of phosphate
deposits in 1947,103 Spain began building housing both for colonial workers, coming mostly
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from the nearby Canary Islands, as well as Sahrawi veterans who had fought with General
Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War.104 What is now known as Spanish Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, or the lower city, consisted primarily of military bases, governmental institutions, a
church and a cinema on one bank of the seasonal river, and a military post on the other.
Spaniards lived to the east of the church, and Sahrawis to the west, near a cemetery in a
neighborhood that became known as Barrio Cementario. The city in aggregate was little more
than a Spanish military garrison situated on the riverbanks of the Seguiet al-Hamra’. But the
formation of two markets in Spanish Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Souq Djaj and Souq Lmkhakh,
indicated that the emerging city was developing a foothold in regional commerce, and therefore
maintaining a tenuous presence in the lives of people otherwise inclined to avoid the city outside
of occasional trade, or as temporary refuge from conditions of scarcity in the desert. The name of
one of the 1950s-era markets is emblematic of this relationship: because the columns supporting
the market building reminded people of a camel’s leg bones, which contain juicy marrow [lmukh, pl., l-mkhakh], this market became known as Souq Lmkhakh.105 To the Sahrawis in the
1950s, the city existed, like the few, other settlements they frequented, 106 as a marketplace, and
the name Lmkhakh played ironically with the particularly unfamiliar form of this new concrete
market, and modern colonial city, rendering this new architectural form and built environment

Resources and the Western Sahara,” in The Western Sahara Conflict: The Role of Natural Resources in
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both more and less familiar.
Though a key moment in this region’s decolonization, events of the 1950s occupy an
ambivalent place in both Moroccan and Sahrawi national historical memories. A 15-foot high
monument that stands in the heart of current-day Laâyoune/El Aaiún exemplifies this
ambivalence. The monument’s inscription memorializes the Battle of Dcheira, perhaps the
greatest victory in the fleeting existence of the Moroccan Liberation Army, a late-1950s
Moroccan-Sahrawi effort to destabilize Spanish and French colonial rule in the Sahara. Rather
than holding a prominent place in the center of an open square, however, the monument sits
within a fenced-in, open-air café-restaurant complex. Surrounded by café chairs, a flat-screen
television, and a miniature fake water wheel, the stele is too austere to blend in with the diverting,
family-friendly décor, and too short to distinguish itself from the prosaic surroundings. As a
result, it sits markedly out of place and noticeably diminished by its surroundings. This is not by
accident: after the monument was built in 1981, the open space at one of the busiest round points
in Laâyoune/El Aaiún was leased indefinitely for a nominal price to the Ould Rachid family, one
of the most prominent Sahrawi families to have benefited from its collaboration with Moroccan
rule, who developed the plaza into the café/restaurant/amusement space that it is today.107
The purposeful marginalization of this monument is fitting, however, given the
ambiguous place that this battle, and the brief anticolonial insurgency of which it was a part,
occupies in both Moroccan and Sahrawi national history. Post-World War II decolonization
began to shape the horizon of political futures in the Sahara as elsewhere, but as will be
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discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, the region’s status as a colonial hinterland meant that
well into the 1950s and even 1960s, neither colonial nor national formations defined Sahrawis
relations to political authority.108 It was in this context that an armed contingent from newlyindependent Morocco sought to mobilize Sahrawis to overthrow Spanish colonialism. The
movement may have reached its most successful moment in 1957 at the Battle of Dcheira when
Sahrawi and Moroccan armed groups inflicted significant casualties on Spanish soldiers and
caused Spain to withdraw from the entire territory, save for a few coastal enclaves. Soon after,
however, France and Spain routed the forces through a coordinated counterinsurgency involving
both ground forces and airstrikes.
At the same time, the Liberation Army was undermined by disputes both within the
leadership, which was largely Moroccan, and between Moroccans and Sahrawis. Some of this
may have even been orchestrated by the Moroccan state itself.109 Today, however, the Moroccan
state promotes the history of the Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) – with certain omissions –
through ceremonies, conferences, and publications under the auspices of its High Commission on
the Liberation Army and Former Members of the Resistance. And yet, the underlying discomfort
with this historical recognition is two-fold: for Sahrawi nationalists, the MLA serves as both an
uncomfortable reminder of the Moroccan Sultan’s capacity to mobilize Sahrawis through his
religious and political authority, as well as a precursor to Morocco’s later, successful annexation
of the territory in the 1970s. For Moroccans, meanwhile, the MLA’s tribulations point to the
Moroccan state’s inability to maintain Sahrawi acceptance of Moroccan authority, represented by
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the number of Sahrawi resistance fighters who defected from the Army to join (or, as was often
the case, rejoin) French or Spanish colonial armies. Reasons for the MLA’s disintegration are
contested and will be discussed in Chapter 3, but the diminished stature of the monument to the
Battle of Dcheira speaks to the ambiguous place of 1950s decolonization in the historical
memory of the region, and how this contested history remains sedimented in the contemporary
political geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún.
After defeating the MLA in 1958, which required a joint counterinsurgency effort with
France, Spain redoubled its investment in what it newly considered a colony of some
consequence, thanks to the discovery of phosphates. Throughout the 1960s, Spain policed the
border with Morocco tightly, and warned its Saharan subjects against Moroccan designs to
exploit the region’s mineral wealth.110 As older residents recall, the city gradually climbed the
southern bank of the river, as more housing was built for Spanish colonists and as Spain
encouraged Sahrawis in the badiya to resettle in the city:
BM: There are those (who came to Laâyoune/El Aaiún) because of drought
conditions, and there are those (who settled) because of the conditions of –
[because] the Spanish administration/government would bring people from the
badiya to populate the city. And they would…give them flour and oil and sugar
from month to month, gratuitement, for free.
Me: Is that what happened to your family - did the Spanish policy attract them to
settle in Laâyoune?
BM: Yes, on account of the help that the state was providing, people who were
living in the badiya, when the drought conditions would come, or (when) the
livestock didn’t produce enough food, or something like that, they’d bring them to
the city so that they’d get the help. That help attracted people to come live in the
city.
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They lived in tin-roof huts, then later the state demolished those - they
demolished the metal/tin (huts) - and gave them a place to live.
Me: Like qubibat-111
BM: Like the qubibat, like Colomina, up above, like Hay al-Matar, like the other
Colomina neighborhood, and like Hay Lahouhum. All of those rose up from the
city, from here. They were in tents, and tin huts, then they demolished the huts,
and replaced them with, or gave them houses. They gave them places to live. That
was how the old El Aaiún was.
With the operationalization of the phosphate mine, the “old El Aaiún” was transformed by an
influx of Spanish workers and Sahrawi city-dwellers, and what had been a simple military post
developed by 1974 into “a real town, with a population of over 40,000, one-third Spanish.”112 As
more worker housing was built, the city climbed above the south riverbank of Saguiet al-Hamra
onto the flat expanse above, taking form in the neighborhoods of Colomina Vieja, Colominat alHamra’, Hay al-Matar, Hay Lahouhum, and what would later become known as Colomina Tirdis.
At this time, however, the city remained for most Sahrawis a temporary resting point. The focal
point for most homes remained the exterior, walled-in area, where sheep and goats were kept.
Souq Lmkhakh and the emergence of Laâyoune/El Aaiún through the process described
by BM is characteristic of a regional phenomenon during the 1950s and 60s during which time
both colonial governments and newly decolonized states sought to settle the people of the Sahara,
and fix their political subjectivity. As French concerns developed iron mining in northern
Mauritania in the 1950s, Sahrawis were drawn to Zouérate, F’dérik and Nouadhibou to work on
building the railroad and other infrastructural projects.113 Newly independent Morocco sought to
settle Sahrawis in Goulmime, Tan Tan, Zaaq and Tarfaya, across its southernmost region, known
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as Wed Nun. Meanwhile, French Algeria promoted the old trans-regional market of Tindouf for
settlement, a policy that independent Algeria continued through the 1960s.114

Unfinished Political Project 2: Moroccan occupation, Sahrawi armed national liberation
struggle, 1975-1991
And then, suddenly, the transition from Spanish colonialism to Moroccan occupation
transformed the city’s population and built environment again. The abrupt nature of Spain’s
withdrawal is memorialized both by stories such as that which was recounted to me in Batimat
one evening, and in the nomenclature of some of the city’s older neighborhoods. One of the
oldest residential neighborhoods, down by the riverbed near Souq Djaj and Souq Lmkhakh,
remains known as Catalonia. One of the first neighborhoods to be built up on the riverbank, in
the 1960s, took its name from the Spanish company responsible for the new housing, Colomina.
After 1975, this neighborhood became known as Colominat Tirdis. The command tirdis, which
means “kick” in Hassaniya Arabic, recalls the collective effort among Sahrawis to “kick down”
the doors of houses abandoned by Spanish colonists. Similarly, another neighborhood remains
known as Diridik (“put your hands [here]”), referring to the way Sahrawis pushed their way into
houses abandoned by Spanish colonists. Less marked, but nonetheless remembered in private by
Sahrawis both in the refugee camps and in Moroccan-occupied territory today, are the properties
abandoned by fleeing Sahrawis that have subsequently been expropriated by Moroccan settlers.
The demographics of the neighborhoods in the lower city today are overwhelmingly
Moroccan, in part because of the density of government offices, military barracks, and security
facilities such as the notorious jails Habs Lkhal (“the black prison”) and PCCM. As Spanish
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Laâyoune/El Aaiún was transformed into a nexus for the Moroccan military state, the
commercial and demographic center of the city moved up onto the expansive plateau running
above the Saguiet al-Hamras south bank. Even as the war between Morocco and Polisario
confined residents to the city limits and sometimes threatened supply lines to Morocco’s interior,
the Moroccan state sought to place its imprint on the city’s built environment. One of its first
moves was to construct a kind of Palais de Ville facing onto a vast open, paved, oval plaza at the
western end of the city. In doing so, the Moroccan state razed most of Colominat al-Hamra’, a
neighborhood built during Spanish rule. The residents from this neighborhood were moved into a
new housing development on the other side of town, at what was then the eastern edge of the
city. The site of this new neighborhood, which took its name from the project developer,
Mu‘atalla, happened to be near the site of the Spanish colonial government’s 1970 massacre of
Sahrawi protestors, memorialized as Intifadat al-Zemla among Sahrawis as the moment when
Sahrawi national consciousness was forged.
The combination of a community of Sahrawis displaced by a new occupier, and the new
neighborhood’s politically resonant location, has made Mu‘atalla an enduring center of Sahrawi
nationalism and resistance to Moroccan occupation. Today, the political temperature of the city
on any given day can be measured by the number of Auxiliary Forces vans [Quwwat alMusa‘da] lining the street at al-zemla, now an intersection across from Mu‘atalla: the greater the
number, the more likely that a demonstration has been planned. When I first arrived in
Laâyoune/El Aaiún to do research, I was repeatedly warned to avoid this neighborhood if I
wanted to remain in the Moroccan state’s good graces. This neighborhood’s committed
resistance to Moroccan rule has posed such a challenge that subsequent development efforts have
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focused on creating neighborhoods with a mixed composition of Sahrawis and Moroccans.115

Source: Agence urbaine de Laâyoune.
Unfinished Political Project 3: Morocco-Polisario conflict after the ceasefire: 1991 to today
Despite the radical changes of 1975, Moroccan Laâyoune/El Aaiún did not fully take
shape until after the ceasefire of 1991. On the heels of the ceasefire, it was believed that a
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referendum on self-determination would be held in a matter of months. As Morocco and
Polisario staked out conflicting positions over the criteria for establishing a voter list for the
referendum, defining the determining self in self-determination became the new terrain of
political struggle, and the referendum preparation process dragged on.116 Taking advantage of
these delays, Morocco encouraged settlement and invested heavily in urban development across
the region. Cities throughout Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, including Laâyoune/El Aaiún,
Boujdour, Dakhla and Smara, practically doubled in size as contingents of poor residents from
the outskirts of Marrakesh, Rabat and other Moroccan cities were brought to the region, given
housing and, in some cases, trained to adopt a Saharan background in a Moroccan state-led effort
to enroll them in the voter lists for the referendum.117 Other settlers came by less formal means,
looking to capitalize on the demographic growth in the region through small-time commercial
establishments. This gave rise to the third phase of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s development, as the city
rapidly expanded south and east.
As the demographic weight and geographical center of the city shifted, new markets, now
furnished with produce and second-hand goods trucked south from Morocco’s southern
distribution hub of Agadir-Inezgane, replaced the old Souq Lmkhakh as the city’s commercial
center. New neighborhoods settled largely by Moroccans who arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún
116
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during the 1990s seeking economic opportunity grew quickly and chaotically, outpacing urban
infrastructure despite the Moroccan state’s heavy investment in the region. The names of shops
lining Tan Tan Avenue, the main avenue in a popular quarter developed during this period,
reflect the range of locations from “inside” Morocco from which small merchants have
relocated: Casablanca Butcher, El Jadida Furniture/Upholstery, Agadir Barbershop, Tata
Provisions, Café Ouezzane. The sustained influx of dakhilis, (or “insiders,” meaning those
coming from “inside” Morocco) – arriving first as part of the relocation of prospective
referendum voters in the 1990s, and then continuing throughout the 2000s as the region attracted
laborers and merchants – reshaped the region’s population. This gave rise to demographically
mixed, densely settled neighborhoods of three and sometimes four-story houses and apartment
buildings. The development of a large block of land known as Laâyoune/El Aaiún Thulathi is
representative of the city’s helter-skelter growth during this time. Because of its size, lack of
electricity and reputation for high rates of crime, Laâyoune/El Aaiún Thulathi became popularly
known as “Texas.” One of the first, mixed neighborhoods of Sahrawis and dakhilis, Texas
epitomized the frontier-like qualities of the Sahara during this time: a representation of space as
unbounded opportunity in the minds of immigrating Moroccans, while also capturing the city as
a representational space of chaos and disorder for many Sahrawis.118 The name remains spraypainted on walls throughout the popular neighborhood today. At the same time, on the other side
of town, the emergence of a new Sahrawi elite that cooperated with and benefitted from
Moroccan rule became apparent in the built form of an architecturally distinct neighborhood
known as Hay Villat (from “villas”).
With the dramatic demographic changes and the sustained conflict, significant tensions
developed between dakhilis and Sahrawis. Not infrequently, the state has mobilized Moroccan
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settlers to attack Sahrawi homes or businesses. Some of the largest attacks have taken place in
retribution for large Sahrawi protests, including those that took place in 1999 in Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, and again in 2010 after the violent breakup of the Agdim Izik protest encampment,
described earlier in this chapter.119 On a more regular basis, if confrontations take place with the
police in a specific neighborhood, a select group of plainclothes thugs – perhaps civilian
“dakhilis,” or perhaps simply plainclothes policemen – are sometimes brought through late at
night to indiscriminately destroy property in order to turn small shop owners (whether Moroccan
or Sahrawi) against the protesters. This happened at least once on Tan Tan Avenue, where I
lived, which was frequently the site of rock-throwing confrontations between young men and
police and soldiers.
Meanwhile, another process was taking place in the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire,
with far-reaching repercussions for the city’s political geography and its emergence as the locus
for political struggle over the future of Western Sahara. Unlike in other cities across Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara, large numbers of those whom the state relocated to Laâyoune/El
Aaiún in the 1990s120 came from the nearby region of Wed Nun in southern Morocco. Unlike
dakhilis, these new arrivals were predominantly from Saharan tribes, including the Rguibat and
the tribes comprising the Tekna confederation. Many had settled in Wed Nun only in the 1950s,
and had relatives throughout the region including Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Polisariorun refugee camps in Algeria, and northern Mauritania. Benefiting from free basic goods such as
flour, sugar and oil, and with the promise of future free housing (which was ultimately provided
119
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during the 2000’s) these families coming from Wed Nun were placed in a vast tent city known as
the Tents of Unity (Khaymat al-Wahda),121 which, stretching east on the road to Smara,
effectively doubled the city’s footprint. A UN peacekeeping official touring Laâyoune/El Aaiún
in the early 1990s saw a sea of tents marked with symbols of the Moroccan royal family, and
noted that “this is not a spontaneous mass movement of people but appears an orchestrated
effort.”122 Or, as one woman who had been resettled in this manner matter-of-factly described it
one day from her home in Batimat, “The King brought us here and put us in tents” [jabna almalik wa khayyimna hun]. Exact figures are hard to come by since Morocco’s census figures
incorporate Laâyoune/El Aaiún and the surrounding area into administrative units that overlap
with Morocco proper but, by 2004,123 it is estimated that 75-80% of the population in Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara had come from outside the territory.124
The Khaymat al-Wahda contingent coming from neighboring Wed Nun have had a
particularly complicated effect on Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s political geography. Despite having been
resettled to the disputed territory with the expectation that they would vote for Morocco in the
proposed referendum, their various social ties to longtime and former residents of the Western
Sahara territory, including refugees in the camps, left their allegiance to the Moroccan cause very
much in the balance.125 For this same reason, however, the characterization of Western Sahara as
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a “settler-colony” is more complicated than it might initially seem.126 Because the political
allegiance of so-called “settlers” coming from Oued Noun could be somewhat fluid, their
political affiliations and sense of identification became the object of intense politicization
campaigns on the part of both Morocco and pro-Polisario groups operating in the territory during
the 1990s. Their arrival to Laâyoune/El Aaiún in the 1990s, and the promises of future housing
made as part of the bargain to bring them there, also effectively transformed the scale of the city
and its built environment. In the 2014 government-planning map below, the lower-right portion
of the shaded, square-shaped area (pink and orange in the color image) encompasses the areas of
the city developed since 1991. The promise to house the people of Khaymat al-Wahda after their
arrival in 1992 was the major catalyst for these developments.
The repetition of this phenomenon – of territorial mobility and confinement, of subjective
fluidity and fixity, and of the (first Spanish, then Moroccan) state’s preoccupation with and
indifference toward its subjects in this regard – is a defining characteristic of the social and
historical process of the decolonization of the Sahara. As this process became structured by the
conflict between Morocco and Polisario after 1975, the mobilization of people took on another
dimension: in a region characterized by its low population density, the attraction of people itself
to one national cause or another became an expression of political power related to mobility and
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mobilization. This was perhaps most successfully demonstrated by Polisario in the 1970s, when
a transportation network of Land Rovers shuttled people from across the region – Saguiet alHamra, Wedi Dhahhab, as well as Nouadhibou, Zouerate and F’derik across northern Mauritania,
and Tan Tan in southern Morocco – to live in the refugee camps. This operation succeeded
because of Polisario’s organizational ability to navigate the desert landscape, as well as its
popularity in mobilizing large numbers of people from around the region to join its cause. It
should be noted that Polisario was known for conducting raids and kidnapping people to bring
them to the camps during this time, as well.
Distinguishing these actions in terms of voluntary will, consent, or political commitment
cannot account for the ambiguities of political affiliation for a population that, even in the 1970s,
frequently sought to avoid affiliation with specific political authorities of any kind.127 I met one
man, for example, who described spending most of his life in the refugee camps after Polisario
captured him and his family during a raid of Tan Tan, when he was quite young. Raised in the
refugee camps in Algeria, he had only recently left the camps and resettled in Laâyoune/El Aaiún
because of a chronic medical condition. His entire family, including over ten children, remained
in the camps, as did his allegiance: multiple times during the brief period I spent in his company,
this man announced that, despite his diminished health, he remained ready “to die for my
[Sahrawi] nation.”128 By contrast, another man who grew up in the southern Moroccan Wed Nun
region reported leaving his family as a teenager in the 1970s to find work in Nouakchott, the
capital of Mauritania. While working in Nouakchott as a mechanic, Polisario supporters
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kidnapped him and took him to the camps. Sought-after for his mechanic skills, this man claims
that he was eventually imprisoned for refusing orders after witnessing the point-blank execution
of dissenters in the refugee camps. Spending several years imprisoned and then a number more
under surveillance, this man left the camps and came to Morocco among the first wave of
“returnees” (‘a’idin) following the ceasefire in 1991.
Both men now live in the newer, eastern neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún
surrounding Agjijimat – places like Douirat, Hay al-‘Awda, Hay al-Wifaq, Hay 23 Mars and Hay
al-Raha – which developed as Morocco distributed houses and plots of land to new arrivals
throughout the 2000s. The first of these developments sprang up to house those living in the tents
of Khaymat al-Wahda who had moved from Wed Nun in the 1990s. A second wave of growth
came about in 2007, when Morocco, seeking to push a plan which would create a Sahara
Autonomous Region under Moroccan sovereignty in lieu of a vote on self-determination,129
sought to attract “returnees” from the camps with promises of a plot of land and a monthly
welfare stipend of 2000 dirhams (roughly equivalent to 200 euros a month). While people
leaving the camps moved to Morocco for a wide variety of reasons – some of them political,
others explicitly not – this initiative represented just the latest of a series attempts since the 1950s
to demonstrate sovereignty through the mobilized resettlement of people. Each of these waves of
controlled resettlement and displacement have shaped and reshaped the city of Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, with the history sedimented in the city’s political geography.

Section IV – Naming Histories and Sovereignties: the Nomoi of the City
The transformations and expansions of the city have been marked, at each stage, with a renewed
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or expanded military government, the mixed use of coercion and necessity to relocate and
displace populations, and an ongoing struggle over its sovereignty. While this continuous
struggle has produced a series of largely incomplete political projects, the afterlives of these
unsettled pasts remain etched in the city’s nomenclature. As I have alluded to throughout this
chapter, a toponomy of Laâyoune/El Aaiún requires as much attention to vernacular names as
official designations. There are place-names, such as Diridik (“put your hands [here]”),
Colomina Tirdis (“kick”), and Zemla (site of the 1970 intifada, or uprising), which index
moments in time, establishing historical perspective in relation to place. Their use in everyday
interactions adds a political dimension to the city’s geography. As decidedly unofficial names
that reference a period of Spanish colonialism which Morocco strenuously seeks to efface, they
convey an implicit knowledge and provide some kind of purchase, however narrow, on place and
space within a city that has undergone multiple transformations by repressive rule and population
resettlement.130 In aggregate, the use of both official and informal names that reference different
periods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s existence indexes a time and space of contested sovereignty – of
the right to name – that remains the productive force of urban space and the city’s defining
feature.
An entire subset of names capture the relationship between decolonization and efforts to
populate the city and control the movement of people. The neighborhood of Lahouhum, for
example, dates back to the period of Spanish colonialism. The name, which translates as “they
threw them,” refers to the distance of this neighborhood, at the time of its settlement, from the
rest of the city. Still a popular quarter that is now situated near the city’s geographic center, the
name indexes today the city’s rapid expansion. At the same time, the indifference implied in the
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name about the subjects who lived there speaks to a relation between people and political
authority in this region that has served as a recurring feature of the decolonization of the Sahara:
namely, the sovereign power to mobilize people and control subjects’ movements – by authority,
force, command, coercion, incentive or otherwise. Lahouhum captures this tension between the
government’s interest in fixing or confining subjects to the city, and its relative indifference in
where and how they live once there. Political projects to resettle and move people with relative
impunity characterize the Sahara’s decolonization more than the colonial period itself. Oral
histories concerning the settlement of Laâyoune/El Aaiún under Spain in the 1950s and 60s serve
as an early example, and the name Lahouhum might be thought of as a trace of this process
sedimented in the city’s popular nomenclature and political geography. The negative space
marking the location where thousands of tents sheltered the people from Khaymat al-Wahda
throughout the 1990s serves as another – and perhaps the largest – example of the city as the
spatial expression of the repeated efforts to fix, and abandon, the people of the Sahara as political
subjects of decolonization.
Like other incomplete political projects, these efforts have left their mark on the
nomenclature and built environment of Laâyoune/El Aaiún in a manner expressive of an
intertwined relationship between urbanization and coercion, political commitment and
ambivalence. Another, more recent, example, involving Agjijimat, captures the intertwined
relationship between legitimacy and scandal. Agjijimat is a village in Mauritania near the strip of
Western Sahara that remains unoccupied by Morocco, and which Polisario refers to as the
Liberated Territories.131 In December 2007, the Polisario Front held its 12th Congress in a nearby
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settlement within its Liberated Territories known as Tifariti. In response, Moroccan security
organized a counter-movement in Agjijimat, hoping to upstage the Polisario congress with the
televised spectacle of Sahrawis defecting en masse as an expression of support for Morocco’s
recently-announced autonomy plan. To implement this plan, Morocco’s chief collaborator in
Western Sahara, Khalihenna Ould Rachid,132 sought to employ Hamada Ould Derwich, a
Mauritanian politician from the Rguibat tribe (the most populous tribe of Western Sahara, in
general, and of the Sahrawi refugee camps, in particular). Ould Derwich sought to disrupt
Polisario’s planned congress by mobilizing a group of Sahrawi refugees to cross the border to
nearby Agjijimat. Moroccan television was going to be there to film what was supposed to be a
contingent of Sahrawis defecting from Polisario leadership. When Mauritanian authorities got
word and prevented the intervention from taking place, a group still appeared and was
transported across the Mauritanian border into Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, to be
received with great ceremony as the latest wave of “defectors” from Polisario. When this group
arrived and it was found that the contingent of “defectors” was almost entirely composed of
Mauritanian villagers, and not former members of Polisario or residents of the refugee camps,
the whole thing became a scandal. The Moroccan state housed them in a posh hotel at a beach
would be in Algeria and Mauritania. If the Moroccans wished to pursue the POLISARIO it would be politically
difficult to cross into these countries. Instead, they left a killing zone.” Chopra, United Nations Determination of the
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outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún for a month, until they were resettled in the standard, small,
single-story box-like houses granted to ‘a’idin who left the refugee camps for Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara during this period.133 These developments dot the eastern reaches of
the city and wherever they can be found the immediate surroundings are known as “Agjijimat,”
as in the case of the tall, four-story building that fronts Avenue Smara where I met Salih and his
acquaintance one afternoon.
How does a building in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, at the center of a dispute between Morocco
and Sahrawi nationalists, come to refer to a village in Mauritania? In the contemporary context
of political conflict and pervasive suspicion, the name, which in practice refers to multiple
locations around the city, references political scandal. In this sense, the name of Agjijimat, refers
to the spectacle involved in attempting to create political legitimacy through the mobilization,
displacement and re-settlement of people, more than a village in Mauritania. But since it was
also the site, on December 17, 1974, of one of the Polisario Front’s early attacks on Spanish
colonial outposts, Agjijimat also references a notable, if relatively obscure, event in the
formative stages of Polisario’s national liberation movement. In this way the name refers to two
events, in multiple locations, which are situated within different historical narratives of
competing political projects. Not unlike Texas and Lahouhum, then, Agjijimat indexes the
fragmented geography of the decolonized Sahara, more generally. In this sense, the city’s built
environment and nomenclature might be seen as the geographical sedimentation of a shifting,
historically repeating process, which has characterized the decolonization of the Sahara and
revolves around regional struggle over mobility and confinement. Taken together, many of the
names of contemporary Laâyoune/El Aaiún – Catalonia, Colomina Tirdis, Diridik, Lahouhum,
133

Sébastien Boulay, “Poétique et politique de la migration au Sahara occidental. Les «câ’idîn»: repentants,
migrants ou ralliés?,” in La migration prise aux mots: mise en récits et en images des migrations transafricaines, ed.
Cécile Canut and Catherine Mazauric (Paris: Le Cavalier Bleu, 2014), 97–98.

89

Texas, Khaymat al-Wahda, Agjijimat – make for a concatenation of terms that together reflect
the tensions of decolonization in the Sahara: a place of displacement, of fixed mobility, of
mobile confinement, of deferred horizons, split allegiance, and contained insurrection.

Naming/Sovereignty – Field
The history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s formation is a history of the region’s decolonization.
That is to say, the history of Laâyoune/El Aaiún is one of multiple, unresolved political projects.
Not only does the nomenclature and built environment of the city reflect the sedimentation of
each of these political projects, but Laâyoune/El Aaiún’s formation and tremendous growth
reflects the importance of urban space as a vector through which attempts to establish
sovereignty in this region of the Sahara have been carried out. Many of the residents of
Laâyoune/El Aaiún live in the city thanks to these political projects which, through necessity and
coercion, have attempted to fix the location and political subjectivities of people living in the
region. And yet the ongoing contestation over sovereignty in Laâyoune/El Aaiún highlights
ongoing contradictions in the concept of postcolonial sovereignty that depends upon both control
of territory, and international legal recognition.
In asserting the primacy of sovereignty to rule of law, Carl Schmitt revisits the meaning
of nomos as a concept that articulates the founding act of political order. Nomos, Schmitt
suggests, “understood in its original spatial sense, is best suited to describe the fundamental
process involved in the relation between order and orientation.”134 Underpinning the relationship
between order and orientation, nomos organizes authority through land-appropriation.
Consequently, political order is spatially produced through the division and distribution of land.
At the same time, the act of land-appropriation constitutes, for Schmitt, a founding political act,
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and an act of legitimacy:
In its original sense…nomos is precisely the full immediacy of a legal power not
mediated by laws; it is a constitutive historical event – an act of legitimacy,
whereby the legality of a mere law first is made meaningful.135
Schmitt’s approach is important for understanding the illiberal context of decolonization in
Western Sahara, where sovereignty has been defined – first by Spain, and then later by Morocco
– largely by the power to occupy. The very act of occupation encloses and politicizes space
insofar as it subsumes that space into a political entity, or order. Or, as cited earlier in this
chapter, nomos, for Schmitt “turns a part of the earth’s surface into the force-field of a particular
order.” This, too, is important for recognizing that much of the language that coalesces around
the ongoing dispute over Western Sahara, including human rights and self-determination,
ethnicity and nationality, overlays a field of force structuring the political geography of the
Sahara constituted by a struggle to name and occupy – a struggle over nomos.
In foregrounding sovereignty as a de facto normative force, Schmitt’s concept of nomos
betrays a preoccupation with the unitary cohesiveness of any political order. Hence, Schmitt’s
focus on the primacy of territory, and with sovereignty itself as a norm that supersedes any other
political claim, legal or otherwise. This is where Schmitt’s concept of nomos reaches its limits in
the context of decolonization. As is known, the post-World War II decline of European colonial
empire brought with it the emergence of a multilateral world order, and the enshrinement of the
legal right to self-determination in the UN Charter. By the 1960s, numerous new nation-states
(though far from all) exercised this right, by then a cornerstone of the United Nations, as a means
of decolonization. Whereas a wave of decolonization took place in the 1950s and 60s, Western
Sahara remained a Spanish colony until 1975. While this temporal disjuncture requires further
examination and will remain a theme throughout this dissertation, the decolonization of Western
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Sahara became the object of competing sovereignties, in both a concrete and conceptual sense.
Concretely, various political forces have struggled to appropriate the territory of Western Sahara
for themselves. As discussed in the Introduction, Morocco’s occupation, based on claims of
historical ties, and Sahrawi claims for the right to self-determination, are based on different
modalities of sovereignty.136 That is, the Sahrawi right to self-determination is premised on
popular sovereignty granted by legal recognition, in contrast to nomos.
Schmitt is also useful here in that he points out the contradictions involved in
“bracketing” force in order to grant sovereignty through legal means: “It was not the abolition of
war, but rather its bracketing that has been the great, core problem of every legal order.”137 In
much of the world, this bracketing has been resolved in favor of legal recognition: this order of
international law underpins the sovereignty of many postcolonies and other small nation-states in
a post-World War II international order.138 Although decolonization formally disrupted a
colonial order premised on European imperialism, it did not replace that order with a unitary,
cohesive political field. Western Sahara exists, in this sense, as a remainder and a reminder of the
unresolved contradiction between nomos and international law, between sovereignty, and selfdetermination. Rather than an ordered nomos, Western Sahara represents a disaggregated
political space, or a space of competing sovereignties.
As I have tried to highlight by focusing on Laâyoune/El Aaiún in this chapter, the field is
structured in binary terms between Moroccan and Sahrawi political causes, which influence the
things that people can say, narratives about the past, and the spaces in which they can act. The
politics of the present polarizes everyday life through demands for the expression of loyalty to
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either Moroccan or Sahrawi nationalism. Scholarship on Western Sahara is structured similarly,
focusing on nationalism and nationalist conflict as the framework for understanding the region’s
past and present.139 This is in part due to political constraints from the conflict itself, which, until
recently, have severely limited the kinds of research that it has been possible to undertake in the
region. As described throughout this chapter, intense repression of Sahrawi nationalism has made
research on the topic in Morocco difficult, and foreign visitors to Moroccan-occupied Western
Sahara are regularly detained at the airport and refused entry, or otherwise expelled. The
Polisario-run refugee camps based in Algeria, by contrast, has over the past decade increasingly
sought to attract foreign delegations and other visitors, including researchers, in an effort to
promote their cause. This has led to a number of important studies, some of them the first of their
kind to document the vibrant social and political life of the Sahrawi refugee camps. This
literature counters, in an important way, Moroccan state politics, as well as the obfuscating work
performed by the discourse of security and terrorism, which overlooks the political organization
of the camps themselves.
In focusing on government, citizenship and nationalism within the refugee camps,
however, some scholarship on Western Sahara conflates the terms of nationalist conflict for the
“roots of conflict” itself.140 Much of this scholarship reproduces the political scripts that
interlocutors have at the ready for broadcasting their position to an international audience. Some
of this is due to methodological constraints: research in the Sahrawi refugee camps, though much
freer than the conditions in Moroccan-occupied territory, remains subject to the hegemony of
Sahrawi nationalism. In foregrounding the uniqueness of the camps, however – one study
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characterized them as a “controlled experiment,”141 another as a “space of autonomy”142 – these
approaches tend to represent the refugee camps as a discrete political unit and isolated
geopolitical space. In many respects, these studies contribute to the project of mapping the
national “geo-body.”143 The problem is methodological not simply because of who researchers
can and cannot speak to, but precisely because the conceptual approach naturalizes the nation as
the object of study. Writing of a similar situation in Israel-Palestine, the scholar Gil Hochberg
suggests that taking the terms of a conflict as it appears is to mistakenly conceptualize “the
political” in political conflict:
What does it mean to speak about a conflict in terms of how it appears or how we
come to see it? To begin with, it means that we do not take the conflict as our
point of departure (asking, for example, how it is represented in the media), but
that we rather explore the very making of the conflict – its contours and mappings
– by focusing on the distribution of the visual and asking, for example, what or
who can be seen, what or who remains invisible, who can see and whose vision is
compromised?144
Some of the earlier ethnographic research conducted in the Sahrawi refugee camps resembles
journalistic work, in that it begins and ends with the most visible phenomena of everyday life,
rather than asking, as Hochberg suggests, “what or who can be seen, what or who remains
invisible, who can see and whose vision is compromised?” By contrast, I suggest that despite this
intense politicization along national identities, the ever-present binary tensions of national
conflict that currently structure so much of Western Sahara ought to be conceptualized as a
concrete abstraction.
Unlike the unitary ordering of space that Schmitt conceptualizes with his notion of nomos,
Henri Lefebvre recognizes that a given political order contains a multitude of social spaces:
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We are confronted not by one social space but by many – indeed, by an unlimited
multiplicity or uncountable set of social spaces which we refer to generically as
‘social space.’…Considered in isolation, such spaces are mere abstractions. As
concrete abstractions, however, they attain ‘real’ existence by virtue of networks
and pathways, by virtue of bunches or clusters of relationships.145
Similarly, in Laâyoune/El Aaiún today, the normative political dispute which organizes and
mediates so much of social relations cannot fully obscure the fluidity and multiplicity of
identities in everyday life. Moreover, the conflict between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists is, I
suggest, a political formation that is neither a fiction, nor a truth. Though it structures and
organizes social relations and political authority in very real ways, as a conflict based on national
divisions, it remains a concrete abstraction as defined by Lefebvre in that it “is developed by
thought – just as it developed in time and space – until it reaches the level of social
practice…”146 While the binary between two national causes crystallizes and distills difference
into a politicized binary, as a concrete abstraction it remains a structure that never fully subsumes
the multiple forms of life which have preceded, and are produced by it.
Conceptualizing national dispute as concrete abstraction helps to see the current situation
in Western Sahara not simply “as it appears,” but as a political formation that both embodies
certain social relations and conceals others. In the case of Western Sahara more generally, the
division between Moroccan and Sahrawi epitomizes a tension between commercial and pastoral
modes of living. These overlapping modes of living underpin relations of dependence and
autonomy between groups that have been in contact for as long as the trans-Saharan trade has
been in existence. However, the national conflict conceals the contradiction between modalities
of sovereignty that were raised by the process of decolonization and that remain unresolved. In
this sense, the decolonization of the Sahara has produced a political formation in concrete
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abstraction – an “ideological thing/not thing”147 that mediates the social and political space of
everyday life in the region, and organizes what can be said, seen and acted upon into the binary
dimensions of national conflict – but which obscures the transformations wrought by
decolonization in the Sahara.

Conclusion – The Binary Dimensions of Nationalist Conflict in Laâyoune/El Aaiún
The Batimat buildings where I dined with the mother and her son are a good place to
begin to understand some of these dynamics between competing sovereignties and their effects
on people’s subjectivities. After a handful of Polisario leaders defected to Morocco in the late
1980s, the Moroccan state believed that political unrest and low morale in the refugee camps,
combined with military stalemate, would contribute to an exodus.148 In anticipation, Batimat was
constructed along the main road heading east to Smara. However, the influx of defectors never
materialized in the numbers that Morocco expected. Instead, the vast sea of Khaymat al-Wahda
populated by Saharans who had been relocated from the neighboring Wed Nun region of
southern Morocco filled in the open land to the east of Batimat. In the winter of 1992, when
unusually heavy rains flooded the city and washed away the supplies of sugar, tea and other free
provisions supplied by the state, a certain number of families dwelling in their tents broke into
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the unoccupied Batimat and have lived there ever since.149 Khaymat al-Wahda has long since
disappeared, however, leaving a negative space surrounding Batimat in what, with subsequent
rapid urban expansion, has become more or less the city’s geographical center.
Mohamed Salek’s in-laws, like the young videographer and his mother whose narratives
opened this chapter, live in Batimat. The entire complex, as far as I know, is populated by
Sahrawis (and not dakhilis). When I visit Mohamed Salek’s in-laws, I am in Laâyoune, the
largest city in Morocco’s “Southern Provinces” as they are called. When I visit the young
videographer and his mother (which I could only do at night), I am in El Aaiún, in occupied
territory. In one house, one says “Moroccan Sahara”; in another, “Western Sahara.” In one house,
the family watches Moroccan or Mauritanian television channels; in another, the television is set
to the national Sahrawi SADR tv, broadcast out of the refugee camps in Algeria, which
frequently airs footage of clandestinely videotaped protests that have, in some instances, taken
place less than a hundred yards from the apartment where the footage is then viewed.
While these differences may seem self-evident in the context of a political conflict
between two, competing nationalisms, the divided attention illustrates a broader phenomenon of
everyday life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In Arabic, “Laâyoune” and “El Aaiún” are pronounced the
same, but the insistence among the parties to the conflict on different transliterations reflects the
importance of naming – to the point of necessity, but also absurdity – in any struggle over
sovereignty.150 And the struggle between Morocco and Polisario is, at root, not a struggle over
ethnic differences – or, I would argue, even nationalist differences, strictly speaking – but a
struggle over sovereignty. The struggle over sovereignty has real effects not just in politicizing
everyday life in Laâyoune/El Aaiún or in perpetuating violent acts of coercion and resistance, but
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also in shaping people’s subjectivity. For Sahrawis living as neighbors but with contested
political allegiances, perhaps the strongest and strangest effect of this struggle is what I would
call the effect of erasure. The friend-enemy relation is not simply one of war and annihilation
(even if the prospect of war constitutes a defining aspect of this relation). When this relation
becomes an important part of everyday life among neighbors, as among Sahrawis in Batimat and
in Laâyoune/El Aaiún more generally, the effects of this struggle over naming discipline the
subjects involved into practicing a kind of erasure. They cohabit with the enemy – sometimes
even in the same family – but refuse them recognition. Put another way, their political
subjectivity demands that they “unsee” the enemy in their midst.
Here, I am borrowing again from China Miéville’s novel, The City & The City,151 which
imagines a city divided on itself – perhaps not unlike Sarajevo or Jerusalem – inhabited by the
residents of two, sovereign city-states. In the world Miéville creates, the two city-states occupy
the same space geographically, but citizens are disciplined from birth to “unsee” the objects or
activities located in the sovereignty to which they don’t belong:
Such rigorous separation requires citizens to act and even to think and perceive as
though the cities were not ‘grosstopically’ – that is, in the terms of actual,
physical, Newtonian space – coterminous. From early childhood, every Besź and
every Ul Qoman [the names of the two types of citizens in Miéville’s novel] must
learn to ‘unsee’ the people, buildings, streets, motor vehicles, and everything else
that the other city contains. Unseeing – the central ideological operation required
to be conventional, law-abiding Besź or Ul Qoman citizen – is a maddeningly
complex and indeed self-contradictory process that seems directly indebted to
Orwell’s influential concept of doublethink.152
I do not mean here to draw a direct parallel between the fictional world that Miéville creates in
The City & The City and Western Sahara, or to suggest that the Moroccan and Sahrawi political
entities are roughly equal in power, like two city-states. Instead, I draw attention to a kind of
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disciplining that goes on when two competing sovereignties are operating over a long time in the
same absolute space. An example of this sustained, subjective inattention is how Sahrawi
nationalists discipline themselves to “unsee” the overbearing presence of Moroccan sovereignty
everywhere around them. In private gatherings, through social media, in connection with human
rights groups that follow the plight of political prisoners in jails throughout Morocco, and in
following SADR television broadcasting from the refugee camps, Sahrawi nationalists carve out
alternative spaces replete with the signs and information associated with the Sahrawi state. When
I asked one young man about an upcoming Moroccan national holiday, for example, he
responded with a dismissive wave of his hand and said, “that’s just ‘ajaj” referring to a strong
wind that comes from the east and brings with it a lot of sand and dust. Through a speech act,
this young man sought to render Moroccan sovereignty invisible, like the wind: an annoyance,
and distraction (and one that, like the weather, he hopes will eventually give way to something
new) that does not require one’s attention. It can be unseen. Meanwhile, at tremendous effort and
expense, and by pretty much any means necessary (including propaganda and favors, arrest and
torture), the Moroccan state relentlessly tries to bend the subjects of its occupation to its will: to
refer to the region as the Moroccan Sahara or Morocco’s Southern Provinces, to make the
Moroccan flag as visible as possible, to erase all signs of resistance from the streets and walls of
the city. It seeks to make its subjects unsee the state’s lack of legitimacy.
Despite the highly structured, binary dimensions of this political formation, it should not
be surprising that there remains tremendous mobility among people across southern Morocco,
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, and northern
Mauritania.153 The quotidian nature of movement, in a situation polarized by nationalist conflict,
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however, is anything but banal. For one thing, the very physical act of traveling from the camps
to Moroccan-occupied territory (and back) keeps channels of movement open where they have
otherwise been restricted by militarized occupation and political borders. At the same time,
political commitment in a situation of longstanding political conflict requires tremendous effort
in the face of various forms of political violence and, in some cases, social marginalization. This
next chapter will examine the resulting tension between fluid and multiple subjectivities that
exist within a binary field of national conflict structured by the poles of loyalty and betrayal.
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Chapter 2 – Subjectivity in Abeyance: Identification and “Return” across western Sahara
Chapter Overview: On Sahrawi Identity, Subject Position and Political Subjectivity
The previous chapter focused on the history that is sedimented in Laâyoune/El Aaiún,
and which shapes the city’s political geography and built environment. The city’s development
has paralleled the region’s decolonization dating back to the 1950s, and this history of multiple,
unrealized political projects remains apparent in the city’s nomenclature and neighborhoods.
Since 1991, when the ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario shifted the locus of conflict from
armed combat to diplomacy, Laâyoune/El Aaiún has increasingly become a focal point in the
struggle over sovereignty. Between Morocco’s military rule and Sahrawi nationalists’ efforts to
publicize human rights violations (the subject of Chapter 5), everyday life in the city has become
inextricably shaped by nationalist conflict. Social relations and public spaces are shot through
with suspicion, and people are subject to intense surveillance and policing of their actions,
relations and identities.
As the largest city and nexus of conflict in the disputed territory of Western Sahara,
Laâyoune/El Aaiún epitomizes the polarizing effects of contested sovereignty, and how this
situation has come to structure everyday life in the city, including constructions of the past.
Contested narratives of the past create a discursive space of multiple, conflicting stories, which
together undermine an epistemology of political truth. At the same time, I suggest that competing
Moroccan and Polisario projects of sovereignty affect residents’ subjectivities by shaping what
they can say, and how. The composite spelling of Laâyoune/El Aaiún foregrounds this
dichotomy: the dual spellings denote the same name in Arabic [el-‘ayun] but, in the context of
the dispute between Morocco and Polisario, connote two different political regimes. My use of
both names is a redundancy and exaggeration. But I hold onto this split nomenclature to
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foreground how competing sovereignties have divided the attention, allegiances and identities
among people sharing the same absolute space of the city. The effects of this division create an
effect of estrangement, or even erasure, among Sahrawi residents adhering to opposing poles
within a field structured by Moroccan or Sahrawi national identities. Highlighting this dichotomy
as an ideological effect of life in a situation of longstanding conflict also foregrounds this
political formation as both a thing, and not a thing: a concrete abstraction.
The dichotomous structure of this concrete abstraction is both a lived reality and an effect
of a longstanding dispute over sovereignty. However, in this chapter I argue that a focus on
polarized national identities misses the processes of fixing identity that have defined the region’s
history of decolonization and which contribute to a disaggregated political geography today. In
the literature on Western Sahara, one could be mistaken for thinking that there are but two,
national identities, Moroccan and Sahrawi, at odds in a zero-sum conflict over a single territorial
entity. In particular, scholarship has focused on establishing Sahrawi nationalism as a social and
political fact, largely through research conducted within the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria.
This work has had important implications in countering Moroccan propaganda that seeks to
undermine Sahrawi nationalism in the ongoing political conflict. Despite providing this
important political contribution, however, I suggest that a pervasive methodological nationalism
has obscured other optics for understanding this fragmented and polarized political geography,
and this complex history of decolonization.
While national identities such as “Sahrawi,” “Moroccan” and “Mauritanian” are
frequently taken for granted in literature on the region, this chapter interrogates the processes
that have been pivotal to fixing the identities of people in the Sahara since decolonization
became an animating feature of regional political projects. When attention has been paid to
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Sahrawi political subjectivity, scholarship has tended to focus on the formation of “ethnic” or
nationalist identity. However, the geographic distribution of Saharan peoples has always been
dispersed across an area much broader than a single, bounded territory. As a result, the
correlation between people, rights and territory in the area has been deeply contested throughout
the decolonization process, and since before the relatively recent formation of a Sahrawi national
identity. For these reasons, I suggest that fixing Sahrawis nationally, much less ethnically, misses
the dynamics of contestation over their political subjectivity – the dynamics of decolonization, in
effect – in which people across western Sahara have been caught since the 1950s.
Rather than taking national identities as given, I propose an analytic distinction between
identity, subject position, and political subjectivity. By identity, I mean the labels, whether
chosen or ascribed, that individuals use to express belonging to various collectivities. In this
region of the Sahara, these identities may be national (Sahrawi, Moroccan, Mauritanian,
Algerian), tribal (e.g.: Rguibat, Izerguiyin, among many others),154 or one of several statuses
within a cultural sphere known as trab al-bidan (hassani, m‘allem, hartani). Individuals
frequently, but do not necessarily, have a sense of belonging at all three levels, contributing to
multiple identities. Many of these terms are relational: Sahrawi is defined against Moroccan, or
dakhili, and, as explained in the Introduction, bidani identity is defined in relation to both
Amazigh (chilha, pl. chleuh in the Saharan dialect of Arabic, Hassaniya), and non-Arab black
Africans (kury, pl. lkwar).
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With the term subject position, by contrast, I refer specifically to categories produced by
different political projects during the history of decolonization that continue to confer certain
rights or benefits in the present upon those who qualify. Unlike identities, subject positions exist
in relation to institutional power (both state and multilateral) rather than to each other. While
they have come into existence through specific political projects and at different historical
moments, these subject positions remain in place today thanks to the particular configuration of
different state, multilateral and humanitarian administrative organizations that sustain each of
these subject positions. In a more conventional political landscape, the most common subject
position in this formulation would simply be “citizen.” Across western Sahara, by contrast, a
field of competing regimes that support multiple, unresolved political projects supports a variety
of subject positions, including refugees, ‘a’idin, human rights activists, and former members of
the Moroccan Liberation Army. While these subject positions often exist on opposite sides of
this political divide – refugees, for example, live in the Polisario-run camps in Algeria, while
‘a’idin have left those camps and returned to Morocco – they co-exist within the same field of
political conflict.
In contrast to identities, which are a matter of belonging, and subject positions, which
retain their lasting significance through various regimes of governance, political subjectivities
refer to the modalities of recognition through which subjects relate to this complex field. These
political subjectivities intersect with both identities and subject positions but political
subjectivities are less positions, or figures, than features of a field distinguished by the politics of
recognition. The political subjectivity of a Sahrawi female refugee, for example, cannot be
understood without taking into account her visibility in relation to the international community.
The political subjectivity of an ‘a’id, or returnee, who leaves the Polisario refugee camps to
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“return” to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, takes form through the modality of movement,
both in terms of physical mobility and political transition. And, finally, the process of
identification can be explored through the prolonged attempt to hold a referendum on selfdetermination in the 1990s, which shaped political subjectivities within this contested political
field.
Through this critique of methodological nationalism, I suggest that scholarship on
Western Sahara that attempts to explain the contemporary dispute strictly in terms of nationalist
conflict and identity reduces multiple subjectivities and subject positions to the terms of the
conflict itself. In this respect, identities and subject positions that both precede and are produced
by the Morocco-Polisario dispute are elided by questions of identity and citizenship, loyalty and
opportunism. This chapter will explore political subjectivity as shaped by movement and
identification in two sections.
In order to counter the naturalization of this process of “fixing” the geography of
subjectivities in this political landscape, the first section of this chapter foregrounds multiplicity,
movement and mobility. Beginning from Nouadhibou, a Mauritanian coastal enclave which
attracts people from around the region during the summer, I present a geography of movement
and mobility in a context of political confinement.155 Whereas Chapter 1 focused on Laâyoune/El
Aaiún in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, this chapter is situated in northern Mauritania,
which borders both Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and the Polisario-controlled territories
of Western Sahara and southwest Algeria. Conveying the dynamics of political identification
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from outside of both the Sahrawi refugee camps (where much recent scholarship on Western
Sahara has taken place), and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara (where the stifling political
climate limits much of what can be said) is part of a methodological claim for the usefulness of
multi-sited ethnography in a disaggregated political geography. From Nouadhibou, I profile the
‘a’id, or “returnee,” a subject position produced by the conflict between Morocco and Polisario,
but which occasionally escapes the nationalist political epistemology upon which the conflict is
based. Despite the cynicism and stigma of betrayal frequently associated with this subject
position, I suggest that the ‘a’id exemplifies the tension between ambivalence and commitment
underlying seemingly fixed political identities in this region.
The second section of this chapter elaborates how the process of identification continues
to shape political subjectivities across the region in two ways. First, I explore how
documentation and “being counted,” structures how belonging is conferred or withheld for
Mauritanians and Sahrawis moving between refugee camps and northern Mauritania. While the
focus on refugee camps within literature on Western Sahara gives the impression that people’s
residencies and identities are largely settled, many people have always moved between a region
now divided between northern Mauritania, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and Saharawi
refugee camps in southwest Algeria. This chapter examines the regimes of documentation that
restrict and facilitate this movement in a fragmented political geography. Second, in recounting
UN-led attempts to hold a referendum on self-determination during the 1990s, I examine how
these efforts subjected certain groups to intense contestation over their identities and political
commitments. While the identification process was shelved over a decade ago and the
referendum was never held, I consider the effects of the identification process on a man who
became the object of intense political recruitment during this time.
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The first chapter showed how surveillance serves as an overarching modality of political
recognition that shapes political subjectivities in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. This chapter will consider
the two modalities just mentioned – mobility and identification – to describe geographies and
subjectivities that exceed, complicate and sometimes reinforce the structured dichotomy of
Moroccan-Sahrawi nationalist conflict.

Section I – ‘A’idin or Returnees: an Overview
‘A’idin are, in the terminology of the Western Sahara conflict, people who left the
Sahrawi refugee camps, and “returned to” Morocco. The name derives from a speech given by
the late King of Morocco, Hassan II, on November 6, 1988, marking the 13-year anniversary of
the Green March, when some 350,000 Moroccan civilians crossed en masse into what was then
Spanish Sahara as part of Morocco’s efforts to annex the territory, causing Sahrawis to flee to the
refugee camps in Algeria where many remain today. The King’s annual speech on the
anniversary of the Green March marks the occasion as a national holiday in Morocco, but the
speech that year took on particular import since 1988 marked a critical year for Polisario
leadership. After thirteen years, war with Morocco had stalemated, and Polisario had been unable
to dislodge Morocco from the territory they occupied in Western Sahara. With social and
political upheaval rocking Algeria,156 Polisario’s main political sponsor was rumored to be in
negotiations with Morocco to potentially sell out the Sahrawi nationalist cause as part of a
political bargain to normalize relations. And as reports of disappearances and torture carried out
during wartime in the refugee camps came to light, Polisario leadership faced protests and
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upheaval in the camps.
After spending much of the previous decade on the military defensive, King Hassan II
sought to take advantage of this newfound position of strength by addressing the population of
the refugee camps directly:
“…I say to whomever lost their way and strayed from the path, that they must be
dealt with mercifully [by] the homeland and kin, for God’s sake, [‘elayhim ‘an
yttaqu allah fi al-watan wa al-rahem], and that they should know that the nation
is forgiving and merciful…”157
By using the language of those who had “gone astray,” Hassan II discursively created a moral
and physical arc of “return” for anyone seeking to leave the refugee camps and come to Morocco
– even if, as was the case with some refugees, they had never been in Moroccan-occupied
Western Sahara, let alone Morocco proper, to begin with.158 Similarly, Hassan II evoked the
nation in terms of moral acceptance and divine authority (“forgiving and merciful” [al-ghafur wa
al-rahim] are both terms in the Qur’an used to describe God) as a way to exhort Sahrawis to
leave the camps, i.e., “to return.” It is important to note that Hassan II’s speech did not have the
intended effect of inducing mass defections from the refugee camps.159 It did, however, create a
new category of political subject: the ‘a’id’, or “returnee.”
Between 1989 and 1997, a little over 1200 people left the refugee camps and “returned”
to Morocco.160 These first ‘a’idin coming from the camps tended to be high-profile members of
Polisario’s leaderhip who were recruited to defect by Moroccan intelligence services with
157
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promises of government jobs, large houses and other amenities. In this first wave during the late1980s and early-90s, especially, ‘a’idin were frequently enlisted by Morocco to publicize their
experience of torture or other harsh treatment under the Polisario.161 One woman whose husband
disappeared during this period showed me pictures from her travels across Europe in the late1990s and early-2000s as part of a human rights group funded by Morocco.162 A Mauritanian
living in Laâyoune/El Aaiún who had joined Polisario as a young man only to be imprisoned in
the refugee camps as part of a purging of the “Mauritanian community,” gave me a copy of a
book published by the Moroccan government that features a collection of profiles and
testimonials by former supporters who had fled the camps after allegedly suffering torture at the
hands of Polisario.163 The subject position of the “returnee” within the framework of political
conflict came to resemble defectors who had suffered under the hands of Polisario leadership and
would now collaborate with Morocco. The author of a 2001 collection of oral histories by ‘a’idin
suggests that the term “which literally means those who return, are known in Morocco as the
people, men and women, who deserted the Polisario Front and came back, or returned, to this
country, since in joining this organization [meaning Polisario] they abandoned their country.”164
An older Sahrawi man who had been imprisoned by Polisario for most of the 1980s
provides testimony characteristic of the ‘a’idin who were imprisoned in the camps during the
war years:
‘A’id: [Polisario leadership] didn’t accept us [Tekna]; they were suspicious of us,
imprisoned us, and made life difficult for us [ykarfasuna yasir min attakarfis].
Whoever died in prison, died, and whoever survived, came out of prison
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handicapped, or messed up in the head [tari’ bi shay fi ‘aqilu]… You see: [he is
showing me an effect of imprisonment/torture] The skin is gone here [misloukha]
- it used to be normal/natural. See?
Me: That was a result of‘A’id: The handcuffs. They put your hands like that, and tie them together with
rope, and the feet…they tortured us a lot. Thirteen years.
Me: What did they do?
‘A’id: This [showing me a mark on his skin]: they burned us, with fire. That was
just certain members of the leadership. Whereas, our young people, we weren’t
against them.
Me: It is difficult (for me) to understand why they did that to, uh, people who
accompanied/were with them in the war.
‘A’id: Us, we’re not against our people. We’re children of the people, but I
explained to you before that the leadership – and, in particular, Polisario
leadership – don’t want someone who could be better than them. And they don’t
want something to be said about them [shi yngal fiha]. You understand me? What
they did to us - who did that to us was someone named Bachir [Mustafa Sayid], a
brother of the Martyr el-Ouali [Mustafa Sayid, a founder and former leader of
Polisario, since deceased], and Brahim Ghali [current President of SADR],
Lamine ould al-Bouhali and Soueid Ahmed al-Batal. Those were the Polisario
leaders, and they’re the ones who governed. You understand? Some spared us, but
they killed lots of Sahrawis in prison - lots - not just a little, you understand? You
couldn’t protest your innocence - even if it were your father or mother, you
couldn’t protest your innocence…You have your father: if your father does
(something like) that and hits you; the president is like your father. The person
responsible is like a father. Am I right, or what? But when it happens and they do
that to you, you’re going to become far from - you can’t.
I prefer the Moroccans to them. You understand? Morocco, now, if you
weren’t here [i.e., in disputed territory] but inside the country, you’d be free. You
wouldn’t have any worries [ma ‘andek saliha]. But, these disputed territories, they
are where there is fear.165
In recounting his own experience with torture, this ‘a’id narrated his experience in the camps as
a way of bringing to justice the Polisario leadership, particularly since a number of those
members that he deemed responsible for these abuses remained in power. In doing so, his
testimony resembles the form through which a couple of publications from the late-1990s and
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early-2000s presented the voices of ‘a’idin. One of these publications was by a Spanish scholar
and the other was published as Moroccan political propaganda, but each attempted to frame the
“voice” of the returnee as a witness to abuse and torture. The Moroccan publication, entitled
Martyrdom and Suffering of the Moroccan Prisoners and Confined Persons within the Tindouf
Region in the South of Algeria, includes books and pamphlets in Arabic and English.166 The
books consist of a series of individual profiles, with background information of each ‘a’id
accompanied by first-person accounts of the torture that they suffered. Some profiles include
photographs of the victims’ injuries. The interviews published by a Spanish scholar under the
title Sahara: Otras Voces provides sociological data on the first wave of ‘a’idin, and is less
narrowly focused on torture and abuse. However, the oral histories are similarly presented as
testimony to the injustices perpetrated by the Polisario Front on its subjects during the 1980s. In
both publications,‘a’idin emerge as historical figures in the form of a dossier, or a compilation of
documented testimonials that testify to political abuse. As such, they are among the first voices
in the history of the Western Sahara conflict to publicize dissent within Polisario. More
importantly, however, the way in which these ‘a’idin are represented as individuals testifying to
political torture and abuse anticipates the adoption of human rights discourse as a tactic in the
conflict between Morocco and Polisario, as it shifted from armed struggle to a struggle of
diplomacy after 1991. This displacement of the language of decolonization by the language of
human rights now characterizes the contemporary terrain of conflict, and will be discussed more
in Chapter 5.
Instrumentalized in this way, the first wave of ‘a’idin arriving the early 1990s were both
denounced by Polisario, and ostracized by Sahrawis living in Moroccan-occupied territory,
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where many of them resettled. As the following poem demonstrates, Sahrawis on either side of
Morocco’s dividing wall associated ‘a’idin with opportunism and betrayal:
Betrayal is bad and haram
[It is] a scandal upon us, and grave
Leave, you scandalous accuser
Betrayer of the Sahrawi blood
Leave and trade dignity
For little houses and cards
While orphans and widows
Are still here in sweetness/goodness [al-halawiya]167
This poem directly addresses the same population that Hassan II sought to sway, but through
accusation rather than invitation. It contrasts the virtuous steadfastness of “orphans and widows”
who remain in the refugee camps despite significant sacrifices, with the transactional
opportunism of those who betray their principles in exchange for “little houses and cards”
offered by the Moroccan state. (“Cards” refer to state-issued identification cards that provide
access to benefits.)
For the first wave of ‘a’idin, the benefits gained from “returning” tended to be negotiated
individually with political officials connected with the Moroccan military, intelligence services,
or the Makhzen. For those deemed of value to the government, these benefits were often quite
generous and might include the promise of a government job. The Moroccan state hoped, or
perhaps even expected, that the first wave of ‘a’idin might induce mass defections from the
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l-khiyana shina wa haram
fadaha fina wa rzina
temshi ya mahdour taham
kha’in dem as-Sahrawiya
temshi wa tabadl karam
bi douira hiya wa kartiya
wa l-ytam wa l-’aramil
mazalu hun fi halawiya
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camps and also sway popular support among Sahrawis within Moroccan-occupied territories.168
New families that arrived in Moroccan-occupied territory would appear on regional television
news broadcasts, performatively describing the abuses they had suffered in the camps and
expressing their gratitude to be in Morocco. First wave ‘a’idin were valued for their capacity to
testify to abuse and torture, while displaying their loyalty to the Moroccan state. In this way,
benefits were provided on the expectation that this first generation of ‘a’idin would serve the
Moroccan cause in the Sahara, visibly and prominently, and were contingent upon political
cooperation. ‘A’idin were, in short, expected to fulfill the role of the defector.
In “little houses and cards,” however, the poem refers to the more recent, standardized set
of benefits provided by the Moroccan government as larger numbers of people began “returning”
in the early- to mid-2000s. Today, the government provides a small plot of land and house in a
city of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, as well as an identity card that entitles ‘a’idin to a
stipend of $200 euros per month (known as al-in’ash). These benefits are less generous and are
disbursed less reliably than they used to be. A frequent complaint among recent ‘a’idin with
whom I spoke in Laâyoune/El Aaiún was that the number of benefit cards distributed by
Morocco to a returning family varies widely, and often arbitrarily. One family may receive a
card and the accompanying benefits for every child in the family; another may find that only the
head of household receives a card.169
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Changes to the benefit regime appear to represent a broader shift in the Moroccan state’s
expectation for ‘a’idin, and therefore in the subject position for those bearing this political label.
Where ‘a’idin were once valued as defectors whose visibility was meant to impact the morale of
the refugees in the camps, the increasing regularity and number of returnees permitted during the
2000s has in effect normalized their presence. Today, entire neighborhoods in Laâyoune/El
Aaiún are marked by the modest, box-like, single story house described in Chapter 1 for those
who came from Agjijimat. The same simple constructions were distributed to ‘a’idin. Unlike an
earlier generation, many of whom fled the refugee camps for explicitly political reasons (whom I
refer to as “first wave returnees”), more recent, “second wave” ‘a’idin who have come to
Moroccan-occupied territory since 2000, do so for many different reasons. Some “return” in
order to care for an elderly relative, or to find a job, or simply to reunite with relatives from
whom they had been separated for decades. Some, even, seek to turn a quick profit by reselling
the plot of land or “little house” distributed by Morocco, taking profits from the sale with them
elsewhere – sometimes even back to the refugee camps. Many of these more recent arrivals
outwardly disdain the Moroccan state and maintain unwavering support for Sahrawi nationalism.
Others, it is rumored, may even have been sent by Polisario to serve as operatives in Moroccanoccupied territory.
As this expectation of loyalty and patronage between ‘a’idin and the Moroccan state has
eroded, the stigma associated with this label among Sahrawis has begun to fade, as well. Where
the “returnee” was once seen as a betrayer and opportunist, they are more often now viewed with
relative indifference, by both the Moroccan state and Sahrawi society. No longer bound to
supporting either Morocco or Polisario, the ‘a’id is an unusual figure in the contemporary
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landscape of political conflict in Western Sahara. On the one hand, this detachment from the two
parties that structure the political field of conflict can lead to a kind of disillusionment and
cynicism. No longer necessarily seen as a traitor, the figure of the ‘a’id still epitomizes political
opportunism. Take, for example, the following joke about Ibrahim Hakim. A former Mauritanian
government official who joined the Polisario Front in 1975, Hakim played a major role in raising
SADR’s profile diplomatically by brokering Polisario/SADR’s entry to the Organization of
African Unity in the early 1980s. After serving as foreign minister and minister of information,
Hakim became one of the earliest and most high-profile ‘a’idin when he turned up in Morocco in
1992.170 Around this time, Morocco and Algeria were negotiating a rapprochement to finally
recognize each other’s borders and build on the recently-established Arab Maghreb Union
(AMU). As part of any agreement, it was rumored that Algeria would close the refugee camps
and send Sahrawis back to Morocco. As the joke goes, the Morocco-Algeria rapprochement
never fully materialized and was interrupted, at least in part, by the assassination of one of the
lead Algerian negotiators, Mohamed Boudiaf. Before the assassination, according to the joke,
Ibrahim Hakim met with Boudiaf in Algiers, learned of the plans regarding the refugee camps,
and went straight to Rabat via Paris. The story is told as a joke on Ibrahim Hakim: so eager to
leave Polisario for a more favorable situation, he anticipated a political development that never
arose.171
This joke also reflects more broadly upon the sense that “returnees,” in general, lack
political principles or commitment. To some extent there is overlap here between the idea of
opportunism and betrayal. The short poem cited above denounces “returnees” both for betrayal,
and for trading political and moral dignity for “little houses and cards.” There is also, however, a
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certain distinction between these notions. The act of betrayal takes on meaning precisely because
of the stakes involved in switching from one political commitment or another. The very act
depends upon a situation of political polarization; one cannot betray an ally to a neutral party, but
to an enemy. An action taken to be opportunistic, on the other hand, suggests a complete
disregard for political commitment of any kind. In the context of the Western Sahara conflict, an
“opportunist” [wahid intihazi] is a label for someone who demonstrates a lack of principles, a
kind of shallow materialism, and an inability to maintain political commitment.
The accusation resonates, however, precisely because the potential for widespread
opportunism is a constant threat in the context of prolonged political stalemate. While the ‘a’id
serves as the paradigmatic opportunist, the construction of political subjects as opportunistic
circulates in subtler and more pervasive ways in popular discourse, particularly in Moroccanoccupied territory. As a jaded observer put it in the context of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, “material
things [al-mada] are fundamental; give people something and they’ll just be quiet.” Making the
same point but from the standpoint of the recipients of these “material things,” a friend in a café
once intimated that the quickest way for anyone in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara to get
out of a bad legal situation (such as getting arrested for hashish, for example), is to raise two
fingers in the symbol of Sahrawi victory and claim oneself a political prisoner. These are both
references to the political economy of political conflict in Moroccan-occupied territory. As seen
in the example of ‘a’idin, Moroccan state benefits are doled out or withheld through a calculus of
political loyalty. Competing with the Moroccan state’s system of benefits and punishment, there
is also an alleged payment system through which SADR/Polisario’s Ministry for the Occupied
Territories provides incentive for protesters in the occupied territories to make themselves visible
(and, it is rumored, to sustain injury in a way that can get caught on tape).
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It is important to note here that many of these generalized examples of opportunistic
political behavior circulate as rumors. The rumors about protesters getting paid – much less paid
to sustain injuries – was never anything I could substantiate.172 It should also be noted that
rumors of opportunism or political indifference serve the Moroccan state’s unrelenting efforts to
undermine nationalist support, and in this way the state likely encouraged or amplified this
discourse. Still, these allegations are, in Veena Das’s conceptualization, a form of language
defined by its lack of signature that becomes pervasive and gains its “perlocutionary force”
through an appeal to unfinished past events in the present.173 In this context of protracted conflict
where, despite continuous polarization, the immediate horizon for political change remains
elusive, these rumors reflect a broader disillusionment. And, as the joke about Brahim Hakim
attests, the ‘a’id represents the quintessential opportunist in this context.
***
In the previous chapter, I introduced Lahcen, an ‘a’id who had been in Moroccanoccupied Laâyoune/El Aaiún since the 1990s. Unlike other “first wave” ‘a’idin who benefited
from jobs in government administration along with generous pay and housing, Lahcen
experienced only marginalization since his return:
When, from the highest reaches of the Moroccan state – which, at that time, was
the late Hassan II – when we were called to as Sahrawis in the Polisario Front,
they said to us that “the nation is forgiving and merciful,” and we listened to the
speech, believing that in the call there was no clientelism or patronage. So we put
the issue of the Sahara to the side.
But when we came to Morocco, they took revenge upon us and they threw
us in the streets - listen, they threw us in the streets without any integration. Now,
I am not a [state] employee - but when the Moroccan security forces from
Mauritania - Sahrawi by origin - come here, they don’t learn/understand anything
172
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[la yfqahu shay’an]. They don’t know anything: on the issue of the Sahara, they
are not well-educated. They don’t read at all. They don’t know anything besides
their own name. They integrate here - complete integration, with a public
job/position, and are welcomed with warm hospitality [bi hafawa]. But when we
came from the Polisario Front, and we are from this very place – [we] the sons of
the Sahara – we are thrown out and ignored and thrown in the alleyways and
streets: decades without integration. Meaning, there was something duplicitous
[an intent that was not trustworthy] in the call to us in the first place, on the part
of King Hassan II. They took revenge on us for ten years. Why?
First, either because of the period that we spent in the Sahrawi army, or
because of my father who resisted them. You understand? And that matter, we
consider the drop that overflowed the cup. And the straw that broke the camel’s
back…174
Lahcen draws particular attention in this passage to the contrast between his marginalization,
despite having lived in the territory prior to Morocco’s occupation, and the state’s recruitment of
Mauritanians into the state security apparatus, as police, educators or administrators. This
reflects a longstanding process in which Morocco has sought to turn the population of the Sahara
“inside-out.” In casting the Moroccan state’s marginalization of him as an act of spite and
vengeance, Lahcen contends that he and others fulfilled the moral arc of return called for by
Hassan II, only to be betrayed by a duplicitous Moroccan state.
Despite this frustration at the marginalization that he has faced since his return to
Moroccan-occupied territory, Lahcen’s reasons for returning stemmed from a similar sense of
frustration while serving in the Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army during the 1970s and 80s.
Lahcen reported that, after being hospitalized in Algiers for battle wounds, he was reprimanded
and imprisoned for his regiment’s behavior, then later removed from his position, serving the
remainder of the war in a non-military position. Lahcen’s experience of marginalization by both
Morocco and Polisario is reflected in his disavowal of both parties:
I assure you that, now, I belong to neither Morocco nor the Front. I am
moderate/in the middle [wasati], and I value dignity and peace and dignified
living. I don’t like injustice or wrongdoing. And I am against the Polisario Front
174
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in certain matters, despite the fact that…25 [members of my family] are now with
Polisario. And [I am] against Morocco on a number of ideas. And I do not support
that Morocco should have sovereignty over the Sahara, unless it happens with our
consultation and consent. That’s the end. Did you understand me?
Salam ‘alaykum. I am going to smoke a cigarette.175
Many Sahrawis distance themselves from Polisario, for various reasons, but remain deeply
committed to Sahrawi nationalism and the right to self-determination. Among ‘a’idin such as
Lahcen, however, I encountered more of a resignation that the principles of the conflict
themselves were no longer meaningful because they depended upon bankrupt political entities
for their realization. Hence, his resort to abstract moral principles of dignity and peace.
Contrary to what these excerpts might suggest, Lahcen was quite reticent to talk about
himself, and more interested in relaying a specific history to me, than in talking about himself.
This set him apart both from pro-Morocco ‘a’idin who reflexively reported their experience of
torture and abuse at the hands of Polisario leadership during the 1980s, and from huquqiyyin
(Chapter 5), who would do the same in regards to ongoing Moroccan repression. What interested
Lahcen most in our conversations were two things: conveying the importance of the events of
1988 in the refugee camps, and coming up with new metaphors to describe the destruction and
hopelessness that he bore witness to in the present.
The history of Polisario culminating in the events of 1988, in Lahcen’s telling, can be
divided in two periods. The first period was between 1974 and 82, which involved the most
intense fighting of the war and during which, for three years (1976-79) Polisario waged a war on
two fronts against Morocco and Mauritania. Facing constant threats to its existence on the
battlefield, this period was also marked by power struggles among leadership, some of which led
to a series of purges within Polisario’s ranks. The first involved a dispute following a conference
in 1974, when Polisario was still in its infancy. Members from the Saguiet al-Hamra region
175

Interview October 11, 2014, Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara

119

surrounding Laâyoune/El Aaiún were imprisoned, after protesting that too many members of
Polisario’s Executive Committee were from northern Mauritania and Algeria. This faction
claimed that the preponderance of Algerian Sahrawis solidified the alliance between Polisario
and the Algerian state from that point forward.176 Subsequent purges resulted less from power
struggles than a concerted effort to target certain populations that were deemed potentially
foreign elements and therefore untrustworthy by Polisario leadership, including members of
Tekna tribes, a group of former prisoners under Spanish colonialism (Lglibat Lfoula), a group
known as “friends of the French community” (Matar al-Ghar), and “the Mauritanian network.”
As these purges led to imprisonment, torture, disappearance, or defection (usually, at that
time, to Mauritania),177 the ongoing near-total mobilization within the camps and beyond around
winning the war left refugees in the camps unaware that SADR/Polisario’s security apparatus
was turning on its own. Lahcen claimed that many people chose to ignore, or preferred not to
know about, the “purging” going on within Polisario’s ranks during that time, in part because to
voice these misgivings would have invited accusations of being a traitor [kha’in].178 But others
claimed that conditions within the camps simply didn’t allow for people to acknowledge what
was going on. On one occasion, a female ‘a’ida remarked that during this time, if one saw
someone who looked disturbed (like they may have suffered abuse or torture), one didn’t ask any
questions. However, Lahcen noted that eventually the purges between 1976 and 82 led a younger
generation to start asking questions. This culminated in an intervention led by one of the
founders of Polisario who occupied a number of leadership positions in the Front between 1976
and 1988, including Director of Military Security, Omar Hadrami (also known by his nom de
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guerre, al-‘Athmi). As Hadrami brought these violations to light, the refugee camps erupted for
five days in October in what is sometimes called the intifada of 1988:
It was a fragile empire [embraturiya hasha]: no one lifted their head without
getting it cut, until 1988. That intifada took place, and after that you could speak.
And you could say, I’m so-and-so, son of so-and-so, from this tribe. You
understand me? Then, you could say that, and no longer be afraid.
And those who undertook it included al-‘Athmi, and a group from among
the younger members of the leadership. They are the ones who protested, which
lifted the morale from that place where you couldn’t say a word, to where you
could speak. And defend yourself/stand up for yourself. You understand me? If
not for that, nothing.179
A year later, in July 1989, Hadrami became the first high-profile ‘a’id to return to Morocco.180
The history of 1988 is one that has drawn little attention from scholars of the Western
Sahara, with the exception of the aforementioned collection of oral histories of ‘a’idin
(Hernández Moreno, Sahara: otras voces), and an unpublished dissertation (Cozza, Nicola, cited
above). Likewise, Morocco’s best efforts to exploit this history of abuse to political advantage
has not resonated either locally among Sahrawis, or beyond. Aside from the relative obscurity of
this history, its importance to a group of ‘a’idin serves to highlight their disjunctive relationship
to the nationalist histories that frame the ongoing conflict. Hadrami’s prominence in Lahcen’s
account contrasts with the fact that Hadrami and other high-profile ‘a’idin have failed to build a
popular following within Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, or in the camps. Indeed, many
point out that, as a former Director of Polisario’s Military Security, Hadrami may well have been
responsible for many of the abuses that he shed light on before departing for Morocco. Similarly,
the significance of the purges during this time are often refracted through different social
alignments. Some view the repression of this period in tribal terms, as the demographic majority
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Rguibat wielded their power within the camps to persecute Tekna, Wlad Dlim and members of
other, smaller tribes. Rguibat who consider Hadrami a traitor downplay the significance of the
uprising in 1988, referring to it as a riot [shughab], rather than an intifada. And, finally, there are
those who prefer to subordinate this history to the ongoing struggle for self-determination,
referring to past abuses during this time as “simple mistakes” [al-’aghlat al-basita].181
Lahcen’s insistence that I understand the extent of and resistance to Polisario’s
repression during the 1970s and 80 built upon a longer history in which he made clear that,
historically, the people of Western Sahara never lived under Moroccan rule. Left with two
histories negated by the present, it is small wonder that Lahcen’s views of the current political
situation were shot through with cynicism. Invariably, when I would ask him for his opinion of
protests in Laâyoune/El Aaiún going on at the time that called for human rights monitoring in
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Lahcen would dismissively state that the politics of the
present were a product of a “fabricated Sahara” [al-Sahara al-mustana‘a or, sometimes alSahara al-mufabraqa] and that the “original Sahara” which belonged to the “original Sahrawis”
was as irretrievable as the Americas of the Native Americans. To make this point, Lahcen
regularly resorted to colorful metaphors, suggesting that the Sahrawi people were like gum, and
the forces of time, displacement and resettlement continue to stretch them more and more thinly,
the better to chop them into pieces. (On another occasion, he used cilantro to make a similar
point.) When I asked whether he supported those continuing to call for self-determination, he
contended that they represented a “fabricated people” acting Sahrawi better than “the originals.”
Other times, Lahcen conspiratorially suggested that the Moroccan state itself fostered the current
version of the Sahrawi nationalist movement in the territory it occupies, and that the
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prolongation of the conflict served only to benefit political elites in Morocco as well as Polisario
leadership in Tindouf, Algeria. Citing Nikolai Bukharin in reference to the seeming omnipotence
of the Moroccan state in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, he grimly asserted, “when the state wants
something from you, it gets something from you.”182
Lahcen’s cynicism constitutes a common and important political emotion in the context
of prolonged political conflict in Western Sahara, and it is not incidental that the ‘a’id would be
particularly prone to this disillusionment. As Lisa Wedeen noted in her study of Syrian citizens
who developed means of dissimulating, or acting “as if” their support for an authoritarian regime
were real, this dissimulation invariably has a depoliticizing effect.183 Building on Wedeen’s
observations, Lori Allen remarked that a cynical disposition that had developed among many
human rights workers in Palestine in the 2000s also created space for critique and hope.184 The
context of Western Sahara resembles aspects of both Syria before the civil war, and Israeloccupied Palestine. As in Syria under Assad, Western Sahara is a context of relentless
politicization; as in Israel-occupied Palestine, the conflict’s prolonged stasis lends itself to apathy.
In discussing the historiography of Polisario authoritarianism during the 1980s that Lahcen and
other ‘a’idin find particularly important, I observe that the subordination of this history to a
broader struggle that they can no longer actively support can lead to a generalized cynicism.
While this cynicism certainly may create the space for critique, in the case of ‘a’idin such as
Lahcen this disillusionment with both Morocco and Polisario does not provide much space for
hope.
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***
On the other hand, ‘a’idin are somewhat unique in the context of nationalist conflict for
openly flaunting political commitment. No longer bound by the poles of national loyalty or
accusations of betrayal that politicize so much of everyday life in both Moroccan-occupied
territory, and the refugee camps, ‘a’idin also embody a kind of opportunism that rejects the
stakes of nationalist conflict. While many Sahrawis oppose Polisario but remain staunchly
nationalist, the ‘a’id’s relative indifference toward either Moroccan or Polisario legitimacy
constitutes a position – or non-position – that in certain instances seems to deflate the
significance of national commitment itself. In this way, the ‘a’id’s opportunism is multivalent,
constituted by rank self-interest, but also by a capriciousness or fickleness predicated on social
and political mobility. In a recent article devoted to these figures, Sebastién Boulay notes that
‘a’idin’s motives for “returning” generally have no bearing on their political convictions. This is
important to note since Morocco tries to capitalize on the phenomenon of “returning,” [al-‘awda]
by associating the act with political defection.185 As increasing numbers of ‘a’idin have little to
no loyalty to Morocco, and may even remain outwardly antagonistic toward the state long after
their arrival, the politics of al-‘awda may simply be embedded in the very act of mobility within
a context of separation and confinement.
As Boulay notes elsewhere in citing the work of the anthropologist Pierre Bonte, in the
context of the Sahara and Mauritania, departure from a group can itself constitute a political act:
In this nomadic western Saharan society, to separate [désolidariser] from a camp
in order to settle elsewhere with one’s relatives is an evident mode of political
autonomization, and more generally of scission and recomposition of groups
(Bonte 2008).186
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In the contemporary context of prolonged nationalist conflict, the significance of al-‘awda may
not lie in the act of leaving from one group for another, as was common among the “first wave”
of ‘a’idin who left the refugee camps to join the Moroccan cause. Rather, in describing the
relative fluidity of the ‘a’id’s political subjectivity, I am mostly referring to the more numerous,
“second wave” ‘a’idin whose very mobility constitutes a kind of disconnection from the
confining geographies and categories of nationalist conflict. Given Lahcen’s insistence on the
“fabricated” reality of political activity going on around him, one might even see among certain
‘a’idin in their disillusionment with the terms that structure everyday life a kind of ideological
“dissociation” that allows them to hold the concrete abstraction of nationalist conflict in
abeyance. I do not wish to suggest that this way of being relative to the political commitments
that predominate and shape the contemporary landscape of Western Sahara are somehow
“better” than the politics of committed nationalists. Rather, I wish to explore the potential, and
limits, to acknowledging that a subject position produced by prolonged nationalist conflict, can
generate certain kinds of political movement, mobility and opportunism that in turn challenge
certain premises of the conflict itself. Can the figure of the ‘a’id, long considered a subject
position of cynical opportunism, also entail a form of political movement and physical mobility
that undermines the prevailing poles of loyalty and betrayal in a context of nationalist conflict?
Section II – Nouadhibou, Mauritania: Mobility in Confinement
Situated midway down the bay side of a peninsula that juts out into the Atlantic, Nouadhibou is
Mauritania’s second-largest city. Originally established by the French as Port Etienne, the city
subsequently became integral to Mauritania’s national economy, both as a fishing port and for
the export of iron ore that is transported by train from the Mauritanian mines of Zouérate and
F’derik some 670 kilometers to the east. The railway transporting iron in open-air cars reaches its
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terminus at the peninsula’s southern tip, at one of the administrative headquarters for
Mauritania’s state mining entity, la Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière (SNIM), in a
neighborhood known as Cansado.187 In an attempt to recruit foreign investment, the city has
recently been designated a free-trade zone. In this sense, Nouadhibou is a classic enclave: a hub
of import-export activity that constitutes a central node in the Mauritanian national economy,
even as it exists in tenuous relation to the rest of the country geographically.
This tenuous relation is exacerbated by the fact that a political boundary dating back to
the colonial era bisects the length of the peninsula. Where the bay side was part of French West
Africa, the ocean side belonged to Spain, where a thriving port, La Guëra, emerged during the
1960s as a commercial hub for imports from the Canary Islands. Separated by several kilometers,
the growth of Nouadhibou and La Guëra was closely connected during this period such that
locals, to avoid paying tariffs, would wait until sundown to smuggle imported Spanish goods
across the peninsula by foot for resale in Mauritania. During the early years of the war in the
mid-1970s many young men from the tribes of northern Mauritanian, known as “ahel al-Sahel,”
were recruited by Polisario.188 Both Nouadhibou and La Guëra became military targets because
of their strategic location relative to the railroad, a vital link to the import and export of
hydrocarbons and minerals, respectively, for Mauritania’s national economy. Following Spain’s
abrupt withdrawal in 1975, La Guëra was abandoned and today, under the terms of ceasefire, the
formerly Spanish half of the peninsula is under SADR/Polisario’s jurisdiction. Because
SADR/Polisario does not have or exercise the means to oversee this territory beyond periodic
187

Cansado, meaning “worn out” in Spanish, is a company town built in the 1960s that houses SNIM management
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sweeps through the area, this strip of land effectively exists in limbo. Today, aside from a
handful of licensed fisherman and a few Mauritanian military officers on the lookout for
contraband, La Guëra is a ghost town. The rest of the peninsula remains undeveloped,189 and
serves as a kind of demilitarized zone between Morocco and Mauritania.
As this tenuous relation to borders and competing sovereignties suggests, Nouadhibou is
shaped by a fractured political landscape even as it is in Mauritania and therefore not technically
a part of the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Hemmed in by the railroad and the boundary
fence marking the formerly Spanish territory beyond it, the city stretches north-south along the
bay side of the peninsula, a long and narrow patchwork of neighborhoods composed of different
peoples living in relatively unintegrated juxtaposition. The “old” town, which dates back to the
city’s establishment as a fishing port, is now largely populated by immigrants from across
Central and West Africa working in artisanal or commercial fishing.190 The villas of Kra‘a
Nasrani,191 where restaurants cater to Spanish, Chinese and other expatriates involved in the
fishing industry, line the bank leading down from the “old” town to the commercial port. In the
opposite direction, Numerowatt, the most populous section of Nouadhibou, stretches north up the
peninsula toward the mainland, with its back to the bay.192 Dubai193 and Baghdad, two
neighborhoods on either side of the main road that together constitute Numerowatt, are where the
vast majority of Mauritanians and Sahrawis, collectively known as bidanis, live.
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The only exception to this is a monk seal observatory run by an environmental NGO that was built on the
formerly Spanish, ocean side of the peninsula, with approval from SADR/Polisario.
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As an enclave, Nouadhibou is a space of transit: for immigrants from Central and West
Africa to work; for iron ore shipping out of the country with every train arriving from the mines;
for cars and other goods imported overland from Europe through Morocco, en route east to the
refugee camps in Algeria, or points south; and for the Mauritanian state to attempt to capture
rents and fees from goods and people passing through. But it is also an important junction where
Sahrawis from the refugee camps and from Moroccan-occupied Sahara meet and escape the heat,
politically and climatically. Morocco and Algeria maintain consulates – meaning, as well, an
intelligence presence – at opposite ends of the city, demonstrating the political salience of this
space of movement and mobility within a geography of conflict and division. And in the
summer, when the peninsula benefits from the cooling effects of Atlantic trade winds not found
elsewhere in Mauritania, Nouadhibou’s population swells. Expansive villas in the neighborhood
of Dubai are transformed from empty shells into bustling hubs of sociality. Apartment buildings
to rent by the day in the more densely settled Baghdad neighborhood fill with vacationers from
Nouakchott, Mauritania’s capital, as well as Sahrawi refugees escaping the desert heat of the
camps in Algeria. At night, the streets are flooded with car and foot traffic.
It was here where I met Mohamed Mouloud, who had come to Mauritania with his wife,
their two children, his cousin’s family, and several in-laws. By the time we met, Mohamed
Mouloud had been in Nouadhibou for a month, having arrived from the refugee camps where he
had spent most of his life. Aside from the requisite tea set, prayer rug, and rolled up bedding,
Mohamed Mouloud’s modest, two-bedroom rented apartment in Numerowatt remained
characteristically unfurnished and spare. In the kitchen, stockpiled foodstuffs lined the floor: a
huge sack of rice, a tub of cooking oil, and other goods brought from the camps and marked as
humanitarian aid had been brought to provision the family for the summer. Unlike many of the
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other visitors filling Nouadhibou that summer, however, Mohamed Mouloud, his family and inlaws sharing the apartment in Numerowatt had packed up and left the refugee camps for good,
intending to move to Dakhla, in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Although Mohamed
Mouloud had been born in the refugee camps, and neither he nor any of his immediate family
had ever been to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, in order to move to Morocco they had to
present themselves to the Moroccan consulate as “returnees,” or ‘a’idin.
Gathering I: The Aspiring ‘A’id
Though some reach Moroccan-occupied Sahara by way of Spain, most “second wave”
‘a’idin leaving directly from the refugee camps travel overland through northern Mauritania. The
travel through northern Mauritania is necessary, because the heavily militarized sand berm that
demarcates the eastern bounds of Moroccan-occupied territory is lined with soldiers and mines
and largely prevents direct travel between the refugee camps and Moroccan-occupied territory.194
Mohamed Mouloud’s extended family had taken the route through northern Mauritania to reach
Nouadhibou, a two-day journey from the camps. The first leg involves roughly twelve hours of
travel via four-wheel-drive “taxis” that ply the commercial route between the camps and
Zouérate, the largest mining town of northern Mauritania. From Zouérate, travellers board the
train that transports iron ore from mine to coast, a 16-hour trip. Though arduous, travel between
the camps in southwest Algeria and northern Mauritania is a well-worn route, both on account of
the deep ties between Sahrawis in the refugee camps and ahel al-Sahel of northern Mauritania,
and because regional commerce based on re-selling humanitarian aid from the camps into the
Mauritanian market is centered in Zouérate.195
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Polisario, where he was picked up by the EPLS and taken to the camps.
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When I first met Mohamed Mouloud, he had been in Nouadhibou for several weeks and
was looking forward to reaching Moroccan-occupied territory soon. Over the next couple of
months, which coincided that summer with Ramadan, we met fairly regularly either at his
apartment or with whomever he was visiting among the large contingent of friends and
acquaintances who were also summering in Nouadhibou. Unlike “first wave” returnees, whose
discourse tends to adhere to a derogatory and highly politicized portrayal about the camps,
Mohamed Mouloud easily switched between aspects of life in the refugee camps that he deeply
valued, and his reasons for leaving. His cousin, he recalled, once denounced Polisario leaders to
a BBC television crew: proof, he said, that one could speak freely in the camps. On the other
hand, he noted that taking a political position in the camps that was in favor of anything less than
Sahrawi self-determination risked facing accusations of being a Moroccan spy. Moreover,
Mohamed Mouloud considered Polisario leadership corrupt, distributing political and economic
opportunities along family lines, and monopolized by several subfractions, or afkhadh, of
Rguibat al-Sharq: Awlad Daoud, Awlad Cheikh, Swayad, Tehellat, Boueihat. When we met a
Sahrawi policeman riding in an official SADR state vehicle on the streets of Nouadhibou, which
was not an uncommon sight that summer, Mohamed Mouloud good naturedly said to him at
some point in their conversation, “but the Sahara’s not Polisario.” In an implicit critique of
SADR’s centralized authority in the camps, he noted drily about the truck, “[Polisario’s] got a lot
of those…”
Perhaps most significantly, Mohamed Mouloud articulated commitment to the refugee
camps in generational terms. An older generation had cast their lot with life in exile and accepted
the sacrifices that come with living in the camps indefinitely: “[it’s] between them and God
[mulana],” as he put it. A younger generation, including his own, will not abide: they go to Spain,
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or wherever else, while making it clear that they won’t stand the status quo indefinitely.
Mohamed Mouloud considered himself between these two generational positions: he had been
born and grew up in the camps, went to school in Algeria196 – an experience that he remembered
fondly despite the fact that it took place in the midst of the Algerian civil war – and, since
returning to the camps, grew impatient with the lack of any meaningful opportunities to work, or
save, for his family. As a result, he has turned his attention to providing for his children, and with
that in mind, had made arrangements through a relative to move to Dakhla, in Moroccanoccupied territory. Initiating this process required registering with the Moroccan consulate in
Nouadhibou for the “right to return” [haq al-‘awda] and qualify for benefits [al-in‘ash].
Like many aspects of the Morocco-Polisario conflict, the process of “returning” is
coordinated between Moroccan state officials in Foreign Affairs, the military, and intelligence
apparatuses associated with the Ministry of the Interior. In the late-1980s and early-90s, the first
‘a’idin would simply appear, unannounced, in Morocco while their means of getting there
remain shrouded by the opacity of intelligence work and the intrigue of diplomatic maneuvering.
As mobility between the refugee camps and Moroccan-occupied territory has increased since
2000, the process of “return” has become somewhat less fraught. The approval of ‘a’id status
still passes through the Moroccan security state nexus, however, and therefore remains opaque
and arbitrary. When I first met Mohamed Mouloud, he was optimistic that he and his family
would be moving to Dakhla as soon as within a week. In anticipation, he was full of questions
about how the cities in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara compared with Nouadhibou. As time
wore on, however, it became apparent that he had little sense or control over when Morocco
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would grant him “the right of return.”
On the surface, the process of “return” seemed simple. Mohamed Mouloud reported that
after presenting himself at the Moroccan consulate in Nouadhibou and declaring his interest in
“returning to the nation [al-watan],” he was asked some questions (“they examine your frame of
mind verbally” [ykharras nefsiyatek shafahiyan”]), and then told to wait. Mohamed Moloud and
his friends and acquaintances who had either gone through the process of “return,” or were trying
to, all recognized that the Consulate is mere window-dressing. Rather, they said, the men
working in intelligence stationed at the Consulate were the ones running the operation and
making the decisions. Whatever the logic and timing to getting approval for “return,” the process
seemed both simple but also entirely opaque.
One evening, an acquaintance from the camps who had become an ‘a’id and was working
in Moroccan-occupied Dakhla joined Mohamed Mouloud and his friends. Gathered on the floor
around the requisite tea set, in the back room of a rented house in Numerowatt Robini 1, the
evening had the feeling of an information session: everyone was interested in what the friend
from Dakhla had to say about conditions in Moroccan-occupied territory. The man from Dakhla
embraced the role of resident expert, regaling us with stories of what daily life was like in
Dakhla (“people are citified and time is full”), his ambivalence about living amongst so many
chilha197 (“you feel as though it’s not in your interest [to be around so many chilha], but then
when you think about it…”), and his encounters with the Moroccan state. Most dramatically,
however, the friend from Dakhla launched into a story of crossing the border in order to arrive in
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Morocco, largely to advise Mohamed Mouloud who had purchased a van in Nouadhibou and
hoped to bring the vehicle with him and his family into Morocco.
Everyone, the friend from Dakhla says, has the right to bring a car into Morocco, but not
livestock.198 As proof, he described reaching the border between Morocco and Mauritania, which
involves a gap of several kilometers, known variously as al-Guerguerat, “the hole” [al-hufra] or,
colloquially, Qandahar, where free trade in various kinds of goods (cars, cigarettes, hashish) has
flourished over the years.199 According to several accounts I heard about this border (I did not
make this border crossing myself), there is often a long line of vehicles waiting to get through
Moroccan customs – “Africans transporting ‘all kinds of stuff,’ and chilha bringing goods from
Morocco,” as the friend from Dakhla put it – such that travelers often have to sleep in their
vehicle overnight in order to keep their place in queue. After waiting overnight in line, the friend
from Dakhla described reaching the front of the line only to be told that he couldn’t bring his car
into the territory. As the friend told it, he used “convincing language” [al-kalam al-muqni‘a],
holding his ground until a higher-up came down from his post and ultimately approved entry for
this man and his car. In this way, the success story of using “convincing language” (the friend
was quick to point out that “convincing language” did not entail getting angry or yelling at the
gendarmes), provided an example for how ‘a’idin could strategically assert their agency in the
face of a vast political machinery meant to intimidate them. As background to this example,
however, the ‘a’id friend from Dakhla stressed the important role played by luck [“al-’azhar,
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‘endhu dur kebir”] in determining how long one has to wait to earn the “right of return.” The
friend had waited several months; the same would end up being true of Mohamed Mouloud and
his family, as well.
Gathering II: Judgment
Late one evening during Ramadan, Mohamed Mouloud and I were in a rented house in
the northern reaches of Nouadhibou, in Numerowatt Robini 6. We were with a group of men
watching television and making tea, including: an ‘a’id who had made the trip to Laâyoune/El
Aaiún to see relatives from the refugee camps summering in Nouadhibou; a friend from the
refugee camps; Mohamed Mouloud’s brother-in-law; and a Mauritanian-Sahrawi man who lived
in Nouadhibou but had family in the refugee camps. It was after midnight, and we had all had
many rounds of tea when the conversation turned to Omar Hadrami. Hadrami, as mentioned
previously, was one of the earliest ‘a’idin, having defected to Morocco in 1989. As a founding
member of the Polisario Front, Hadrami was and remains one of the most high-profile ‘a’idin to
have left the camps and, since his “return” to Morocco, has served a number of prominent roles
in national and regional government.
In the summer of 2015, Hadrami was in the news again, having recently been appointed
to a new position advising the King of Morocco on Saharan affairs, which prompted Mohamed
Mouloud to assert that he thought Hadrami “supports Sahrawis” [ybghri al-Sahrawiyyin] despite
actively opposing the Polisario Front and having disavowed Sahrawi nationalism. The
Mauritanian-Sahrawi man with family in the refugee camps flatly rejected this statement as “a
contradiction.” The group argued over this for a while, and it became clear that most of the
others were dubious of Mohamed Mouloud’s view. Mohamed Mouloud’s younger brother-inlaw sided with the Mauritanian-Sahrawi, explaining that Hadrami chose his mother’s people,
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referring to the Aït Oussa, a Tekna tribe based in Wed Nun, over “his own” tribe (meaning the
tribe of his agnatic kin), the Rguibat. This led someone to take a straw poll. Everyone besides
Mohamed Mouloud thought the assertion that one could “be” Sahrawi and not be nationalist was
an untenable position. One friend, making tea, stared at the television, apparently abstaining.
This led someone to declare cryptically that national identity can be democratic in this way, and
conversation moved on.
Although this impromptu referendum brought closure to the question of identity in the
context of this gathering, the constituents of this conversational vote were themselves occupying
multiple subject positions. The man who flatly rejected Mohamed Mouloud’s proposition as “a
contradiction,” for example, lives in Mauritania but has close ties to the refugee camps. These
folks are sometimes referred to as “Mauritanian of Sahrawi origins” or simply ahel al-Sahel. 200
Ahel al-Sahel refers to the tribes historically associated with the territory of Western Sahara,
such as Rguibat, Wlad Dlim, Laarousiyin and Barikallah, which are largely coterminous with
those found throughout Mauritania, but specifically those concentrated in the country’s drier,
northern region. The ties between Polisario and northern Mauritania run deep. After facing
repression within Morocco, Polisario leadership was largely based out of northern Mauritania
between the years of 1973 and 1975 and announced its establishment from the northern
Mauritanian mining town of Zouérate in 1973. Even as the Mauritanian state capitulated to
pressure from first Spain and then Morocco to repress Polisario’s activities within the country,
many people in northern Mauritania continued to materially support Polisario fighters. A
Mauritanian National Security report from that era notes:
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It is certain that all of the sons of the tribes of the region are offering support for
the Sahrawi fighters, and especially those of the Rguibat tribe to which most of
the Front’s leadership belong…this includes the contributions of merchants and
Sahrawi workers, as well as certain Bedouin notables/elders [wujuha’] who
present their camels to the Front’s bases in order to provide meat to the fighters,
while the women donated their jewelry.201
The leader of Polisario at the time, El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, sought to convince the President of
Mauritania, Mokhtar ould Daddah, of their shared cause by describing the Sahrawi and
Mauritanian peoples as “two eggs in one nest.”202 At the diplomatic level, however, the
Mauritanian government contested the Western Saharan people’s right to self-determination
before the UN on the very grounds of these similarities, claiming that the peoples of the two
territories shared the same “cultural entity” known as trab al-bidan.203 When war broke out in
1976 and the Mauritanian state sided with Morocco, many ahel al-Sahel moved to the refugee
camps and joined Polisario. And as processes of displacement, resettlement and mobility have
continually shaped and reshaped the geography of political conflict in the Sahara since the
1970s, the overlap between Sahrawi and Mauritanian peoples – particularly those in northern
Mauritania – has remained constant.
Unofficial figures from ten years ago estimate that 25,000 Sahrawis live in Mauritania,
mostly in the cities of northern Mauritania, Nouadhibou, F’derik and Zouérate.204 It should not
be surprising, then, that refugees in the camps remain closely connected with Mauritania through
commercial, kinship or other property ties that go back generations. It is not unusual for a family
to maintain property both in the camps and in the mining towns of Zouérate and F’derik,
regularly traveling between both. An older generation, in particular, may use a combination of
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Mauritanian and Sahrawi forms of identification to access pasturelands of northern Mauritania
and those in the territory of Western Sahara under Polisario control, known in the refugee camps
as the Liberated Territories. Others may renew a prior generation’s connection with Mauritania
in search of employment, or simply mobility. In one instance, I met a man who was born in
Zouérate where his father worked on building the railroad that now transports iron ore to the
coast. When the war broke out in 1976, his father joined Polisario and the family moved to the
camps, where they have been based ever since. Forty years later, the family retains the original
plot of land in Zouérate, though diminished in size, where, when I met him, this man was staying
and applying for a Mauritanian passport in order to visit family in Moroccan-occupied territory.
To be sure, certain distinctions between Mauritanians and Sahrawis have inevitably
sharpened with time, whether from the lingering bitterness left by the four years of war between
Mauritania and Polisario, the effects of Morocco’s attempts to instrumentalize “non-Sahrawi”
Mauritanians by resettling them in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, or simply the distinct
habitus that has developed among those living in the particular political and economic conditions
of refugee camps. Particularly when people from around the region converge on Nouadhibou in
the summer, a range of markers, from clothing to moral and ethical judgments of behavior, are
used to distinguish between Sahrawis and Mauritanians. However, the identity “Mauritanian of
Sahrawi origins” captures the enduring overlap between refugees and the tribes of ahel al-Sahel,
blurring these distinctions and complicating the relationship between the consolidation of
national identity and its boundaries.
In this way, the resident of Nouadhibou who called Mohamed Mouloud’s position on
Omar Hadrami “a contradiction,” himself embodies a contradiction inherent in the Sahrawi
national project. In a disaggregated political landscape where affiliation and belonging typically
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mapped onto genealogical cartographies of kinship, in the case of tribe, and cultural spaces tied
to models of moral excellence, in the case of trab al-bidan, efforts to consolidate a unitary sense
of ethnic nationalism constantly face the issue of who falls “inside” and “outside” of these
boundaries. Recent literature on the importance of “connectivity” to the reproduction of
economic, social and cultural space in the Sahara highlight the difficulties posed by new,
postcolonial modes of identification:
Hence, in the contemporary Sahara, with the growing impact of centralized states,
nationalism, and the bounded and exclusive ethnic categories that accompany
them, radically different notions of identity are put forward, putting pressure on
earlier identities that relied on regional connectivity.205
The notion of connectivity is an important one, as it conveys an aspect of life in the Sahara
integral to the sociocultural realms. However, I would also like to posit the importance of fluidity
and multiplicity, which are characteristic of political subjectivity in the Saharan context where
mobility and separation are as important to the realm of political authority as connectivity and
consolidation. The “Mauritanian of Sahrawi origins” embodies this phenomenon of multiplicity
and fluidity in a single subject position.
While the man from Nouadhibou called Mohamed Mouloud’s proposition “a
contradiction,” the more extended reply came from Mohamed Mouloud’s brother-in-law. By
referring to Hadrami’s split allegiance between his mother’s people, from the Ait Oussa tribe,
and his father’s people, the Rguibat, Mohamed Mouloud’s in-law questioned Omar Hadrami’s
loyalty not explicitly in national terms, but through the idiom of kinship and tribal affiliation. By
suggesting that Hadrami placed ties to his matrilineal kin over and above those on his father’s
side, the young man used the patrilineal norms of tribal kinship to cast aspersions on Hadrami’s
political loyalty. Parsing Hadrami’s national and political commitment through the idiom of
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kinship and tribal affiliation, this explanation highlights the entanglement of national and state
sovereignty projects in the Sahara with social relations organized by kinship and tribe. This
returns to Alice Wilson’s point that state and tribal sovereignty in the Sahara are formed out of
the same social relations, and that one process of making sovereignty entails the “umaking” of
the other. Wilson foregrounds this mutual imbrication between the relations of tribal and state
sovereignty in the context of the refugee camps in order to note that this relationship is not
unidirectional: sometimes tribal relations are overwritten by the state, while at other times they
reassert their significance.206 Similarly, the young man’s evaluation of Hadrami’s loyalty and
betrayal in terms of kin aligns Sahrawi nationalism with Hadrami’s father’s tribe, Rguibat, and
allegiance to Morocco with his mother’s, Aït Oussa.
In doing so, the brother-in-law is also referring to Hadrami’s subject position along two
fault lines that have persisted during efforts to unify under the collective identity of Sahrawi
during the era of decolonization. While the Rguibat constitute the largest tribe populating
Western Sahara, and are particularly dominant in both refugee camp society and Polisario
leadership, Aït Oussa is one of the largest Tekna tribes (a collection of Saharan tribes based in
Oued Noun in southern Morocco). Rguibat and Aït Oussa have historically intermarried,
Hadrami being just one product of this union between members of these rival tribes. Following
the failure of the Moroccan Liberation Army in the 1950s, however, the Moroccan state
cultivated support among the Aït Oussa, furnishing them with weapons and promoting raids
between the two tribes as a means of sowing distrust.207 Perhaps as a result, the Aït Oussa tribe
has been heavily recruited into the Moroccan Army, and Aït Oussis occupy prominent positions
in the upper echelons of Moroccan state administration. By suggesting that Hadrami “preferred
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his mother’s people” to his father’s tribe, the young man accuses Hadrami of siding with the Aït
Oussa over the Rguibat and, by association, Morocco over Polisario. The distinction remains
significant both within the camps, where Rguibat are seen to be the dominant constituents of
Polisario and SADR, and in Moroccan society, where to be Rguibat is to be ascribed a subject
position of potential traitor (see Chapter 5).
In addition to the Rguibat-Tekna division, the young man is also referring to a division
within the Rguibat tribe between the afkhadh, or tribal subfractions, known as “Rguibat alSahel,” found closer to the Atlantic coast, and Rguibat al-Sharq. While together these two halves
form the Rguibat tribe, this division follows the segmentary logic of North African and Middle
Eastern tribal affiliations more generally, whereby smaller groupings stand in opposition to one
another unless the imperative arises to unite against a common foe who lies outside the groups’
kinship structures.208 In the case of Rguibat al-Sahel and Rguibat al-Sharq, these divisions have
largely been subsumed under the Sahrawi identity and Polisario’s project of national liberation.
However, the consolidation of Polisario’s leadership by members of afkhadh from Rguibat alSharq during the 1970s, and the leadership’s repression, torture and abuse that came to light in
1988 exacerbated resentment among Rguibat al-Sahel (as well as other tribes) over their
marginalization. While members of all tribes participated in the 1988 uprising in the refugee
camps, members of Rguibat al-Sharq view the event as a divisive “riot” that reproduced the
segmentary divisions between Rguibat al-Sharq and Rguibat al-Sahel. The rebellion was led, of
course, by none other than Omar Hadrami, a member of Rguibat al-Sahel.
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This discussion among ‘a’idin in Nouadhibou captures the complex array of identities
involved in constituting Sahrawi nationalism, and the competing frameworks for expressing
collective identities. In light of this conversation, I would like to return to Alice Wilson’s
perceptive point that nation-state and tribal projects of sovereignty in the Sahara are mutually
imbricated. Questions of loyalty and affiliation are regularly expressed through the idiom of
kinship, illustrating how the emergence of national identities do not erase pre-existing forms.
However, I would suggest that the categories involved in this discursive space are not limited to
the binary of nation-state or tribe. I have highlighted this conversation among a group of men in
Nouadhibou for what it conveys about the multiple identities that many individuals embrace
within the fragmented political geography of decolonization in Western Sahara. Both tribal and
national affiliations in this context associate with collectivities that overlap current geopolitical
boundaries (Sahrawi, Tekna, ahel al-Sahel), and in other cases subdivide genealogically and
geographically within a broader unity (ahel al-Sahel/Sharq/Qibla in Mauritania, Rguibat alSharq/al-Sahel in Western Sahara). Identities emerge in relation to tribe and nation, but also in
relation to hierarchical cultural spatial imaginaries that exists outside of national time (trab albidan), as well as subject positions that emerge in the context of prolonged nationalist conflict
(‘a’id).
Indeed, the fact that most of the men were either ‘a’idin, or in the process of “returning”
is an important factor in the conversation that I have been analyzing. Their mobility, as ‘a’idin,
destabilizes the poles of loyalty and betrayal in the context of nationalist conflict. But the inverse
is true, too: the group’s appraisals and dismissals of Omar Hadrami, who is in many respects
considered the original ‘a’id, serves to historicize the category that they share. Their willingness
to judge Hadrami without assuming that his status as a defector defined their own, highlights
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shifts and continuities in the significance of the figure as a subject position in regional context.
The “return” of Hadrami in 1989 was nothing short of a political spectacle: for many, al-‘Athmi
embodied the notion of “return” as betrayal. Twenty-five years later, the act of “returning” was
less about political motive, and more a matter of finding work, education for children, a future.
In this way, requesting “the right to return” from the Moroccan state is no longer considered a
humiliating act of betrayal and shame, but simply an expression of movement and mobility.
Reflecting upon the aftermath of civil war in Sri Lanka, another context of nationalist conflict,
Sharika Thiranagama suggests that historically shifting judgments of treason and betrayal give
perspective for how judgments of political right and wrong are made, but additionally indicate
how politics could have been framed otherwise:
Traitors, then, are not given once and for all but created by history, as new frames
of interpretation are opened up, allowing a sense that it could have been different,
that there were other possible forms of engagement. Only by exploring the
complex ethical terrain through which acts of treason are judged and evaluated
can we begin to understand why some people are violently punished for acts of
betrayal, while others are either forgiven or ignored.209
Given the multiple frameworks for making sense of identity and political action that were
expressed in this conversation about Omar Hadrami, and the fact that it took place among
“returnees,” itself a subject position of movement and mobility, I suggest that these men were
implicitly discussing “other possible forms of engagement” within a political context structured
by nationalist loyalty and betrayal.
Finally, it is not incidental that this conversation was taking place in Nouadhibou, rather
than within Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara or the refugee camps in Algeria. Mohamed
Mouloud’s suggestion that one could “support” Sahrawis collectively and not support Sahrawi
nationalism, for example, would immediately invite suspicion of betraying the national cause if
209
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he were to state this in the refugee camps. Conversely, questioning Morocco’s occupation of the
Sahara from within Morocco is nearly impossible.210 In Nouadhibou, by contrast, there is much
greater latitude in discussing the effects of ongoing political conflict. In this space of transit,
Sahrawis and Mauritanians from across the region converge in a space devoid of much of the
suspicion and surveillance that structures Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. Likewise, the
popular discourse of national diplomacy that predetermines many interactions with foreigners
visiting the refugee camps is not pervasive here. Of course, the convergence of people from
around a politically fragmented region will reproduce many of the tensions and suspicions at the
heart of the nationalist conflict. It was not incidental that one of Mohamed Mouloud’s friends
kept his silence when the “referendum” on Sahrawi identity was put forward in Robini 6, staring
at the television instead: many prefer to keep these thoughts to themselves, even in Nouadhibou.
Nonetheless, in serving as both a hub of movement and mobility within the regional geography
of confinement, and an enclave that stands outside of the loci of competing sovereignties,
Nouadhibou provides a setting where the processes of fixing people’s identities are held in
abeyance. This context where the recitation of political scripts that achieve diplomatic visibility,
express national loyalty, and confirm identification are contested, if not refuted, provides the
conditions for “other possible forms of engagement” with the region’s past in the present.211

Section III: Identification by Referendum
210
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One such form of engagement took place through the straw poll, which brought the
men’s discussion of Omar Hadrami and Sahrawi nationalism to an end. As was intended by the
Sahrawi-Mauritanian man who proposed it, the vote was carried out quickly and informally, by
voice and gesture – or abstention from both – and confirmed a majority view within the group
that Sahrawi identity could not be decoupled from nationalism. Neither the suggestion nor the
outcome of the vote elicited much debate. Rather, in bringing closure to a voluble exchange of
views, the casting of votes provided a segueway for the conversation to move on to a less
contentious or explicitly political topic. Despite its apparent simplicity, the conversational vote
was also a gesture toward the unrealized referendum on self-determination for Western Sahara.
A part of the formal process for applying self-determination under international law, a
referendum in Western Sahara was preempted first by Morocco’s invasion in 1975, and
subsequently – and perhaps more agonizingly – during a prolonged process during the 1990s. As
part of the ceasefire agreement of 1991, the United Nations established a peacekeeping mission
in Western Sahara, MINURSO, tasked with overseeing a referendum. Hopes were high that the
referendum would be carried out within the year.212
From the outset, however, Morocco and Polisario staked out conflicting positions on how
to determine the list of eligible voters for the upcoming referendum. Polisario sought to restrict
the list of eligible voters to those listed on a 1974 Spanish census, and their descendants.
Morocco sought much more expansive criteria, calling for the inclusion of all members of all
tribes associated with the territory. These differences were strategic. Polisario counted on a more
restricted voter roll to work in its favor, even if the colonial-era census may have excluded some
of the families of Polisario’s founding members and highest ranking officials. Morocco’s
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position in opposition sought to include tribes with tenuous connections to the territory, but
whose members, the government believed, could be counted on to vote in Morocco’s interest.
Those tribes which under Spanish administration had been listed as “Tribes of the North,” and
“Tribes of the Coast and South” became the focus of the dispute, since these were terms used by
Spanish administration to categorize anyone living in the territory who did not belong to one of
what Spain identified as the territory’s seven main tribes (Rguibat Charg, Rguibat Sahel,
Izerguiyin, Ait Lahsen, Laaroussiyin, Wlad Dlim, Wlad Tidrarin).213 The dispute centered on
both which tribes to include, but also, if including parts of “neighboring” tribes, whether to allow
eligibility up to the level of tribal subfraction (al-fakhdh), or a more narrow kinship group (alahel).
In an attempt to resolve this dispute over the criteria for voting, MINURSO established
an Identification Commission, with agencies set up across the region in Moroccan-occupied
Western Sahara, Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, as well as across Morocco and Mauritania.
As Erik Jensen, the former UN employee who directed this process, notes in his detailed account
of MINURSO’s Identification Commission during the 1990s, Morocco and Polisario’s dispute
over the criteria of eligible voters for the referendum did not translate easily into a technical
solution.214 The struggle over the anthropological basis for determining a voter list had
implications for the evidence and procedure used for verifying potential voters’ identity and
affiliation. Polisario’s position depended upon Spanish documentation for verification. Morocco
argued that colonial-era documentation excluded family members living outside the territory at
213
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that time. In response, Morocco asserted that all members of any tribal subfraction counted in the
Spanish census should be eligible to vote, and that oral testimony verified by shaykhs from each
subfraction ought to be used.
Moreover, as the UN-led process of determining eligible voters unfolded, Morocco
increasingly appeared to be exploiting the bureaucratic process by flooding the Identification
Commission with applications. The Commission, which had set up processing stations in
Morocco, northern Mauritania, the refugee camps, as well as the territory of Western Sahara
itself, received three times as many new applications from its offices in Morocco as from those
in refugee camps and Mauritania combined.215 In addition, I heard from several people whose
relatives had been recruited to “train” non-Sahrawi’s to present themselves as Sahrawi before the
Commission.216 As a result, the process of identifying a list of eligible voters dragged on for the
better part of a decade, and has been largely abandoned ever since results of the initial round of
the identification process were published in 2000.217 Across the region, this period is referred to
holistically as ‘amaliya tahdid al-hawiya, or the identification process.
Given this context, the impromptu vote in Nouadhibou among friends evoked the history
of this unresolved political project. Not only did it bring closure to the topic of conversation but
this gesture performed a kind of resolution to determining the “self” in Western Sahara. Even as
it evoked the unresolved project of Sahrawi popular sovereignty, the vote among friends also
served as a point of contrast, an expression that consolidated the meaning of Sahrawi identity
simply, decisively, and in a manner which has eluded Sahrawis to this day. By staging “other
215
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possible forms of engagement” with the region’s past in the present, this brief and relatively
uncontroversial vote among friends in Robini 6 in Nouadhiobu was, in a sense, an act of selfdetermination. In this way, the act was performative if not effective. Their vote, which stages the
sovereignty of “the people,” in a national sense, brings to mind Nathaniel Berman’s notion that
the “self” in self-determination is a “form of argument:”
The recognition of a particular ‘people’ is an effect of a particular form of
discursive reconstruction. The ‘self’ of self-determination emerges through the
particular textual dynamics of subjective and objective conceptions, dynamics
guided by the particular type of disruption giving rise to their conflict. No less
than the legal competence over self-determination, the ‘self’ is a form of
argument.218
Berman’s analysis comes from looking at the legal discourse of self-determination in
international law, one which has taken place through moments of disjuncture or transition when
sovereignty is, as his title indicates, “in abeyance.”219 This insight helps to think through the
discussion of identity and belonging taking place in Numerowatt 6 as, similarly, a form of
argument between a group of men. In this sense, evoking the referendum belies its inescapable
presence in the history of the region’s decolonization, but is also expressive of their own
“subjectivity in abeyance,” as ‘a’idin who, themselves, were on a trajectory, movement, or
transition, between identities and subject positions.

Section IV – Multiple Returns
Despite the duration of the Identification Commission process throughout the 1990s, the
intricacies of the process directly affected only certain groups. Those shaykhs appointed by
either Morocco or Polisario to preside over oral testimony of prospective voters, for example,
found themselves in positions of concentrated power. In the context of the refugee camps, this
218
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made for a particularly sudden shift given that Polisario had worked for a generation to dissolve
what it considered traditional, or tribal, bases of authority. For those who registered and testified
before the Identification Commission, however, the process was largely administrative.
Certainly, there were contentious cases: like something out of a soap opera, people alluded to
instances where shaykh’s, under political pressure, refused to recognize people who were
patently from their own family. Or, for example, in the case of those presented by Morocco as
prospective voters who had no connection to the Sahara, there were stories of how the training
that these candidates underwent ultimately revealed itself, as these fraudulent applicants
stumbled over their newly adopted Sahrawi name, or failed in some other crucial detail. More
generally, however, I found that people who lived through the experience either did not want to
talk about it, or found the experience mundane. One woman simply recounted her day as a
mundane, bureaucratic experience: somewhat baffled by what to do, she followed instructions,
answered questions, and was otherwise nonplussed by the experience.220
However, the significance of the identification process could be seen in relation to
broader transformations to the region. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Morocco transferred large
numbers of settlers to the territory and began investing heavily in regional economic
development durin this time. Many of these settlers were poor Moroccans transplanted to cities
in Western Sahara such as Boujdour, Dakhla and Tarfaya with promises of housing and land.
Some underwent the training described above; these transplants tended to live in distinct
neighborhoods built for their arrival. By contrast, large numbers of Sahrawis who belonged to
the contested category of “Tribes from the North” were transplanted specifically to Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, where they formed a large tent city mentioned in Chapter 1, known as Khaymat alWahda. In addition to transforming the demographics and political geography of the city, the
220
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people of Khaymat al-Wahda experienced the effects of the identification process in a
particularly intense way. Unlike other transplants, who had only questionable basis for voting in
the referendum, these transplanted Sahrawis were guaranteed the right to vote in the referendum,
but who they would vote for remained very much in question. While Morocco furnished
residents of Khaymat al-Wahda with free sugar, flour, oil and other necessities, along with the
promise of future housing, these transplanted Sahrawis were now in closer proximity to the
epicenter of Sahrawi national struggle. And as the Identification Commission labored through
years of administrative and procedural work of identifying eligible voters, Sahrawis in Khaymat
al-Wahda became subject to a different kind of scrutiny, from friends and neighbors alike, that
sought to identify their political commitments and affiliations. When people across western
Sahara refer to tahdid al-hawiya, or identification, during the 1990s, they are referring as much
to this scrutiny that demanded political identification, as to the years-long administrative process
which provoked such everyday politicization.
***
Most ‘a’idin formally move between sides in the political conflict only once. The effort
expended in attempting to fix the identities of those subject to this dispute, however, is ongoing.
This final profile of an ‘a’id illustrates this continuous pressure to commit to one side or another
in his double movement. Born in Tan Tan, in the southern Moroccan region of Wed Nun,
Mohamed Salek’s family was among those brought to Laâyoune/El Aaiún to live in the vast tent
city known as Khaymat al-Wahda in 1991. Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1, Khaymat alWahda was one of the first major efforts by the Moroccan state to shape the demographics of
Western Sahara while contesting the list of eligible voters for a potential referendum on selfdetermination. Unlike those resettled to Moroccan-occupied territory from the outskirts of major
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cities across Morocco, however, the population of Khaymat al-Wahda was constituted largely by
members of Saharan tribes already deemed eligible to vote, but who had been living in the
neighboring region of Wed Nun. Like many of the major movements of displacement and
resettlement motivated by decolonization in the Sahara, it is not easy to distinguish between
voluntary and forced resettlement. Mohamed Salek’s father, for example, was a retired member
of the Moroccan Armed Forces when the family moved. Whether he participated in this project
of resettlement orchestrated by the Moroccan state because he was still subject to orders within a
chain of command, because his pension was threatened if he did not move, or because he wanted
to support his country in this endeavor, I cannot say.
What is certain, however, is that upon moving to Khaymat al-Wahda as a child,
Mohamed Salek grew up in a context of intense politicization. On the one hand, the Moroccan
state provisioned his family, like all of those living in Khaymat al-Wahda, with free basic goods
such as water, flour and oil, in addition to free medical care, shelter and electricity.221 At the
same time, Sahrawis loyal to Polisario sought to educate him of the justness of Sahrawi
nationalism, no doubt describing the violence of Morocco’s invasion, the number of people
imprisoned during the 1970s and 80s, or otherwise disappeared, and the ongoing state repression
of Sahrawi nationalism. Unwittingly or not, in moving to Khayma al-Wahda Mohamed Salek’s
family put themselves at the epicenter of a fierce political campaign where the upcoming vote
would determine the sovereignty of their new home. Starting at the age of ten, Mohamed Salek
himself became one of the most sought-after voters.
Politicized by the Sahrawi nationalists who recruited him, Mohamed Salek joined proPolisario “cells” named for martyrs of the movement who had died under Moroccan occupation,
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such as the Group of Martyr Bashir Lahlaoui, the Forum for Truth and Equity on the Sahara, and
others. These groups emerged in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara in the mid- to late-1990s,
when Morocco’s maneuverings with regards to eligible voters increasingly appeared to be a
strategy meant to prevent the referendum from ever taking place. Drawing upon the emerging
language of human rights in the context of the dispute (Chapter 5), these groups demanded
greater information on disappeared persons dating back to the 1990s, and increasingly gave voice
to a public identity for Sahrawi politics in Morocco. Indeed, some of the most prominent
Sahrawi human rights activists today, such as Aminatou Haidar, Ali Salem ould Tamek and
Ibrahim Dahman, first got in touch and involved with each other through these groups.
Mohamed Salek became involved enough in the Sahrawi nationalist cause that he
committed, as part of a cohort of activists, to move to the refugee camps in Algeria. Following
the inverse trajectory of the Moroccan ‘a’idin, those who moved to the camps from Morocco are
known within the camps as “joiners,” or multahiqin. I met a number of multahiqin who had been
living in the camps for years, working for SADR-affiliated civil society organizations such as
AFAPREDESA, and supporting the Sahrawi national cause. Mohamed Salek was among them
for a time, having moved to the camps, where he benefitted, like many of the refugees, from
education in Algeria and found work with UJSARIO, a youth organ of SADR in the camps. Not
long after reaching the camps, however, Mohamed Salek said he became disillusioned by what
he claims to be Polisario’s favoritism toward members of the Rguibat tribe, and its
marginalization of members of “Tribes from the North,” or Tekna tribes. Moreover, upon
learning about the government’s pre-1988 violent past only after arriving in the camps, which he
also considered an outgrowth of Polisario’s tribalism, Mohamed Salek felt as though he had been
misled. A few years after arriving in the camps, he decided to return to Morocco as an ‘a’id, a
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move that he recognized has left him stigmatized by those whom he has left on both sides of the
berm: “When you return ‘a’id, you live two things: there are those here [in Moroccan-occupied
Western Sahara] who call you ‘traitor,’ and those with the [Polisario] Front who call you
‘traitor.’”
Having moved twice as an act of “désolidarisation,” Mohamed Salek’s experience
testifies to the experience of having one’s political subjectivity be the object of such intense
political struggle. Because of his ongoing bitterness toward his experience in the refugee camps
in Algeria, Mohamed Salek characterizes the experience of his initial politicization in terms of
being inculcated with a “fabricated reality”:
Mohamed Salek: The [people of the Khaymat al-Wahda] camps, akhi [brother],
they were people of the Sahara [ahel al-Sahra’], they came from the Tan Tan
region, but they're all Saharan and lots of those tribes - every family has a
member with the [Polisario] Front, or two, or an entire family. So the internal
separatists, or, human rights activists (huquqiyyin) as they are called, are
mercenaries (murtazaqin). They [the human rights activists] are among those who
fed this tendency. Protesting against the Moroccan order…ruined, ruined, the
thinking of many young people, because they were injected by this antagonistic
thinking, and by this sabotage. And they [the human rights activists] benefited,
personally, from these protests. So the residents of the [Khaymat al-Wahda]
camps suffered two-fold: originally, [the Sahrawi residents of Laâyoune/El Aaiún
who predated their arrival] say that we're coming from inside Morocco,
while…the Polisario Front says that we're Saharan people and concerned by the
issue, and so [we] can organize protests. So what happened is that reality was
fabricated [fabraqa al-waqa‘]. I mean, there have been a lot of victims from this,
young men and women.
Me: What do you remember from this time?
Mohamed Salek: I was among the people who were injected [huqina] [with these
ideas]…and I don't deny that I participated in establishing a number of cells, with
lots of mobilizing for the struggle and I had a farfetched idea [fikra wahmiya],
until I joined the Polisario Front [of what I was fighting for], and when I joined
the Polisario Front everything that I encountered was an illusion inside an illusion
and so I became convinced [tuwwaladat liddayyi qana‘a rasikha] that we, Tekna
tribes, we are, in truth, on account of the historical link by bay'a to the King, that
we are Moroccan tribes. That's a result of what I experienced/lived in the
[Polisario-run refugee] camps as far as marginalization and exclusion and
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tribalism and discrimination and being informed about my cousins who'd been
shot while in Polisario prison. And who were tortured and separated from each
other and had their families violated. All of that's the truth.222
Mohamed Salek’s account notes that his political affiliation has been the object of both struggle
and suspicion since the time he was a child. In being moved to Khaymat al-Wahda, he observes
that even as Polisario supporters sought to influence his outlook, other Sahrawis living in
Laâyoune/El Aaiún when Khaymat al-Wahda was established initially viewed the new residents
with great suspicion. Given that their presence was clearly the result of a project of the Moroccan
state, and that residents of the camps were lavished with handouts from which longtime residents
were excluded, the camps could be seen as part of Morocco’s strategy to create and deepen
divisions among Sahrawis. What is particularly interesting, however, is that his political
subjectivity became the object of suspicion and marked him as a target for recruitment. In the
context of political conflict, those who cannot be trusted need to be convinced.
Mohamed Salek’s present disillusionment with his past experience in the camps causes
him to view the subsequent period of his activism as a young man with bitterness and regret.
Where he once thought that he was being recruited into a revolutionary struggle, he now sees
“mercenaries” posing as human rights activists. Of course, whether “mercenaries” or human
rights activists, these people were also likely neighbors and peers: Sahrawis living in
Laâyoune/El Aaiún and, quite possibly, even in Khaymat al-Wahda. Mohamed Salek frames this
shift between joining the struggle for independence to leaving it, disgusted, as a trajectory of
discovering the difference between believing in a “fabricated reality” of the Sahrawi nationalist
cause, and then learning a much less inspiring “truth” upon arriving at the camps. This trajectory
is reminiscent of Lahcen’s “return” to Morocco, only in reverse: Lahcen complained about
responding to the call to “return” to Morocco with an open mind, only to find himself deceived
222
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and marginalized upon his arrival. More than the corruption or bankruptcy of Polisario and its
affiliated human rights activists – who are, as Lahcen’s story points out, no more manipulative or
coercive than the Moroccan state – Mohamed Salek’s perspective is noteworthy for his twodimensional way of seeing. Where once Mohamed Salek saw the righteousness of human rights
supporters, he now sees mercenaries and agents paid by the Algerian-backed, Polisario-run
Ministry for the Occupied Territories. Where once Mohamed Salek saw in Polisario a righteous
liberation struggle, he later saw an exploitative, discriminatory cadre of corrupt rulers. This twodimensionality reflects the binary of friend/enemy, loyalty/betrayal, and Morocco/Polisario, and
might be thought of as a way of seeing that both produces and is produced by the concrete
abstraction of nationalist conflict.
However, the language of a “fabricated reality” that Mohamed Salek and Lahcen share,
and that Mohamed Salek heightens with references to having been “injected” with beliefs and his
decision that the nationalist struggle was, ultimately an “illusion inside an illusion” gives one the
sense that he, too, holds this structure of conflict in abeyance. In the passage quoted above, he
has been particularly critical of Polisario leadership of the refugee camps and the ideology that
led him to join. However, aside from accepting that his people once pledged allegiance to the
Moroccan sultan, which is his reference to bay‘a,223 Mohamed Salek’s affiliation to Morocco
was more a matter of necessity than an expression of enthusiasm for their cause. In this sense, his
movement between nationalist causes highlights the modes of governance that have expended
tremendous resources in an effort to configure his political subjectivity in certain ways – to
identify him, politically. At the same time, this same movement highlights how Mohamed Salek
has sought to hold the concrete abstraction in abeyance.
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Conclusion
The experience of Mohamed Salek captures how the political struggle to define the determining
self of self-determination during the 1990s took place at the level of controlling populations and
defining political subjectivity, as much as at the level of diplomatic negotiations over the rules
and criteria for establishing voter rolls.224 And whereas important literature on the Western
Sahara conflict tends to focus on institutional political actors to identify the “root” causes of
conflict, the dynamics of its perpetuation, and lessons to be learned about conflict resolution, the
political subjectivity of the people involved is too often overlooked.
In the next chapter I aim to show how this history of fixing the political subjectivity of
the people of the Sahara dates back to the 1950s, and the current political geography is in many
ways the expression of tensions of autonomy and dependence between bidani people of the
Sahara and their more sedentary neighbors to the north, the chleuh.
***
By moving without conforming to the polarized dichotomy of Moroccan or Sahrawi nationalism
– either by moving to Morocco but maintaining Sahrawi allegiances, or by moving to Morocco
and disavowing national commitments of any kind – these “second wave” ‘a’idin represent a
more fluid political subjectivity that had been restricted and fixed by the polarized process of
decolonization in the Sahara. These ‘a’idin are representative of what Hagar Kotef calls “hybridsubjectivity,” meaning they are “configured through their mobility, but [they] inhabit spaces of
confinement.” The movement of returnees between camps, politically and physically, makes
visible the tremendous efforts expended to fix the Sahrawi as political subjects, in location and in
identity, throughout the process of decolonization. This “hybrid-subjectivity” of the “returnee” in
224
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the Sahrawi context is both produced by the polarized political geography of nationalist conflict,
and has increasingly come to complicate this concrete abstraction through its mobility and
fluidity.
In critiquing methodological nationalism as it pertains to Western Sahara, I suggest that
this approach has foreclosed two important dimensions to the history and political geography of
the region. Suggesting that Sahrawi nationalism was the outcome of a colonial dialectic reduces
the historical complexity of the Sahara as a disaggregated political field that has involved
multiple colonial regimes, a mobile populace with multiple and fluid political affiliations, and a
temporal disjuncture in the processes of decolonization across the region. Rather than a dyadic
relation of colonizer-colonized, which, if such a relation existed at all in Western Sahara, existed
for little over a decade (1958-1970), I suggest that Sahrawi identity emerges within the political
field of decolonization, where multiple relations to political authority have been in contestation
for decades. Rather than tracing the emergence and consolidation of a single collective identity, I
suggest that Sahrawi subjectivity during decolonization might better be understood in terms of
various attempts to fix multiple, shifting subjectivities. This chapter has elaborated on this
multiplicity through an account of the ‘ai’d, (pl. ‘a’idin, literally “returnee,”), whose significance
as a political label has shifted with time. The subject positions of the ‘a’id, stand in ambiguous
relation to the contemporary poles of loyalty and betrayal that structure nationalist commitment,
whether Moroccan or Sahrawi. While bearing various stigma of “defector,” “betrayer,” and
intihazi, or “opportunist,” ‘a’idin are prone in some instances to a stance of cynicism and
resignation, lacking faith in either Morocco or Polisario. In other instances, I suggest that the
‘a’idin’s movement represents, in certain cases, a kind of subjectivity that holds the structures of
nationalist conflict “in abeyance.”
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Chapter 3 – “Home Is Knocking on the Mind”: Morocco’s Liberation Army in the Sahara
and the “Unsettled Past” of 1950s Decolonization in Northwest Africa
The mid-1950s were a tumultuous time across the Maghreb, Sahara and Sahel regions, as
a rising and seemingly pervasive anticolonial sentiment connected the horizons of political
possibility from across disparate areas of the globe. Anticolonial insurrection had spread across
Morocco following the exile of Sultan Mohammed V to Corsica and then Madagascar in 1953.225
On the heels of the Bandung Conference in 1955, the arrival of Algeria’s National Liberation
Front (FLN) as a diplomatic force with the announcement of its Soummam Platform in 1956, and
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Suez triumph that same year, Third World anticolonialism was emerging
as a force capable of tipping the scales of global political power against colonial empire.
Decolonization’s resonance across continents generated a horizon of expectation even in
seemingly unexpected regions of the colonized world. After a local asked him about the war in
Indochina while he passed through Wed Nun on a last-gasp “adventure” in 1954, a French
traveler noted in disbelief that this anticolonial consciousness had reached even the Sahara.226
And yet, even as the end of European colonial empire became more apparent in the late1950s with the independence of Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, and Ghana a year later, capital
investments poured into the Sahara, and regions that had previously been colonial hinterlands
increasingly became the sites of a late-imperial scramble. In a foreshadowing of its françafrique
neocolonial policies toward natural resource extraction in Africa,227 in 1957 France established
l’Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS), a “transcolonial” administrative
225
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regime encompassing the Algerian Sahara, with an eye toward retaining access to newly
discovered oil reserves.228 The following year, a 75-year concession was granted to an
international group of investors for the purposes of exploiting iron ore deposits in a northern
Mauritanian mountain, Kidya Idjill. With the backing of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, this mining concern, known as MIFERMA (Mines de fer de
Mauritanie), undertook the construction of two worker towns, as well as a 650km railroad near
the border with Spanish Sahara, for the ore’s extraction and export.229 And although full-scale
exploitation had not yet begun, Spain’s recently-discovered phosphate deposit in Spanish Sahara,
known as Bucraa, was drawing the attention of its neighbors.230 As a result, borders that had
previously been left largely undefined (such as the so-called “Trinquet Line” between the French
Protectorate in Morocco and French Algeria) or unpoliced (such as the border between Spanish
Sahara and the surrounding French colonial territories) increasingly became vectors of political
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struggle.231 As one account of Spanish Sahara noted, “the coast has been replaced, as the zone of
conflict, by the inland boundary.”232
These inland boundaries transected the pasturage, wells, oases, shrines and marketplaces
of trab al-bidan, or land of the bidan, encompassing a Saharan populace that shares the Arabic
dialect of Hassaniya. Closely associated with the varied geographies shaped by the desert climate
between these “shores” of the Sahara, this “land of the bidan” was, in the early 1950s, divided
between multiple colonial administrative regimes: Spanish Sahara, French West Africa, French
Algeria, and the French Protectorate in Morocco. This region of western Sahara,233 which today
includes parts of Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Mali, and encompasses the disputed
geopolitical territory of Western Sahara, was largely a colonial hinterland. Although France
maintained military posts throughout both northern Mauritania and southwest Algeria, French
West Africa was administered from Dakar, a thousand kilometers away. And, until the
establishment of the aforementioned OCRS, France governed the Algerian Sahara under military
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administration, unlike the rest of the French colony.234 Spain’s colonial presence was restricted
largely to coastal fishing enclaves even into the 1950s and, as a result, Spanish Sahara attracted
bidanis who sought to avoid French taxation and keep contact with colonial rule to a minimum.
Southern Morocco under the French Protectorate, including Wed Nun, was known as the fiefdom
of Pasha T’hami el-Glaoui, whose relatively unchecked power distinguished this region of
French rule from the rest of the Protectorate.235
In part because of this fragmented geography of colonial rule, the dynamics of
decolonization across western Sahara did not follow the dialectics of struggle between colonizer
and colonized. Instead, the late-colonial influx of capital to the Sahara increasingly contributed
to a scramble not only for territory, but to gain the allegiance and guarantee the support of the
bidanis living in the region. French advocates used the language of protecting Saharan minorities
as a justification for establishing OCRS in the Sahara.236 In Mauritania, France focused on
constructing a national identity so as to facilitate a referendum vote in favor of national
independence, overseen as part of the French Loi Cadre during the late 1950s.237 Following the
discovery of phosphates after World War II, Spain belatedly dispatched the anthropologist Julio
Caro Baroja to its territory, then known as Spanish West Africa, to learn about its colonial
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subjects, the findings of which Caro Baroja published in a 1955 ethnography.238 And while
French rule in Algeria was increasingly preoccupied with the FLN by the mid-1950s, the
colonial military administration had been active in reestablishing the market town of Tindouf as
a regional hub of western Sahara since 1934.239 Newly independent Morocco, meanwhile, tried
an altogether different strategy of attracting support among people from across the region by
enlisting them in an armed movement, known as the Moroccan Liberation Army, that aimed to
destabilize French and Spanish colonial rule. Just as the horizon of decolonization in the Sahara
increasingly led to an influx of capital to the region, so too, did the 1950s see the intensification
of efforts to fix the political subjectivity of the people of the region.
In this sense, this region of the Sahara during the 1950s defies what Luise White terms
“the orderly process of decolonization.”240 White’s apt phrase joins with a broader critique of the
historiography of decolonization for retrospectively naturalizing the outcome of a massive
reconfiguration of the relations between sovereignty, people, and territory. By contrast,
considering the horizons of possibility opened by decolonization draws attention to the
discontinuities and alternative possibilities constitutive of this process.241 A particularly
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seductive aspect of the historiography of decolonization involves the assumption of
synchronicity, or the idea that anticolonial struggle coincided with the achievement of national
consciousness, culminating in the transfer of power by former colonies to newly independent
nation states. Decolonization certainly transformed the relationship between people, sovereignty
and territory across the region, but from the vantage point of the Sahara in the time-space of the
1950s, in particular this process did not constitute a moment of synchronicity but, rather, the
onset of a disjunctive political present. Decolonization of the Sahara in the 1950s, I argue, ushers
in a series of unresolved political projects with afterlives that continue to haunt the region’s
political present, most clearly in the ongoing dispute over Western Sahara. In this chapter, I will
be exploring the ongoing ramifications of decolonization in western Sahara through historical
narratives surrounding Morocco’s Liberation Army in the Sahara from 1956-59.
Section I – Anticolonial Irredentism: Morocco’s Liberation Army in the Sahara in
Regional/International Context, 1956-59
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Algerian War and the Remaking of France (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).
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The Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) was the outcome of both territorial ambiguity
and temporal disjuncture between the abrupt end of the French Protectorate, and the
intensification of armed resistance in the Moroccan countryside. As a means of attenuating
anticolonial demands for the withdrawal of French empire from the Greater Maghreb, and in an
attempt to try and consolidate its control over Algeria, which was governed as an administrative
unit of France proper, France expedited the decolonization of the adjacent Protectorates in
Tunisia and Morocco.242 These direct negotiations stood in tension with the aims of the MLA, a
group with membership from across North Africa, which aimed for the decolonization of the
Greater Maghreb and drew upon support from Gamal Abd al-Nasr. In August 22-29, 1955,
French negotiations in Aix-les-Bains with a group of Moroccan political figures established a
242
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framework and set the course for ending French colonial rule, but left the outcome uncertain. For
many involved in anticolonial resistance, and particularly those associated with the MLA and the
Moroccan nationalist Istiqlal Party, the terms of the Aix-les-Bains agreement were deeply
disillusioning. In response to the French premise of “independence within an interdependence
liberally negotiated,” Ahmed Balafrej, a member of the Moroccan Istiqlal party, said:
“Interdependence was talked about: the word does not possess any juridical content…even the
notion of interdependence is only valid to the extent that it expresses an organic reciprocity, for
the people cannot be interdependent unless they are already independent.”243
Meanwhile, the span of time between the Aix-les-Bains negotiations and March 1956,
when France recognized Moroccan independence, was marked by political escalation. A
shipment of arms arranged by Gamal Abd al-Nasr, coming from Czechoslovakia and arriving by
boat to Morocco’s northern Mediterranean coast, was divided between the MLA and the
Algerian National Liberation Front. An armed insurrection subsequently developed in the
mountainous Rif region in northern Morocco.244 Meanwhile, Abdelkebir and Allal Fassi, leaders
of the Moroccan nationalist Istiqlal Party, hosted a meeting in Madrid in January 1956 with other
MLA leaders, making the strategic decision to divide the newly strengthened MLA in three.245
By spreading the freshly armed fighters throughout the country, between the Rif in the north, the
Central and High Atlas to the east, and the Souss and Sahara to the south, the Liberation Army
appeared to be preparing for a long resistance.
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And yet, by March 1956, just three months after the meeting of anticolonial leaders in
Madrid, France had restored Mohammed V to his throne, abrogated the Treaty of Fes, ended its
Protectorate and granted Morocco independence. Spain, which governed northern Morocco with
a protectorate of its own, ended its rule one month later, but maintained control over enclaves on
the Mediterranean (Ceuta and Melilla) and Atlantic (Sidi Ifni) coasts, as well as its colony in the
Sahara. The abrupt end to the French and Spanish protectorates in Morocco stands in marked
contrast to the growth of the MLA as an armed resistance movement, which appeared to just then
be preparing for a new scale of conflict. This sense that decolonization did not bring about the
end of anticolonial struggle was articulated by Allal Fassi on June 19, 1956 in terms that can be
read as nationalist, irredentist and, simultaneously, as an expression of anticolonial solidarity:
Now, if Morocco is independent, it is not completely unified. The Moroccans will
continue their struggle until Tangier,246 the Sahara under French and Spanish
influence from Tindouf to Colomb-Bechar, Touat, Kenadza, Mauritania are
liberated and unified. It is necessary to complete Morocco’s independence. Our
independence will only be complete with the Sahara and all of the other territories
whose delegates have come to Rabat proclaiming union. It is necessary to struggle
for a complete union. It is necessary to retake the regions under Spanish and
French influence. Our solidarity is profound for we have made a promise with
God to liberate Algeria, Tunisia, the Libyan Fezzan. Our future is in Africa, we,
North Africans, we have been equals in history, under colonialism, and we will
live as equals in independence.247
Fassi’s claim to a “Greater Morocco” has subsequently come to be seen, with reason, as fostering
an irredentist ideology which has caused lasting instability in the region, what with Morocco’s
refusal to recognize an independent Mauritania until 1969, and its invasion and annexation of
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Western Sahara starting in 1975.248 In 1956, however, al-Fassi’s claim was at once anticolonial
and irredentist, a matter of political posturing surely calibrated for an international audience,
while also serving as a catalyst for the populist MLA now spread throughout the country.
Independence had arrived in Morocco only a few months before, and there was already a sense
that it was inadequate and compromised.
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While the MLA elsewhere in Morocco disbanded, its extension south into French
Algeria, French West Africa, and Spanish West Africa, became, in a sense, the expression and
object of a struggle that had been preemptively foreshortened. Nonetheless, by June 1956, a
group of some 150 men under the leadership of Ben Hamou Mesfioui, a veteran of the French
war in Indochina,249 arrived in Goulmime, a northern hub of trans-Saharan commerce that, in
1956, bordered Wed Nun and what was then called Spanish West Africa. The group included a
large contingent from the central plains of Morocco known as Zemmour, and was receiving arms
and aid from anticolonial fighters who had taken refuge in the Spanish enclave of Sidi Ifni, on
the Altantic coast. Though initially supported by the Moroccan state, the MLA was not a part of
the newly formed Royal Armed Forces of Morocco, which was then operating under the
command of Prince Hassan II with French advisers.250
Even as it established headquarters in Goulmime in the summer of 1956, the MLA was
an anticolonial armed movement operating in an independent nation-state. This status as an
“irregular army” indexed the moment of transition in which the MLA’s Sahara campaign
emerged, between colonial withdrawal and postcolonial state formation. This transitional
character is also reflected in the MLA’s munitions, organizational structure, and personnel. On
the one hand, the MLA had a standard military hierarchy, with distinctions between officers,
most of whom were Moroccan and soldiers, most of whom were from the Sahara. On the other
hand, the officer-led regiment of 300 soldiers was known as “al-rha’,” a term derived from the
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word for “millstone” or “grindstone” which refers to the units of armed self-defense around
which a village or tribe in rural Morocco would rally. 251
The hybrid organization basis of the MLA, blurring the distinction between a “regular”
and “irregular” armed force, can also be seen in its munitions. Aside from the Abd al-Nasr
shipment via Czechoslovakia, the MLA relied upon an eclectic collection of arms, including
French- and Italian-made grenades, and American-made pistols. Ben Saïd Aït Iddr notes that,
aside from a stock of guns that the MLA had already accumulated, the Royal Armed Forces of
Morocco provided 300-450 shotguns, with other arms expropriated from French loyalists, and
the remainder provided by volunteers who joined.252 In addition to shotguns, the Moroccan state
at some point funded the MLA, so that the soldiers could be offered stipends. Angela Hernández
Moréno notes that, upon enrollment, MLA soldiers received 2000 francs, a military outfit, a gun
(type “lebel”), training, and pay at the rate of 2000/mo.253 Aït Iddr suggested that the Makhzen
provided 50 million centimes to pay 5000 soldiers, but that this funding only arrived in 1959 and
became the object of political contestation between MLA leadership and the Moroccan state.254
At least one interlocutor mentioned that his reason for leaving the Army was due to a lack of
pay.255 Not unlike the MLA’s organizational structure, however, it appears as though many of its
armed fighters furnished their own guns, usually rifles of World War I vintage. In oral histories,
former fighters frequently referenced “ts‘aiya’s” and other rifles used in hunting, during their
narratives of fighting for the MLA.
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Display of rifles from the Rabouni National History Museum, Sahrawi refugee camps, outside
Tindouf, Algeria. This Museum exhibits artifacts from Sahrawi national history and does not
mention Sahrawis’ role in the Moroccan Liberation Army. But the gun in the foreground, the
ts‘aiya, was frequently mentioned by former fighters in the MLA during the author’s research.

And this speaks to a significant feature of the MLA’s composite military form: though
most of its leadership were Moroccan anticolonial fighters, its ranks were filled by bidani and
Ba‘amranian256 tribesmen of Wed Nun and the Sahara. Sahrawis and Ba‘amranian’s constituted
an estimated two-thirds of the MLA, and the vast majority of the Army’s combatants.257 Where
the Moroccan leadership were mostly (although not exclusively) young men who had been active
in the pre-‘56 urban-based resistance, bidanis who took up arms to join the MLA cut across
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generations. There were, of course, young Sahrawi men who left their families to join the MLA,
accounts of which I heard directly through oral histories. But part of the MLA leadership’s
approach was to recruit shaykh’s, such as Khatri ould Joumani and Lhabib ould Bellal, who, as
leaders of tribal subfractions, could mobilize large numbers of bidan. In parts of Wed Nun where
the Aït Oussa tribe is based, I was told that the mobilization around MLA fighting was total:
entire fergan, or groups of families living in tents that travel together, contributed livestock and
joined the cause. This mobilization, where it was total, cut across gender lines as women
prepared food, served as lookouts, and readied camels’ saddles for men to mount and ride into an
attack.258

A receipt acknowledging the donation of twenty sheep by Yahdih Bin Bahi to the Moroccan
Liberation Army in the Sahara.
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While the reasons for why bidanis joined the MLA may have been manifold, and will be
discussed later in this chapter, Moroccans’ recruitment appears to have been largely successful.
Reaching an estimated 1200 to 1500 fighters in early 1957 and as many as 5000 later in the
year,259 the Army relied heavily on bidani fighters to carry out a series of attacks on French
outposts along the ambiguously defined border between Morocco and French Algeria, near
Tindouf. The first attack on a military outpost at Um Laachar was carried out 19 June 1956, part
of a series that continued from August through January 1957, targeting the French outposts
Merkala, Zemoul, Zegdou and Tinfouchy along the Algerian/Morocco border. During the fall of
1957, another MLA detachment had traveled south by camel, traversing Spanish Sahara over
three months before reaching northern Mauritania. In January 1957, this contingent launched an
attack near the city of Atar, hoping to benefit from the spontaneous support of Mauritanians in
the area and spark a larger uprising. Instead, the French met them with an equal force, including
many bidani soldiers fighting with the French. The support from local Mauritanians never
materialized, and the MLA was routed, with significant losses, including 41 prisoners taken by
France.260 During the retreat north, the MLA also was forced to disarm by Spanish colonial
officers.
At independence, Morocco was divided between Spanish rule in the north and far south,
and French rule in the most populous regions in between. When the anticolonial struggle against
the French Protectorate was at its peak in the early 1950s, anticolonial fighters frequently took
refuge in areas of Spanish rule, including Sidi Ifni, a coastal enclave in southern Morocco and
the center of Spain’s colonial administration for the Sahara. MLA leaders have noted that, at the
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outset, the Liberation Army had counted upon Spain’s accommodating stance toward any
activity that would undermine French colonial stability. Exploiting “the contradiction” between
France and Spain, as it has been termed, would allow them to traffic material through Spanish
Sahara and launch attacks into French Algeria and Mauritania.261 Some former MLA leaders
even claimed to have been “friends” with Spanish military officers, and in regular
communication with these officers about their plans.262
In light of this strategy, the defeat in northern Mauritania in January 1957, compounded
by having been disarmed by Spanish authorities, represented a turning point for the MLA. From
that point forward, the MLA established more permanent camps throughout Spanish Sahara,
along the Saguiet al-Hamra in the north of Spanish Sahara, and in the Tiris region to the south.
Throughout 1957, the MLA carried out attacks against Spanish military posts and settlements
from these strongholds throughout the territory, including Argoub, El Ayoun, Lemsid, Tafoudart,
and Ghaywa. By November 1957, some 4000 to 5000 soldiers, distributed across four or five
regiments, were stationed in Spanish Sahara263 and Spain’s already-tenuous presence across
broad swaths of the colony had been further depleted by Sahrawi soldiers who defected and
joined the MLA. With the MLA now training their old rifles against Spanish targets, the Spanish
colonial administration withdrew from nearly all of the territory, with the exception of its
military bases in El Ayoun, and the coastal enclave of Villa Cisneros (now known as Dakhla).
The MLA’s gains in Spanish Sahara would prove to be temporary, however, as its offensive
drove Spain to cooperate with French colonial officials.
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In July 1957, the new Governor General of Spanish West Africa, Mariano Gomez de
Zamalloa, met with the French General Gabriel Bourgund. The colonial officials met again in
September in Dakar, and once more in the winter of 1957, by which time they had come to an
agreement to carry out a two-phased, coordinated countinsurgency campaign against the MLA.
Meanwhile, by November 1957, Morocco had established a Direction des Affaires Sahariennes,
while reportedly sending signals, covert and otherwise, that it was ready to be rid of the
“uncontrolled elements” of the MLA.264 The first phase of Ecouvillon, from 10 to 19 February,
1958, focused on clearing bidanis out of the northern tier of Spanish Sahara, known as Saguiet
al-Hamra. To complete the second phase of what was called Opération Ecouvillon,265 a
combination of soldiers and air strikes were used to “sweep” bidanis out of the southern tier of
the colony, known as Tiris, from February 10-20, 1958. All told, some 15,000 French soldiers
entered Spanish Sahara from Mauritania and Tindouf in Algeria, and as many as 8500 Spanish
soldiers swept in from the coast.266 While leaflets were dropped warning bidani’s to flee the
territory, one report lists 132 killed, 37 injured, and 51 taken prisoner from Opération
Ecouvillon.267
For bidanis who lived through the year commonly referred to as ‘am khabt tyayyir, or the
year of the aerial strikes, the bombardment drove MLA fighters either south to Mauritania, east
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to Tindouf in French Algeria, or north to Wed Nun. One former MLA fighter mentioned
traveling twenty days by foot to reach Wed Nun.268 Another described the journey as follows:
They arrived in planes. They fired at us and killed camels. The planes hovered
overhead and sent out parachutes in the sky, and 14 planes went by like this
[motions with his hand]. And they went back and forth all over the place, and
descended to fire. By God, by God, the camels - the planes were descending in
order to seek out a camel and hit it. Because they could get lower and fire at it. So
our division split up, completely, and we spent the whole day in the wad [river
bed], our supplies - we lost everything.
Complete loss. We lost [everything] there. When it was the afternoon, the
force arrived with tanks, from near Smara and came to us and fired at us. So we
surrendered. They left at night, so we took off by foot, to get away from them, and
we continued on, heading for Morocco.
M: On foot?
Yup, We didn't have clothes.
M: From Lghaywa? [in Tiris]
From Daysfa - Lghaywa's close, also - but we left from Daysfa to Laâyoune
Ghoman, before Goulimime a little, after Wed Draa on that side. It took us a
while (fawtna zaman) walking by foot. And there wasn't any food - we were
eating just the plants, and water. And the clothes, also, a lot of it wasn't with us. It
was a bad situation! We went through all that trouble/we were worn out. (Nahna
mtakarfaisin)269
Several accounts, including one report from a French journalist who visited Tindouf just months
after the operation, note that the counterinsurgency was entirely covert: “for Ecouvillon there
were neither war correspondents, nor photographers, nor cinematographers, nor
communiqués.”270 Just days before Ecouvillon, a bombardment of Algerian FLN regiments in
Tunisia had drawn unwanted international attention, leaving France sensitive to the need for
secrecy, particularly since the military operation was being carried out in Spanish Sahara.271 The
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viability and clandestinity of Opération Ecouvillon underscores the stark contrast in visibility
between processes of decolonization in the Sahara, and concurrent anticolonial struggles for
independence elsewhere – even, or especially, in Algeria.
Far from having overthrown colonial rule, bidani MLA fighters displaced by Ecouvillon
found themselves ensnared in processes of Mauritanian and Moroccan state formation. On April
10, 1958, in Tintekrat near Fort Gouraud (now F’derik) in northern Mauritania, a gathering was
held to rally support for Mauritania’s upcoming vote for autonomy, which was expected to lead
to national independence under France’s Loi-Cadre:
Three hundred Rguibi tents were assembled. A colorful spectacle. Six hundred
fighters parade on camel before the President Moktar Ould Daddah and the
Commander of the Region of Atar, Mr. Vézy. An offering of camels. Lengthy
discussion under the presidential tente. It is by design that the High Commissioner
Cusin refrained from appearing, and asked General Bourgund not to come, the
better to savor the victory : the Rguibat must recognize, in pledging allegiance to
Mr. Ould Daddah, of their affiliation to the Mauritanian nation. The presence of
the Commander of the Region [Cercle] and of officers from the Saharan Affairs
attest to France having given its support to the President…272
The above description of Tintekrat captures the spectacle surrounding France’s attempt to attract
bidani tribesmen – along with France’s particular focus on the largest tribe of western Sahara,
the Rguibat – to affiliate with the emergent political nation of Mauritania, whose representative,
Mokhtar Ould Daddah, would become the French-backed President for most of the next two
decades.
Meanwhile, those MLA Sahrawi fighters who fled north and arrived in Wed Nun
encountered spectacle of a different sort. April 1, 1958, several months after Opération
Ecouvillon, Spain agreed to transfer the Wed Nun region at the northern end of its colony, to
zawiya who was calling for jihad to overthrow the Moroccan Alawite Sultan collaborating with the French
Protectorate. Acloque, “L’idée de frontière en milieu nomade: héritage, appropriation et implications politiques
actuelles: Mauritanie et Sahara occidental,” 357.
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Morocco.273 By this time, the Liberation Army was in complete disarray. Some members of the
MLA’s leadership were reputedly seeking to overthrow the King of Morocco and establish a
republic.274 Fissures within MLA leadership, possibly related to support for or opposition to the
monarchy, had led certain members to imprison others in the southern Moroccan town of
Bouizkarn.275 At the same time, Spain and France actively recruited leading bidani shaykhs to
defect from the MLA. Meanwhile, throughout 1958 the Moroccan state was actively trying to
disband the MLA and incorporate its members into the Royal Armed Forces. As Sahrawi
soldiers spent much of 1958 stationed in various parts of Wed Nun, rumors circulated about
Morocco’s plan to incorporate Liberation Army fighters into the Royal Army of Morocco. By
the beginning of 1958, bidani fighters had already begun defecting, having become disillusioned
with the MLA for any or all of the reasons above.
In early December, 1958, several regiments of bidani soldiers that had been stationed in
Wed Nun for nearly a year since Opération Ecouvillon had swept them north from Spanish
Sahara, broke into the stockade in Tan Tan. They detained the one Moroccan officer on hand,
Saleh al-Jeza’iri, and, led by bidani regiment leader Mohamed al-Kher, they reclaimed weapons
that had been taken from them months earlier. Ts‘aiya’s in hand, they headed for points west and
south. Some were actively recruited by the French, which dispatched prominent bidanis who had
joined the French, such as Ba ould Dkhil, to meet rebelling soldiers partway and provision them
with supplies flown in by France. Large contingents headed to Tindouf, in French Algeria and
Bir Moghrein, in Mauritania. Another large contingent, led by Khatri ould Joumani, returned to
273
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Spanish Sahara, as returning civilians rather than armed insurgents. The breaking into the
stockade, known as mdigadig l-magazin, or taksir l-magazin, came to define the failed efforts
between Moroccans and bidanis to collaborate on a project of anticolonial resistance. The MLA
was finished, but the process of decolonization in the Sahara had only just begun.

Section II – Friends of the State: Morocco’s High Commission for Former Resistance
Fighters and Publicly Historicizing the Liberation Army in the Sahara
On June 20, 2014, a conference was held at the Hotel de Ville of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in
Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, with all of the trappings of a state-sponsored affair: traffic
had been stopped on Avenue Mecca to allow a motorcade of officials and conference participants
to pass through under the Moroccan flags lining the city’s central avenues, which had been raised
for the occasion. Sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, the conference was the latest in a series
dating back to 1989, with each annual installment focusing on the reign of one of Morocco’s
Alawite sultans. Named for the founder of Morocco’s ruling dynasty and funded by the Ministry
of Culture, University Moulay Ali Sharif had arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the largest
Moroccan-controlled city in the disputed territory of Western Sahara, for its 18th installment,
bringing together historians from across Morocco under the heading “The Second Period of
Sultan Sidi Mohamed Bin Yousef’s reign: 1939-1955.”
In the morning, the Governor of Laâyoune/El Aaiún spoke, thanking specific members of
the audience for their role in resisting colonialism and participating in Morocco’s Liberation
Army (MLA). Other officials made reference to the “spontaneous” uprising by the people of the
Sahara following Sultan Mohamed V’s exile from Morocco in 1953.276 For the afternoon
session, a university historian from Casablanca, Noureddine Belhaddad, gave a presentation with
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the title “The Uprising of the tribes of Moroccan Sahara following the Exile of Mohamed V.”
The talk was short on specifics, but in the course of his presentation Belhaddad asked
rhetorically, “When Sahrawis rose up in 1953, and when Sahrawis dressed in black to mourn the
King’s exile, who was making them do that?” When Professor Belhaddad posed this question, an
older Sahrawi man seated in the front row, wearing the typical bidani attire of blue, embroidered
robe, or dra‘a, and black litham head-wrap, stood up in protest and addressed the panelists
directly. Belhaddad continued, uninterrupted, as the man cinched the dra’a around his waist and
marched out of the building.
I stayed until the end of the talk, then walked out of the Hotel de Ville, the interior of
which is decorated with large murals (in a vaguely social realist style) that depict the 1975 Green
March when the Moroccan army organized some 350,000 civilians, as a mass demonstration of
Morocco’s claim to sovereignty over the territory, to cross the border into what was then Spanish
West Africa. By the time I exited the hall, the man who had left the conference was waiting for a
taxi at the curb. I walked aimlessly up the wide avenue; it was well before the mid-afternoon
prayer, and Sahat al-Mechouar, the vast public plaza across the avenue which had been built
after Morocco razed the Spanish colonial-era neighborhood Colominat al-Hamra’ following its
military occupation of the city in 1976, was empty. As I crossed the street, a young man in a
business suit gave a hiss to draw my attention. Evidently a member of the conference’s security
retinue, he asked for my information (name, affiliation, etc), first in Arabic and then in English
as he approached, before letting me go on my way. By this time, the Sahrawi man who had left
the conference in protest had found a cab, so I continued on my way.
***
A longstanding, ongoing dispute over the sovereignty of Western Sahara between Morocco and
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SADR/Polisario shape the historicization of the region’s decolonization in readily apparent ways.
However, I open with this ethnographic scene to illustrate how regional decolonization in the
1950s – and the MLA’s incursion into the Sahara from 1956-59, in particular – raises
uncomfortable political histories for both Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalists. For Sahrawi
nationalists, the MLA serves as an uncomfortable reminder of the Moroccan Sultan’s capacity at
that time to mobilize people of the Sahara through his religious and political authority.277 The
MLA’s campaign in the Sahara can also be seen as a precursor to Morocco’s later annexation of
the territory in the 1970s. For Moroccans, meanwhile, the MLA’s internal divisions and rapid
demise point to Morocco’s inability to legitimize its rule in Western Sahara, then and now. For
both Moroccan and Sahrawi nationalists, the MLA epitomizes the complex relations of
autonomy and dependence between people of the Sahara and their neighbors to the north. The
reasons for the MLA’s disintegration remain contested, but the conference at Laâyoune/El
Aaiún’s Hotel de Ville highlights the tensions involved in any effort to make this history visible:
the complexities of this period of regional decolonization sit in disjunctive relation to any given
national historical narrative.
Following the overview of the MLA’s military campaign in the Sahara between 1956 and
59 in the previous section, the next two sections of this chapter will examine how historical
narratives surrounding the MLA shape, and are shaped by, contemporary politics in Western
Sahara. In a context of nationalist conflict, I suggest that the MLA appears as a history that is
“alien to the times”278 of the present, since it reveals relations of neither independence nor
sovereign unity between Moroccans and Sahrawis but, instead, a dialectic of autonomy and
dependence. As mentioned in the introduction, recognizing the temporality of a past that is
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seemingly out of step with the present is important for understanding how the apparently
anomalous histories of decolonization in the Western Sahara disrupt the very premise of
decolonization as an orderly sequence of events. As a particular kind of disorderly history that
both cannot be consigned to the past, and cannot be resolved with the present, I suggest that the
MLA constitutes a “nonsynchronous contradiction” in relation to the present. Drawing upon
Ernst Bloch’s concept, this chapter considers the different ways in which the history of the MLA
manifests itself as an “unsettled past”279 in the present context of nationalist conflict.
This section examines how the Moroccan state attempts to produce a visible but restricted
historical narrative regarding decolonization in the Sahara during the 1950s, principally through
the High Commission for Former Resistance Fighters and Members of the Liberation Army.280
Through publications, public events and museums, the High Commission publicizes the exploits
of the Moroccan Liberation Army (MLA) in the Sahara, while attempting to control the narrative
over its relationship to the Moroccan monarchy and Moroccan nationalism. In this sense, the
High Commission’s role in attempting to monopolize the production of history regarding the
Liberation Army is an extension of the Moroccan state’s tenuous and contested claims to
sovereignty. While the High Commission’s provision of benefits for veterans has made the
subject position of “former resistance fighter” fairly prominent in Moroccan-controlled Western
Sahara today, the current visibility of these figures often highlights the MLA’s uneasy
relationship to Moroccan national history, particularly when these figures evoke controversies
from the 1950s that continue to haunt the present. While the High Commission’s mission to
279
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publicize this historical moment keeps the MLA visible in the present, its purpose of producing
history as a means of legitimating sovereignty ensures that this history remains closely tied to
state security prerogatives. The next section of this paper will examine the tensions between
visibility and control underpinning state-led efforts to produce the MLA’s public history, by
focusing specifically on the High Commission’s museums, as well as a private archivist who
might be described as a “friend of the state.”
***
The 2014 conference in Laâyoune/El Aaiún illustrates how the emphasis on Sahrawis’
historical allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco remains a prominent theme in Morocco’s statesanctioned narrative. When performed, however, this public history frequently encounters
resistance and begets controversy, as with the Sahrawi man who walked out on Nourredine
Belhaddad’s conference presentation in protest. As a result, the maintenance of the public form
of this history is as closely tied with the institutions of Moroccan state security and intelligence
as with academic scholarship. Much as Morocco is engaged in an ongoing dispute over
sovereignty in Western Sahara, the historicization of the MLA in the Sahara is imbricated in
Morocco’s ongoing struggle to legitimate and maintain sovereignty in the region. While the 2014
conference was sponsored by the Ministry of Culture’s University of Moulay Ali Cherif, the
state institution with the mandate to sustain national memory surrounding the MLA is the High
Commission for Former Resistance Fighters and Members of the Liberation Army. The High
Commission was established June 15, 1973, which, as Samia Errazzouki points out, followed
two unsuccessful coup attempts against King Hassan II that took place the two previous years
(July 1971, August 1972). Given this context, the establishment of the High Commission might
be seen as a counterrevolutionary act, taking place at a moment of political opening in the
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1970s281 when a number of groups, some including former MLA members, were involved in
plots to potentially overthrow Hassan II:
These mobilizations took on the form of violent acts of resistance in Rabat and
Casablanca, sparking a round of arrests and disappearances. During the same
month that Hassan II issued dahir nº 1.73.252, on June 25, 1973, 149 people
accused of taking part in these acts stood trial in the military tribunal in Kenitra. It
was under the shadow of these events that in 1973 the Moroccan state’s domestic
intelligence agency, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST) was
created.282
Initially a means of coopting political opposition through the distribution of state benefits, and
for Hassan II to consolidate power, the establishment of the High Commission was, in this sense,
an instance of Moroccan state formation through the reappropriation of the past.
Today, however, the High Commission makes the past visible in the present through
museums, events and publications that incorporate the MLA into a narrative of history that
blends anticolonial nationalism with loyalty to the Alawite dynasty. The High Commission’s
museum, which opened in 2001, consolidated documents from the MLA’s struggle into an
archive housed at headquarters in the Agdal neighborhood of government ministries in the
capital city of Rabat. While purporting to present an exhibit of MLA anticolonial resistance, the
lower floors of the museum, which one first encounters upon entry, feature a number of artifacts
that predate or are otherwise not directly related to MLA activities (such as material from the Rif
War of the 1920s), and the upper floors, which show documents and photos from the MLA,
focus on the period of Mohamed V’s exile and return, 1953-55.283 Local branches of the museum
for the High Commission which have opened more recently in Sidi Ifni, Tan Tan, Laâyoune,
Boujdour and Dakhla (all located in either southern Morocco or Moroccan-occupied Western
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Sahara) follow a similar design. With few exceptions (at the museum in Boujdour, for example,
where a private archivist and friend of the state donated photographs and documents), exhibited
material emphasizes nationwide uprisings, with very little documentation specific to the Sahara,
and focuses on the period from 1953 to 1955, which erases the anticolonial unrest, such as the
MLA in the Sahara, that continued after Moroccan independence in 1956. In each museum
branch, the exhibited materials are set against the backdrop of portraits featuring Alawite kings.
In addition to the museum displays, the High Commission has established a prolific
publication wing, which provides an outlet for dissertation work by Moroccan PhD students in
history, circulates periodicals such as National Memory (al-Dhakira al-Wataniya), and publishes

“Kings of the Cherifian
Alawite State”
A series of portraits of
Moroccan Kings at the
Boujdour branch of the
High Commission for
Former Resistance Fighters
and Members of the
Liberation Army, in
Moroccan-controlled
Western Sahara.

184

edited volumes to commemorate the anniversaries of particular events.284 As with the museum
displays, the publications align the culmination of anticolonial resistance movements with the
return of Mohamed V from exile, and Moroccan independence. Mohammed Zade’s Résistance et
Armée de Libération au Maroc (1947-1956), to take one of the more thorough histories
published based on High Commission archives, for example, ends its study in 1956. This
periodization synchronizes the end of anticolonial resistance with Moroccan independence,
erasing the sense of dissatisfaction with decolonization which remained after 1956, and drove the
MLA’s campaign in the Sahara.285 Those publications that directly address MLA activities in the
Sahara from 1956-59 invariably describe this armed movement in nationalist – and gendered –
terms, phrasing the MLA’s campaign as an effort to reunite the “usurped regions” [al-manatiq
al-mughtasiba] of the “Moroccan Sahara” with the nation.286 As with the museum display, the
High Commission’s publishing arm seeks to synchronize MLA anticolonial resistance with the
timeline of Moroccan national independence and conflate this movement with what Errazzouki
terms “the perceived organic and enduring centrality of the monarchy that nationalist histories
have propagated.”287
The High Commission’s active role in publicizing this controversial moment stands in
tension with the control it maintains over MLA archives and which, by association, it attempts to
maintain over the narrative of the MLA. In the course of my fieldwork, this tension was
embedded within a broader ambiguity concerning the High Commission’s central mission. The
publications and museums suggest an active pedagogical role in promoting the public history of
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the MLA in the Sahara. But, in the course of multiple visits to Morocco and Moroccancontrolled Western Sahara during fieldwork in 2013 and 2014, I was never granted authorization
to access High Commission archives, nor were High Commission staff authorized to refer me to
former resistance fighters. Only on one occasion, in Tan Tan, a city in the Wed Nun region of
southern Morocco, did an employee address the High Commission’s reluctance to make its
archive available. Because documentation at the local level remained scarce, according to this
employee, the vast majority of documentation remains archived in Rabat. As for family and
privately held documents, the employee said that while the High Commission is open to
collecting them, very few families have taken the state institution up on this. What followed was
one of the more frank discussions of the Moroccan state’s relation to MLA history:
The employee then mentioned that, unfortunately, we would have a hard time
getting anywhere on the matter given the political sensitivity, and the fact that the
High Commission really doesn’t deal with or provide this history, for multiple
reasons.
For one thing, the employee said, the High Commission was established to
manage all matters related to veterans of the National Resistance, and only
recently (this employee mentioned an initiative started in 2000) was it given the
additional mandate to historicize that period, but that the Mandoubiya lacked the
capacity in personnel (naqs kifa’ al-bashari) to carry this out.
In addition, though, this employee said that the institute isn’t really interested
in promoting “scientific” research on the matter.288 This staff member pointed out
that even if they were to sit down with former Army members and record the
most basic information, someone would censor it before it ever saw the light of
day. In this way, the High Commission acts as a kind of puppet master - pulling
the strings of what gets said at commemorative events (this employee used the
term “tamjid”) and on the information collected, since its censorship guarantees
that only selective information is published.
In short, as this person put it, there is no freedom in this matter.289
The High Commission attempts to manage the tension between publicity and control over this
history by restricting access to first-hand sources, even as it keeps MLA history visible in the
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public sphere. In doing so, the High Commission itself represents an institutionalized tension
between producing historical visibility, and maintaining control over this discourse.
There are, however, additional forms which this tension takes, not least in the figure of
the “friend of the state” mentioned above, who donated certain documents to the High
Commission’s museum branch in Boujdour, a coastal city in Moroccan-controlled Western
Sahara.290 Early on in my research, I received a phone call from an unrecognized number. The
man told me that I “did not need to know” the caller’s name, but that he wished to introduce me
to someone, who turned out to be Hamadi. Hamadi’s father had kept a private archive and had
been an active participant in the MLA in the 1950s, and the son had inherited both his father’s
archive and political proximity to the Moroccan state. After the introduction by phone, Hamadi
invited me to his house in Lââyoune/El Aaiún (he has property in both Boujdour, his hometown,
and in Laâyoune/El Aaiún). When he welcomed me to his home, Hamadi had just returned from
an annual trip to Rabat for the Festival of the Throne (Eid al-‘arsh) to perform bay‘a, a ritual
renewal of allegiance and submission to the Moroccan king performed by notables from around
the country.
The purpose of my visit had been for Hamadi to introduce me to some of his documents
pertaining to the MLA, and he initially expressed his enthusiasm at the prospect of being able to
share documents from the history of the MLA toward academic ends. When I asked whether I
could share the documents with two Moroccan graduate students with whom I had been working,
Hamadi expressed his reservations. Instead, he suggested that it was possible to share some of
this history with me precisely because I was approaching the subject from outside Morocco.
Once he began showing me documents, however, this certainty waned. One document Hamadi
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pulled from his binders was a type-written report that circulated among MLA leadership about
how to proceed following Opération Ecouvillon. At its conclusion, the report identified several
prominent Sahrawis for having collaborated with French and Spanish counterinsurgency efforts.
Another handwritten paper, which Hamadi said was French propaganda, named three bidanis
who had “joined” the French cause, encouraging others to do the same. All of the documents
appeared to be originals. After spotting the names, Hamadi asked me not to photograph the
documents and to erase the photographs I had already taken, suggesting that I could copy
portions of the documents by hand, but at a later date.
That later date, as it turned out, took place at an evening gathering at Las Dunas, a public
outdoor café situated near one of the busiest intersections of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Hamadi agreed
to meet with me, along with the two Moroccan graduate students with whom I had been
arranging interviews and conducting research. As we were getting started, Hamadi noted that a
colleague who had important contacts with regards to the MLA was going to join us. The fellow
arrived, and upon introduction he mentioned that he had done his research on US foreign policy
toward terrorism. He sat and listened as we talked about the MLA in general terms and discussed
the prospects for meeting people to whom Hamadi might introduce us. After about 15 to 20
minutes, Hamadi’s guest got up and left, leaving me his email address as we talked about
meeting in the next few days. Somehow, it was only after we finished meeting with Hamadi and
went to another café, when one of the graduate students pointed out the obvious: the man to
whom Hamadi introduced us was clearly working for the Department of the Interior, and had
been conducting reconnaissance.
My interactions with Hamadi the archivist were representative of how the history of the
MLA became manifest in the present: visible and therefore seemingly accessible, but with that
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access conditional upon being cleared, first, as a friend of the Moroccan state. The publications,
museums, archives and events together comprise the Moroccan state’s attempts to coopt and
consolidate a hegemonic narrative in which the Sahara had to be reclaimed in order to restore
national unity from French and Spanish colonial usurpation. That the state remains deeply
invested in controlling what should be remembered and what must be forgotten about the MLA
in the Sahara should not be surprising precisely because Morocco’s legitimacy in the region
remains tenuous. But given that publicizing this history still requires the cooperation of living
members from this period, former resistance fighters themselves often manifest this tension
between publicity and control over this history. However, they cannot fully escape the
hegemonic narrative surrounding this history which is tied to Morocco historicizing its claims to
sovereignty. As a result, the counternarratives emerge as scandals more than as means of
rethinking the historiography itself. The pervasive sense of scandal functions as a kind of
institutionalized controversy surrounding the history of the MLA.
Section III: Institutionalized Controversy: Counternarratives and Public Secrets in
Historicizing the MLA
As much as the history of the MLA is mediated in a highly restrictive manner by the
politics of the present, the Moroccan state cannot fully monopolize the historical narrative on the
MLA in the Sahara. This is in part because the state’s failure to address the complexities entailed
by this unresolved project of decolonization ensures that this history remains riven with
controversy. Another reason is because living, former members of the MLA do not necessarily
conform to Moroccan state narratives. In this section, I will examine historical counternarratives,
including histories by Ben Said Ait Iddr, a former member of the political wing of the MLA, oral
histories published as part of dissertation research by the Moroccan sociologist, Ali al-Omri, and
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rumors that I encountered in the course of my fieldwork. Each of these counternarratives
complicate the official narrative promulgated by the Moroccan state. However, because they
cannot separate themselves from the political stakes of nationalism shaping the political field in
the present, these counternarratives are frequently consumed by controversy. This
“institutionalized controversy” surrounding decolonization of the Sahara in the 1950s, as
manifested by rumors, oral histories and other counternarratives, both indicates and conceals the
complexities of this unresolved project of decolonization.
In my initial meeting with him, Hamadi appeared to be hesitant to share his documents,
not because of the imperatives of state security and sovereignty, but presumably out of concern
with protecting the reputations for the descendants of those named in the documents. This
consideration of the history of the MLA differs from the state security imperative, and is worth
exploring on its own terms. If the state security approach to the history of 1950s decolonization
emphasizes synchronism and control, another aspect of the historiography of the MLA is rife
with scandal. Even in a context of competing sovereignties, where Moroccan legitimacy in the
Sahara remains deeply contested, the distinction between an anticolonial resistance fighter and a
“traitor” (kha’in) still holds great currency. In this way, the sense of scandal surrounding the
history of the MLA is structured by the same poles of loyalty and betrayal that structure the
contemporary political field of nationalist conflict, and perspectives on the MLA become a kind
of prism through which political dynamics of the present are read.
Ali al-Omri, a Moroccan sociologist who conducted his dissertation research on the
Moroccan Liberation Army in the Sahara, published a collection of oral histories through the
High Commission.291 The first edition created an uproar among certain veterans who claimed
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that they had been slandered by the claims found in specific interviews from the published
collection. Those who felt wronged went so far as to take the author to court.292 The High
Commission attempted to withdraw the first printing from circulation, and published another
edition. Both editions are marked as “first edition,” and with the same publishing year, but
certain passages in the first edition are missing from the altered version. In the first edition, for
example, El Ouali Ba Bayt asserted that one Larabas Ma al-Aynayn had been charged by the
MLA with delivering arms to a regiment near Laâyoune/El Aaiún, but ended up giving himself
up to the Spanish authorities and disclosing his cargo.293 Though Larabas was imprisoned on the
Canary Islands for this, El Ouali Ba Bayt’s account implied that Larabas had not been a reliable
or trustworthy member of the anticolonial struggle of the 1950s. In the second edition, this
account has been removed and, according to several people, Larabas was one of the aggrieved
parties who threatened al-Omri with libel. As the son of an influential shaykh, Mohamed
Laghdaf Ma al-Aynayn, and as part of a tribe that has been considered loyal to the Moroccan
state, Larabas has occupied a series of powerful governmental posts since 1975, including
President of the Provincial Council, President of the Council of Learning, and Judge on the High
Appellate Court for the region of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In the role of judge, Larabas presided over
trials for Sahrawis arrested for their political activity, and was notorious for accepting bribes in
this role. In this sense, El Ouali, who was imprisoned for thirteen years following Moroccan
annexation for allegedly providing material support to the Polisario Front, was perhaps settling
scores for the injustices and imbalances of power that had accrued over decades of political
dispute.
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It was not simply that El Ouali was questioning Larabas’s participation in the MLA,
however. After all, there is no doubt, according to those I spoke with, that Larabas was involved
in the MLA, and was imprisoned by Spain for these activities. Rather, El Ouali may have been
trying to correct for the privileged role that Larabas, as member of a tribe favored by the
Moroccan state, has had in making and speaking for this history. This has afforded Larabas, and
“friends of the state” like him, not just the status that comes with public acknowledgment as a
member of anticolonial resistance, but the opportunity to frame the history in simple terms of
anticolonial nationalism: in fighting for Morocco, Larabas was imprisoned by Spain. This
narrative, buttressed by the High Commission’s events and publications, marginalizes the
participants who experienced this history in all of its complexity of competing sovereignties and
transforming relations to political authority.294 The controversy over Larabas’s role in the MLA
also reflects the “nonsynchronous contradiction” entailed in historicizing the MLA in the present
– even disagreements end up filtered through the binaries of loyalty and betrayal to the
nationalist cause.
The prestige associated with being recognized as a former MLA fighter might appear
paradoxical. After all, the recognition bears the ambivalence of having participated in an armed
movement that did not succeed in its primary aim to dislodge Spanish and French colonial rule
across western Sahara, and which was largely sold out by the Moroccan state that initially
backed the effort. Moreover, part of the MLA’s leadership may have been plotting to overthrow
the Moroccan king, while many of the Sahrawi fighters who joined this armed movement ended
up feeling betrayed and defected. Perhaps to compensate for this historical ambivalence, the
High Commission liberally bestowed recognition upon former members of the MLA after its
establishment in the 1970s. Some claimed that people took advantage of the financially tenuous
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situation of certain former members of the MLA, paying them for an attestation in order to gain
approval for benefits. Others allegedly enlisted enough relatives willing to sign an attestation in
order to compel an obliging member of the High Commission’s administration to grant
recognition.295 Whether directly sanctioning these practices, or not, it is not difficult to see how
the enrollment of large numbers of former anticolonial fighters under the High Commission’s
benefit regime served the state’s interest in repurposing the MLA’s anticolonial heritage to align
with both the monarchy, and Morocco’s state-sanctioned historical narratives.
Regardless of the process, the end result was that the ranks of former members of the
MLA swelled with fraudulent members. As the Director of one of the High Commission’s local
branches acknowledged, some pensioners receiving benefits from the High Commission had
birthdates on their veterans’ identification cards that preceded the MLA in the Sahara by only
twelve years. This speaks to the space which the MLA history occupies between public history
and public secrets. Because of the Moroccan state’s politicization of this history, the gap between
the state-sanctioned historical narrative, which is both visible and visibly inaccurate, casts a
shadow over parts of this history which do not align with the national narrative but are too wellknown to be ignored.
In the relatively limited historiography of the MLA that is not sponsored or published by
the High Commission, Ben Saïd Aït Iddr’s works distinguish themselves for providing a
relatively comprehensive account of the MLA, and a distinct argument. Aït Iddr was a part of the
MLA’s political wing, which organized funding and funneled arms to the Army’s headquarters
in Goulmime, but did not participate in military campaigns in the Sahara. Like others involved in
the MLA’s political wing, including al-Fqih Ben Basri, Said Bounailat, Moulay Abdeslam Jebli,
and Ibrahim Tizniti (later known as Nemri), Aït Iddr went on to form the 23 Mars movement, a
295

Fieldnotes 3 May 2014; 8 August, 2014.

193

radical leftist group whose members were engaged throughout the 1960s and 70s in attempts to
overthrow the monarchy in Morocco.296 After spending decades in exile in Algeria and France,
Aït Iddr returned to Morocco and published two histories of the MLA, based both on his
experience and on MLA documents that he obtained privately.297
In doing so, Aït Iddr presents a history of the MLA that foregrounds two dynamics, one
of them explicitly, the other perhaps unwittingly. Aït Iddr’s central argument, first presented in
his 2001 publication, is that the MLA was not undone by French-Spanish joint
counterinsurgency but by a series of damaging schisms and unnecessary obstacles that emerged
between the MLA and the Moroccan state, and from within the MLA itself:
Rather, the difficulties and obstacles that [the MLA] faced from within were
effectively and actually stronger, so despite the military loss before the colonial
alliance, the Liberation Army could have come out with a new result, enabling the
lifting of morale, and opening new horizons in order to continue fighting a new
battle.298
Primary among these internal constraints was the Moroccan state’s ambivalence toward the
MLA. This is the focus of Aït Iddr’s first book on the subject, Safahat min Melhamat Jaysh alTahrir bi Janub al-Maghrib.299 As Aït Iddr suggests, the newly independent Moroccan state
became increasingly ambivalent toward the MLA even before the group had arrived in
Goulmime. As the armed faction made its way south taking revenge upon and seizing property
from people seen as French loyalists, and kidnapping French officers who were still stationed in
southern Morocco, the MLA became seen as a threat to the stability of the new nation state.
As a result, Aït Iddr suggests that the Moroccan state increased surveillance over the
MLA’s operations in Goulmime and, more damagingly, sowed discord among MLA leadership.
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Drawing upon the notebook kept by an official in the MLA, Aït Iddr suggests that a meeting was
arranged in Bouizkern, just north of Goulmime, in 1957. At the height of their gains against
Spain, MLA officers were commanded to leave their posts. Some traveled from as far south as
Tiris, in southern Spanish Sahara and, upon reaching Bouizkern, a number of those summoned
were arrested. The entire town was apparently under siege while the power struggle between
MLA officers played out. There are conflicting reports about who led this plot. Aït Iddr blames
officials from the Moroccan state who, he claims, had convinced a faction of MLA officials to
join the Royal Armed Forces, and then force others to do the same.300 Another historian,
however, documented how some of the MLA’s leaders, including Ben Hamou and Driss elAlawi, ruled with impunity, imprisoning and executing French “collaborators” during 1956 and
57 when the MLA first arrived in Goulmime. By this account, Bouizkern may have either been a
continuation of this heavy-handed leadership, or a revolt among a disillusioned group of MLA
officers.301 Regardless, Aït Iddr notes that what he calls the “Bouizkern Plot” “contributed in a
fundamental way (bi shakal jidhari) to changing the original direction of the Liberation Army,
and pushing it to build a different strategy that was forced upon it, without its wish.”302
In his first history, written in 2001, Aït Iddr focuses largely on the role that the formative
Moroccan state played in stymying the MLA’s campaign in the Sahara. According to Aït Iddr,
state agents withheld support from the MLA, or actively undermined its efforts. Though Aït Iddr
never mentions him by name, the implication is that the Prince Hassan II was responsible for
these countermeasures, seeing the MLA as a threat to the Royal Armed Forces that was newly
under his command. In this first historical account, Aït Iddr depicts the MLA as a largely
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coherent extension of the anticolonialism that predated Moroccan independence, but which was
suddenly betrayed by the newly independent Moroccan state. However, not unlike the High
Commission museums, the bidani and Ba‘amrani fighters who constituted most of the MLA’s
armed force have a limited role in this history. In Aït Iddr’s second history Watha’iq Jaysh alTahrir fi Janub al-Maghrib, published in 2011 and based largely on notes kept by an MLA
officer, Aït Iddr characterizes the MLA as an armed movement betrayed by potential allies and
besieged by otherwise avoidable obstacles. In this history, there are plots and conspiracies (aldasa’is wa al-mu‘amarat) at every turn. In this second account, Sahrawis do make an
appearance, but they are most prominently identified as the creators of these plots and
conspiracies. Nonetheless, unlike the earlier publication, Aït Iddr focuses more on the
relationship between MLA leadership, which was largely Moroccan, and the Sahrawis who
constituted the rank and file of the armed movement.
This leads to the second insight from Aït Iddr’s historiography of this period, which
begins to shed light on the relationship between Moroccans and the bidani tribesmen they had
recruited to join their ranks. In both works, Aït Iddr is invested in redeeming the MLA’s
leadership from the suspicions and aspersions that have dogged historical understandings of their
role in potentially plotting to overthrow the King, as well as alienating the Sahrawis who initially
rallied to their cause. As a result, Aït Iddr makes it his task to prove that members of the MLA’s
leadership were motivated purely by nationalism (with no other, anti-monarchical aims) and
sought to spread this nationalism to the people of the Sahara. In one passage, he notes:
To that end, the leadership opened a school for political formation whose
responsibility fell to one of the leaders of the Resistance, comrade Abdesslam
Jebeli, with the aim of raising the political level of the Liberation Army
soldiers.303
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The MLA, Aït Iddr notes, also provided education and housing to children displaced by
Opération Ecouvillon in cities across southern Morocco such as Agadir, Tafraout and, most
famously, in a repurposed mansion in Casablanca known as Dar Touzani.304
In drawing attention to the MLA’s material efforts to better the people of the Sahara, Aït
Iddr also provides an unvarnished perspective of how MLA leadership viewed Sahrawis at that
time:
The Army took some major steps in creating a national consciousness (al-wa‘yi
al-qawmi) and nationalist feeling (al-sha‘ur al-watani) until the words ‘traitor’
and ‘loyalist’ and ‘general interest’ and ‘independence’ and ‘freedom’ and
‘colonialism’ and ‘struggle’ and ‘unity’ and ‘racism’305 – and other expressions
that had not been in use before the Army’s arrival, when the Sahara only knew the
likes of the word ‘camel’ and ‘rain’ and ‘grazing’ and ‘tea’ and ‘French territory’
and ‘Spanish territory’ and a distorted picture of ‘the North’ and ruinous battles
(al-ma‘arik al-tahina) that took place between one tribe and another.306
Whether one believes that the MLA was responsible for instilling these feelings in the people of
the Sahara is less important, here, than drawing upon Aït Iddr’s account – which is, again, based
on a journal kept by a Moroccan MLA officer – for its ethnographic insights into the relationship
between Moroccans and bidanis at this time. The condescension in this passage is apparent,
associating the bidanis with political ignorance and backwardness. Without the “gift” of national
consciousness, this passage implies that the people of the Sahara knew only the geographies
imposed by French and Spanish colonialism. This passage also constructs the way of life in the
Sahara as a series of vacuous preoccupations with ostensibly apolitical things: livestock, weather,
and sociality, i.e., “‘camels’ and ‘rain’ and ‘grazing’ and ‘tea.’” What politics they do have, this

304

Ait Iddr, Safahat Min Melhamat Jaysh Al-Tahrir Bi Janub Al-Maghrib, 118–19.
Al-‘unsriya, refers here to the pride and favoritism that one tribe holds for its own members over those of another.
306
Ait Iddr, Watha’iq Jaysh Al-Tahrir Fi Janub Al-Maghrib, 40; Ait Iddr, Safahat Min Melhamat Jaysh Al-Tahrir Bi
Janub Al-Maghrib, 115. Many of the primary documents used by Ait Iddr were obtained from a former MLA
fighter, rumored to be Nadl al-Hashimi. In his 2011 book, he presents a journal by al-Hashimi; it is not clear whether
Ait Iddr has edited this journal, or not. There are unattributed excerpts from this journal also in the 2001 book.
305

197

stereotype asserts, is the chaos of tribal warfare associated in the Moroccan political imaginary
with al-bilad al-siba’, or the land beyond the pale of state control.
Aït Iddr’s historiography of the MLA is well-known in Morocco, and for good reason. In
acknowledging obstacles which the MLA faced from the Moroccan state and within its own
ranks, this perspective contests the High Commission’s state-centered historiography, which
attempts to erase any separation between the politics of anticolonialism, Moroccan nationalism,
and allegiance to the Alawite dynasty. Because he is writing within certain political constraints,
Aït Iddr cannot directly accuse the King of undermining the MLA. Instead, he focuses on other
parties: the agents of the state responsible for Bouizkern and, subsequently, the Sahrawis who, in
defecting from the MLA, failed to show the requisite loyalty of committed nationalists. In a
certain respect, Aït Iddr’s work serves as a counternarrative to Moroccan state-centered
narratives that refuse to acknowledge the complexity of this historical moment. This also serves
to some extent as a corrective to the Spanish historiography, largely completed by military
historians, which minimizes the level of Sahrawi involvement in the MLA.307
However, Aït Iddr’s focus also belies a preoccupation with the terms set by the statecentered narrative: the people of the Sahara are characterized as blameworthy (whether
duplicitous or ignorant) because of their inability to remain steadfast and loyal to a national goal.
In this specific way, Aït Iddr’s counternarative resembles the controversy surrounding Ali alOmri’s oral histories. Both counternarratives complicate, in different ways, the state’s attempt to
align this history with its own interests of legitimation and sovereignty. In doing so, these
counternarratives spark controversies that contest the most visible inaccuracies in the state307
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sanctioned public history. Nonetheless, these counternarratives remain constrained by the politics
of national historiography and, as a result, their debates end up framed by the poles of loyalty
and betrayal.
***
In this section, I have examined historical accounts that, in one way or another, contest the High
Commission’s attempts to monopolize the historical narrative of the MLA in the 1950s. Because
these studies must accept certain parameters within which to debate what took place, the focus
tends to leave nationalism itself unexamined. When Sahrawis aren’t erased entirely from this
narrative, they are generally evaluated relative to the framework of loyalty and/or betrayal to the
MLA cause. This even occurs in the instance of oral histories, where the controversies
engendered focused on questions of loyalty and betrayal, and not necessarily the ambiguities of
the MLA as a political phenomenon. These controversies illustrate how the MLA remains an
“unsettled past” that sits in disjunctive relation to the political present of nationalist conflict. In
the next section, I attempt to displace this framework by using the MLA as a point of departure
from which to consider the transformative effects of decolonization on the people of the Sahara
during the 1950s. The sources for this account include oral histories, a rumor, and a poem.
Section IV – Disorderly Histories: 1950s Decolonization of the Sahara through Oral
Histories, and Rumor
With one exception to this point, I have largely avoided presenting oral histories by MLA
participants, despite the fact that the recording of oral histories through interviews constituted a
significant part of my research of the MLA in the Sahara. This is in part because the
methodology presented a number of challenges, which I have tried to outline above. In Morocco
and Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, the High Commission’s effort to coopt the history of
decolonization in the Sahara in the 1950s in order to serve the Moroccan state’s struggle to
199

legitimate sovereignty in the territory constrained everything from the use of names (“Moroccan
Sahara”) to the recognition or omission of historical events. No one I interviewed while I was in
Morocco or Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, for example, would provide a first-hand
account of mdigadig l-magazin, although people would acknowledge that the event took place.
The contemporary framework of nationalist conflict often served as the “audience,” whether
absent or present, shaping interviewees’ narratives.308 This polarized context constrained what
could be said and what could not be said about events of the period leading, as I suggested in the
previous section, to a historiography grounded in assigning blame for the demise of the MLA.
This “institutionalized controversy” manifested itself in interviews I conducted with certain
interlocutors eager to blame Ben Saïd Aït Iddr, for example, for revising the history of the MLA
for the purposes of resuscitating his own reputation. When I conducted interviews in the
Polisario/SADR-run refugee camps in southwest Algeria, the effects of the political conflict
manifested themselves in reverse form, particularly since I was carrying out interviews with the
assistance and in the presence of an employee of SADR’s Ministry of Communications.
Although the form and content of oral histories about this period deserve further analysis
in their own right, I turn to a specific passage from a single interview with a former MLA fighter
in an attempt to situate this experience within broader changes across western Sahara during this
period. Rather than evaluating this military campaign in relation to national projects still in
formation at that time, or that were yet to come, I suggest that the events in the region between
1956 and 59 can be particularly revealing for what they can tell us about decolonization as an
attempt to fix the political subjectivity of people of the Sahara. M’hamid, for example, was a
soldier under Spanish rule in Smara in 1957, when a MLA contingent arrived and commanded
308
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his group to surrender. M’hamid spent the next year fighting for the MLA. After the Army was
routed by Operation Ecouvillon, M’hamid and his unit spent twenty days traveling on foot to
reach Wed Nun, where they subsequently remained camped out for months awaiting orders.
M’hamid recalls that during this time, word spread among the bidani fighters that they had been
“tricked,” and so they broke into a stockade of arms and defected, in what was known as
mdigadig l’magazin:
M’hamid: …Mdigadig L-magazin: when a year had passed, at the beginning of 59,
the chleuha said, “The war's over.” For them, in their minds [damir unfusahum
huma], the war was over and they said that they were going to disarm the
Sahrawis. …[It was a] trick [khid‘a]: ... Take their arms, and leave them. You
understand?
Me: Meaning, they took the arms from the Sahrawis…
M’hamid: …Almost three months passed, and they were promoting that idea, that
the Liberation Army will be followed by the Royal Army…And when they said
that they were going to promote that rumor, that it would trick us into [joining]
the Royal Army.
There was someone in Tan Tan who was the leader of a unit [katiba], a
Sahrawi, known as Mahfoud ould Ma'atalla…raised in Marrakesh, in
Morocco…He called the leaders of the platoons [fasa'il], and leaders of the
regiments. All of them Sahrawi. Called them and told them a story, that it was a
trick: Morocco tricked you.
Me: He's the one who told you about the trick.
M’hamid: But, it wasn't clear to us; we weren't convinced by it. [mahi jadd ‘elina]
Me: Why not?
M’hamid: We had at that time, just the Sultan, and nothing else. Just the Sultan,
and that's it. [Ma‘atalla] was the one who was there for us, and that's it. Three
months passed and he called them and met with them, the leadership, two days
each week. They met. And he passed along the trick that was being planned. You
understand, or what? This guy was raised in Morocco, and he was aware [khbari]
- smart.
After becoming convinced by Ma’atalla of this trick, M’hamid participated in mdigadig lmagazin, when MLA soldiers tied up their Moroccan commander and broke into the stockade of
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arms which had been taken from them. M’hamid and hundreds of others then left Tan Tan with
the aid of a handful of prominent shaykhs who, with the support of France, provided material
goods and transport to Tindouf, Bir Moghrein, or points south in Spanish Sahara. By 1960,
M’hamid was a soldier in the Mauritanian army, attending independence ceremonies in
Nouakchott. Since joining the Polisario Front in the 1970s, he has lived in the Sahrawi refugee
camps in Algeria.
There are three aspects of M’hamid’s oral history and itinerary that I would like to dwell
on. The first is his political mobility. The significance here is not only that there were different
perspectives from bidani former combatants about why they participated in the Liberation Army
– the myriad of motives both contradict the notion that nationalism was a hegemonic force at the
time, but also defy cataloguing. Rather, I take the significance of these varied perspectives to
suggest the multiple political and ethical commitments, as well as the various collectivities to
which people of the Sahara had a sense of belonging at that time. Rather than thinking of their
identities as fixed in tribal (Rguibi, Ma al-Aynayn, Izerguiyin, Wlad Dlim, among many others)
or national (Mauritanian, Moroccan, or Sahrawi), I have used the descriptor bidani to draw
attention to the relatively undefined political geography of western Sahara during the 1950s.
Recognizing these processes as in flux serves to highlight the tremendous effort expended during
this time – by the Moroccans, by the French, and by the Spanish – to define and redefine borders,
to fix the subjectivities of their subjects, and to delineate the horizon of political futures in the
region.
The second part of M’hamid’s personal narrative that I would like to focus on involves
his reference to the Sultan, and to being “tricked.” Whether the people of the Sahara have
historically pledged some form of allegiance to the Sultan of Morocco, or not – and whether that
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constitutes “a sovereign tie” – has been the subject of a ruling by the International Court of
Justice, and is beyond the scope of this chapter.309 But the reference to having “nothing but the
Sultan,” and then being “tricked” by the Moroccans they encountered, can be understood in a
number of ways. For M’hamid, it seemed to reference the fact that he and many others had been
ordered to trek north to Morocco and disarm, and then, rather than receiving compensation, he
and others were threatened with conscription into the Moroccan Army. He had been tricked into
fighting for a national project, rather than an anticolonial one.
But the notion of being “tricked” speaks to tensions that exist on a number of levels. It
speaks to the tension between people of the Sahara and their neighbors to the north, whom
M’hamid refers to, in ethnicized terms, as chleuh.310 Without resorting to overdrawn dichotomies
between nomadic and sedentary peoples, it is worth recognizing how the MLA laid bare many of
the relations of complementarity and antagonism that are entailed between these mutually
imbricated groups, particularly in border regions such as Wed Nun, which is where mdigadig lmagazin took place. Underpinning the apparent reciprocity in regards to this transitional region
on the shores of the Sahara, there is a tension between autonomy and dependence, between
pastoral and commercial modes of living, that entail questions of trust, power and respect, as
well as political and moral commitment. This tension is captured more generally in multiple
Sahrawi proverbs that invoke the north as a place to be avoided:
The sahel is the house of money
The south, for wandering
The east is the house of fire
And don’t look to the north311
309
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And, again, this time framed in terms of advice should one’s son head in one of two directions:
If he goes south, don’t hesitate
And if he goes north, don’t [let him] go312
And, finally, a couplet that more explicitly associates danger and difficulties with Morocco:
Whoever goes south, gets what he needs
And whoever goes to Morocco, it is ruined313
Whether as a potential site of moral corruption, or political trouble, these proverbs present the
North, or tell, as a place to be avoided.
And, yet, the North was also a place where people from the Sahara took refuge, whether
from drought or war (both of which occurred during 1956-57314) as well as for commercial
purposes. In this sense, the third aspect of M’ahmid’s narrative of particular interest is the figure
of Mahfoud ould Ma‘atalla the bidani raised in Marrakesh who alerted the MLA fighters to
having been tricked. M’hamid spoke with reverence during our interview about ould Ma‘atalla’s
role in alerting the bidani soldiers to the fact that they had been sold out by the Moroccan
leadership of the MLA. Ould Ma‘atalla’s position as a go-between aligns, in this telling, with his
subject position as a bidani living in Morocco. In M’hamid’s telling, this left ould Ma‘atalla both
alert to the machinations of the MLA leadership, yet sympathetic to his fellow bidanis. Ould
Ma‘atalla is far from an anomaly. On several occasions in the course of my fieldwork as people
referenced their family history they mentioned relatives – often from just one or two generations
prior – who had spent time in locations throughout Morocco, such as Ben Guerir, or the

Al-sharg bayt al-nar
Wa tell la tshuf
312
Ila ystagbil la tarud
Wa ila ygaf la t‘adu
313
al-Omri, Al-Muqawama Al-Sahrawiya Wa Al-‘Aml Al-Watani: Muqabalat Wa Watha’iq, 105. Quoting El Ouali
Ba Bait, whose oral history has been translated into Modern Standard Arabic: men istaqbil yrfa’ min sha’nu
wa men ytijah ila al-maghrib ykhrab
314
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Maamora forests outside of Rabat. In both instances, this had been a temporary stay and the
relatives had returned to the Sahara with their identities and way of life intact. The sense of
danger posed by the North, however, would seem to be related to the prospect of those who do
not return but, instead, settle in the north and, potentially, assimilate.
My point is to suggest that distrust between people of the two regions is no more
structural than a certain interdependence. However, as a horizon of political possibility,
decolonization foregrounded the tensions in this social relation in historically specific ways.
Indeed, while much literature on colonialism in North Africa has focused on the centrality of the
construction of Arab and Berber identities under French colonial rule,315 I would suggest that
making sense of the relationship between peoples of the Sahara and people to the north is
fundamental to understanding the region’s decolonization. This is not simply because of the
‘sedentary/nomadic’ difference, but because the two groups experienced colonialism and
decolonization in related, but radically different ways. Unlike Morocco under the French
Protectorate, the Mediterranean French Algeria, or the Senegalese of French West Africa, the
Sahara had largely been treated as a military outpost, and a colonial hinterland. And, likewise,
just as European empire was withdrawing from its former colonies in the 1950s, capital
investment in the Sahara was surging. And yet, decolonization brought about a political
convergence of these divergent histories.
This brings me to my last point, which is that M’hamid’s description of having been
“tricked” by the Moroccans resonates with what I’m going to call a persistent rumor, or story,
related to the MLA that crops up in written sources and that I also encountered during fieldwork.
315
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Multiple written accounts have suggested that internal dissension which led to a certain number
of bidani defections from the MLA may have been attributable to disagreements between
Moroccan leadership and certain bidani shaykh’s who had rallied to the cause. Tony Hodges
writes:
Very little is known about the causes of these defections. The western ways of the
young radical Moroccans in the Army of Liberation’s leadership may have
alienated the austere and traditional nomads…316
And reporting from Tindouf, Algeria in 1959, shortly after Operation Ecouvillon, Paul Mousset
reports that Rguibat tribesmen who had been combattants in the MLA whom he met there
claimed that:
…these Moroccans who presented themselves as the flower of Islam were praying
very little or not at all, drinking beer and shaving their beards.317
The persistence of this rumor came through in my fieldwork. One interlocutor suggested that
bidanis in Goulmime had been put off by MLA leaders who put out their cigarettes on portraits
of Mohamed V. On another occasion, a man of a younger generation said that he’d been told:
[the Moroccans of the Liberation Army] didn't pray, they drank wine and they
shaved their beards…and that's when it all began.318
This difference in religious or ethical sensibilities between young Moroccan freedom fighters –
some of whom were fighting not for the King, but for a republican or socialist future – and
Sahrawi combatants, point to 1950s decolonization in the Sahara as a disjunctive time-space.
Where the political and religious authority of the Sultan could still rally freedom fighters from
the Rif to the Sahara in the name of anticolonial struggle, their conceptions of what constituted
the Sultan’s authority differed significantly.
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This is not to suggest, in any way, a lack of coevalness between the two, or to place one
within modernity, and the other without. Indeed, one former MLA fighter now living in Sahrawi
refugee camps in Algeria responded to the name of a Moroccan who had been involved in the
MLA and is now a retired colonel living in Rabat by saying, “Jenah bin Acher, he was my
friend!” Those who converged on Goulmime in the summer and fall of 1956, whether Moroccan
or bidani, shared many things, not least an anticolonialism, broadly construed. However, the
divergent projects animating a young, socialist Moroccan liberation fighter from Casablanca and
a bidani shaykh from the Sahara highlight the different political horizons for which each was
fighting: the nation, or the Sultan; jihad, or a socialist future. These might be thought of as
indicative of the “disorderly” nature of this history: reflecting neither nationalist unity nor
separatist antagonisms, the history of the MLA reveals the complex relations of autonomy and
dependence between Moroccans and bidanis that constitute a nonsynchronous, or “unsettled past”
in relation to the present context of nation state-based decolonization.

Section V – Alternative Geographies: 1956-58, Tan Tan, and western Sahara at the
Threshold of Decolonization
Stanza I – Tan Tan and Tiris: Place and Displacement across western Sahara
Somewhere between 1956 and 1958, in the fall, two brothers composed a poem in Tan
Tan. Alternating stanzas, Mohamed Ibrahim ould Sid Ahmed ould Sidi composed the first and
third stanzas, and his brother Bashir composed the second. This dialogic form, known as lgta‘,319 illustrates how poetry can serve as a means of spontaneous entertainment and creative
expression in Hassanaphone, or bidani, poetry. While this dialogic form of poetic composition
319
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can serve as the basis for a verbal duel, Catherine Taine-Cheikh notes that “poetic jousting is not
tied to a specific theme.”320 In this instance, the brothers’ tone is structured less by a sense of
competition than a tacking back and forth between playful boasting, a celebration of moral
goodness, and a longing for their home. These three themes are all present in the first stanza,
composed by Mohamed Ibrahim:321
Lmagta‘ Lahmar and Lkhaljan
And Lgara and Fam Ifandan
And the “Jardin” and the Hasi of Tantan
And Lahmaydiya and Dra‘a Lkhayl
This is my home (since) the summer
And that is thanks to God
But replace those with Iniyyan
Or with Lmanhar and Najdayl
And the longing that surrounds me
And comes to me at the end of the night
Reminds me of the home of the Bidan
Morning, noon and night
And all the other seasons of the land
The autumn with the rainfall and the runoff
And I’m still here, trembling/lonely322
I don’t see any way for poetry
But home is knocking on the mind
There is nothing more beautiful
As for me, my home has never been spoken badly of
The meaning of which is clear, and as proof
All of that from Nagjir323 on
It’s like it recognizes me even at night
And don’t be afraid of me forgetting
I won’t forget you, not for a long time324
320

Taine-Cheikh, “Pouvoir de la poésie et poésie du pouvoir. Le cas de la société maure,” 296.
Transliteration of the poem follows vernacular pronunciation in Hassaniya, rather than IJMES transliteration
standards.
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Rejfan : lit. “trembling”
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A kidya, or small mountain, in Tiris.
324
Lmagta‘ Lahmar wal Khaljan wa Lgara wa Fam Ifandan
wa ljardin wa hasi Tan Tan
wa Lahmaydiya wa Dra’a Lkhayl
had wakri fi sayf nban
dhak lla tasrif Jalil
badal had bi Iniyan
wa bi Lmanhar wa Najdayl
dhak lhazem elayyi zignan
wa jinni ‘ad ‘agib layl
wa hajjal wakr lbidan
lmbat wa lmathal wa lmgayl
wa had ‘ad awwan at-turban
li kharif wa lmsayl wa sil
wa ana bagi hun wa rejfan
mani ra’i lejhan sabil
ghayr lwakr targ dhhan
ma fi ha lilmakhlouq jamil
321
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Mohamed Ibrahim opens by listing a series of places in and around Tan Tan, at that time
a military outpost south of the river Wed Draa.325 Situated in a narrow and variegated plain
between Morocco’s Anti Atlas mountains to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and the
hard rocky Saharan hammada to the east, Tan Tan is located in a region at the northern end of the
Sahara, known as Wed Nun. Thanks to its intermediary climatic and geographic position
between the Sahara and points north (the “tell”), Wed Nun has historically been a gateway for
trans-Saharan trade coming from the south and leading through the market town of Goulmime
toward the agricultural plains and cities of Morocco. Unlike the more arid desert regions to the
south, however, Wed Nun receives sufficient rain for seasonal grain cultivation, such that in
times of drought it often hosts an influx of camel herding pastoralists from neighboring tribes
who otherwise follow seasonal pasturage throughout western Sahara. As a place where pastoral
nomadic and sedentary living overlap, Wed Nun has historically served as a point of
convergence between multiple modes of life. Writing in 1934, the French colonial officer
Frederic de la Chapelle suggested that the region “nicely synthesizes the reciprocity between
nomads and sedentary people.”326
Although uniquely situated at a point of convergence between overlapping ways of life,
Wed Nun, like much of the Sahara, is also structured by displacement. The historical
wa ana wakri ma gut shiyyan
ma’ana ha battil wa dalil
had kamil Nagjir ‘ala
khayf lima ya’refni filil
wa la kha’ifni li nansahu
mani nassih wa dhak tawwil
325
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War II Spain’s Saharan territories administratively became a part of was called “Spanish West Africa,” and
governed under Spain’s Moroccan Protectorate. Spanish colonial presence beyond several coastal enclaves was
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renamed Spanish Sahara.
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involvement of Wed Nun tribes in trans-Saharan trade has led to their dispersion across
commercial networks to places as far-flung as Atar, Tindouf, Taoudenni, Walata, Timbuktu and
Saint-Louis.327 As a semi-desert region, Wed Nun itself is also susceptible to water shortages,
and, like other tribes of western Sahara, people in Wed Nun have been known to take refuge in
the rural plains of Morocco during times of drought. Underpinning this apparent reciprocity,
then, is a tension between autonomy and dependence that cuts across several axes: between
sedentary and nomadic modes of living, between commercial and pastoral means of subsistence,
and between the different tribal (Tekna, Rguibat, Laarousiyin, among many others), ethnic (Arab
and Amazigh), and religious (Muslim and Jewish) groups that converged, intermingled and
dispersed through these intersecting ways of life.
In the mid-1950s, before Spain began expanding its nominal colonial presence in the
Sahara beyond several coastal enclaves, Tan Tan was more a military garrison than a town. In
1956, Tan Tan was a Spanish military outpost at the threshold, in space and time, of
decolonization. And unlike other Saharan towns such as Goulmime and Tindouf, which emerged
through trade networks that were either trans-Saharan or colonial in nature, Tan Tan would
develop largely through the struggles over political authority and population control that
characterized processes of decolonization in the Sahara. By the fall of 1958, after Spain
transferred the northernmost strip of its Saharan colony, Tan Tan was a part of newly
independent Morocco.328 In the intervening two years, the city would swell with bidani fighters
who, after joining the Moroccan Liberation Army in the Sahara (MLA), were pushed north by a
327
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joint Spanish-French counterinsurgency. Many bidani’s who had joined the MLA subsequently
found themselves in Tan Tan, stranded and disarmed. Some were conscripted into the Moroccan
Royal Armed Forces (RAF), as tanks from the RAF surrounded the city following its transfer
from Spanish to Moroccan control. Others fled to French Algeria and Mauritania. Another
contingent returned to Spanish Sahara, no longer as anticolonial insurgents, but as colonial
subjects fleeing the nascent processes of postcolonial state formation.
While I received conflicting reports as to whether the brothers composed this poem in
1956 or 1958, whether at the outset or end of their participation in the MLA, it is clear from
Mohamed Ibrahim’s first stanza that Wed Nun has failed to capture his imagination. In referring
to it as a hasi, or well, he implies that, regardless of its military importance to either Spain or
Morocco, Tan Tan is more waystation than destination. Though he begins by listing a series of
places in and around Tan Tan to situate himself in time and space, he does not dwell in his
present situation. Perhaps finding this fledgling settlement uninviting, unimpressive (his use of
the French word “jardin” was perhaps dismissive) or simply unfamiliar, he runs through a series
of places nearby (Lmagta‘ Lahmar and Lkhaljan, Lgara and Fam Ifandan, Lhamaydiya and Dra‘a
Lkhayl), without offering any further description. Indeed, his mind is elsewhere and he soon
moves on to his main preoccupation, the absent presence of home, using this conversation with
his brother to indulge in “the feeling that surrounds me” when he thinks of places like Iniyyan,
Lmanhar, Najdayl and, later in the stanza, Nagjir. Together, these hills, stream beds and water
sources constitute a region known as Tiris, some 900km south of Tan Tan that in the late 1950s
was divided between the northern reaches of French West Africa (soon to be Mauritania), and
the southern tier of what was then called Spanish West Africa.329 With its varied landscape, Tiris
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is renowned for providing an unusually vast expanse of seasonal pastureland ideal for grazing
camels, sheep and goats, following rains (“The autumn with the rainfall and the runoff”). In
1859, from the administrative capital of French West Africa in Dakar, Senegal, Colonel Louis
Faidherbe wrote of Tiris:
Between this sebkha (d’Ijil) and the sea one finds a country that is not found on
any map, nor in any geography, and the name for which is nonetheless continually
on the mouth of those who speak of this part of Africa or who live there, or who
travel there; it is Tiris.
Now what is Tiris? It is a country where there is neither a village nor a
tree, nor of course the smallest stream; until now it has not seemed important to
make it appear on maps. But from October to May it is covered in pasture, and all
of the tribes from Wed Nun in the north, until Senegal in the south, and to Tichit
in the east, that is to say, living within an area of 40,000 square [km], go to Tiris
with their herds of camel and sheep in order to find grass there. During our winter
in Senegal, by contrast, from June to October during the season of rains, there is
no grass in Tiris, and the tribes return each one to their country where they find
pasture. This year, even Mohammed el Habib, cheikh of the Trarza, went to
Tiris.330
This place, which, Mohamed Ibrahim boasts, is so familiar to him that it would recognize him
“even at night,” visits him during his time in Tan Tan, reminding him of its beauty. This longing
for home leaves the poet feeling “rejfan,” trembling from a cold that one can assume is a result
of being both north of Tiris, and simply so far from home. Despite this separation, Mohamed
Ibrahim expresses a clear resolve in the stanza’s closing couplet, directly addressing his home
with the reassurance that his longing won’t be forgotten, “not for a long time.”

ceasefire ended 15 years of war between Morocco and the Sahrawi national front, Polisario. Because Morocco does
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Stanza II: “Neither Stifled nor Pressured”: bidani Moral Geography and Genealogical
Identity
Lmagta‘ and Fam Targuan
Those are in my soul, and Lkarban
And L‘atef, also, and Amazzan331
Meaning affection, oh, from before
From Tagba to Zemoul Iniyyan
The place where the land separates
And from Laglat to Inzaran
Here the people are generous332
Tiris is not two hearts attached
From one resting place you see another
And in all of this are people
And sharaf who shine in candle light
And there are zawaya with notables
And the Qur’an and Khalil
And the mosque and call to prayer
And people who give with piety
And I, among them, with goodness in store333
And the action that isn’t vile
And I know about riding camels
And I travel this way and that
I am neither stifled nor pressured
And no route before me is closed off
And I only befriend notables
Who are free and small in number
And I won’t be interrupted in my poetry
For on my verses an elephant could rest
And I won’t stray from the bidani way
As my origins are bidani and the proof
Is that I make the ambiance, rhythm and poetry
Biki and Tawwil334 are both known [to me]
And I pledged/sold335 that to God
The pledge/sale took place some time ago
And when people pledge/sell in these times
I think that one should not rescind
331

Places near Dakhla and Aouserd, in Tiris, in present-day Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara.
Tjala, pl tuwajil: “petite colline rocheuse isolée” Catherine Taine-Cheikh, Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français.
dialecte arabe de Mauritanie 2, 2, (Paris: Geuthner, 1989), 187. (Taine-Cheikh, v.2 p187)5/11/18 3:06 PM. Here,
the poet appears to be using this feature as a metaphor for the people grouped together in this region
333
fi khazini li hassan – this is also a reference to being from a “big tent,” or a family with the means (and morality)
to be generous.
334
Prosody (buhur) in azawan.
335
Over these three lines, the poet plays with the meanings of “sell,” and “pledge,” which share the same root [b-a-‘]
in Arabic. I’ve maintained the split translation in order to illustrate the movement between completing a sale, in a
transactional sense, and pledging allegiance, in terms of submission to authority.
332
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God created these nations
And separated between them that separation
From Boulawtad to Dar Aman
Where there is boukar336 and atil337
While very little of this is found
In Tan Tan and Draa Lkhayl
And if it is there it is not well-known
Where its traces are found at night.338
Feeling “neither stifled nor pressured,” Bashir ould Sid Ahmed ould Sidi picks up where his
brother’s first stanza left off, expressing his affection for Tiris. Bashir opens the stanza by
naming more places (“Lmagta’ and Fam Targan,” “Laglat to Inzaran”) and closes by referencing
vegetation endemic to Tiris (“boukar and atil”). In referencing the region’s natural features,
rather than cities or towns, Bashir gives an implicit description of the human geography of the
region at this time, which in the 1950s was still defined by its inland seasonal grazing, rather
than permanent settlements on the coast. But Bashir soon makes it clear that his affection for
Tiris is tied to the people who gather there, as much as the natural beauty of the place. His
336

Panicum turgidum. A desert grass. Taine-Cheikh, Dictionnaire Hassāniyya français. dialecte arabe de
Mauritanie 6, 6,.
337
Maerua crassifolia. A tree/shrub with green leaves. Taine-Cheikh.
338
Lmagta‘ wa Fum Tergan
hadou fi khalgi wa Lkerban
Wa L‘atif mlli wa Amazzan
ma‘ana ‘atf ’ah gbil
Min Tagbi li Zamoul Ainian
blad mnin y‘ud te‘azil
Min Laglat ilayn Inzaran
hadha fih nass tuwwajil
Tiris mahum galbayn gwan
min mgayl tashuf mgail
Wa hadha kamil fih l-‘arban
wa sharaf yggidhum qandil
Wa fih zwaya min l-a‘yan
wa fih l-qur’an wa fih Khalil
Wa fih masjid wa l-’adhan
wa nass tenfaq fi sabil
Wa ana fi khazni li hassan
wa lfe‘l lli ma hu radil
Wa n‘arif fih arkub imilian
wa tisdar fi sabil fi sabil
Mani medium wa la nekdan
wa la mahsur a’liya sabil
Wa la nesshab shi ma hu l-a’yan
wa ahrawi min had dhalil
Wa la nqata‘ ‘end azawan
kifani yteku fihum al-fil
Wa la naqta‘ ‘en yum al-bidan
assli bidani wa dalil
Mul hawl tarab wazan
ya’refha baygi wa tawwil
Wa hadha yba’atu li ssabhan
maddayt al-bi‘a fh gabil
Wa mnadem ba‘ fadha ‘alawan
ma zanti zin ‘alih iqil
Mulana khalg dha lawtan
wa fassal fiha dkha at-tafsil
Min Bu al-Witad ila Draman
fiha boukar wa fiha itil
Wa hadha milkan najad nakir
fi Tan Tan wa fi Dra‘a Alkhayl
W-allah huwa kanu shahir menin
ykun ‘atheru fi l-layl
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allusions to a “generous” number of people who still enjoy enough space so as not to be like
“two hearts attached” describes an idyllic landscape of fergan, or groups of tent-living families
traveling together, with livestock in tow. That one tent can be seen from another seems to evoke
an ideal landscape of proximity and distance – a poetic pastoral of seminomadic pastoralism.
With his affection for the land established, Bashir elaborates on the piety and moral
goodness of the people populating Tiris. From the mosque and call to prayer to the acts of
giving, he extolls their religious devotion (mosques and zawaya) and ethical goodness (“people
who give”). At the same time, a boastful pride runs through Bashir’s stanza. In defining the
company that he keeps by their moral propriety, he refers both to their religious commitment,
and their sharaf, or honor. This honor, based on the claim of patrilineal descent from the Prophet
Mohamed, continues to underpin Arab identity in the Sahara, and to mark the status of certain
tribes in the region, among them Bashir’s Laaroussiyin. As Mandana Limbert and Engseng Ho
have shown in the Indian Ocean context, this renders Arabness not so much an ethnic identity as
“a caste or class notion, reproduced through patrilineal genealogy.”339 In the Sahara, this status is
racialized as bidani “white” identity in contradistinction to non-Arab Africans (“l-kwar”), and
made hierarchical through the genealogical nobility of sharaf, in contradistinction to the servility
of slaves and other dependents. The line “sharaf who shine in candle light” expresses this
racialized status by referring to light-skinned people who “shine,” or glow, by candlelight.
Bashir’s boast of being “neither stifled nor pressured” elaborates a sense of subjectivity
constituted by relations with bidanis of similar status “who are free and small in number.” In this
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Mandana Limbert, In the Time of Oil Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town. (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 2010), 144; Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim: Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 158. Limbert looks more at the racial aspect of this genealogical
Arabness in contemporary Oman, while Ho emphasizes the religious significance of genealogy in constituting an
Indian Ocean Arab diaspora. Ho: “a particularly complex interweaving of religious and genealogical status has
helped define what it means to be Arab in this wide field.”
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way, Bashir’s sense of freedom and autonomy is deeply tied to ethically appropriate behaviors,
moral goodness, as well as status within the hierarchies of Saharan social formations. This
bidani-ness is highly differentiated and shot through with hierarchies, distinctions and tribal
affiliations.340 Beyond the status distinctions between tribes, a group of firgan in Saharan society
may be constituted by another set of hierarchies, differentiating between “notables,” such as
Bashir, and their dependents, who might include haratin, or freed slaves, ma‘allem (a class that
provisioned a collection of families with cookware and necessities for traveling), iggawen,
(traditionally, families of poets), and slaves. As one colonial officer put it, the multiple sets of
status distinctions within and between tribal affiliations render Saharan society “doubly
hierarchical,”341 since authority and autonomy in the Sahara have historically been predicated on
the control of dependents, or people, rather than territory.342
In their ethnographies of Bedouin poetry in Egypt and Yemen, Lila Abu-Lughod and
Steve Caton both discuss the importance of autonomy as an orienting value in Bedouin society,
which bears a close family resemblance to bidani forms of life. For Caton, the persuasiveness of
poetic rhetoric in Yemeni politics was necessary because “rule over those who cherish their
autonomy demands the art of persuasion, not coercion.”343 Lila Abu-Lughod qualifies the
importance placed on autonomy as a cultural value among Bedouin in Egypt by noting its
gendered dimension, as an ideal that for many women remains unattainable:
But if honor derives from virtues associated with autonomy, then there are many,
most notably women, who because of their physical, social and economic
dependency are handicapped in their efforts to realize these ideals. Although they
340

Tara Deubel refers to “Bidan” to as “a high-status category.” Deubel, “Between Homeland and Exile,” 2010, 19,
footnote 12. For a more contemporary discussion of this “social pyramid” and the efforts of SADR/Polisario to
overwrite these hierarchies, see Wilson, Sovereignty in Exile, 50.
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Françoise Beslay, Reguibats: de la paix française au Front Polisario. (Paris: L’harmattan, 1984), 82.
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Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 133.
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Steven Charles Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon” Poetry as Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 32.
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share the general ethos and display some of the virtues of autonomy under certain
conditions, their path to honor in this system is different.344
For Abu-Lughod, poetry becomes – for men and women alike – a medium for the culturally
acceptable expression of vulnerability. In both Caton’s and Abu-Lughod’s accounts, poetry is
understood as an expressive form that preserves an idealized sense of autonomy through an
allusive language that achieves and conceals its primary aim (submission to authority of another
in Caton’s case study, disclosure of vulnerability in Abu-Lughod’s). With Caton’s and AbuLughod’s insights in mind, Bashir’s stanza about being “neither stifled nor pressured” might be
thought of as a poetic expression that conceals the relations of dependence underpinning bidani
notions of autonomy.
At the same time, however, Bashir’s stated “proof” (dalil) of his “bidani origins” refers
not only to hierarchical status, but to the cultivation of certain moral behaviors, as well as the
mastery of certain cultural practices, such as poetry. Bashir uses poetry to boast of his capacities
as a poet, both in technical terms (when he announces the prosodic forms he knows “Biki” and
“Tawwil”), and in a more expansive sense (“for on my verses an elephant could rest”). With
these boasts, Bashir is making clear that poetry itself is an aspect of a cultivated bidani identity.
As Judith Scheele points out in her ethnographic work from southern Algeria, in Saharan society
“status categories and 'ethnic groups' more generally are not thought about in terms of bounded
groups but rather with reference to a model of excellence to which people correspond to varying
degrees.”345 In this stanza, poetry, piety and genealogy together serve as elements around which
bidani “models of excellence” are cultivated, claimed and expressed.
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Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1986), 33.
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Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 133. On genealogical imaginaries, see also, Andrew Shryock,
Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley,
Calif: University of California Press, 2008); Jonathan Holt Shannon, Performing Al-Andalus: Music and Nostalgia
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This model of excellence relates to what Scheele describes as “a genealogical vision of
the world” with implications for property, identity and authority that run counter to the bounded
concepts of race, ethnicity and nation.346 Scheele’s notion of a genealogical relation to identity
and authority based on hierarchical but open-ended encompassment, rather than the boundaries
of ethnicity and nation, brings to mind the work of Engseng Ho and how a genealogical lexicon
enabled the translation and transferal of authority across an Indian Ocean diaspora of mobility
and trade. Ho’s insights regarding the production of a “moral geography” where “places in turn
become signs for values”347 also provides an apt frame for thinking with Bashir and Mohamed
Ibrahim about the moral goodness associated with the place-names, otherwise poetic and
inscrutable, dotting the poem like sign posts.
With the moral geographies of Tiris and the complexities of bidani identity elaborated in
this stanza, I hope to show that this poem challenges easy translation of the concepts of identity,
land and belonging across western Sahara to the contemporary context of nationalist conflict, just
as the complexity of Saharan social, cultural and political formations have long defied bounded
nation-state configurations of territory, people and sovereignty. Of course, Mohamed Ibrahim’s
and Bashir’s expressions of longing in this poem describe a sense of displacement that would
understandably resonate with the current political field driven by nationalist conflict, fragmented
political geography, and exile. But in reducing these expressions entirely to a presentist discourse
of nationalism, as they so often are in the literature on Western Sahara conflict, the richness of
poetic longing is lost, as are the complexities of Saharan subjectivities, and the layered histories
of regional decolonization. Rather, I suggest, this poem illustrates the degree to which western

across the Mediterranean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015); Ho, The Graves of Tarim; Limbert, In the
Time of Oil Piety, Memory, and Social Life in an Omani Town.
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Scheele, Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, 145.
347
Ho, The Graves of Tarim, 94.
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Sahara has been radically transformed from the 1950s to present – or since the boundary-making
processes of decolonization emerged. Therefore, the evidence of experience from different
moments of decolonization in the region need to be historicized rather than assumed.348

Stanza III – Love and Longing
Today, really, Jalyat is far
As is Gran and Laghraydat
This distance and the distance to ‘Agaybat
The home of your parents for Ramadan
Where there is a remedy for any sadness,
For love349 and remedy for Satan
And moreover it is the place of souls
The place of souls and such goodness
Regardless of what has happened with the passing of time
It nevertheless remains [home] for all time
Where there are youngsters and girls
And, what is more, beautiful camels to ride
And there’s also Lgour which isn’t bad
And Um Daggan and Lkarban
And Tarf where I spent the night
Gart L‘adayl, full of love350
And Lmanhar and Twinagjarat
There, where the longing at night
Took from me all reasoning
And left my balance trembling351
This, here, is the place of houses
And of my joy in the cold and the heat
Also, there is Sallam, who left
My mind worn out from so long
Love for her regenerates352 in my soul
But right now Iniyyan is far
And so is Aatf and Laachariyat
And if there are still understanding people
They won’t reproach me for turning at length
Toward the land of the Bidan
348

Joan W Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, no. 17 (1991): 773–97.
dellal: “(très rare) “amour”… “Coeur (style poétique)” (T-C, v4, p654)
350
ghaywan: “séduction, amour, charme” (T-C, v8, p1718)
351
rejfan
352
nekrat refers to the end of spring, at a time when plants would otherwise stop growing, when more rainfall causes
them to resume growing.
349
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And the land of the camel and pretty girls
Return me, without any dissembling353
To my land, oh God
Until I see the mouths of the riverbeds
And I’ll stop and pull up with a tin can/metal barrel
A kettle of water from Bir Inzaran
To break, if [only] I were [there], a bit of wood354
In the third and final stanza, Mohamed Ibrahim continues and intensifies the poem’s theme of
longing for Tiris. At the top of the stanza, he continues listing place-names but, whereas in the
first stanza he was insisting on their proximity in his mind, now he flatly acknowledges the
distance of Jalyat, Gran, Laghraydat and ‘Agaybat. Even as he avoids further mention of Tan
Tan, the reality of his separation from Tiris is more present than ever in this concluding stanza.
Nevertheless, the timelessness of this homeland remains unchanged, and as the stanza
progresses Mohamed Ibrahim increasingly expresses this longing for Tiris in terms of desire.
From “dellal” to “ghaywan” to “’azzat,” he evokes a series of terms that articulate his love, ardor
and dear feelings for a homeland increasingly personified in the figure of a woman. First
referring to the appeal of home in terms of the young women (tafilat) and camels (amliyan) who
are present there, more generally, Mohamed Ibrahim eventually names her Sallam, and recounts
353

Jehdan: Taine-Cheikh v2, p295 “dissimulation, secret”; “faire de tenir secret qqc, de cacher (un secret)”.
Assl ba’id lium jelliyat
wa ba‘id Gran wa Laghraydat
Had ba‘id wa ba‘id ‘Agaybat
Dar ahlek dhik fi Ramadan
L fiha tib l’ayat
Lil dullal wa tib ash-shaytan
Wa hiya zad bled li khlagat
Wa bled li khlag lla yzyan
Ysu mza ha fi lfat
Yaghayr ytem lla bla azman
Fi l’ail wa tafilat
Wa shi ma dhak rkub amliyan
Wa fi Lgour wa ma hum shinan
Wa fihum Um Daggan wa Lkarban
Wa Tarif fih w hi nbat
Gart L’adayl bil ghaywan
Wa Lmanhar wa Twinagjarat
Fum Lhezam al bat kran
Rah misu bini min hejjat
Lima khalli mezzani rejfan
Had huwa bul diyarat
Tarabi fi l-berd wa fi l-hawman
Wa fi hum mulli Sallam khallat
‘Aqli ysaf min ‘awdan
‘Azzat-ha fi khllagi nekrat
Ghayr ba’id lium Iniyan
Wa ba’id ‘Atef wa L’asharyat
Wa had bad mnadem ftan
Ma ykessir li tal tilfat
‘Ala shur trab l-Bidan
Wa trab ilbil wa shabibat
Rj’ani ma fiha jehdan
Li trabi ya lwahid fi dhat
Ilayn nshuf afam lwedian
Wa nukaf wa netla’ min tinuat
Maghraj min ma’ Bir Inzaran
Kasir lu kunt khshibat
354
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how his encounters with her both left him “worn out” (“Sallam khallat/‘aqli ysaf,”) and enables
his longing to regenerate, like the season of extended rainfall and growth (nekrat). This passage
is particularly interesting because, by equating his love for Tiris with his love for Sallam,
Mohamed Ibrahim evokes this longing not only as a powerful emotion, but a destabilizing force.
In doing so, he recycles the term “rejfan” which, in the first stanza, referred to shivering from the
lack of warmth that he feels in Tan Tan. In this stanza, the poet recalls an evening of love and
longing in Tiris that “took from me all reasoning/and left my balance trembling.” Here, the
trembling of rejfan refers to the destabilizing force of an intimate encounter. Recalling this
experience with his love/home inverts the relationship of distance the poet currently experiences
in order to evoke the feeling of longing as a regenerative feeling of intimacy.
With this, Mohamed Ibrahim concludes the poem with an appeal that allows him to
imagine his return one more time:
Return me, without any dissembling
To my land, oh God
Until I see the mouths of the riverbeds
And I’ll stop and pull up with a tin can/metal barrel
A kettle of water from Bir Inzaran
To break, if [only] I were [there], a bit of wood
***
In its expression of longing for another place, the brothers’ poem is representative of a popular
bidani poetic genre known as nasib. According to Catherine Taine-Cheikh nasib as a genre
“nostalgically evokes ties with formerly frequented places.”355 With movement and displacement
a structural element of life in 1950s Tiris (as Colonel Faidherbe noted a century earlier, Tiris
drew people from around the region from October to May, and then emptied out the rest of the
year), the nasib offers a genre particularly well-suited to seminomadic pastoralism. But the
355
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brothers’ expression of longing remains meaningful beyond the time and space in which they
composed their poem. Today, this expression of longing may resonate on multiple registers. In
the present context of nationalist conflict – for the poets’ descendants living in refugee camps in
Algeria, for example – the longing for Tiris may easily translate to a longing for a return to their
national homeland, from which Sahrawis governed by SADR/Polisario have been exiled now for
over 40 years.
For bidanis living throughout the region, whether in Moroccan-occupied territory,
Morocco, or even Mauritanian cities, this stanza may express longing, in a more generalized
sense, for a time when seminomadic pastoralism still prevailed as a way of life. With settlement
in cities a major feature of the era of decolonization in the Sahara, when colonial and
postcolonial administrations sought to sedentarize people of the Sahara, poetry became a means
of expressing longing for the badiya, or desert, in contradistinction to the city. This sentiment
was articulated with particular emphasis during my fieldwork in the largest city of Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara, Laâyoune, where Sahrawis increasingly found themselves settling
more permanently, on account of militarized occupation and wage labor, since the 1990s. Not
infrequently, interlocutors would mention how the inability to “see far” from within the concrete
walls of an urban residence particularly affects older Sahrawi folk, whose embodied capacity for
relaxation (a frequently-used term, “ynfatah sadru,” means “opening of the heart”356) depended
upon escaping the architecture of the house. For Saharans living in cities, the poem’s resonance
may be understood not only in relation to a specific place (Tiris), but as a kind of cultural poetics
of space (badiya). It was frequently mentioned to me, for example, that the tent, open at all times,
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is a defining aspect of life in the Sahara, and a characteristic sign of trust and hospitality.357 In
this way, the locked metal doors of the urban house represent the tent’s antithesis, in synecdochic
relation to the opposition between the city and badiya.
Tara Deubel’s research provides further insight into how poetry gives expression to this
discourse of longing for the badiya. According to Deubel, the poet Sidati Essallam, a longtime
resident of Laâyoune, connects the sensory experience of poetry to life outside the city, in the
badiya. Particularly since this experience has diminished with widespread sedentarization over
the last generation, the badiya provides a source of inspiration both for the poet and their
audience: “[Essallam’s] representations of the rural experiences of mobile pastoralists and their
forms of knowledge resonated with both his contemporaries and urban youth. Older generations
shared in his nostalgia for lifestyles they had largely abandoned in moving to the city and youth
sought to reconnect with the badiya…”358 The limiting horizons of the urban built environment
across western Sahara contrasts with the sensorily rich experience of the badiya, an experience
which remains evocative for poet and audience alike.359
***
To this point, I have discussed how the poem’s theme of longing for Tiris translates across
multiple registers, some of them grounded in the present context of (occasionally forced) urban
living, and conflict between Morocco and the Sahrawi nationalist movement. In concluding, I
would like to turn now to the context in which the poem was produced. Whether in 1956 or
1958, the brothers were in Tan Tan either at the beginning or end of their involvement with a
357
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fleeting and peculiar anticolonial armed movement known as the Moroccan Liberation Army in
the Sahara (MLA). Led by mostly young Moroccan men, the MLA recruited bidani shaykhs to
mobilize entire Saharan tribes in supporting the armed movement’s attempts to claim parts of
French Algeria, French West Africa and Spanish Sahara for newly independent Morocco.
Recruited by Moroccan anticolonial fighters, bidanis from around the region initially rallied to
the cause, under the sign of jihad or the Moroccan Sultan. Though most of its leadership were
relatively young Moroccans, the MLA’s ranks were filled by bidani tribesmen, who constituted
an estimated two-thirds of the Army, and the vast majority of its combatants.360 Where the
Moroccan leadership were mostly (although not exclusively) young men who had been active in
the pre-‘56 urban-based resistance to Morocco’s French Protectorate, bidanis who took up arms
to join the MLA came from across western Sahara, a region that included southern Morocco and
surrounding Spanish and French colonial territories. By 1957 several thousand members of the
MLA had occupied most of Western Sahara, effectively reducing Spanish colonial presence to a
handful of coastal enclaves.361
The MLA’s success, however, was fleeting. Despite its initial incursion, a covert FrenchSpanish counterinsurgency in early 1958 routed the MLA and drove the combatants out of
Spanish Sahara. On April 1, 1958, several months after the French-Spanish counterinsurgency,
Spain agreed to transfer the region of Tan Tan at the northern end of its colony, to Morocco. By
this time, the Liberation Army was in complete disarray. Some members of the MLA’s
leadership were reputedly seeking to overthrow the King of Morocco and establish a republic.362
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At the same time, Spain and France actively recruited leading bidani shaykhs to defect from the
MLA. Meanwhile, throughout 1958 the Moroccan state was trying to disband the MLA and
incorporate its members into the Royal Armed Forces. After bidani soldiers spent much of 1958
stationed in various parts of southern Morocco, with rumors circulating about Morocco’s plan to
incorporate MLA fighters into the Royal Army, many of them deserted. After overthrowing their
Moroccan officers and reclaiming their rifles in a revolt known as mdigadig l-magazin (breaking
into the stockade) they left Wed Nun for points west and south. Large contingents headed to
Tindouf, in French Algeria, and northern Mauritania. Others returned to Spanish Sahara, as
colonial subjects rather than armed insurgents.
***
For some, mdigadig l-magazin and the MLA has come to epitomize the failure of Moroccans and
people of the Sahara in what Hannah Arendt terms “the elementary problems of human livingtogether.”363 In the contemporary political landscape of nationalist conflict, mdigadig l-magazin
is rarely discussed in public. Morocco promotes historical memory of the MLA in Sahara
through commemorative events and state-sponsored publications, but these efforts remain
closely tied to Moroccan state security prerogatives that simplify its history and effectively
silence public discussion of events such as mdigadig l-magazin. In the Sahrawi refugee camps,
on the other hand, the MLA is erased almost entirely from a Sahrawi national narrative that
promotes the historical memory of unwavering resistance to both Moroccan and Spanish rule.
Perhaps it is fitting, then, that the allusive language of Bashir and Mohamed Ibrahim’s poem – a
poem about longing to leave Tan Tan and return to Tiris – indexes this moment in the region’s
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tortuous history of decolonization. By the fall of 1958 in Tan Tan, the MLA was finished, but the
process of decolonization in the Sahara had only just begun.
Situating Mohamed Ibrahim’s and Bashir’s poem in relation to their involvement in the
MLA in the late 1950s also provides background to their longing, and suggests that their
displacement had a specific cause that was neither the seasonal result of seminomadic
pastoralism, nor the outcome of nationalist conflict, the displacement from Tiris to Tan Tan in
1958. Rather, their displacement was the result of mobilizations and conflicts surrounding the
emergence of decolonization as a horizon of expectation across the Sahara. In this way, the
brothers’ poetic longing emerges from a particular moment that has had specific ramifications
for understanding the relationship between decolonization, border-making and displacement
across western Sahara.
***
Today, the poem’s construction of Tiris as object of longing translates across multiple
registers. Nasib as a genre is particularly apposite to the situation of displacement in a region
long characterized by mobility and borderless-ness, and the poem’s ongoing circulation across
the occupied territories, refugee camps, and borderlands of western Sahara, demonstrates the
existence of a receptive audience for this form of creative expression of longing. Longing for the
badiya takes form within a cultural poetics of non-urban space, as well as a nostalgia for an
eclipsed way of life. Meanwhile, nationalist longing for Tiris is tied to a specific history of
conflict and exile since 1975, one which also sustains a sense of belonging to the Sahrawi nation,
and a commitment to realizing the return of Tiris – now configured as part of a national territory
– in the future. And, finally, I suggest that the longing expressed by Mohamed Ibrahim and
Bashir presents another layer of signification concerning the moral geography of the Sahara and
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a genealogical bidani subjectivity that may not necessarily be commensurable with the post-1975
nationalist concepts of identity and territorial sovereignty. The way in which Mohamed Ibrahim
and Bashir’s poem resonates at different registers indicates how multiple layers of
decolonization’s history – including the 1950s, post-1975 nationalist conflict, and today – are
sedimented in the poem’s expressions of longing.
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Chapter 4 – Open Horizons of Change, Narrow Spaces of Dissent: the Spatiotemporal
Frameworks of Sahrawi National Liberation and 1970s Decolonization
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[Map of Mauritania and Western Sahara ca. 1978]364
Appendix – Chapter 4
CPASS (Comité Provisoire d’Action Scolaire) – Mauritanian student group at the secondary
education level that formed in 1968 and became a part of the Kadihin movement.
Ila al-Amam – Marxist-Leninist political group active in UNEM in the 1960s and 70s, and
affiliated with the publication Anfas.
Kadihin – A popular Mauritanian opposition movement that formed in the early 1970s and was
a strong early supporter of Polisario. Coopted by state reforms, the movement continued in
diminished form after 1975.
MIFERMA (la Société des Mines de fer de Mauritanie) – France-based company that
operationalized the mining and transportation of iron ore from northern Mauritania beginning in
1960. Industrial engine of Mauritania. Nationalized in 1974; renamed SNIM.
Mars 23 mouvement – Radical New-left political group active in UNEM in the 1960s and 70s.
Named for the date when the Moroccan state violently repressed student protests in 1965.
MLA (Moroccan Liberation Army) – A Moroccan-led anticolonial, irredentist armed movement
with widespread Sahrawi participation that briefly disrupted French and, especially, Spanish
colonial rule across western Sahara in the late 1950s. The subject of Chapter 3.
National Democratic Movement – Formed in 1966 in Mauritania, in opposition to the ruling
regime, when bidani and non-Arab Black intelligentsia joined together following inter-ethnic
violence in the country. Joined with what became the Kadihin in the early 1970s.
Polisario Front (Frente Popular para la Liberación de Sagui el-Hamra y Río de Oro) – Sahrawi
national liberation movement formed in 1973. Polisario established SADR, a state-in-exile, in
1976 and, since then, has been based in refugee camps in southwest Algeria.
SADR (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) – The state-in-exile declared by Polisario in 1976.
Often used interchangeably with Polisario because, even if they are institutionally distinct
(Polisario is the liberation movement, SADR the state), they operate in combination.
SNIM (Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie) – the name of MIFERMA
following Mauritanian nationalization in 1974.
UGESM (l’Union générale des étudiants et stagiaires mauritaniens) – Mauritanian National
Union of Students that formed in 1971 when pre-existing groups organized around bidani and
non-Arab Black membership, joined forces.
UNEM (l’Union National des Etudiants Marocains) – Moroccan National Union of Students
364
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UNFP (Union National des Forces Populaires) – Primary left opposition party in Morocco;
crushed by events of and fallout from March 23, 1965.
Vanguard Movement for the Liberation of the Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Wedi Dhahab – The
first anticolonial movement against Spanish rule to form in Spanish Sahara, in 1968, with the
arrival of Mohamed Ibrahim Basiri. Dismantled following Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970.
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Introduction: Three Frameworks for Historicizing Sahrawi National Liberation
In the mid-1960s, Mohamed Ibrahim Basiri returned to Morocco from his studies in
Cairo and Damascus and began publishing a newspaper, al-Shumu‘ [“Candles”], that called for
Saharan independence. Basiri was by lineage a member of the Rguibat, the most populous tribe
of western Sahara, but had been raised in central Morocco at his family’s zawiya near the
agricultural city of Beni Mellal. After Moroccan authorities shut down his publication, Basiri
moved to Smara, a historic town in Spanish Sahara, and began organizing a movement to
overthrow Spanish colonialism in 1968. Basiri’s movement, known as the Vanguard Movement
for the Liberation of Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Wedi Dhahab365 began as a secret order amongst
Basiri’s relatives and other acquaintances who received him in Smara. The movement appears to
have borrowed certain organizational elements from Ba‘ath Party politics, such as requiring an
oath of initiation and regular monetary contributions from its members but, according to several
former members, it did not adhere to any specific political ideology – whether Maoist, Leninist,
or Arab nationalist (Ba‘athist or otherwise) – among those that were prevalent at the time.366
The Vanguard Movement was still in its formative stages when Spain organized a festival
open to foreign journalists in El Aaiún, the provincial capital of Spanish Sahara, on June 17,
1970. On the day of the event, Sahrawis organized a protest on the outskirts of El Aaiún on a
small rise known as al-zemla, demanding certain rights of the Spanish government. When
protesters threw rocks at Spanish police, the police returned with live fire, killing as many as 12
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protesters.367 In the aftermath, Spanish officials arrested members of Basiri’s movement. Basiri
himself, who was not present at the protest, was arrested and disappeared; his body has never
been found. Apprehended members of the Vanguard Movement were sent to different prisons
across Spanish Sahara and the Canary Islands. Intifadat al-Zemla, as the event became known,
came as a shock to Sahrawis living under Spanish colonialism who, in the aftermath, began to
consider violent means necessary in order to overthrow Spanish rule.368
Aside from catalyzing the political consciousness of Sahrawis living under Spanish
colonialism, Intifadat al-Zemla also brought those living in an isolated Spanish Sahara back into
correspondence with those in surrounding areas:
Whoever wasn’t taken to prison that evening…Those who could, fled far away,
beyond the borders - to the north, south and east…When those members (of the
Vanguard Movement) arrived in those regions, they brought with them the news
(of the event)…this was the only means of delivering the news: there was no
telephone, only (direct) communication. And people in the external, surrounding
areas – Sahrawis – began to think and talk and discuss from 1970 to 1973, about
three years.369
Those fleeing Spanish persecution began to break Spanish Sahara’s isolation. One member of the
Vanguard Movement made his way to Nouakchott and, perhaps through relatives, brought news
of the uprising to Mauritanian Ba‘ath Party members there, who organized a protest in front of
the Spanish embassy.370 Others ended up in Morocco and Mauritania.371 In this way, Intifadat al-
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Zemla brought Spanish Sahara out of the isolation that had been imposed only a decade before,
and in convergence with the horizons of expectation prevalent among political movements in the
surrounding region.
***
Following official Polisario/SADR discourse, studies of the Western Sahara typically
begin with Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970 as the starting point for a history of Sahrawi
nationalism.372 In my research, oral histories from those who witnessed the event only
corroborate the significant impact that the protest’s violent repression had on Sahrawis living in
Spanish Sahara, and beyond. These oral histories also corroborate the prevailing historiography
that suggests that Intifadat al-Zemla served as precursor to the subsequent emergence of the
Polisario Front in 1973, and the institutionalization of Sahrawi national liberation in a state-inexile in refugee camps in Algeria. In this chapter, however, I situate the emergence of Sahrawi
national liberation movements within several, complex spatiotemporal processes. Rather than a
linear history of nationalism, beginning from its supposed point of origin, I point to three
frameworks that are necessary for contextualizing Sahrawi nationalism, yet which remain
overlooked in historiography of Western Sahara.
The first looks toward the past, examining how Spanish colonialism during the 1960s
isolated the people and territory of Western Sahara in a manner that was unprecedented in the
Sahara, through border-making practices. Historiography of the region that draws a direct line
from 1970 to the present naturalizes the geopolitical territory of Western Sahara, separating it
those 30 who were in the ranks [of the movement] when Basiri was arrested, they either fled to Morocco or to
Mauritania - most of them, of course. There were those who just fled to the countryside, and that’s it, since they
weren’t very well known, and so they went to the badiya and stayed there. So, that’s the most important event [that
took place] in the Sahara.” Interview Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, December 4, 2014.
372
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from a regional context of disaggregated authority that has generated multiple, unresolved
political projects dating back to the 1950s. Periodizing the political project of Spanish colonial
isolation during the 1960s, by contrast, historicizes the consolidation of Western Sahara as a
geopolitical space. Foregrounding the mechanisms of colonial border-making draws our
attention to sociohistorical and political processes entailed in the production of political
formations, rather than assuming the territorial nation-state as a natural outcome of post-World
War II decolonization.
Training our focus on this exceptional period also foregrounds several developments that
shaped subsequent dynamics of Sahrawi nationalism. The first concerns the border-making
processes that effectively isolated the territory and population during the 1960s. The second
involves urbanization and the emergence of new social formations in the Sahara, which I call
“government towns.” Concomitant processes of urbanization and isolation can be seen as an
effect of the spatial fix of international capital, a process which, as I showed in the previous
chapter, began in the Sahara during the 1950s, but which continued in earnest throughout the
1960s, both in Western Sahara and northern Mauritania. This isolation is particularly important,
as well, for understanding how Western Sahara became a political object characterized by what I
am calling “conceptual blankness.”373 Defined by its isolation and relatively light population, this
“conceptual blankness” enabled Western Sahara, as a territory, to become the object upon which
multiple political futures were projected during the 1960s and 70s.
In the second section of this chapter, I argue that Sahrawi nationalism and the formation
of the Polisario Front must be understood in relation to contemporaneous political developments
across the region. Rather than focusing on the contributions to Sahrawi nationalism that came
from either “inside” or “outside” of its borders, this section, instead, situates Spanish Sahara
373
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within a regional and global constellation of political developments during the 1970s. The
implication here is that, as with political projects at other moments of decolonization, the
emergence of Sahrawi national liberation can only be understood through a framework of
connected interdependence. Without privileging any specific movement for its “founding” role,
this traces the connections between Polisario and contemporaneous movements, including the
New Left Ila al-Amam and 23 Mars movements in Morocco, and the Kadihin374 movement in
Mauritania.
Understood in theoretical terms presented by Theodor Adorno, constellation offers a
conceptual framework or theory of history without “reducing it to individual concepts or pairs of
concepts.”375 In a region shaped by multiple political regimes and formations that cannot be
understood through conventional frameworks that focus on self-evident relations between state
and subject, governing regime and governed populace, constellation becomes a particularly
apposite framework to understanding decolonization in the Sahara. At the same time, in pointing
to the contemporaneity between Sahrawi nationalism and a number of other movements across
northwest Africa, the framework of constellation distinguishes regional political dynamics of the
1970s from those a generation earlier. In the previous chapter, I argue that the politics of
decolonization in the 1950s were marked by complex relations of autonomy and dependence
between people of the Sahara and Maghrib. In this chapter, by contrast, I note that this
constellation marks a moment in the early 1970s of rising anticolonial, anti-imperial politics
across the region that is marked by a sense of global political awareness, and a generational
sense of identification with history.
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Despite the contemporaneity among movements in the early 1970s, the third section of
this paper examines how shifts in global politics produced another “disorderly” relation between
Sahrawi decolonization and concurrent developments. This section begins by noting the dramatic
rupture entailed by Morocco’s invasion of Western Sahara in 1975, which forced Sahrawis to
flee to refugee camps in Algeria. The backing of Morocco by the United States and France have
been identified as major factors in facilitating the preemption of Sahrawi national selfdetermination.376 While acknowledging these as proximate causes, I suggest that this
transformation of the Sahrawi national project is particularly important for understanding the
disjunctive temporality in which Sahrawi nationalism emerged.
By 1975, the wave of post-World War II decolonization had largely subsided. As Samuel
Moyn has suggested, during the 1970s political programs overtly asserting collective rights, such
as Third World anti-imperialism and self-determination, were increasingly overtaken by human
rights. This latter, as a moral and political regime, would increasingly define institutional
priorities at the global scale. While this particular historicization of human rights has been
contested, Moyn is not alone in recognizing the 1970s as a historical conjuncture during which
the political horizon of national liberation and sovereignty began dissipating.377 Kristin Ross
describes a similar shift in France following May ’68 when, during the 1970s, prominent former
activists from the left began an intellectual project of criticizing the politics of Third World antiimperialism, promoting in its place a humanitarian ethic in relation to the postcolonial world.378
Thinking along with Ross and Moyn in this manner helps to see that Sahrawi nationalism
emerged at a particularly fraught, or disjunctive, moment within “a larger history of competing
376
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ideologies of human betterment”379 between anticolonial self-determination and human rights.
This third framework has implications for situating Sahrawi nationalism within a changing
history of the national form. As Manu Goswami notes, the modularity of the national form needs
to be historicized:
Nationalist claims of particularity and the imagined singularity of national
formations only become intelligible against and within a global grid of formally
similar nations and nation-states.380
While Sahrawi nationalism emerged as an anticolonial, anti-imperial project under Mohamed
Basiri’s Vanguard Movement, and followed by the Polisario Front, it only became intelligible –
that is, practicable as a political project – through the paradigmatic form of an emerging global
humanitarianism, the refugee camp.
In this way, I suggest that Sahrawi national liberation can only be understood by situating
its emergence and perdurance in relation to three spatiotemporal frameworks. The first two
concern the Sahrawi national liberation’s emergence: first, in relation to a specific period of
isolation under Spanish colonialism during the 1960s; and, second, in relation to a regional
constellation of liberation movements in the early 1970s. The transformation and perdurance of
this liberation movement into a “nation of refugees” highlights the disjunctive, or disorderly,
relation between Sahrawi nationalism and tectonic shifts in global politics during the 1970s from
Third World self-determination toward a global ethic of humanitarianism.
Section I – Territorial Sovereignty and Spanish Sahara during the 1960s: Border Policing
and the Government Town
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The Moroccan Liberation Army’s military campaign between 1956 and ’58 had lasting
effects on the region’s political landscape, even if the insurgency’s aims of destabilizing French
and Spanish colonialism were generally unsuccessful. The most immediate change involved
Spain’s transferal of an area, known as the Tarfaya Strip, to Morocco through the Angra de
Cintra Treaty of April 1958. This shifted the border between Morocco and Spain from the river
Wed Draa approximately 95 km south to the 27º40´ parallel. Meanwhile, significant numbers of
Sahrawis had been displaced either after mobilizing to fight with the MLA, or in fleeing from
Opération Ecouvillon, the joint Spanish-French counterinsurgency of 1958. As noted in the
previous chapter, Ecouvillon was designed to “sweep” MLA combatants out of Spanish territory,
either north to Wed Nun in the newly transferred Tarfaya Strip under Moroccan control, east to
Tindouf in French Algeria, or south to the developing cities of Zouérate, F’derik and
Nouadhibou in northern Mauritania.381 After fallout between Sahrawi combatants and Moroccan
leadership of the MLA in 1959, a number of former MLA fighters also returned to the newly
designated capital of Spanish Sahara, the fledgling city of El Aaiún.
The MLA’s campaign in the Sahara also precipitated changes to Spain’s administration
of its African colonies. On January 10, 1958, Spain dissolved Spanish West Africa, a colonial
jurisdiction administered from the northern Moroccan city of Tetouan that had included Spanish
Morocco, Spain’s Saharan territory (often referred to in terms of its northern and southern
regions, Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Rio de Oro), and the coastal enclave of Sidi Ifni.382 With the
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dissolution of Spanish West Africa, Spain not only established separate administrations for Sidi
Ifni and its Saharan territory, but changed the political status of both from colonies to provinces.
Saguiet el-Hamra’ and Rio de Oro became a single Spanish province named Spanish Sahara,
with “all of the rights that this entails.”383 Claudia Barona Castañeda notes that Spanish
historiography of this period offers multiple reasons for what motivated Spain to hold on to these
territories, including an interest in maintaining them as protection for the nearby Canary Islands
and, in the Franquist discourse of the time, as a “defense for Western civilization in Africa
against Communist advances.”384 Regardless of motive, the reorganization signaled Spain’s
intent to consolidate control over the Sahara following the MLA’s incursion in the late 1950s.
The administrative changes reorganized jurisdictions within Spanish Sahara, designating
El Aaiún the provincial capital for the first time, and establishing city councils in three other
cities, including the port towns of Villa Cisneros (now Dakhla) and La Guëra in the south, and
the historical town of Smara to the east. The new administrative structure was also meant to
bring Spanish government closer to its Saharan subjects by basing provincial governance, at least
in part, on Sahrawi institutions and practices. Qur’anic law and traditional property rights were
incorporated into colonial administration, for example, with separate courts and judges
designated for these proceedings. In deference to the widespread pastoral nomadism of many
Sahrawis at the time, certain representatives for El Cabildo, a provincial council of 14 that was
established in 1962, were designated according to tribal fractions, rather than municipality.385
This practice would be expanded when, facing increased international pressure before the United
Nations, Spain instituted a general assembly constituted entirely by Sahrawis, known as al383
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Jem‘a, in 1967. Named after one of the traditional forms of bidani inter-tribal council in the
Sahara, the 82-member al-Jem‘a became the highest representative institution of provincial
administration, superseded only by the Spanish-appointed Governor General, and with the
purpose of functioning as interlocutor between Spanish government and what was perceived to
be an increasingly restive population.386
Reforms to the territory’s formal political status and governing institutions were not,
however, what substantively marked this new phase of Spanish colonial rule. A Spanishappointed Governor General retained sweeping and final powers and, as Barona Castañeda notes,
“Although the civil presence in the territory increased, this did not modify the military character
of the province, even if it did influence relations with the inhabitants.”387 Rather, the
administrative shift from colony to province coincided with intensified oil and mineral
prospecting in the region, along with an effort to build infrastructure and operationalize the
mining of Bucraa, a significant deposit of phosphate rock that had been discovered shortly after
World War II. Given that Spain’s inland presence in the territory before 1958 amounted to little
more than a handful of military outposts (many of which had been abandoned at the height of the
MLA’s campaign in 1957), the new phase of investment in the colony388 was comprehensive. In
July 1960, 54 new companies began work in the territory, in sectors ranging from construction,
shipping and food imports, to banking, hospitality and naval supplies.389 The focus on
infrastructure led to the construction of over 5000 km of new roads to facilitate communication
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and transportation between the northern and southern parts of the territory, Saguiet el-Hamra’
and Wedi Dhahab, respectively, and to the interior.390 Another major infrastructural project
involved the construction of ports in the two largest cities, Villa Cisneros in the southern part of
Spanish Sahara, and El Aaiún in the north.
El Aaiún, the first Spanish administrative capital in the Sahara that was not a coastal
enclave, was built largely from the ground up in the early 1960s, with 371 houses constructed in
1960 alone. As discussed in Chapter 1, Spanish investment beginning in the 1960s transformed
what had been a water source,391 fledgling local market and colonial military base into a growing
city of colonial administration and Spanish settlers (many of them coming from the nearby
Canary Islands). A Sahrawi recalls how the influx of settlers changed the city of his childhood:
Before then, there were military bases and military men, and you saw very few
Spanish families. There were maybe one or two small schools, but there were not
many families of military officers or government officials then.
But then companies began coming with their workers and commerce, and
they started bringing their families and then colonialism started to get established
and govern [bada’ istiqrar al-ist‘emar wa yhakemha], and they laid out a strategy
for the region for exploiting resources. And they began to discover phosphates,
and to figure out and plan investments for those minerals which it was possible (to
plan for).
Prospecting companies came and began prospecting for other minerals or
natural resources, and life - and El Aaiún began getting bigger and bigger and
bigger.392
Construction beginning in the 1960s initially addressed the need to accommodate a growing
colonial settler population that was moving to El Aaiún to staff the administration, and to work
for newly-arrived companies involved in construction and mining. However, the process of
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urbanization itself produced wage-labor employment opportunities which, when extended to
Sahrawis, began transforming their relationship with the city from a marketplace and seasonal
way-station toward a year-round place of residence.
This process was by no means immediate or uniform, but several factors were combining
to influence increased settlement in cities across the Sahara during the 1960s, including the
social formations developing around extractive industry, the policies of newly independent
nation-states, and intermittent drought.393 In southern Morocco, Sahrawis continued moving to
the city of Tan Tan throughout the 1960s, joining a community that had settled there after
Ecouvillon and the unrest that followed.394 In northern Mauritania, the mining and port cities of
Zouérate and Nouadhibou grew rapidly along with the multinational iron ore conglomerate,
MIFERMA, which became operative in 1961.395 As mentioned previously, it was reported that in
1962 Algerian authorities attempted to “settle” 15,000 members of the Reguibat tribe in
Tindouf.396 And, according to results from a Spanish census, by 1974 only 17% of Spanish
Sahara’s population was “nomadic.”397 Even if the accuracy of the Spanish census is uncertain (it
is unclear what proportion of this population was constituted by European settlers, for example),
the Spanish administration adopted policies encouraging, or even forcing, settlement during the
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1960s.398 By 1976, on the eve of Spanish withdrawal, one account estimated El Aaiún’s
population to be 28,500 (another estimate was “over 40,000”),399 and while these figures clearly
are not indicative of a major metropolis, El Aaiún constituted a social formation that only
emerged in the Sahara during the era of decolonization: the government town.400
In addition to urbanization and infrastructural investment, post-1958 changes to Spanish
rule in the Sahara focused on border control. As part of the colony’s administrative
reorganization, a November 17, 1960 decree integrated the Grupos Nomadas, a mobile Sahrawi
police force previously delegated to roam the countryside (many of whom defected to join the
MLA in the late 1950s, only to return following its dissolution), into the military. Many of these
reorganized “Nomadic Troops” were now tasked with border control, instead of domestic
patrols.401 During this time Spain increasingly relied upon a “language test” for people seeking to
cross the border with Morocco that depended upon differences in pronunciation between
Moroccan spoken Arabic, known as darija, and the Hassaniya Arabic dialect spoken by bidani
people of the Sahara. Border control on the Spanish side allegedly would ask people crossing
from the north to enunciate the Arabic word for either “wolf” (dhi’b) or “fox” (th‘aleb). The test
was used to distinguish and block entry for darija-speakers who gloss the classical Arabic
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phonemes dh and th into hard “d” and “t” sounds (di’b, t’aleb). Hassaniya-speakers who
enunciated the dh and th sounds in their speech were allowed to pass.402
That the intensification of border policing coincided with a shift in the border’s location
only made it more fraught. Prior to 1958, Spanish colonial territory ended at the Wed Draa river,
a geographical boundary that has traditionally marked the northern edge of the Sahara. With the
previously-mentioned transfer of the Tarfaya Strip in ’58, the boundary between Morocco and
Spain moved approximately 95 km south to the 27º40´ parallel, becoming a veritable line in the
sand which ran east-west through the desert north of Saguiet el-Hamra’. No longer able to rely
upon border geography as a natural barrier, Spain increasingly utilized linguistic and cultural
markers at the border crossing with Morocco in order to demarcate its territorial sovereignty.
While Spain’s reliance on a linguistic marker to police the boundary with Morocco
predated the changes following 1958, the shift in location and concomitant intensification of
border policing during the 1960s gave the border new meaning. The pronunciation test represents
an attempt to disentangle the complicated relationship between people of the Sahara and people
to the north in terms of identity, much the way that a border attempts to disentangle spatial
relations through the instantiation of an abstract line. As explored in previous chapters, the
complexity of these relations between people of Morocco and people of the Sahara frequently
defies such neat boundaries, and yet the effects of these policing practices ramify beyond the
borders.403 As Lauren Derby notes in the context of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, border
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tests create new mechanisms for social division, including the instantiation of the border as a
marker of ethnic, or national, difference.404 In this sense, with the intensification of border
policing, the Spanish administration’s linguistic pronunciation border test to separate Sahrawis
from Moroccans was effective not only at policing the border, but at inscribing difference in
terms of “insiders” and “outsiders” to Spanish Sahara.
Literature on the effects of Spain’s increasingly tight control over the Sahara during the
1960s is relatively scarce. The rupture brought about by Morocco’s invasion and annexation in
1975 and 76, which brought Spanish colonialism to an end and produced the geography of
military rule and exile in refugee camps that continues to structure the political situation today,
has tended to overshadow the period of Spanish colonialism in terms of historical memory.405
This erasure is not simply a matter of scholarship. It was not uncommon in the course of my
fieldwork to encounter a sentiment among Sahrawis that Spain’s presence in the Sahara never
actually constituted colonialism. Speakers invoking this discourse often cited the fact that Spain
established their presence in the Sahara peacefully through coastal trade and, in some cases,
concluded agreements with local tribes over terms of protection and exchange.406 When Spanish
colonialism was acknowledged, it was usually in favorable contrast to Morocco’s scorched earth
military campaign and occupation, which has resulted in the disappearance of hundreds of
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Sahrawis, and the displacement of thousands more.407 Historiography reproduces this nostalgia
either by glossing over Spanish colonialism, or by reducing its presence to a foil for the
emergence of Sahrawi nationalism.408
And yet, even the limited historical material on the subject suggests that Spain actively
isolated the territory, and Saharan subjects, from outside influence during the decade of
investment and extraction that began in 1960. Along with closing the border, Spain cultivated a
discourse within the territory that distinguished the colony’s Saharan subjects from “the enemy”
to the north:
“It is certain that, with the scent of these riches, the jackals are beginning to prowl
around your khaimas,[tents]” Lieutenant-General Camillo Menéndez Tolosa, the
Spanish army minister, warned the Sahrawis during a visit to El-Ayoun on May
16, 1967. “But now more than ever,” he promised, “you will have us by your side,
to the end and to the last sacrifice, to guarantee your will, without foreign pressure
or interference, to protect you against the maneuvers and false fraternity in whose
name it is intended to bring you into a household to which you have never
belonged and in which, if they achieved their goal (something they will never do),
you would be considered a poor relative to be exploited like a domestic.”409
In this passage, Lieutenant-General Menéndez Tolosa amplifies a sense of vulnerability among
Sahrawis in relation to their more powerful neighbors to the north in order to situate Spain as the
protector of Sahrawis’ interests. The allusions to false forms of kinship in this speech also
present Spain as more trustworthy and less exploitative than Morocco – particularly important
since deception, as noted in Chapter 3, is often an underlying tension in bidani relations with
neighbors to the north. Along with the discourse of outside threat (Moroccan in the particular
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form, Communist in the abstract), Spain also utilized an expanded colonial presence to try and
inculcate a sense of loyalty among Saharan subjects through patronage and education:
In 1966, no fewer than 16 African Orders and 25 Imperial Orders of the Yoke and
Arrows were awarded to compliant Sahrawis. Other handouts ranged from
blankets to jet flights to Mecca. A sense of nationalism was further encouraged by
playing on the Sahrawis' fear of neighboring states, and emphasizing the threat of
communism. (In 1963, for example, Spain published a map of Africa which
asserted the communist domination of Morocco to be 70-90 percent of the
population, that of Mauritania and Mali 60-80 percent, and that of Algeria 50-70
percent).410
I have not found any other sources to corroborate the claim in this passage that Spain actively
promoted a sense of nationalism among Sahrawis. The one time it was directly addressed in an
interview, my interlocutor suggested that “Sahrawi” first became prevalent as a term of identity
in contradistinction to “Spanish” during the colonial period of the 1960s. It was not, however,
until political movements took form starting in 1968 and continuing into the 1970s that the term
took on positive content as a nationalist form of identity, according to this interlocutor.411 I do
not, in other words, want to suggest that Spain initiated Sahrawi nationalism. Nor did Spain
fabricate a sense of antagonism between Sahrawis and Moroccans out of whole cloth: mistrust
was widespread from the fallout of the MLA in the late 1950s.
The isolation in Spanish Sahara, however, marked a significant departure from the ease
with which people moved across borders throughout the region of western Sahara before the
1960s, a change which had significant and lasting effects.412 This shift affected the circulation of
people, as well as information and ideas. One man mentioned that when he was younger and
410
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going to school in El Aaiún, he remembered reading an article by the Moroccan leftist Ali
Yata413 calling for Sahara’s independence, and that when the article fell into Spanish hands,
colonial officials tried to buy up all the copies.414 Another recalled that teachers would call
students “marroqui” if they were behaving badly in school.415 As a man who worked at the
Bucraa phosphate mine during the early 1970s, and later joined the Polisario Front, put it:
Very little reached inside (Spanish Sahara)…Everything was forbidden, so what
got through was just whatever they had with them, because the guards (at the
borders) were always there.416
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, very little seemed to penetrate the colonial
isolation of Spanish Sahara until Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970. But when the politics of national
liberation did emerge in Spanish Sahara following Intifadat al-Zemla in 1970, this was because
of a regional and international context receptive to the Sahara’s decolonization. The connections
with existing anticolonial and anti-imperial movements that ensued in the early 1970s, and the
shared horizons of political possibility that they entailed, are explored in the following section
through the concepts of contemporaneity and constellation.

Section II – Contemporaneity: A Constellation of Liberation Movements across Northwest
Africa in 1972
A. Morocco: Open Horizons of Discussion and Narrow Spaces of Dissent
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From Nouakchott to Rabat to Algiers, the summer of 1972 was “hot.”417 In May of that year, a
group of college students from Rabat travelled to Tan Tan, in the Tarfaya strip of southernmost
Morocco, where some had family. They returned for an annual moussem in honor of Sidi
Mohamed Laghdaf, a shaykh, religious scholar and son of Ma al-Aynayn. Ma al-Aynayn, the
elder, was the founder of a colonial resistance movement that originated, initially with Moroccan
backing, in Smara, in Western Sahara, that later sought to overthrow the Moroccan Alawite
sultans who had accepted the French Protectorate in 1912.418 The cohort descending upon Tan
Tan sixty years later were themselves seeking to end Spanish colonialism in the Sahara, and had
been engaged in discussion with a range of different actors in Morocco over how best to bring
this about. Motivated by the Zemla uprising in El Aaiún on June 17, 1970, in which Spanish
authorities shot and killed Sahrawi protesters, the college students believed that the horizon for
change was near.
Raising banners in Arabic calling for the end of Spanish colonialism, with slogans such
as “Free Sahara, and out with Spain,” “Spain, get out, the Sahara isn’t yours,” and “Franco, you
impostor, Sahara is for the free,”419 the students were building on widespread sentiment in
Morocco and elsewhere that Spanish colonialism in the Sahara had to end. According to multiple
accounts, however, the students also raised banners that alluded to King Hassan and Moroccan
national unity, including “Hassan is our king, liberation our aim,” “Hassan and us, we will unite
the nation,” and “We are all with Hassan in struggle, and with arms we will make the Sahara rise
up with our spirits.”420 The references to the King and Morocco do not necessarily represent
417
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support for the King. Rather, they indicate the fine line that the activists were walking at the
time, as the King of Morocco had barely survived a military coup d’état the year prior and was
cracking down on all forms of dissent – which, aside from the military, was predominantly
coming from the left.
Indeed, the state did not reward the protesters’ appeal to the King’s authority, and some
35 of them, including El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, Omar Hadrami, Biydilah Mohamed Cheikh, Ma
al-Aynayn ould Khalihenna and Ahmed Mahmoud Lilli (a.k.a., Mohamed Lamine ould Ahmed)
were arrested and beaten. One witness recalls the local authorities’421 harsh response, and the
resulting fallout from this event:
These people called to free (the people of the Sahara) from the yoke [mesqat
ru’usahum] of colonialism. They didn’t say anything about a Sahrawi republic no - they said “Hassan is our King, and liberation is our goal.” With that, they
were met with a beating with pipes, and jail. Even when they were released and
returned, their scholarships were taken away.
Me: Meaning all of them were university students at that time?
Some of them, yes. Their scholarships were cut off; their chance of success,
reduced. An individual can no longer succeed. [They were subject to] police
surveillance. So, they thought, “we came here to help bury your father - and you
chased us away with a shovel”…We came here to free (the Sahrawis) from the
yoke of colonialism, and we’re prepared to liberate (the Sahara) within the
framework of Moroccan unity, and our operation was met with getting hit with
metal pipes, our chances for a successful future taken away [nasbat al-najah
tahayyid], the scholarship taken away, and police surveillance and harassment.422
After their arrest and release, a number of protesters, including El-Ouali, fled Morocco to
Tindouf, in Algeria, and Zouérate, in northern Mauritania.
Three months later, in August, the Moroccan National Union of Students (UNEM)
convened for their 15th congress in Rabat, led by New Left organizations such as 23 Mars and Ila
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al-Amam [“Forward”]. 23 Mars emerged out of the Union National des Forces Populaires
(UNFP), a left-wing political party led by Mehdi Ben Barka that had been devastated by violent
state repression of protests in 1965, which left hundreds dead. Following this crackdown, and
Ben Barka’s assassination that same year in Paris, 23 Mars formed out of the former UNFP, went
underground, and adopted a more radical, leftist stance, memorializing the date of the ’65
protests in its name. The movement included a handful of veterans from the 1950s independence
struggle (including Mohamed Ben Saïd Aït Iddr and several other former members of political
wing of the 1950s Moroccan Liberation Army [Chapter 3]), but was predominantly a student
movement. Ila al-Amam, meanwhile, was founded by Abraham Serfaty, a former government
functionary, and Abdellatif Laâbi, a poet and founder of Souffles, the influential French-language
cultural review, and forerunner to Anfas [“Breaths”]. Serfaty and Laâbi established Ila al-Amam
in 1970, and adopted a more explicit Marxist-Leninist position than 23 Mars, but both
movements were composed largely of students, and both operated without state recognition.423
When the groups met as part of the UNEM Congress in Rabat in 1972, their collective
influence was at its height. Though 23 Mars and Ila al-Amam shared an opposition to the
Moroccan regime, decolonization of the Sahara had become a central issue in the Congress’s
proceedings, and a split emerged between the two groups’ positions. Ila al-Amam lobbied for the
Congress to take a position explicitly in favor of Sahrawi self-determination, while 23 Mars took
a position that was “more nuanced…without contesting the marocanité of the Sahara,” arguing
instead for “a voluntary union, on a democratic basis, between the Moroccan people and the
Sahrawi populations.”424 The position of the 23 Mars movement relative to the Sahara – like the
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poster slogans at the Tan Tan protest earlier that summer – reflects a combination of political
expediency and principle that cannot be easily disentangled. On the one hand, by the early 1970s
the sovereignty of the Moroccan state had created a political field that exerted tremendous
pressure on Moroccans to conflate Saharan decolonization with Moroccan national unity. The
stakes for leftists had been clear ever since the Moroccan state jailed leftist Ali Yata and exiled
Mehdi Ben Barka for their dissent over a border war with Algeria in 1963, and those stakes had
only risen since.425 On the other hand, it would be overly simplistic to suggest that 23 Mars shied
away from calling for the Sahrawi right to self-determination simply because of state repression
and intimidation. The historic ties between Morocco and the Sahara influenced many in Morocco
from across different social classes and political persuasions.
Nor was this debate limited to student organizations or the Moroccan left. In the early
1970s, with the horizon of decolonization imminent, discussion of the Sahara issue in Rabat was
“open”:
This discussion/debate would not be limited to a specific group, nor to a specific
idea. Sahrawis, Moroccans, including those convinced by the need to “return” the
Sahara to Morocco, presented one idea. And those convinced by the need for
independence presented their idea. And those coming from a progressive
perspective - for example, the Marxist thinking present at university, presented
that idea. The only idea absent was the Islamist position that is happening now;
that wasn’t present. These were the ideas that were there. Those coming from a
progressive position combined [ytalaqa’] with the Moroccan left.
Me: Like the 23 Mars movement?
23 Mars, Ila al-Amam, and others. Those coming from the unified Morocco
position, and the expansion of its empire, joined the Istiqlal Party. Those coming
from the position of (Sahrawi) independence, depended upon the idea of self425

Heckman, “Radical Nationalists: Moroccan Jewish Communists 1925-1975,” 236. The so-called “Sand War,”
was based on disputed borderlands between Morocco and Algeria that had been shifted around between French
administrative regimes during the colonial period and left unresolved at decolonization. Tindouf, in southwest
Algeria, and a focal point of the MLA’s campaign in the Sahara in the 1950s, was a focal point of this border
conflict in 1963. See Trout for extensive background on the colonial origins of the ill-defined Morocco-Algerian
border. Trout, Morocco’s Saharan Frontiers.

252

determination. And in this way, the discussion was open.
It took place in people’s homes - even (in the homes) of those who worked
in the Palace – in the Royal Administration [al-diwan al-maliki]. There were
people close to the monarchy, yet despite this, they weren’t embarrassed to [lem
ytaharraj] enter this debate. There were officers in the Royal Army - of course,
they were formerly of Jaysh Tahrir [MLA] – who participated in this discussion.
Me: Really? The discussion wasn’t limited to students, only?
There was no forum [‘awima] specific to students, or young people: the
discussion was open. Of course, students played a role and entered this discussion
from all sides – they even changed positions within the debate. In traditional
society, women did not participate in the discussions in these kinds of matters, but
beginning with this period, women were among the central actors, and
participated in the discussion.
So, during this period in the 70s, the debate/discussion was open, and
everyone participated.426
I excerpt from this interview at some length, with a man who had been a university student in
Rabat at the time and was subsequently imprisoned for 13 years, because his account of the
debate in Rabat over the future of the Sahara in the early 1970s captures the horizon of imminent
and indeterminate change. In part because of this indeterminacy, and, in part because of Spanish
Sahara’s isolation within the surrounding region, the Sahara became the object onto which
multiple, potential futures were projected.
One, final aspect of the debate between Ila al-Amam and 23 Mars is worth noting
because it distinguishes the 1970s from a generation prior. By the early 1970s, there was a sense
that effective decolonization, which would counter both imperialism and neocolonialism,
required not just national independence, but supranational political formations. The 23 Mars
movement was likely not immune to a growing sense of disillusionment on the left with the
postcolonial nation-state. A former member of 23 Mars cited the New Left’s martyr and
inspiration to convey this tension, claiming that Mehdi Ben Barka once said: “The Sahara must

426

Interview, Lâyoune/El Aaiún, December 4, 2014.

253

be a connecting bridge, and not a region of separation.”427 This view could be attributed to the
various influences of the Non-Aligned Movement and Arab nationalism, and the Cold War field
of supranational political alignment. From this perspective, the creation of a “mini-state” would,
in the context of 1970s Third Worldism and the Cold War, invariably create another forum for
superpower struggles, whereas 23 Mars believed that the decolonization of Western Sahara
without its independence could render this part of the desert a “connecting bridge” for
democratizing rule throughout Morocco, Mauritania, the Greater Maghreb and, possibly, beyond.
Hopes for Western Sahara to become a catalyst for anti-imperial political formations was one of
several horizons of possibility projected onto the Sahara in the 1970s, which prefigured the
territory (oftentimes, more than the people) as a space from which region-wide liberation might
emerge.
***
The basis for the split between 23 Mars and Ila al-Amam came from an article published
earlier that year in Anfas (“Breaths”), the radical Arabic-language literary and political review
aligned with Ila al-Amam. Published in the December-January 1971-72 issue – the last issue of
Anfas before it was shut down by Moroccan authorities – the article ran under the provocative
title “A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara.”428 Written for an audience across the Maghreb
and Mashreq (Anfas was estimated to have a press run of 5000 copies, and a “sizable following”
across the Middle East),429 the piece introduces readers to the situation in Spanish Sahara by
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warning that it could become “a new Rhodesia…a new Palestine.”430 Much of the article is
devoted to providing a historical, sociological and political sketch of the people in the territory,
describing, for example, the Sahrawi people’s involvement in – and disillusion with – the
Moroccan Liberation Army of the 1950s as part of the historical background. The sociological
background provides basic information on the major tribes of Spanish Sahara, with a section on
“Features of Class Differentiation” that pays particular attention to the potential for “groups of
young people” [al-shabab] to lead an anticolonial movement. In addition, the article emphasizes
the need to raise the political consciousness of those living outside of the cities in the desert
badiya.431 Despite these distinctions, the article stresses the pivotal role that the undifferentiated
category of “the masses” [al-jamahir] must play in order to overthrow Spanish colonialism.432
As a reflection of the Marxist-Leninist orientation of Ila al-Amam, with which Anfas was
closely affiliated, the article references both the forces of imperialism and, in reference to
Morocco and Mauritania, the “reactionary parties surrounding the territory” that have helped to
maintain colonial rule and inhibited the formation of a liberation movement there.433 In a section
that lists several possibilities regarding what could happen to the territory, the article returns to
the theme of its title by suggesting that the territory’s future could follow one of three paths: it
could become “a new Rhodesia” ruled by Spanish settlers; it could end up annexed by and
divided between Morocco and Mauritania; or it could follow a path of “autonomy” [hukm aldhati] under continued Spanish rule, deferring decolonization to a later date.434 The hoped-for
outcome of national liberation is left unstated. The article then lays out a series of “basic facts”
that capture the present situation in the territory. The first is the continuation and deepening
430
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[rusukh] of the Arab identity among Sahrawis. The second point warns of the “increasing
imperial presence” in the region, and the third notes the “expansionist, divisive and exploitative
intentions” of the “reactionary” parties surrounding the territory, in reference to Morocco and
Mauritania. Last on the list, however, the article notes the absence of a committed nationalist
leadership in the territory at that time.435
By way of conclusion, the article outlines, in a Leninist fashion, the way forward, or “the
way to liberation.”436 And here, some of the most intriguing observations are made. In repeating
a point made several times, the article notes that the “Sahrawi masses” must provide the basis for
any transformative change. Notably, however, this concluding section of the article is articulated
under the heading “The link between liberating the Sahara, and liberating the surrounding Arab
region.”437 Like 23 Mars, Ila al-Amam sees Sahara’s liberation as a means toward broader, antiimperial liberation. In contradistinction to 23 Mars, however, the Anfas article argues that the
notion of the territory’s “marocanité” must be set aside, giving priority, instead, to movements
across the region coming together in solidarity to liberate the territory. This, in a sense, is Ila alAmam’s reply to 23 Mars. It follows, however, that because of the territory’s small population,
the absence of any nationalist leadership in the territory, and the presence of Sahrawi “refugees”
in neighboring territories, there is the need “similar to the Palestinian situation” to rely upon and
mobilize the surrounding areas of the Sahara.438
The article in Anfas does not list any author, but El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, one of the
students who protested in Tan Tan in 1972, was reputed to have been involved with Ila alAmam, and the article reflects El-Ouali’s close understanding of the situation in the Sahara at
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that time.439 The article is of particular interest, then, for several reasons. For one, it provides a
sense of the horizon of expectations animating the discussion and activism surrounding the
decolonization of the Sahara in the early 1970s. Change seemed imminent, but the possibilities
were apparently quite indeterminate. In addition, the article appears to be written as a polemic
drawing attention to Western Sahara, and exhorting an international audience to support the
Sahrawi cause. In this sense, the points of reference to Palestine and Rhodesia are informative, as
is the emphasis on Sahrawis’ “continuing and deepening Arab identity.” By describing Sahrawis’
Arab identity as “deepening,” the article is presumably not referring to Arab identity in the more
racialized, genealogical sense discussed in Chapter 2 (since this had never really been in
question), but, rather, in the political, Arab nationalist sense as an appeal to the journal’s
readership. In a further appeal to a broader audience, Sahrawi liberation is directly tied to the
broader cause for “liberation of the surrounding Arab region.”
Thirdly, the article represents an engagement in the debate within Morocco – or, more
specifically, within the Moroccan left – over the proper way to support decolonization in the
Sahara. Ila al-Amam is clear that the “marocanité of the Sahara” should be set aside, and a
liberated Western Sahara must precede the hoped-for transformation of Morocco and, perhaps,
the Greater Maghreb. Fourth, if it can be assumed that El-Ouali had a significant role in either
informing or writing the article, this “way to liberation” outlines what the Polisario Front would
effectively accomplish from 1973 to 1976: cultivating support among “the masses” in the Sahara
through secret cells, while concurrently preparing a networked diaspora of Sahrawis in
Mauritania, Algeria, and southern Morocco to mobilize when the situation demanded action. In
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this sense, the article is a kind of blueprint for what the Polisario Front would do over the next
few years.
Lastly, the article draws attention to an important aspect of the Sahara: that the “masses”
within Western Sahara might not be massive enough.440 This last point connects to a theme that
runs throughout this dissertation: that the decolonization of this region of the Sahara depended
upon initiative and support from surrounding areas. We have seen at various moments in the
region’s history – whether it was the relatively borderless western Sahara of the 1950s, Spanish
Sahara’s isolation during the 1960s, or Western Sahara today – political projects in the Sahara
have always depended upon regional and international connectivity to support attendant claims
of independence and autonomy.441 This dialectic of autonomy and dependence renders moot the
question of whether Sahrawi nationalism emerged from “inside” or “outside” the territory.
Beyond the content of the article itself, the context in which it was published illustrates
the narrow margin in which leftist groups operated in relation to the Sahara issue during the early
1970s. In August 1972, as 23 Mars and Ila al-Amam attempted to sort out conflicting positions
over the Sahara at the UNEM Congress, a coup attempt was carried out against Hassan II, the
second unsuccessful coup attempt by the Moroccan military in as many years. In January 1973,
UNEM was disbanded, and a series of student political leaders were arrested in police raids on
universities.442 In March 1973, an Algerian-based group of Moroccans in exile carried out an
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attack on several rural outposts of Moroccan gendarmes; this was followed by another round-up
of leftist activists throughout Morocco.443
Several of the students arrested at the Tan Tan protest in May 1972 had already fled the
country and thereby avoided getting swept up in these arrests. Almost a year after the Tan Tan
protest, and just months after the crackdown in Morocco, on May 10, 1973, the Frente Popular
de Liberacíon de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, or the Polisario Front, announced its formation
from Zouérate, in northern Mauritania. May 20, the Front carried out its first attack on a Spanish
military outpost, El Khanga. Some of the students who fled from Tan Tan in the summer of
1972, led by El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid, were involved in both the formation of Polisario Front in
northern Mauritania, and in the Khanga operation ten days later.

B. “Two Eggs in One Nest”: Mauritania, Polisario and the Kadihin movement
1972-73 marked a clear turning point in the relationship between the left and the
Moroccan regime, but Moroccan leftists were not the only ones deeply involved in debating and
discussing the future of the Sahara. In the following section, I will examine the Kadihin
movement in Mauritania, another point in the constellation of movements that became engaged
in the liberation of Western Sahara in the 1970s. Mauritania became independent in 1960 but
gained recognition from Morocco as a nation-state, and admission to the Arab League, only in
1969. In addition to having its legitimacy as a nation-state contested externally by Morocco
throughout the 1960s (Morocco claimed Mauritania as part of “Greater Morocco”), there had
been doubts and schisms within the country about its future since its formation.
Following its decolonization under the French loi Deferre carried out between 1958 and
1960, a certain skepticism lingered among many Mauritanians about their country’s
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independence. This skepticism is captured by several sayings which circulated during this time.
The first rhyme frames the loi Deferre referendum of 1958 – in which Mauritanians, like all
former members of French West Africa, chose between immediate independence that would cut
off ties with France, or continued involvement in the Communauté Française transitioning to
formal independence in 1960 – as a pair of bad choices:
“Oui” or “Non” are just two options
That leave the chooser disinterested;
“Oui” is no good on principle
And the problem with “Non” is the money444
“Oui” was a vote to remain a part of the French community while transitioning to independence
in 1960, presented here as a betrayal of the promise of decolonization and therefore “no good on
principle.” “Non” was a vote for immediate independence in 1958, with the consequence of
being immediately cut off from French support. The “oui” vote prevailed amidst widespread
questions about the integrity of the referendum, and Mauritania became independent in 1960
with France’s hand-picked “successor,” Mokhtar Ould Daddah, becoming president.445
Despite its decolonization in 1960, Mauritania’s new status seemed to reflect a
neocolonial relation as much as an independent one:
Independence is misunderstood,
Meaning it is not cheap [mutabakhil]
Colonialism is buried within
In the pocket of independence446
The fact that both of these rhymes were composed and remembered in the genre of Hassaniya
poetry suggests that they circulated broadly and were reflective of popular sentiment of the time.
For much of the 1960s, then, even as Mauritania was struggling to establish its legitimacy and
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achieve full recognition as a nation-state before the United Nations, there was a certain
disillusionment within Mauritania that independence was compromised by the country’s
neocolonial relationship with France. As one former MLA fighter who later became a soldier in
the Mauritanian army put it, the transition was as superficial as a change of clothing:
As God is my witness, [laughing] I know exactly who they were. Those that
ended (colonial) rule, they were with us, but then they changed their clothing just their clothing! They gave independence at that time to countries from here to
there, and they called it sham independence [al-istiqlal al-mzayf]. They call it
sham independence. By God. Yup.447
The country continued to use the French franc, its military continued to depend upon French
assistance, and the largest post-independence actor in the country’s economy, the multinational,
World Bank-backed mining concern MIFERMA, was run by international financiers.
Several movements would emerge within Mauritania during the late 1960s to oppose
Mokhtar Ould Daddah’s government, calling for an end to the country’s neocolonialism.
Foremost among these was the Kadihin movement, which coalesced out of multiple points of
origin beginning in the 1960s. One thread begins in the fallout from the violent confrontations
between Arab bidani, and non-Arab Soninke, Wolof and Pulaar students at Mauritanian
educational institutions in February 1966. The violence, which had been precipitated by a
government attempt to Arabize education, resulted in several deaths and caused a reorientation
among certain non-Arab Black and bidani elites who had until then been inspired by Modibo
Keita’s Malian republic and Nasr’s Arab nationalism, respectively.448 Abandoning Arab
nationalism, these bidani elites joined their Black counterparts at a conference in southern
Mauritania to develop an agenda premised on national unity, opposition to the governing regime,
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social transformation and, first and foremost, ending Mauritania’s neocolonialism.449 Out of this
conference would emerge the National Democratic Movement.
In May of 1968, the same year as the formation of National Democratic Movement,
Mauritanian police fired on striking mine workers in Zouérate, at the iron ore mines owned by
the internationally-financed MIFERMA, killing seven. Students across the country organized
mass protests in response. At one of these protests in Rosso, a town in southern Mauritania, the
police again responded with violence. For one student protester, this marked a turning point:
“The police intervened brutally, hitting students hard with rifles, and I became convinced that the
regime was by nature a brutal, terrible power.”450 Out of this developed the Comité Provisoire
d’Action Scolaire (CPASS), whose members became the foot soldiers for the National
Democratic Movement, producing and distributing the Kadihin’s Maoist-influenced publication,
Sihat al-mazlum (“Cries of the Oppressed”). A women’s branch of the movement formed, and
the movement’s social agenda, which included a call for social equality among citizens, a fight
against slavery, and consciousness-raising among rural folk, took shape.451 The Kadihin
movement developed as a social reform project as much as a political one, inspired by Maoist
literature on educating and organizing rural workers. An explicitly populist, anti-elitist
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movement, the slogan for members went “I’m a kadih and the kadihin are without money, and
without cars.” This is the second origin story of the Kadihin.
The third origin story takes place in Damascus. In July 1968, the same year as the
formation of National Democratic Movement and CPASS, approximately 20 Mauritanian
students studying at university abroad (there were no institutions of higher education in
Mauritania at the time) convened in Damascus for a conference hosted by the Syrian Ba‘ath
regime. Students came from Dakar, Paris, Cairo and Kuwait. The majority of these students were
opposed to Mokhtar Ould Daddah’s government, but unable to organize within the country. The
conference was held in the Damascus parliamentary building but, according to Mohamed
Mahjoub Ould Bih, a Mauritanian student in Syria at the time, Syrian Ba‘athist government
officials did not interfere in the conference proceedings. The challenge for those attending was to
bridge the ideological gap between Arab nationalists and Marxists (who tended to be students in
Paris, affected by the student protests there). Out of this meeting, Mauritanian university students
continued organizing around the premise that Mauritania’s problem was a matter of
neocolonialism, and not ethnic differences between Arab and non-Arab groups.452
After a meeting between bidani and non-Arab Black student groups in Nouakchott in
1971, Mauritanian students formed a national union, UGESM,453 and established contact with
CPASS and the National Democratic Movement. By the summer of 1972, when UGESM
declared a general strike, the Kadihin had formed as a popular, grassroots extension of the
worker, student and party unions. Facing significant repression by the Mauritanian state,
including forced conscription in the army, members of the party and movement remained
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underground. The presence of the Kadihin was not officially announced until the following year,
but with student and labor strikes occurring with regularity, the movement maintained a series of
demands focused on ending Mauritania’s neocolonial status. Specifically, the Kadihin demanded
the abrogration of Mauritania’s mutual defense agreement with France, the establishment of
Mauritania’s own currency (replacing the franc), and the nationalization of the iron ore mining
concern, MIFERMA.454
The Kadihin were ascendant when Polisario was in its formative, or “embryonic”
stages,455 and members from both movements regularly gathered at an office in the northern
Mauritanian mining town of Zouérate. Kadihin members provided Polisario with supplies,
including arms, during this early period. The mutually imbricated relationship between the two
movements is also captured by a phrase attributed to the Polisario leader, El-Ouali Mustafa
Sayid, who is reputed to have told the Mauritanian President Mokhtar Ould Daddah that the
Mauritanian and Sahrawi peoples, sharing the same bidani heritage, are “Two eggs in one nest –
if you disturb one, you will disturb the other.”456 And, indeed, the simultaneous emergence of
progressive movements for liberation in Mauritania and Spanish Sahara portended the potential
for sweeping change in both places. In January 1974, when Polisario convened for its Second
Congress, held in secret in the badiya close to the border between Spanish Sahara and northern
Mauritania, the lone delegate from an outside organization to attend was a Kadihin
representative, Mustafa Badreddine.457 As a former Polisario member from northern Mauritania
put it “Kadihin were on our side, helping us. Kadihin, by God, Kadihin were against the
454
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government here…They didn’t like colonialism. Kadihin, by God, they were with us.” 458 In
1972, as movements were in their “embryonic” stages, Sahrawi nationalists and the Kadihin
grew in tandem, like two eggs in one nest.

C. Qaddafi, Arab Nationalism and Contested Political Futures in Mauritania and
the Sahara
If Spanish Sahara was largely isolated from regional and international political currents in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, and politics in Morocco was increasingly circumscribed by state
repression, the situation in Mauritania was altogether different. Though the Kadihin and Polisario
Front played an important role in this politicization, they were neither the only political projects
animating this field, nor the first ones to infuse revolutionary politics into postcolonial
Mauritanian society. Mauritania appears to have attracted the interest of multiple foreign
countries after its decolonization, which perhaps viewed its rural populace as a tabula rasa, and
the country a political vacuum to be filled by competing Cold War ideologies. To hear those who
came of age during this time tell it, the capital of Nouakchott – which, like El Aaiún, developed
from almost nothing during the 1960s – was a city of tents and embassies. The Chinese, Iraqi –
and, later, Libyan – embassies all distributed literature in an effort to win the hearts and minds of
the residents of this burgeoning capital.
China had a particularly visible presence in Mauritania in the 1960s, a relationship tied to
the fact that both the People’s Republic of China and Mauritania struggled to win recognition
before the United Nations. Through major public works projects, including the development of
infrastructure for a water supply, the dredging of an industrial port, and the construction of
landmark public buildings in Nouakchott such as Dar al-Thaqafa, which remains one of the most
458
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impressive structures in the capital today, Chinese support visibly bolstered Mauritania’s
development.459 At the same time, the embassy distributed free Maoist literature. As one man
reminisced of the 60s and 70s, “oh…in every tent in Nouakchott, there was a Little Red Book by
Mao Tse-Tung. Can you imagine?!”460 Maoism, in particular, informed the program of the
Kadihin movement, in educating and organizing rural communities.461
Of course, the visible presence of propaganda and other political activity in Nouakchott
did not necessarily affect the vast majority of the population living in rural areas, many of whom
were averse to explicitly secular and political ideologies of the time. A running joke from that
era involves the Iraqi embassy which, pleased with rising demand for their Ba‘ath Party
literature, sent two functionaries to find out who was consuming the literature, and if the
relationship could be cultivated further. When a man came the next morning and gathered all of
the free pamphlets and books from the embassy, the Ba‘ath functionaries eagerly followed him
outside the city, only to be disappointed when they found the ideological tracts fed to a herd of
goats.462
Nonetheless, the Ba‘athist and Nasserist political ideologies, like the Maoist literature,
both found an audience, and the latter became particularly influential following the 1969 coup in
Libya that brought Colonel Mu‘ammar Qaddafi, an acolyte of Gamel Abd el-Nasr, to power.
Qaddafi’s charisma and adventurous foreign policy had impacts on the region that were both
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immediate and lasting.463 On June 6, 1972 – one month after the Tan Tan protest, two months
before the UNEM student congress in Rabat, and four months before the Kadihin movement
formed in Nouakchott – Colonel Qaddafi gave a speech in Atar, in northern Mauritania, calling
for the end of colonialism in Spanish Sahara. Two months later, Qaddafi dispatched an operative
named Muhammad Saïd Qashshat to northern Mauritania to organize Nasserist groups and
foment revolution in both Mauritania and Spanish Sahara.464
Qashshat’s efforts, and Qaddafi’s popularity, spurred the formation of Nasserist political
groups among a younger generation in northern Mauritania. Between Polisario and the Maoist
Kadihin already on the scene, the northern Mauritanian cities of Atar, Nouadhibou and Zouérate,
perhaps more than anywhere else in the region at that time, became centers of political
fomentation, animating debates and discussions for a younger generation coming of age in the
1970s.465 While Qaddafi befriended El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid and became the Polisario Front’s
first major backer (the Mauritanian Kadihin, as an underground movement, had far fewer
resources), the connection between Arab nationalism and the Sahrawi cause was complicated by
Arab nationalism’s emphasis on the need for supranational political formations to combat
imperialism and Zionism. This former Nasserist student-activist was unmoved by the cause of
Sahrawi independence despite coming of age in Nouadhibou, mere kilometers from Spanish
Sahara, in the 1970s:
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The Saharan liberation movement wasn’t a big deal to me – I believed that the
period of fragmentation [al-tafriq] ought to end with the expulsion of the Spanish
colonial invader/occupier. But as for establishing an independent country, for me,
as an example of a separatist movement, I was not for it. That was my
conviction.466
The emphasis was even stronger among members of Mauritania’s active Ba‘ath Party, whose
connections to Ba‘ath Party leadership in Baghdad provided them with resources that other
groups lacked, but whose support for Sahrawi liberation was mitigated by the Baghdad
leadership’s refusal to support Sahrawi independence on Arab nationalist grounds.467
***
Between the protest in Tan Tan in May, Qaddafi’s speech in Atar in June, the UNEM
Congress led by leftist radicals in Rabat and the attempted coup d’état in August, and the
formation of the Kadihin in October, the summer and fall of 1972 were, indeed, politically “hot.”
In this sense, I suggest that the movements involved in these events constituted a constellation
across western Sahara and the Maghreb, subtended by an imminent horizon for change. From
interviews and oral histories conducted with people who lived through this time, from Rabat to
Nouakchott, and from Tindouf to Nouadhibou, two features of this constellation are particularly
striking. The first is the indeterminate future portended by an open horizon of expectation, and
the widespread debate that this engendered. An older man from northern Mauritania who joined
Polisario during this time describes the discussions that would take place at Polisario’s office in
Zouérate:
The ones with political posts would present, like Shahid El-Ouali [Mustafa
Sayid], and other leaders [l-kibar] from the Front. They would present to us, and
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we would continue (the discussion): what do we think about Mauritania [shinhu
tekhmam fina fi al-muritan]…what do we think about Morocco, and what does
Algeria have – what are our thoughts (about them)?
And they would present (these questions) and we would discuss them.
And we would discuss like this, “what about this, and that,”…and that was how
the discussion went: each and every day, discussion/debate, discussion/debate.468
This account of the discussions taking place in Zouérate involving direct interaction between the
leaders of Polisario, Mauritanian-Sahrawis, members of Kadihin, Arab nationalists, and others,
covered the range of political actors and possibilities and precipitated the convergence of people
from different movements. In this sense, it is remarkably similar to the description of the
contemporaneous debates taking place in Rabat.
The other striking feature of this constellation is the degree to which Western Sahara
itself became the object upon which different visions for the future could be projected. For the 23
Mars movement in Morocco, the Sahara held the potential to serve as the first of several
dominoes that could topple authoritarian regimes and transform the Greater Maghreb toward
radical democracy – but only if that process began with the affirmation of the “marocanité” of
the Sahara. For the Kadihin, the Polisario Front represented a movement that was kindred in
spirit, and which would enable the decolonization of Spanish Sahara to occur in tandem with the
reinvention of Mauritania, like “two eggs in one nest.” For Arab nationalists, the independence
of Western Sahara simply represented the further fragmentation of anti-imperial, anti-Zionist
power, a position which Morocco would exploit in order to undermine support for the Polisario
Front in the Arab League. For Ila al-Amam and the Polisario Front, meanwhile, selfdetermination was a clear goal but this, too, was foreseen as an outcome to be achieved by armed
struggle, and not by legal process.469 Even Qaddafi, who embraced El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid and
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the Polisario Front from the outset, was engaged with the Sahara as one of many projects across
Africa and the Middle East to foment regime change, from the Canary Islands to the Dhofar
liberation movement in Oman, with Mauritania and Western Sahara in between.470
The capacity for Western Sahara to absorb a variety of political projections for the future
can also be connected to Spanish Sahara’s isolation of the people and territory during this time.
The Zemla uprising in 1970 was the only visible puncture of this blackout that brought Sahrawis
in Spanish Sahara in contemporaneous relation to the constellation of surrounding movements
across the region. But precisely because Spain maintained such tight control over the territory,
the future of Western Sahara became increasingly tied to a range of political projects and
possibilities that were emerging along with this constellation of movements in Mauritania,
Morocco, and further afield. Moreover, as noted in the Anfas article, the populace would need
support from the outside even if a political movement within the territory were in evidence.

Section III –The Generational Noncontemporaneity of Decolonization, from the 1950s to
1970s
The regional constellation of movements that became particularly visible across
northwest Africa in 1972 formed in relation to a horizon of imminent but indeterminate change.
This horizon for change was largely filled by plans surrounding the decolonization of Western
Sahara and yet, this chapter has shown that the political projects anticipating these futures were
largely taking place outside of Spanish Sahara itself, thanks to the territory’s isolation under
Spanish rule. The “center” for decolonization of Western Sahara in 1972 was as much Morocco,
Mauritania, Algeria and even Libya - in Zouérate and Rabat, Tan Tan and Tindouf, Nouakchott
and Tripoli – as it was in El Aaiún. This dispersion conveys the degree to which the politics of
470
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Western Sahara’s decolonization has always entailed and depended upon processes that surpass
its territorial boundaries. This is precisely why I have found the concept of a constellation to be
useful, both because it captures the simultaneity of these movements’ emergence, as well as the
disaggregated political geography of decentralized connectivity which they constituted.
One feature of this constellation was its sense of connection, not necessarily between
each movement (the Kadihin movement, for example, appeared to have little direct
communication with UNEM or other student groups in Morocco), but with political
developments from around the world. Principle among these were the Six Days War in 1967, and
the student movement in France that culminated in the Paris protests of May, 1968:
A period of heightened awareness [marhala idhka’ al-wa‘yi] emerged with two
fundamental events: the first event is the War of ’67, Palestine, and the second
event is the French student movement in ’68. They had an influence on the region,
generally, in mobilizing political awareness in the region. Everyone in the region
interacted [tefa‘il] with the war in Palestine, but also everyone - especially in
Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco - lived the events that France went through in
’68, with that student revolution. It provoked a questioning of (one’s)
consciousness.
A new generation appeared, no longer traditional or religious, which
considers Hassaniya the sole connection, or religion as the sole connection
(between people). Instead, political thinking began to crystallize [ytabalwar]. And
from there, the first movement that came to the Sahara, was established in ’68.471
My interest here is less in exploring the significance of the Six Days War or the Paris student
movement from the present moment, or from the perspective of northwest Africa.472 Nor am I
trying to single these two events out from others as an argument for their decisive role in shaping
the history of decolonization in the region. These were only some of the political developments
that my interlocutors cited as being particularly influential in shaping their political
subjectivities. The Cultural Revolution in China, the Vietnam War, and Maoist-inspired
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revolutions in Cambodia and Laos also came up several times in interviews among activists in
Mauritania and Morocco. To cite just one example of another event, a former member of the
Kadihin mentioned the emotional effect [al-ta’thir al-wujdani] that the guerrilla wars taking
place in Vietnam and elsewhere across southeast Asia had on him, along with Palestine.473
However, the Six Days War and the May ’68 protests and strike in France were not only
referenced most frequently, they also most clearly bore the signature of world-historical events
that marked a generation’s sense of political becoming. Therefore, I single out the Six Days War
and the May ’68 protests in France as representative events that indexed a sense of coexistence
and simultaneity for a certain generation marked by an awareness of global political futures.
In another important sense, the emergence of this constellation took place not only in
relation to the open horizon for the future, but also in temporal relation to the past. When the
interviewee notes that “a new generation appeared” concomitant with the developments in
Palestine and Paris, he is distinguishing this emergent consciousness from a previous generation.
In relation to western Sahara, in particular, I suggest that this awareness of global political
developments distinguished the generation coming of age during the late 1960s and early 70s
from a previous generation’s “nonsynchronism” with world-historical events in the 1950s. As
outlined in Chapter 3, the effects of this experience of nonsynchronism during the 1950s left
many Sahrawis discouraged during a prior moment of decolonization, specifically through a
sense that the Moroccan Liberation Army failed – or, worse, “tricked” – them. From this
perspective, the isolation of Sahrawis during the 1960s was not only an effect of intensified
Spanish rule, but the result of fallout from disillusionment with the MLA a generation prior. The
sense among Sahrawis of having been tricked or betrayed by the MLA contributed to a turn
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inward and away from “politics” – a turn which, in the spatial imaginary of the Sahara, entails a
return to the desert, or badiya.
By contrast, for those who participated in Sahrawi nationalist movements beginning in
1968 with Mohamed Basiri and the Vanguard Movement, and then later with the formation of
the Polisario Front, the horizon for change was imbricated with events in Paris, Damascus,
Vietnam, Palestine and Guinea-Bissau. This experience of contemporaneity with global Third
Worldism constituted a break with the politics of a previous generation. The following is from a
former member who contrasted the politics of Basiri’s movement with what motivated Sahrawis
who joined Morocco’s Liberation Army in the 1950s:
There is no comparison (between Jaysh al-Tahrir of the 1950s and the Vanguard
Movement), not even in their thinking. The thinking of Jaysh al-Tahrir was jihad
in God’s name [fi sabil allah] and to expel the colonizer from the Sahara, but not
to call for a state or for independence. The latter (Vanguard Movement) came via
an experienced man [rajl muhanik] and a nationalist – an Arab nationalist and
Nasserist – following the East.474
There are multiple distinctions made here between the politics animating the moment of
decolonization in western Sahara in the 1950s, from those at play in the late 1960s. Here, a sharp
distinction is made between the traditional or religious politics of jihad from the modern
consciousness of nationalism. The former, it is claimed, is what mobilized tribesmen to join the
MLA in large numbers to expel the Christians [nasara] in the 1950s; the latter, having coming
from a reliable source (“the East,” i.e., Cairo, Damascus, the Levant), is validated by someone
whose authority comes not only from moral goodness, or shaykh-ly lineage, but from political
experience.
In many contexts, the distinction between generations is understood either in terms of
disillusionment and frustration, or, as in the excerpt above, as a break between tradition and
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modernity, which reflects a secular idiom that denies coevalness to non-secular modes of
rationality.475 However, the setting of Rabat circa 1972 again provides a concrete example for
conceptualizing this debate about the future as a dialogue between generations, when veterans of
the MLA were a part of discussions with radical Sahrawi university students in Rabat:
The subject (of the Sahara) was an issue related specifically to Sahrawis, (that
involved) perhaps a small number of people. There was a kind of togetherness
[luhma] between individuals that surpassed political ideas, much of the
time…Before [Intifadat al-Zemla], there was a kind of sluggishness [al-khumul]
after what happened with Jaysh Tahrir, from shock, there was shock, there was an
apprehension of trust [intiza‘ al-thiqa] toward others. Meaning, there was no
longer a desire to support someone: the south claims you, and the north claims
you, and Algeria’s not interested – so, there were those in the country just trying
to live, and that’s it. But with Zemla, the clouds cleared [ihqasha’ al-dabbab] and
(there was) a reopening of the discussion anew. This discussion would not be
limited to a specific group, nor to a specific idea.476
This recollection, from a man who was a university student participating in these discussions and
was later forcibly arrested and jailed without trial for 13 years, frames the debate less as a
confrontation precipitated by a break in consciousness, and more as a dialogue between
generations.
David Scott’s thinking about generation provides another means for thinking through this
distinction, one which does not assume the kinds of rupture or break often conveyed by social
memory. By Scott’s conceptualization, generation, as a temporal concept, marks a certain
noncontemporaneity between cotemporal groups, and that “mere copresence in historical time
does not make for contemporaneity.”477 In borrowing from Scott, the contemporaneity of the
generation that formed Polisario was tied to an awareness of and connectivity with regional and
global political developments that was not shared by a previous generation. At the same time,
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and in following Scott again, the dialogue between generations illustrates how intergenerational
tradition constitutes the grounds through which shared horizons of expectation emerge. In the
context of Rabat in 1972, two generations of Sahrawis were making sense of a changing horizon
of possibility – metaphorically suggested by the former student’s phrase “the clouds cleared” – in
relation to their disparate spaces of experience.
Section IV – “A Nation of Refugees:” Humanitarian Nationalism and Postcolonial
Sovereignty in the Global Space-Time of the 1970s
Despite this constellation of emergent leftist movements across northwest Africa in 1972,
the open horizon of possibility regarding Western Sahara did not last long. On the one hand, the
end to Spanish colonialism never seemed nearer: Portuguese revolution and regime change in
1974 led to the immediate decolonization of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde
and Sao Tomé.478 Likewise, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was growing, as Algeria hosted
the largest NAM Summit to date in Algiers in 1973.479 These developments did not, however,
necessarily bolster the anti-imperialist movements in Mauritania and Morocco. As noted earlier
in the chapter, the second coup attempt in Morocco was quickly followed by a crackdown on the
student left, which began with the formal dissolution of the Moroccan student union, UNEM, in
January 1973. State arrests of leftists continued throughout the year following the attacks on
Moroccan police outposts by a radical group based out of Algeria, and in November 1974 over
100 more activists were imprisoned, including Abraham Serfaty, a founding member of Ila alAmam. In Mauritania, meanwhile, 1973 was marked by a year-long student strike, another
miner’s strike in Zouérate, and the growing influence of the Kadihin movement, which was
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escalating demands for the state to nationalize the mining concern based in northern Mauritania,
MIFERMA.
Maneuverings at the state and international level would soon outpace the leftist
movements. In February, 1973, Spain warned neighboring countries not to allow Polisario to
operate on its territory, putting additional pressure on a Mauritanian government that was
contending with both growing internal opposition and severe drought conditions across much of
the country.480 At the same time, just as the Kadihin movement was ascendant, Mokhtar Ould
Daddah’s government moved swiftly to meet several of the movement’s demands. In 1972,
Mauritania ended its mutual defense agreements with France; in 1973, the government
established a national currency for the first time; and, most substantively, in 1974 the
Mauritanian state nationalized MIFERMA. That same year, the government invited members of
the Kadihin movement to a conference with government ministers. This precipitated tremendous
debate within Kadihin leadership and ultimately led to a split as certain, key members of the
movement, compelled by Ould Daddah’s reforms, joined the government.481 This schism proved
decisive, depriving the Kadihin movement of much of its leadership and leaving those who
rejected joining the government to reorient their activities toward rural activism and away from
state-oriented demands (such as nationalization of MIFERMA) that had previously anchored the
movement’s political activities. As several former members put it, the government had “pulled
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the rug out from under our feet,” effectively coopting the movement just as it had arrived on the
national scene.482
A shifting political landscape in Mauritania did not slow Polisario’s activities, however,
throughout 1973 and 74. As noted previously, the Polisario Front officially formed in May 1973,
carrying out its first operation, an attack against a Spanish military outpost. In May and June of
1974, a United Nations convoy visited the region and Polisario, outmaneuvering Spanish and
Mauritanian authorities, organized strong displays of support at each stop that the envoy made in
Spanish Sahara and surrounding areas (Tan Tan, Zouérate). Two months later, Spain declared
support for organizing a referendum, but Polisario, after holding its second congress in the desert
in August 1974, did not let up. In October 1974, Polisario cells formed by workers at the Bucraa
phosphate mining operation in Spanish Sahara sabotaged the open-air conveyor belt that
transported extracted mineral from the mine to the coast. Again in May and June of 1975, new
attacks on Spanish posts in Guelta-Zemmour succeeded in drawing Sahrawi recruits from the
ranks of the Spanish military. Throughout this time, Qaddafi was trucking arms and other
supplies from Libya to Polisario’s base of operations in southwest Algeria. Where the Kadihin in
Mauritania and leftists in Morocco were in retreat, Polisario was asserting itself: by May 1975,
Spain declared that it had no intention of prolonging its colonial presence in the Sahara.483 And,
on October 12, 1975, in a village in northern Mauritania known as Ain Ben Tilli, at the home of
Ba ould Dkhil, a judge who had fled southern Morocco in 1956 because of a political dispute, an
intergenerational group that included members of the Spanish representative council, al-Jem‘a,
voted to recognize Polisario as the legitimate representative of the Sahrawi people.
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Just days after the meeting at Ain Ben Tilli, the International Court of Justice issued an
Advisory Opinion regarding Morocco’s and Mauritania’s claims to sovereignty over Western
Sahara. Citing proof of historical political ties, the ICJ’s opinion nonetheless denied that these
historical ties constituted sovereign ties.484 Within Morocco, the regime promoted the ICJ
Opinion as a victory, disregarding the opinion’s rejection of Morocco’s claim to sovereign ties.
By the end of October, Moroccan armed forces were encroaching on Western Saharan territory,
preparing to enter the towns of Smara and El Aaiún.485 Also during this time, the Moroccan
military transporting hundreds of thousands of unarmed civilians to Morocco’s border with
Western Sahara, to march into the territory as a symbol of national reclamation. This took place
on November 6, 1975, in an event of mass mobilization that has become steeped in Moroccan
national mythology, known as the Green March.486 Some 350,000 civilians wielding Qur’ans and
Moroccan flags marched into the territory, and then withdrew.
Then, most crucially, on November 14, 1975, Morocco and Mauritania negotiated a
trilateral agreement with Spain, known as the Madrid Accord, to transfer Western Sahara to the
two countries: Morocco would annex the northern two thirds, Mauritania the rest. This was done
while General Franco was on his deathbed, and with his military advisors allegedly divided
between supporting Sahrawi self-determination, and the terms of the Madrid agreement.487 After
solidifying its control over the cities and completing Spanish withdrawal during the final months
of 1975, Morocco then expanded its military sweep of the territory during January and February,
1976. During these two months, the army indiscriminately killed civilians, precipitating an
exodus among Sahrawis who fled east. The Moroccan air force strafed camps that were set up in
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the east of Western Sahara with napalm, forcing Sahrawis into a remote part of the desert in
southwest Algeria, outside of Tindouf.488
From 1976, the rupture was profound: Morocco occupied most of Western Sahara
militarily, and violently repressed any dissent among Sahrawis in the territory. Meanwhile, on
February 28, 1976, from refugee camps in Algeria, Polisario announced the establishment of the
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). During this time, Polisario also mobilized
supporters from across the region to come to the camps and bolster their armed force. One man
remembers the voluntary exodus of Mauritanians leaving F’derik and Zouérate in northern
Mauritania to join:
They left all of their belongings. Really [ga‘a]! They left the house - the car
wasn’t theirs, it belonged to the company (SNIM)489 - but those who owned their
houses left them as well. This house of ours [where the interview’s taking place],
we left it and went. This house here, we left it and went to the Front. And we
stayed with them; we went to battle with them [nakhubtu m‘ahum], until peace
was settled and we came (back) to our house. This is our house, and none of us
remained in it…we went to fight with our brothers…490
The decisive series of events in late 1975 and early 1976 precipitated several major changes.
Where Polisario had previously been waging a battle against Spanish colonial rule, it suddenly
had to pivot toward simultaneous armed struggle against Morocco and Mauritania. The
annexation by Morocco and Mauritania, which had seemed unlikely just a few years earlier, also
precipitated a realignment in the ongoing regional struggle between Morocco and Algeria. This
led Algeria, which had heretofore treated the Polisario Front with a level of distrust, to embrace
the Sahrawi national liberation movement.
***
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After Spain withdrew from the Sahara by December 20, 1976, Morocco and Mauritania
moved quickly to establish control over the annexed territory,491 surrounding the cities with
barbed wire to pen residents in. Chapter 1 of this dissertation begins with the account of a
woman who remembers, as a girl, a violent encounter with a Moroccan soldier on the roof of her
home in Laâyoune/El Aaiún during this time. Concurrent with laying siege to the cities, Morocco
conducted sweeps through the Saharan badiya. According to journalistic reports from this time,
these military campaigns were brutal, with eyewitnesses recounting soldiers killing, raping and
torturing their family members.492 As Sahrawis fled east, preliminary desert encampments in
Galtah Zemmour and Um Drayga were strafed by the Moroccan air force, which dropped napalm
on fleeing civilians on four known occasions.493 Meanwhile, Sahrawis living throughout
Morocco who had any familial connection to Polisario or were believed to harbor sympathies,
were rounded up and sent to the remote Moroccan prisons of M’gouna and Agdz. One
interlocutor quoted throughout this chapter was apprehended in Rabat without warning in 1976,
and spent 13 years imprisoned in the remote fortress/prison of M’gouna. Many of those forcibly
disappeared died in prison during the war. Although I could not find exact figures for the death
toll from this campaign, “it is likely that several thousand Sahrawi civilians died” between 1975
and 1980, with several hundred still unaccounted for and mass graves that have recently come to
light.494
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The aerial attacks at Um Drayga and elsewhere pushed fleeing Sahrawis further east,
where many settled outside of Tindouf, a market town in southwest Algeria. Polisario scrambled
to provide a network of Land Rovers relaying people to the camps, not only from Moroccan- and
Mauritanian-occupied territory, but from across northern Mauritania. As the camps grew,
Polisario formalized its alliance with Algeria during its Third General Congress held in Algiers
in August, 1976, which allowed leadership to set up the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a
state-in-exile in the camps.495 In the early years, women predominantly organized daily life in the
camps, since most men were fighting with Polisario as it engaged in war with both Morocco and
Mauritania. As Alice Wilson points out, this period shifted the locus of political subjectivity
from the tent to the public domain, where Qaddafi-inspired Popular Committees, composed
predominantly of women, administered education, health care, justice, and Red Crescent matters
(which constituted much of the camp’s economy).496 A Mauritanian who visited the camps
during this time recalled a remarkable sense of purpose and collective sacrifice:
I felt a strong sense of dedication [al-ikhlass al-shadid]. There was a spirit of
sacrifice and patience, patience, patience at the beginning, at the hunger. And
there was nothing: people endured [nas tatahamel]. By God, (there was)
dedication. There was mutual support and I didn’t see anyone at odds. There was
deep dignity…There was no tribalism at that time, and they were fighting against
tribalism. Far from Marxist thinking, they were simply Sahrawi nationalists.497
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Social memory about the hardship and purpose of the early revolutionary period, and women’s
pivotal role in building and running the camps, remain foundational to the Sahrawi national
narrative of resistance and exile.498
Much has been written about the Sahrawi refugee camps, with particular attention to the
political operations of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or what Wilson calls Polisario’s
“state-movement,” within the camps.499 My interest is not to contribute to this literature, but,
rather, to note the integral role of the refugee camps in making Sahrawi nationalism intelligible
to an international audience. In focusing on early reports of the refugee camps, some of them
journalistic and propagandistic, I will examine two tropes of this literature, primarily conducted
during the time of war between 1976 and 1989, in order to relate these tropes to significant shifts
in global politics that coincided with the rise of Sahrawi nationalism during the 1970s.
The first trope is organization. Initial reports from the camps marveled at the
comprehensively organized political life of the camps, and the widespread, active participation of
refugees in these processes. In reporting to the African Studies Association annual meeting 1978,
Anne Lippert, who made several visits to the camps in the 1970s and 80s, described the highly
organized camp conditions by listing the popular, administrative committees that organized daily
and political life, as well as the camp’s spatial organization:500
The 23 camps of refugees, each carrying the name of a city or village in the
S.A.D.R., are divided into three wilayas: Smara, El Aaiun, and Dakhla. Every
person over 12 in the camps belong to one of the nine camp committees
(education, health and sanitation, crafts, commerce, guard duty, herds, pediatrics,
social affairs, supplies) and also belongs to a political cell (group of 11 people
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who meet daily to discuss politics, the war, etc.). Popular meetings in the camps
are held to discuss problems of the camps, the progress of the war, plans for the
future. Every one in the camp has a chance to have his say.501
Tami Hultman, who published several articles from the camps as well as the front soon after the
outbreak of war, related this committee life to a spirit of mobilization:
The atmosphere in the frontier camps is so energetic and purposeful that it often is
difficult to remember that the people are there under duress, living in the most
extreme conditions of deprivation. Each unit has several thousand people and is
run by an administrative committee, an economic committee, an education
committee, and a sanitation committee.502
Lastly, this trope of organization and participation provided the basis for a discourse on the
exceptionalism of the Sahrawi camps. This report, prepared by members of a donor organization
promoting agricultural projects in the camps during the 1980s, emphasized the uniqueness of
Sahrawi refugees in relation to other situations of forced displacement:
All the refugees, men and women, participate at all levels of camp activity in
services and institutions, in production workshops, in the system of justice and in
the political organization. Other refugees often sink into alienation and apathy.
The Sahrawi leaders, while recognizing their dependence of external supplies,
have organized the camps to harness and maximize the energies, commitment and
hope of the Sahrawi people.503
As Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh has demonstrated through her in-depth study of Sahrawis in the
refugee camps, this discourse has a gendered dynamic in singling out female Sahrawis as “the
ideal refugee.”504
The accompanying trope to “the ideal refugee” is one of suffering. This is true in a basic,
material sense, in that the distribution of international NGO aid through the Sahrawi-run Red
Crescent has always been the camps’ lifeline:
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Disease, particularly bronchitis, pulmonary tuberculosis, diarrhea, and other
intestinal illnesses, is rampant. The children are afflicted by measles as well, and
the lack of refrigeration as well as the lack of vaccines and medicines have
resulted in many infant deaths. The refugees are also suffering from burns and
other wounds as well as from malnutrition. Their plight is serious, and will
become even more serious as the winter months continue. Tents, warm clothing,
and medicines are major needs, not to mention food supplies…Additional help is
hoped for as more people become aware of the plight of this people.505
While health conditions improved along with the establishment of a working national hospital
and with medical support from Cuba, in particular, the refugee camps as a situation of
humanitarian need remains central to their operation. Beyond this fundamental observation about
the camps’ operation, however, I suggest that the humanitarian appeal has also been what made
Sahrawi nationalism legible as a compelling political formation. A 1979 Algerian publication
entitled “Western Sahara: a people in struggle” illustrates how representations of the Sahrawi as
a people took form through the exodus of forced displacement:
From the moment Morocco entered the war and later Mauritania, massacres and
torture accompanied each village occupation initiating a mass exodus to the zones
controlled by the Polisario Front. In a few days time, the Sahraoui people became
a nation of refugees.506
If the martyred figure of the nationalist hero El-Ouali Mustafa Sayid continues to personify the
negation of Sahrawi national liberation (Chapter 1), then Sahrawi nationalism in its realized form
emerged through the figure of the refugee – or, collectively, as “a nation of refugees.”507
In this way, Sahrawi national liberation militants, not unlike their Kadihin compatriots,
had “the rug swept out from under their feet.” By this I mean not only that Polisario was
victimized by Moroccan irredentism and international complicity, which remains as salient and
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true today as when it took place forty years ago.508 But, also, even as Polisario’s emergence as a
national liberation movement coincided with a regional constellation of anti-imperial
movements, it still existed in disjunctive relation to decolonization more generally. Sahrawi
national liberation as a political project emerged just as human rights eclipsed anticolonial selfdetermination as a mobilizing political principle. In this way, decolonization in the Sahara during
the 1970s remained in disorderly relation to global politics. With a global shift in the politics of
anticolonialism away from supporting Third World self-determination and toward a global ethic
of humanitarianism, the bases of support for Third World liberation movements quickly eroded
just as Sahrawi nationalism emerged.
Because of the contingencies of Sahrawis’ escape from Moroccan invasion, and Algeria’s
subsequent support, Sahrawi national liberation has perdured through the convergence of these
two forms. On the one hand, Morocco’s invasion brought Polisario enduring support from the
Algerian regime, once celebrated by Amilcar Cabral as the “mecca” for national liberation
movements.509 Crucially, however, Polisario/SADR has remained intelligible as a political
project through the space of the refugee camps, and the figure of the refugee. This political
formation, which relies upon humanitarian aid from a range of multilateral organizations and
NGOs, is both a space of national liberation and humanitarian politics.
Parallel to this point, then, is that the refugee camp is simultaneously a space of
humanitarianism and sovereignty, which builds on Miriam Ticktin’s observation that
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humanitarianism “allows for the recombination of bare life and political life in new ways, such
that the political dimension of human life is never lost.”510 Similarly, the Sahrawi refugee camps
combined national self-determination with humanitarianism in concurrence with the demise of
Third Worldism as a political project. Not simply an anomaly, however, the Sahrawi refugee
camps might be considered within a spectrum of postcolonial political formations, each of which
may be distinguished by varying degrees of compromised sovereignty. Or, returning to Robert
Jackson’s formulation, as “consisting not of self-standing structures with domestic foundations –
like separate buildings – but of territorial jurisdictions (supported from above) by international
law and material aid – a kind of international safety net.”511 In this sense, the Sahrawi refugee
camps appear much less as spaces of exception, than representative of the tensions of autonomy
and dependence inherent in post-World War II political formations, more generally.
Framing depictions of the Sahrawi refugee camps in this way is not meant to justify
Morocco’s violent invasion, nor to explain Sahrawi national liberation in terms of “success” or
“failure.” Rather, this demonstrates, again, the “nonsynchronism” of decolonization in the Sahara
through the disjunctive temporal relation between Sahrawi nationalism and shifting global
politics of the 1970s. While too many studies of the Western Sahara conflict have uncriticially
celebrated these camps as a space of experimentation, organization, women’s liberation, and
autonomy, their emergence and durability are also effects of 1970s shifts in the global space-time
of decolonization and postcolonial sovereignty. In this manner the words of Elsa Assidon, sister
of the Moroccan leftist Sion Assidon, are particularly prescient. Writing in 1978, while the war
between Morocco, Mauritania and Polisario was raging (and while her brother was in Moroccan
jail), Elsa Assidon suggested that Polisario’s reliance on Algeria and humanitarian aid left the
510
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movement with very little autonomy, given that international solidarity was increasingly
mobilized by an ethic of humanitarianism, rather than Third World liberation:
This aid only leaves a narrow margin of autonomy to the Polisario Front relative
to the Algerian regime and one no longer clearly sees which strategy the Sahrawis
have given themselves on this point, besides constant efforts to capitalize on
international solidarity in their favor beyond the Algerian wake and the political
work of ‘consciencization’ undertaken in the camps.512
Nearly four decades later, Sahrawi political autonomy remains dependent in much the same way.
The role of human rights, however, has changed significantly and will be the subject of Chapter
5 of this dissertation.
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Chapter 5 – Human Rights in Conflict: The Figure of the Huquqi in Western Sahara
On February 16, 2017, the Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute at Hunter College convened
an event entitled “Watching Western Sahara: Human Rights and Press Freedom in the Last
Colony in Africa.” The panel featured several experts on human rights in Western Sahara,
including Mohamed Ali Arkoukou, President of the Sahrawi Association in the USA; Katlyn
Thomas, a former high ranking member of UN-led efforts to hold a referendum in the 1990s;
Sandra Lynn Babcock, a scholar of international law; Eric Goldstein, the deputy director of the
Middle East and North Africa division of Human Rights Watch; and Madeleine Bair, manager of
WITNESS Media Lab’s Western Sahara project. The presenters addressed ongoing Moroccan
violations of human rights in Western Sahara, situating these violations within the history of
conflict between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists that dates back to 1975. Although the official
Moroccan state perspective was not represented on the panel, several members in the audience of
50 or 60 spent the time throughout the panel busily typing into their phones and conferring with
one another in Moroccan Colloquial Arabic, or darija, as the presentations unfolded. It did not
seem far-fetched to think that they were keeping their embassy, if not officials back in Morocco,
apprised of what was being said. Even as it informed a mostly foreign audience in New York
about human rights abuses in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, the panel itself was part of
the political terrain – constituted by human rights, diplomacy, and publicity – which has become
the focal point of struggle between Morocco and Sahrawi nationalists since a ceasefire in 1991
ended armed conflict.
As the event’s title promised, the panel discussion included the presentation of
eyewitness footage shot from Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. The footage depicted scenes
of Moroccan security forces in action. Certain clips showed plainclothes members of Moroccan
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security forces disrupting street protests, sometimes kicking and dragging protesters as
uniformed police looked on, while the protesters screamed and shouted. The police, sometimes
helmeted in riot gear, other times indistinguishable from civilians in their clothing, were also
shown breaking and entering homes. The footage was usually shot from above, apparently from
the window or rooftop of a neighboring building across the street from where the confrontation
was taking place. When the footage became wobbly or abruptly cut off, one understood that the
videographer risked becoming interpellated as a target of the same kinds of raids and
interventions that they were depicting.
Madeleine Bair contextualized these videos by noting that Morocco continues to block
freedom of expression in the territory of Western Sahara that it controls. Notably, Morocco
restricts the entry of journalists to the territory, frequently expelling those whom it deems
politically sympathetic to Sahrawi nationalists and Polisario/SADR.513 Forced to contend with a
media blackout, the videos attest to the fact that Sahrawis have taken matters into their own
hands, forming media activist teams and documenting human rights violations of political
expression by uploading this footage to the internet. An English-speaking Sahrawi I met during
fieldwork described their role as “citizen media, digital militant, cyberactivists.”514 During
fieldwork in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, they were typically referred to, neutrally, as
huquqi (“human rights activist”), or, supportively, as munadil (“militant”). As Managing Editor
of the recently formed website, “Watching Western Sahara,” Bair noted in her talk that, although
these videos were readily available online and continued to grow in number over the last several
years, they remained largely unseen. The purpose of “Watching Western Sahara,” Bair said, is to
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“curate and contextualize videos to make them more accessible.” She went on to screen an edited
series of clips showing protests interspersed with interviews with activists. Following the video,
Bair characterized the situation in Western Sahara as one that suffers from a lack of visibility and
said that the purpose of making the videos available is for outsiders to “witness what [Sahrawis]
witness." In curating these videos in order to facilitate the “witnessing” of human rights
violations in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, Bair emphasized the lack of visibility several
times in her presentation, raising the rhetorical question, “Why is [Western Sahara] invisible?”515
Bair’s presentation at the 2017 event “Watching Western Sahara” touches on several
well-known aspects of human rights. The suggestion that footage documenting police violence
allows viewers to “witness what [Sahrawis] witness” relies upon a presentational trope through
which human rights violations are meant to draw attention, generate empathy, and translate to
political action transnationally. It has long been noted that human rights are made meaningful as
a moral discourse through the trope of witnessing, and the testimonial has become the standard
genre through which the documentation of human rights violations are typically communicated.
In providing a first-hand account, the testimonial is meant to both document human rights
violations and elicit empathy in a witnessing public audience. As a means of political
communication, the testimonial as genre rests upon the hope or expectation that a receptive
public, in witnessing the testimonial, effectively takes note of the violation and is moved to
respond. Regardless of form, whether as written report, or video clip, the framing of human
rights in this manner mediates between the fact of the violation, and the construction of an
audience whose reception makes the fact of the violation morally meaningful and politically
significant. As Meg McLagan notes, “[i]t is in this sense that a transnational ‘witnessing public’
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around human rights trauma is constituted through testimony (McLagan 2003).”516
McLagan also notes that the expansiveness of human rights as a moral and political
project can lead to tensions between the realist conventions of documentation, the enframing
devices used to convey testimony, and the acts that constitute human rights violations. For
example, the widespread effects of militarized occupation may well be apparent to anyone who
visits Laâyoune/El Aaiún, but if the security forces are trained to avoid and minimize violent
confrontations as much as possible, then these events must be provoked in order to be classified
as a human rights violation. As testified by the growing archive of documented abuses compiled
by Watching Western Sahara and others, activists in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara do not
seem to have much difficulty in producing material.517 Efforts by the state to prevent the
recording of the violent breakup of protests, for example, have not succeeded, although these
efforts have escalated the risks involved for those activists who attempt to document these
events, as will be discussed later in this chapter. As perhaps an added layer of complication, the
work performed by the WITNESS Media Lab’s website “Watching Western Sahara” in
organizing, archiving, curating and contextualizing already-produced videos foregrounds how
the mediating infrastructure of the internet must also be harnessed in order to make these videos
– and, by extension, the conflict – accessible for a human rights audience. In these ways,
Madeleine Bair’s presentation at the “Watching Western Sahara” event in New York City drew
attention to the problems of publicity and audience in the documentation of human rights
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violations.
While the “Watching Western Sahara” event at Roosevelt House in New York City
suggests that the plight of the Sahrawi national cause suffers from a lack of visibility
internationally, within the field of conflict in Western Sahara, human rights are everywhere. This
chapter will trace the emergence of human rights discourse as a political terrain, its more recent
proliferation in this field of conflict and, in particular, the broader effects of human rights
operating in close relation to publicity. From New York City to Geneva to Marrakesh to the
Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria and, of course, back to Laâyoune/El Aaiún in Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara, human rights have become a major focus in the ongoing conflict. And
although this discourse may have displaced armed conflict and national self-determination as the
primary terrain upon which the political future of Western Sahara is waged in the present, the
discourse remains embedded in the broader conflict’s ultimate aims.
***
This chapter will situate the emergence of human rights as a political terrain in Western
Sahara since the end to armed conflict between Morocco and Polisario in 1991, giving particular
attention to the period of 2014-17, when the use of human rights as a tactic in the conflict
escalated. In doing so, I will be focusing specifically on the struggle to document and publicize
human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. While human rights violations
committed by Polisario/SADR in its governance of the refugee camps have also been
documented, these largely took place before the 1991 ceasefire, and the grievances associated
with these violations come largely from ‘a’idin, who were discussed at length in Chapter 2.518
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Nor will this chapter be addressing the hundreds of Sahrawis whose disappearances under
Moroccan occupation remain unaccounted for.519 Instead, I will focus on the struggle over the
production, documentation and publicity of human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied
Western Sahara which, in contrast to the violations alleged to have taken place in refugee camps,
have become increasingly pivotal to the broader conflict over the past decade. Specifically, the
discourse and practice of human rights revolves around the documentation of human rights
violations in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara as a means of drawing attention to the
illegitimacy of Morocco’s rule there. Struggles over documenting and publicizing these
violations have only intensified since Polisario/SADR initiated an effort to broaden the mandate
for the UN peacekeeping body in Western Sahara, MINURSO, to include human rights
monitoring. Debated annually each spring during the UN Security Council’s renewal of
MINURSO’s mandate, Morocco has – successfully, thus far – fought this initiative tooth and
nail.520
In discussing human rights in this chapter, then, I am focusing almost exclusively on
human rights activism – often called human rights discourse – rather than law.521 This is because
human rights law, whether seen as emanating from United Nations covenants such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or from the Moroccan National Human Rights Council
(CNDH), have little bearing under Morocco’s militarized rule in Western Sahara. In this respect,
Moroccan Prisoners and Confined Persons within the Tindouf Region in the South of Algeria/Mehna Wa Mu‘anat
Al-Muhtajizin Wa Al-Sujana’ Al-Maghariba Bi Al-Mintaqa Tinduf Janub Al-Jaza’ir, n.d.
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Madeleine Bair’s talk at Hunter College reveals a particularly prominent dimension of human
rights activism in Western Sahara: the need for publicity and audience. At the same time, the
publicity requires not only an audience, but also a subject. The mobilization involved in
documenting human rights violations has generated a new figure populating the landscape of
political conflict in Western Sahara: the huquqi, or human rights activist. The huquqi (pl.
huquqiyyin), is a subject position that has emerged from the shifting terrain of conflict in
Western Sahara following the ceasefire in 1991, and has subsequently proliferated since the
Sahrawi intifada began in 2005. As this chapter will explore, the subject position of huquqi takes
on particular features from different locations across the transnational networks that make human
rights activism about Western Sahara possible, both inside and outside the territory. Since human
rights remain subsumed within the field of nationalist conflict, huquqiyyin are subject to
manipulation by the exigencies of Moroccan state security, and the particular political rationality
of national-humanitarian sovereignty in the Sahrawi refugee camps. In this way, I suggest that
the figure of the huquqi is particularly revealing of how human rights have emerged and shifted
across time and space in the Western Sahara conflict.
The label “huquqi” requires some clarification, in particular because of its expansive use
in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. The term derives from “al-haq” in Arabic, meaning
“right.” “Al-haq” can refer to “right” in both its formal, legal sense (to have a right to something)
as well as its moral sense (to be correct, or “in the right”). In Western Sahara, huquqi refers to
anyone involved with a human rights-based NGO, including organizations working in fields
(such as disability rights, rights of migrants, etc) unrelated to the politics of the dispute. As we
will see in Marrakesh, huquqiyyin from the Sahara involved with state-sanctioned human rights
associations working across a range of fields attended the World Human Rights Forum in large
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numbers. However, in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, huquqiyyin also, and increasingly,
refers to anyone involved in activism around the politics of the dispute. This includes activists
for some of the highest-profile human rights organizations sympathetic to Sahrawi nationalism,
such as CODESA, a collective of Sahrawi human rights defenders and ASVDH, Sahrawi
Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State.
Members of these organizations are the quintessential huquqiyyin in Western Sahara, in that they
are human rights activists involved in leveraging transnational connections to organize around
the right to political expression in Moroccan-occupied territory. In this respect, the huquqi is at
least somewhat distinct from the munadil, or militant, who is associated more with “on the
ground” activism in the streets of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. In practice, however, I found that any
Sahrawi engaged in activism around the dispute was labeled huquqi, whether involved as a
media activist, participating in demonstrations, or working with a formal organization. And,
finally, a pro-Moroccan human rights worker would be known as a huquqi, as well, reflecting the
universal, non-partisan terrain of human rights discourse. In this sense, huquqi refers to both
NGO employees working in the “human rights industry,” to use Lori Allen’s term, and activists
engaged in political activity surrounding Western Sahara.522 In tracing the proliferation of the
figure of the huquqi throughout this chapter, I will be using the term as I heard it used during
fieldwork, in all of its expansiveness.
This chapter will first provide an historical overview of the formation of human rights as
a political terrain in Western Sahara: its emergence following the UN-brokered ceasefire
522
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between Morocco and Polisario in 1991, its renewal with the first Sahrawi intifada in Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara in 2005, and its proliferation with recent efforts to expand the
peacekeeping mandate of MINURSO to include human rights monitoring after 2011. This
historical overview will also serve to trace shifts in the figure of the huquqi, as well as certain
defining features that have characterized human rights discourse over time in the context of
Western Sahara. First and foremost, human rights have developed as an instrument, or tactic, in a
broader conflict where the primary aim remains sovereignty and self-determination. Regardless
of the increased prominence of human rights in Western Sahara, the discourse remains embedded
in a struggle over sovereignty and self-determination. Huquqiyyin themselves recognize and
embrace the reality that human rights are subsumed by, and do not transcend, the political field.
In this sense, conceptions of human rights as an “ethical theory in social practice,” or as a moral
initiative existing in tension with the instrumentality of politics, are not terribly applicable to this
context.523 Nor, however, can human rights be characterized as a depoliticizing discourse – the
escalation of human rights-inspired protests in Laâyoune/El Aaiún between 2011 and 2015
attests to the role of human rights activism in amplifying, rather than displacing, the locus of
conflict.524
Nonetheless, human rights as an instrument of political conflict in Western Sahara
highlights a number of features of human rights discourse derived from a number of other
ethnographic contexts. As in many other situations, human rights in Western Sahara have
emerged through the development of and reliance upon transnational networks, while human
rights activism involves a process of the “vernacularization” of universal rights concepts into
523
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particular contexts.525 Oral histories and interviews with activists in Moroccan-occupied Western
Sahara confirm these insights, revealing a process of sensitization and “conscientization” to
human rights language and practice – most notably in the form of non-violent civil disobedience,
as well as an appreciation for transnational support as a bulwark against Moroccan oppression. In
understanding how the “vernacularization” of human rights has played out in the context of
Western Sahara, the insights from two anthropological studies of human rights practice
conducted in the context of longstanding political conflict are especially salient. The first insight
comes from Jennifer Curtis and her characterization of human rights as “war by other means.” In
the context of Northern Ireland, Curtis notes that “[r]ather than transforming divisions, human
rights discourse has helped reproduce them,”526 in ways that have the potential to create new
instabilities in the peace process there. Whereas human rights activism in certain contexts may
be seen to produce or reflect an emergent ethical subjectivity, in Western Sahara the discourse
remains bound to the friend/enemy distinction that structures nationalist conflict. The second
insight comes from Lori Allen’s study of human rights activism in Palestine, and her focus on
the cynicism that developed as human rights practice became decoupled from the political goals
of Palestinian nationalism.527 Borrowing from McLagan, Curtis and Allen, this chapter will pay
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particular attention to human rights as a political terrain defined in part by its relation to
publicity, conflict, and cynicism.
This will be explored through several ethnographic scenes that demonstrate the regional
and transnational dynamics of human rights discourse concerning Western Sahara. From New
York City, we will move to Marrakesh, Morocco. There, I describe the disorientation that
accompanied my efforts to make sense of human rights activism amidst the spectacle of Morocco
hosting the 2014 World Human Rights Forum. The second scene takes place in the Sahrawi
refugee camps in Algeria, the hub for publicizing human rights violations in Moroccan-occupied
territory, both regionally and transnationally. These efforts guarantee that human rights publicity
is mediated by Polisario/SADR’s “state feminism,”528 and by the particular political rationality
of humanitarian-nationalism in the refugee camps. And, finally, the chapter concludes by
describing encounters with huquqiyyin in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in Moroccan-occupied territory.
Recounting the challenges that accompanied these meetings, I discuss how huquqiyyin engender
both tremendous admiration and cynicism, connecting these contrasting responses to the notion
of “plural vernacularization” articulated by Daniel Goldstein.529 This will, finally, leave us where
the dissertation started: situating human rights activism within the layered history of
decolonization across the disaggregated political formations of western Sahara.
Section I - A Brief History of the Emergence, Deployment and Proliferation of Human
Rights in Western Sahara, in Three Stages
A. 1991-2005: Emergence, Conscientization
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Concerns about human rights violations immediately followed from Morocco’s invasion
and annexation of Western Sahara, with journalists and academics reporting on the
disappearances of hundreds of Sahrawis living under, or attempting to escape from, Moroccan
occupation.530 While the armed conflict between Morocco and Polisario reached a stalemate by
1984, the war continued to structure the political landscape throughout the 1980s.531 While
Polisario/SADR began welcoming journalists to the refugee camps to establish international
support and humanitarian connections, and to promote its viability as a governing entity,
Moroccan-occupied Sahara remained largely sealed off. Teresa Smith’s account from 1987
provides one of the few windows into the conditions in Laâyoune/El Aaiún during wartime.
Relying upon reports from the European Parliament and the SADR-run Sahrawi Red Crescent,
Smith reported that “[t]he secret police maintain an eminent watch over the city,” and that
“Moroccan authorities directed a powerful campaign of terror against the Sahrawi people during
the autumn of 1987. This occurred prior to and during the visit of a United Nations team to the
territory of Western Sahara.”532 A number of interlocutors referred to the period of war as a time
of complete militarization. One man from Smara, the city in Moroccan-occupied territory closest
to the Sahrawi refugee camps, recounted how Moroccan soldiers, serving as his schoolteachers,
brought their arms with them into the classroom.533 A younger man remembered that, growing
up, his parents scrupulously avoided political references of any kind – including, and most
importantly, listening to SADR radio broadcasts from the refugee camps – save for the occasions
when the family was spending time in the badiya, safely distanced from urban-based, state
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security surveillance. Several younger activists mentioned how the disappearances and pervasive
surveillance during this period instilled a deep fear in their parents. In turn, several reported that
their parents, out of a sense of self-preservation, avoided discussing the history of the conflict, or
Sahrawi nationalism, in the hopes of discouraging them from political activity of any kind.534
With the war having stalemated to Polisario’s disadvantage, the period from 1988 to 1991
saw a transition away from armed conflict. In 1988, major uprisings in the refugee camps against
the impunity of SADR’s rule there led to the first defections of Sahrawis leaving the refugee
camps. From these defections emerged the figure of the ‘a’id, or “returnee,” the subject of
Chapter 2. For the first time since 1975, this established movement and communication between
the refugee camps and Moroccan-occupied territory. The UN-brokered ceasefire in 1991
between Morocco and Polisario also included agreements for the release of political prisoners.
Hundreds of civilian Sahrawis who had been “forcibly disappeared” in the southern Moroccan
prisons of M’gouna and Agdz were released, many of them returning to live in Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara. Unsurprisingly, their place in society was at first unsettled. One of the
formerly “disappeared” [mukhtatef] Sahrawis described the disorientation that followed when he
was released along with two other fellow prisoners:
We three, we were in the same group but after we went out in the street, in reality
not much changed, because what shocked and surprised us after spending between
4 and 16 years [in prison] - the problem that we faced was that the State [al-sulta]
wanted to make the blame fall on “the others” [i.e. us],…so that they would be
afraid of [us], and [decide it was] better not to deal with us…And, [so we were]
incapable of la intégration in a natural/ordinary way, because people were
ostracized [menbudhin] within the society.535
The Moroccan state tried to determine the path of re-entry for those Sahrawi civilians detained
and disappeared during the war. And while this account observed that “not much changed,” by
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the early 1990s the social dynamics in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara were undergoing
tremendous transformation after fifteen years of full-scale militarization and isolation.
Along with ending armed conflict, the UN-brokered ceasefire agreement had established
a peacekeeping agency, MINURSO, tasked with holding a referendum on self-determination.
While expectations at first were to hold the referendum within a year or two, disputes between
Morocco and Polisario/SADR over determining the list of eligible of voters led to protracted
negotiations and delays. As the two parties continued to contest the criteria for establishing a
voter roll, the logistics of screening potential voters became increasingly contentious and timeconsuming.536 Delays to the referendum worked in Morocco’s favor, as the state could now
invest in the territory, and it moved quickly to resettle large numbers of Moroccans from the
interior of the country to the cities of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Dakhla, Boujdour and Smara. As
described in Chapter 1, many of those resettled had no prior connection to the territory, save for
sizable contingents of Sahrawis who resettled to Western Sahara from the southern Moroccan
region of Wed Nun. In addition to transforming the demographics, cities and regional economy,
the influx of new “settlers” 537 to Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara also generated new,
sometimes unanticipated dynamics between longtime residents and the new transplants. In the
years following the UN-brokered ceasefire, Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara underwent
tremendous changes, with state investments, an influx of new residents, the re-entry of Sahrawi
civilian prisoners detained throughout the war, and the establishment of new lines of connectivity
between the camps and the rest of the territory. Amidst these changes, Sahrawi nationalists found
new space for protest, but the idiom of human rights was not immediately apparent. Rather, the
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referendum was the locus of conflict.
According to an interview with a former political prisoner, the first Sahrawi human rights
organization formed in 1994 under the name The Committee for the Coordination of the Forum
on Sahrawis, only at that time “There was no awareness of human rights, we didn’t know
anything…We didn’t know law, we didn’t know the potential, I mean at all…At that time it had
been two and a half years since we had been let out of prison.”538 Nonetheless, the formation of
the group occurred contemporaneously with the stirrings of a human rights movement across
Morocco. Spurred by a reckoning with the repressive “years of lead” under King Hassan II –
which largely overlapped with the years of war in the Sahara – a nascent human rights movement
emerged in Morocco during the 1990s.539 This movement, through the demands of human rights
organizations in Morocco, was augmented by a public sphere captivated by the published
memoirs of Moroccan former political prisoners (primarily leftists, or relatives of members of
the military that carried out coup attempts in the early 1970s). The coronation of the new King
Mohamed VI in 1999 gave further impetus to redress the injustices of the past decades through
some form of restorative justice. This galvanized human rights organizations across Morocco as
well as Sahrawis who, according to one activist, joined the movement for restorative justice “in
numbers.” In 1998, a group of Sahrawi former political prisoners went to Rabat. At a time when
phone calls from the Sahara to “inside” Morocco were still routed through state security services
[al-’ajhiza], this marked a renewed point of connectivity that dissolved some of Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara’s isolation:
due to ignorance or a lack of understanding, we decided to participate in
everything that had to do with human rights, regardless of [it being] Moroccan,
foreign. Meaning, every protest having to do with human rights, we’ll go there
538
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and spread our issue. We’ll spread our issue, and we’ll benefit from getting closer
to others. Following some months – not many – we began establishing
relationships – Amnesty International comes to mind, but we must also mention
and thank a bunch of Moroccan activists who helped us.540
In a trajectory that bears remarkable parallels to the early 1970s (Chapter 4), this first group of
activists circulated through Rabat and Casablanca at a time of social and political ferment in
Morocco. As in the early 1970s, people living in Western Sahara were emerging from a period of
socio-political isolation and disconnection. And, as in the early 1970s, Sahrawi activists emerged
from this isolation by negotiating with members of Moroccan political parties and civil society –
particularly on the left – for support over the future of both Morocco and the Western Sahara.
It would be reductive to view this reconnection between Sahrawi political activists and
Moroccan civil society simply as a matter of political bargaining, however. As one activist
pointed out, these interactions during 1998 and 99 introduced Sahrawi activists to the lexicon of
human rights talk and reconfigured their own sense of political subjectivity as activists:
…the other principle thing, was greater familiarization, as some of the
terminology took root [tarsikh]: the matter of “Western Sahara,” and “forced
disappearance” and “torture” and “killing outside of legal convention”: all of that
terminology, for us, was new. It was new, and it was necessary to use it for its
efficacy. It was effective with respect to a bunch of assistance, effective because it
intensified the Sahrawi victimization. We didn’t [even] know that we were
victims. When someone pointed out that here was a group of people, they would –
imagine, when you say “You’re a victim,” [a Sahrawi activist] would say to you,
“No, I’m a militant and committed,” they’d say to you, “No, fine, you’re a
committed activist, but by law, and by these specifications [tawssifat] and the
conditions that you [get] from them, these are crimes against humanity, war
crimes, these are considered such-and-such.541
In this sense, during the late 1990s the “disappeared” began to adopt the idiom of human rights
discourse. This “familiarization,” or “conscientization” occurred through the re-connection with
Moroccan civil society at a moment when human rights discourse was on the rise.
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While Sahrawi human rights activists were familiarizing themselves with human rights
discourse and establishing “transnational” connections with human rights organizations in Rabat,
and beyond, the phenomenon of human rights remained confined to a small vanguard in the
context of the Sahara. Moreover, while the push for restorative justice resonated with former
political prisoners, rapid urbanization was transforming the demographics, built environment,
and local economy on the ground in Moroccan-occupied territory. Tremendous investment and
immigration to the territory had transformed the cities of Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara.
Entire neighborhoods – some so quickly formed, they were comprised of tents – doubled and
tripled the size of these cities. Moreover, the dispute over voter eligibility for the referendum
showed few signs of resolution after Morocco continued to contest the results of a laborious
vetting process. In this context, restorative justice did not necessarily mobilize Sahrawis
experiencing frustration with the political and socioeconomic context of the late 1990s. In 1999,
Sahrawis motivated by socioeconomic marginalization organized a large sit-in in a central plaza
of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, Sahat Dcheira (“City Place”).542 Though not explicitly concerned with
either human rights or self-determination, the very act of public protest was a landmark event
given the history of military rule in the Sahara, and Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in particular. Moreover,
the form of the 1999 protest – a sit-in – has enabled it to be retrospectively incorporated by
human rights activists into a longer history of non-violent resistance in the Sahara.543
As frustration in the territory rose with a sense of social marginalization and a constantly
deferred referendum, former political prisoners became increasingly disillusioned with the
Moroccan state-led initiative to build on human rights movements and compensate victims from
Morocco’s “years of lead.” While a number of former prisoners were offered material
542
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compensation for having been political prisoners, many saw this as the Moroccan state’s effort to
buy out their calls for justice. Indeed, according to one account, several of the most prominent
current-day Sahrawi human rights activists, including Aminatou Haidar, Ali Salim Tamek, and
Ibrahim Dehan, participated with committees involved with the process of restorative justice that
culminated in the formation of Morocco’s Truth and Reconciliation Forum (IER) in 2004.544 By
this time, the referendum had been all but abandoned. On May 7, 2005, the initial cadre of
activists educated in human rights in the late-90s formalized their association under the name
ASVDH.545 ASVDH announced its presence at a conference convened under the title “Response
to the Forum of Equity and Reconciliation: No Equity without Truth, No Reconciliation without
Comprehensive Solution.”546 The conference title referred to the state-led IER’s attempts to
compensate Sahrawi political prisoners without investigating the hundreds of disappeared
civilians during the war, on the one hand, while attempting to impose a resolution to past
injustices without addressing Sahrawi demands for self-determination, on the other. From this
point, the activists’ familiarization with human rights discourse enabled them to deploy human
rights as a tactic in the broader struggle over Western Saharan self-determination.

B. 2005-2010: Deployment
In 2005, with the collapse of negotiations between Morocco and Polisario/SADR over a peace
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settlement and the prospect of holding a referendum long diminished, Sahrawi’s living in
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara launched what became known as an intifada.547 The
uprising began among youth across the territory under Moroccan control, calling for the removal
of Moroccan security and intelligence officers from their schools.
Munadil1: 2005, there was a student movement without any relationship with the
[Polisario] Front. It was a group of peopleMunadil2: Students.
Munadil3: Students, organized through institutions [i.e., schools]. That was the
time of [cough], meaning the years of adolescence - from 2005, to be exact, or
from 2004, to we’ll say 2007. The situation was a little fluid. After the intifada of
2005, the situation moved from the institutions to – in each institution, you found
some mobilization. And in each institution, at 12 and 6 in the afternoon, there was
mobilization. Each time, the number of police increased. Because each institution
has police. The young people confronted the police after…
Host: The Moroccan state, after the creation of youth, student organizations, they
monitored them and blockaded the institutions [tehasir].
Multiple: They blockaded the institutions.
According to Zunes and Mundy, these protests spread throughout Moroccan-occupied Western
Sahara and into southern Morocco, as well as universities that host large numbers of Sahrawi
students, in Agadir, Marrakesh, Casablanca, Rabat, and Fes. The protests continued for months,
with “almost nightly clashes between Sahrawi youths and Moroccan police,” culminating in the
death in October, 2005 of protester Hamdi Mbarki, since memorialized as a nationalist martyr, at
the hands of Moroccan security officials.548
In addition to incorporating a new generation of activists into the experience of political
struggle, the protests ushered in a more public era of civil disobedience among Sahrawi’s in
547

While intifada simply means “uprising” in Arabic, since the term is so closely associated with the Palestinian
uprisings against Israeli occupation in 1987-91, and 2000-05, this appears to be one of many instances in which
Sahrawis have drawn upon both the tactics and symbolism of the Palestinian struggle. (Another example: the
Western Sahara national flag closely resembles the Palestinian national flag.)
548
Zunes and Mundy, Western Sahara, 154–56.

306

Western Sahara, making the role of human rights much more prominent within the framework of
the conflict. While human rights activists had been gathering and forming committees since the
armed conflict between Morocco and Polisario ended in the early 1990s, the focus on human
rights had been, as described above, on restorative justice. Meanwhile the center for Sahrawi
nationalist action in its visible form – military or otherwise – had until 2005 been the refugee
camps. In this sense, the intifada of 2005 represented a new phase in the role of human rights in
Western Sahara now used as a tactic, or instrument, in the broader struggle for self-determination.
Looking back on the changes since 2000, one activist noted:
Huquqi: The subject of human rights during the last 15 years, has been a pivotal
[mihwari] subject/matter in the conflict/struggle. Of course, not that each party
has been defending human rights – that has not been the goal – but [each party]
was working with it as, how do you say–
Friend: Instruments? [al-’adat]
Huquqi: ...instruments in the struggle.549
Using human rights as a tactic through public, regular protest in cities such as Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, foregrounded the fact that Morocco’s rule operated without popular consent. Additionally,
the uprising in Moroccan-occupied territory gave expression to Sahrawi nationalist sentiment
that, once displaced from the refugee camps, was less directly dependent upon Polisario and its
ties to Algerian security forces and state funding. And, finally, a decade and a half after the
ceasefire in 1991, the deployment of human rights had effectively re-instantiated conflict
between Sahrawis and Moroccans. Whereas human rights are sometimes conceptualized as an
ethical means of transcending the stasis of competing political parties, their use in the 2005
intifada demonstrates the usefulness of human rights activism for Sahrawi nationalists in
producing confrontation with the Moroccan state, thereby publicizing the friend/enemy relation
of the nationalist conflict. In other words, since 2005 human rights has become the means
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through which Sahrawis make politics visible – to themselves, to their families and compatriots
in the refugee camps, and to a transnational audience.
Certain dynamics of the confrontations produced by human rights activism warrant
particular attention. The confrontation produced by human rights activism differs from previous
iterations of conflict in two ways. The first, of course, is that the confrontation occurs between
state and subject. This asymmetry, however, was not absent from Morocco’s military invasion
and annexation in 1975-76, when hundreds of civilians were killed and “disappeared.” The
second, and perhaps more consequential, distinguishing characteristic of human rights as a
political terrain in conflict is the imperative for treating violence as an object of publicity and
transparency. Each violation, after all, is meant to be documented. As one longtime activist
observed, this differs significantly from the history of violence in the 1980s, which an older
generation, victimized by state violence, generally sought to conceal these conditions from
younger Sahrawis who did not experience them directly, or were too young to remember:
For us, during the time when forced disappearances were taking place and all of
the [other] atrocities that we lived through, once you emerge from them, we don’t
tell our children about them. And they don’t know anything about that.
“Small children who were in school, for example – our generation kept
quiet about the atrocities, we were participating positively in agreement between –
because we believed in the future of the unity of the people of a Greater Maghreb.
And this land must be a land of peace among the people where they could live
together in peace, connecting people. But now, I believe that with things this will
be difficult in the future, because the young children, now, when you ask a small
child, you find that he will talk with a kind of resentment [al-kurahiya] and hatred
[al-haqd] for Morocco and Moroccans because of what he’s seen in the streets
and what is done to the children, women and men – but to the women, in
particular.550
The rise of human rights activism in Moroccan-occupied Sahara has reflected its utility as a
550
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tactic, or instrument, in drawing attention to the Moroccan state’s illegitimacy in the Sahara. As
one activist put it, the shift with the 2005 intifada allowed activists to “transition from a position
of defense to a position of attack in terms of human rights.”551 However, the public,
asymmetrical, and gendered dimensions of the violence produced by human rights activism in
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara have particular ramifications. Embedded in a context of
political conflict, human rights as a political terrain in Western Sahara has amplified the moral
repugnance between Sahrawis and Moroccans to a level that concerns even some of the activists
at the center of this struggle. Jennifer Curtis noted that, in functioning as “war by other means,”
rights discourse can “contribute not just to present divisions but to the broader contradictions that
both human rights law and discourse create regarding past and future violence.”552 Although
Western Sahara differs from the context of Northern Ireland in certain key respects, Curtis’s
main insight still applies: when functioning as an instrument of confrontation in political
struggle, human rights activism has the capacity to elicit and exacerbate potential violence in the
future.

C. 2010-Present: Proliferation
As efforts to publicize Moroccan detention and abuse of Sahrawi political prisoners grew,
the role of the videographer in capturing the physical abuse of protesters became all the more
important and small groups of mostly young men with names such as Intifada May Network, or
Equipe Media, became increasingly pivotal figures in the terrain of political conflict. As
mentioned in Chapter 1, the son in Batimat related a litany of arrests and confrontations with
police that occurred while filming protests, usually from a nearby rooftop or window. This
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access comes with great danger, however, and the focal role of publicity in making human rights
violations “count” in the conflict became most apparent following the breakup in 2010 of
Sahrawi protest encampments in an area outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún known as Agdim Izik.
After months of protest, Moroccan security forces laid siege to the tent encampment, estimated
to include 6000 tents and upwards of 10,000 Sahrawis.553 During the siege, carried out the
morning of 8 November 2010, eleven members of Moroccan security forces, as well as two
civilians, were killed. In rounding up suspects to bring to trial over these deaths, Morocco
targeted militants involved in media teams, rather than seeking the perpetrators. The accused
were tried in military court using confessions that observers claimed were extracted through
torture, and the group of 25 were given sentences ranging from 20 years to life imprisonment.
Although this verdict was overturned on appeal in 2016 (trial by military court having become
illegal in the intervening years with the ratification of a new constitution), in July 2017 the Rabat
Court of Appeals convicted 23 activists to sentences ranging from two years to life
imprisonment.554
The increasingly important and visible role of human rights in the conflict over Western
Sahara over the last decade can be seen in the proliferation of huquqiyyin, or human rights
activists, and the discourse around them. Since the intifada of 2005, longtime activists who had
been operating largely underground have been able to form organizations, the most prominent
being the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA), and the Sahrawi
Association of Victims of Grave Human Rights Violations (ASVDH). Operating in Moroccan553
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occupied Western Sahara, these organizations have managed to connect with international
organizations such as the UN High Commission for Human Rights and members of European
Parliament, even as Morocco refused to recognize them as human rights organizations.555 In
forging these connections, which provide important leverage in piercing the media blackout that
Morocco had managed to maintain through decades of military occupation, these activists have
increasingly fashioned themselves as human rights activists, or huquqiyyin. When the Moroccan
authorities refused re-entry to the activist Aminatou Haidar at the airport in Laâyoune/El Aaiún
in 2009, ostensibly because she refused to declare her nationality as Moroccan, her subsequent
hunger strike drew international media attention, elevating her profile as a human rights activist,
and of human rights activism among Sahrawis more generally.556 But with international
connections and a higher profile for human rights, the surveillance of huquqiyyin in Moroccanoccupied territory has intensified.
With this emerging influence, human rights activists and Polisario’s diplomatic corps
have devoted substantial efforts since 2011 to broadening the mandate of the UN mission in
Western Sahara, MINURSO, to include human rights oversight.557 Each April, as MINURSO’s
mandate has come up for renewal before the UN Security Council, protests and repression
intensify in the Occupied Territory and the focus on human rights reach a fever pitch. In 2013,
this campaign succeeded in gaining the backing of the US Department of State, which
recommended to the Security Council the expansion of MINURSO’s mandate to include human
rights oversight, only to withdraw the recommendation when a diplomatic crisis with Morocco
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ensued. In 2014 and 2015, while I was conducting field research, tremendous hope among
Sahrawi nationalists in Moroccan-occupied territory was placed in breaking through with what
almost was achieved in 2013, but to no avail. Given these failures, the burgeoning role of human
rights issues in the Morocco-Western Sahara conflict may be reaching its apogee, as the failure
of recent campaigns have taken their toll. In the Spring of 2014, there was a genuine sense that
the Security Council could cause real change. Following failed campaigns in both 2014 and 2015,
the rhetoric coming from Sahrawi nationalists has increasingly deplored UN inactivity and called
for the expulsion of MINURSO peacekeepers from the refugee camps.558 In 2016, in an
unprecedented move in the conflict’s history, Morocco expelled MINURSO peacekeepers from
Laâyoune/El Aaiún in response to then Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s use of the term
“occupation” in reference to Western Sahara during a recent trip to the refugee camps, and have
been pre-emptively cracking down in the occupied territories.559 Whether this means that human
rights have reached certain limits as a useful instrument in the nationalist conflict, or will take on
new forms in the shifting terrain of political struggle, remains to be seen.
***
From the intifada of 2005 to the international event involving Aminatou Haidar in 2009
through to the ongoing attempts to lobby the UN Security Council to append human rights
oversight to the UN peacekeeping mission, human rights and civil disobedience have been
mobilized as key strategies for drawing international attention to the abuses of political rights
taking place in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, as well as for the broader political aim of
achieving self-determination and establishing an independent Sahrawi nation-state. With their
proliferation in the last decade, however, both parties to the conflict have used the discourse to,
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in the words of one activist, move “from a position of defense to a position of attack.” This, in
turn, has blurred certain distinctions regarding human rights activism, and heightened certain
features of the practice in the context of Western Sahara. I will explore these ambiguities and
specificities through an ethnography of the huquqi across several contexts of the disaggregated
geography of conflict. Having started in New York, we now move to Marrakesh, followed by the
Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria, before returning, at last, to Laâyoune/El Aaiún.

Section II – Marrakesh, Morocco. 2014 World Human Rights Forum
On Saturday evening, at the conclusion of a musical concert by a Lebanese quartet, two friends
and I stand on the steps outside of the downtown Marrakesh theater La Colisée, amidst a crowd
bubbling with positive energy and excitement. The concert marked the end of the international
day of solidarity with Palestine, itself the culmination of the four-day long World Human Rights
Forum, a sprawling event hosted in Marrakesh that convened hundreds of panels and brought
together thousands of delegates representing human rights organizations from around the world.
As we stood on the steps, a group of young people, sporting kefiyas and still inspired by the
concert, broke out in song, waving Palestinian flags and jumping in unison with their arms
wrapped around each other. Passing cars honked from the boulevard below, galvanizing the
singers to continue with even greater verve and excitement. The effervescent expressions of
transnational solidarity in the name of human rights and social justice seemed both boundless
and, in garnering attention from the passing nightlife in Marrakesh’s cultural district, glamorous,
at one and the same time.
***
The celebration in support of Palestinian rights that evening in Marrakesh would seem to
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capture something essential about the spirit of transnational solidarity that animates and
characterizes human rights as a moral and political project, more generally, and that justifies a
gathering on the scale of the World Human Rights Forum, which reportedly involved over 5000
participants from 94 countries, more particularly.560 And yet, preoccupied as I was with making
sense of Moroccan-occupied Sahara, I couldn’t help but think about how the event had gone off
as planned with effectively no mention of the human rights situation in Western Sahara. Despite
the fact that Marrakesh is less than 1000km from the northern border with the territory (referred
to in Morocco as the “Southern Provinces,” or, for Sahrawis traveling in Morocco, “the
region”),561 the four-day event had taken place without – as far as I knew – any public protest
drawing attention to Western Sahara, nor any panels devoted to the subject.562 This was not
necessarily a surprise, as a number of the most high-profile Sahrawi human rights organizations,
including CODESA, ASVDH, CPSRON, the Forum for the Future of Sahrawi Women, and a
group known as the Gdim Izik Families of Political Prisoners, had announced a decision to
boycott the event weeks before the World Human Rights Forum began. The boycott extended
beyond Sahrawi organizations, and took place amidst an increasingly hostile environment for
Moroccan human rights organizations, in general.563 However, given the parallels between the
situation in Western Sahara and the Palestinian cause, including everything from the claim to
national self-determination to the national flags that closely resemble one another, the marked
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contrast in visibility was particularly striking. On the steps of the concert hall that evening,
instead of imparting inspiration, the song and dance of human rights left me bewildered.
This bewilderment stemmed not just from that evening’s events, but from my full
experience of the Forum. It should come as no surprise that the Moroccan state would not allow
discussion of an issue that it considers a threat to national sovereignty. Likewise, Sahrawi human
rights groups supporting the right to self-determination recognized that participation in the
Forum would only burnish Morocco’s image as a regime that respects human rights, and so
boycotted the event. And yet, like so many of the dynamics of the politics of the Sahara in
Morocco, what was happening on the ground at the Forum was at once more confusing and more
disturbing than the newsworthy developments of boycott and exclusion. As I found out,
Sahrawis were not so much barred from the World Forum as they were selectively invited,
coopted, rewarded or manipulated into attending. And their responses ranged from active
participation to wary acceptance to completely ignoring the event. It was, in short, a microcosm
of everyday life in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, where the discourse of human rights
proliferates and sometimes almost everyone, it seems, claims to be a huquqi, or human rights
activist.
Almost from the moment I arrived in Marrakesh for the World Forum on Human Rights,
I started running into friends and acquaintances from “the region.” Not every encounter came as
a surprise: students whom I’d met at the Sahrawi Studies graduate program at Mohamed V
University in Rabat, for example, staffed a booth representing their program. But, soon after
visiting this booth, I encountered a Mauritanian English teacher, who was one of the first people
I had met during my preliminary research trips to Laâyoune/El Aaiún. This man had been
exceptionally gracious in accommodating me during times when I knew very few people in the
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city, inviting me to his apartment for meals and out for coffee with his friends. For that reason, I
thought that I knew him fairly well, and yet, he had never expressed any involvement with
human rights organizations of any kind. If anything, he displayed a strong aversion to anything
that might be construed as political, since his wife had lost a family member during the
Morocco-Mauritania-Polisario phase of the war in the 1970s. Of course, it was entirely possible
that he could have been a member of a human rights organization – although, if this were the
case, I would assume that he would be involved with a state-associated group working in a less
politicized realm. If that were the case, then perhaps he was here to attend panels and network
with people from similar organizations, I thought. I was even more surprised, then, when he told
me that he had just presented a talk with the title “Social Change for a Society Living in the
Shadow of Human Rights.” On what authority, I wondered, was this man presenting on human
rights at an international forum?
I was curious and confused but, before I could ask him questions, we encountered an
acquaintance to whom the English teacher friend had introduced me years earlier at a café in
Laâyoune/El Aaiún. If it seemed unlikely for my English teacher friend to be presenting on
human rights at an international conference, this acquaintance’s presence at the World Forum
seemed even more far-fetched. On the occasion when we first met, this acquaintance told me that
he was a businessman involved in commerce in Dakar. How did English teachers and
businessmen in Laâyoune/El Aaiún somehow become human rights activists in Marrakesh? I
didn’t get to talk to either one of these two to learn more about their involvement in the Forum,
but the presence of Sahrawis in Marrakesh began to emerge like mirror images in a
kaleidoscope: they were the same, in appearance, as the people I knew in Western Sahara, but
here in Marrakesh, on the other side of the border, they inexplicably occupied new subject
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positions.564
I soon learned that the Moroccan state had transported a contingent of people from the
Sahara to attend the World Forum in Marrakesh. Flown free of charge, this Sahrawi contingent
was housed on a property owned by one of Morocco’s public unions.565 Compact and private, the
property included a hotel, bungalows and outdoor swimming pool – the landscape and setting of
a Moroccan middle class summer vacation spot. Vacant and largely unstaffed in the wintry offseason, the slightly worn property, combined with the cold, rainy weather, made the arrangement
feel like an impromptu occupation. For a few nights of the World Forum, I stayed in a bungalow
on this property with two friends, and each evening seemed to reveal new insights – and
confusions – into who was attending this event, and why. Yet, like most of the dynamics
involving politics of the Sahara in Morocco, it was difficult not to sense the Moroccan state
operating the kaleidoscope and bending the will of its subjects to meet the interests of state
security and intelligence.
One evening over dinner in the hotel dining room, I met women and men representing
different sectors of civil society groups from Laâyoune/El Aaiún, working with or on behalf of
people with disabilities, immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, and so on. For representatives of
these civil society groups, the World Forum appeared to be a genuinely unique occasion to
connect with and learn about discussions and best practices taking place among colleagues
working in similar fields elsewhere in the world. The disorienting experience of unexpectedly
564
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encountering people I had previously met in Laâyoune/El Aaiún would recur, however, after
dinner when people gathered in the hotel’s ground floor. After encountering multiple
acquaintances of my Mauritanian English teacher friend during these leisurely evenings, I began
to discern a cohort of participants distinct from the members of civil society described above.
The cohort of friends connected to my English teacher friend did not appear to have any
organizational affiliation and were attending, I suspected, as a favor for some service rendered to
the state intelligence services. For this group, the “politics” of attending the World Forum on
Human Rights was no different from any other trade conference, where people are rewarded for
their work with an all-expenses-paid trip to a nice place – on this occasion, cold, rainy
Marrakesh.
I eventually learned that there remained yet another group of “attendees,” distinct from
the first two. One evening during the Forum, my friends and I visited a group in a neighboring
bungalow to where we were staying on the property. As soon as we walked in, the ambiance felt
a world apart from the rest of the hotel and conference. A group of several young men and
women had gathered in a bedroom of the bungalow and were drinking tea. Like so many
gatherings I’d been to during the course of fieldwork in the Sahara, the cycle of boiling, steeping,
pouring, sweetening, re-pouring, percolating, distributing, cleaning and re-starting pots of tea
was the focal point of the room. There, on the floor and with the aid of an electric kettle and the
ubiquitous accouterments of metal serving containers arranged on a metal tray, yet another round
of tea was brewing. Those gathered had wrapped themselves in thick comforters to ward off the
penetrating damp cold from the unrelenting rain, warmed as well by the uniquely pungent steam
of Chinese tea fortified with sugar.566 Conversation and energy ebbed and flowed, pulling
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conversation deeper into the night with each new round of tea.567 While I have no record and
little recollection of what we talked about that evening, I do recall that the World Human Rights
Forum never came up. No one mentioned their interest, much less their involvement in the
conference, in any way. Rather, the ambiance was reminiscent of countless gatherings I’d
experienced with Sahrawis in a variety of locations: with ‘a’idin on a beachfront in Nouadhibou,
Mauritania, with Sahrawi university students in their apartment in Agadir, with refugees in the
camps in Algeria, and in numerous settings on the floors of sparsely furnished, carpeted rooms in
homes throughout the peripheral urban neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Although
everyone in the room of this bungalow had been flown in to Marrakesh for the occasion, and
were housed with the rest of us on the campus of the retreat facility, the World Human Rights
Forum was of little to no interest, and so, symbolically, the space was transformed into a
gathering typical of any other across northern Mauritania, southwest Algeria, southern Morocco,
or the Moroccan-occupied territory. Indeed, it was as if we were back in Smara, or Laâyoune/El
Aaiún, where these folks were from. As I later learned, many of the younger functionaries whose
trip was paid for, spent their time in Marrakesh visiting friends at university, shopping in the
medina, clubbing in the fashionable quarter of Gueliz – or, as I learned that evening, simply
staying in their bungalow, ignoring and unseeing the broader political context in which they were
embedded.568
***
On the last day of the World Human Rights Forum, on the afternoon before the Lebanese
music performance, I sat with a few other men in a gravel-strewn space outside the massive tents
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set up for the event. The passing stream of people leaving the tents from one of the last panel
sessions of the Forum gradually thinned as we took advantage of one of the first clear afternoons
in what felt like weeks to brave the chill and reflect on the experience. Appropriate to the World
Forum’s transnational reach, conversation began by lamenting the lack of representatives from
Syria, Iraq and Libya – all in the throes of civil war and proxies to regional and international
conflicts, in some form or another. Eventually, the violent conflict gripping many other Arab
countries led to some reflection on and appreciation for the UN-brokered framework that has
structured the Morocco-Sahrawi conflict since a ceasefire between Morocco and Polisario in
1991. In contrast to my encounters with younger media activists in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, no one in
this group, comprised of middle aged, professionally accomplished Sahrawi men working in
different parts of Morocco, was pining for a return to armed conflict.
Having established a general appreciation for this peace-in-conflict, one man articulated a
new problem produced by this state of perpetual irresolution.569 Having worked at a fairly high
level in the central administration of the Moroccan government, in Rabat, he described a
particularly demoralizing experience. During 2011, a time when the revolutionary horizon of the
Arab Spring was galvanizing protest throughout the region – including the 20 February student
movement in Morocco – King Mohammed VI ordered the drafting of a revised constitution to
put before the people of Morocco for ratification. This man was a functionary in government
during this time and, in the office one day, a French-language Moroccan newspaper was lying
around with the headline “Si les Marocains disent non?” (“If Moroccans Say ‘No’?”). Upon
seeing this headline, his boss looked at him and said, “You will be the ones to say ‘No.’” By
“you,” his supervisor meant Sahrawis in general whom many Moroccans regard as lazy,
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ungrateful and – worse yet – disloyal, for not responding appropriately to the largesse spent by
the Moroccan state to “improve” their standard of living. As a government functionary working
on major state initiatives, this man regarded his boss’s statement as both an accusation and an
assumption. Beyond simple stereotype or mere slight, this man understood that no matter how
much loyalty one expresses, as a Sahrawi in a context of ongoing nationalist conflict, one’s
essence as a political subject remains in doubt. As a Sahrawi in Moroccan society, one is, he
said, “A traitor until the reverse can be proven.”570
This story clearly touched a nerve with the rest of the group, and as we drove to drop the
storyteller off at the train station for him to return to Rabat, a cascading series of stories revealed
that almost everyone in this party had been approached, at some point, to serve in some agency
of the Moroccan intelligence services. The man who had worked in government (not directly
related to security, as far as I knew), told a story before we dropped him off about how, while in
college, he was approached to by a member of the DST571 to provide information about proPolisario classmates. The story made everyone in the car laugh, because this man not only
refused the offer, he later pointed out the operative who recruited him in an effort to shame him
before friends. But the laughter came also from the unhappy awareness that everyone shared a
similar experience. For Sahrawis who grew up in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, this rite
of passage usually took place once they reach university campuses in Marrakesh, Safi, Agadir, or
elsewhere in Morocco proper, which are known as environments of intense student politicization.
As one man put it, this leaves Sahrawis with a certain level of education always in a “double
bind:”572 either keep one’s head down and try to avoid involvement with any activity that could
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be construed as “political,” and still face suspicion and coercion of disloyalty by both sides in the
conflict; or, capitulate and cooperate with the Moroccan security state.
***
As the World Human Rights Forum was winding down, these stories confirmed that, in order to
become a certain type of human rights activist in Morocco – the kind that gets invited to speak in
Marrakesh for example or, more significantly, before the United Nations Human Rights Council
in Geneva, a Sahrawi first had to prove their loyalty, and worth, to the state security and
intelligence services. These guys then named several individuals whom we had seen at the World
Human Rights Forum as examples – an undistinguished classmate at university who, somehow, a
year later, appeared on video speaking as a representative of Morocco at a conference in Geneva.
The stakes, then, were clear: to become a huquqi, as human rights activists were known, required
first a willingness to serve the interests of Moroccan sovereignty. For me, after four days of
confusion, this was finally clarifying: the proliferation of human rights – as a practice of nonviolent protest, as a means of publicizing Sahrawi resistance and Moroccan oppression, and as a
subject position in the terrain of political conflict – was structured by the terms of loyalty and
betrayal that permeate everyday life in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara. And, as we will see,
Sahrawi activists who are for self-determination also struggle against a rising cynicism that to be
a huquqi – whether Sahrawi nationalist, or not – entails “selling oneself” to one side or the other.
For the men in the car, however, I sensed that sharing these stories was, like so much else
concerning everyday life at the locus of Morocco-Sahrawi conflict, a matter of carving out a
space of dignity, relief and privacy in a context of pervasive suspicion, surveillance, and political
polarization.
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Section III: Human rights activism in Sahrawi refugee camps, Algeria: gendered publicity
If my experience at the 2014 World Human Rights Forum in Marrakesh suggests that
human rights practice in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara is invariably subsumed by the
structures of Morocco-Sahrawi nationalist conflict, this does not in any way preclude
transnational networks and publicity from shaping human rights practice in the region. The
human rights activism that I encountered in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria involved
elements of the human rights discourse described in New York and Marrakesh: publicity, and the
ways in which human rights reinforce a project of sovereignty. Although Polisario/SADR has
recently established a national human rights council with the mandate to monitor human rights in
the camps, interest in human rights in the refugee camps remains overwhelmingly focused on the
human rights violations against Sahrawi nationalists that take place in Moroccan-occupied
Western Sahara.573 Polisario/SADR’s Ministry for the Occupied Territories and Ministry of
Information coordinate with media activists in Moroccan-occupied territory to record protests,
devoting significant time on its daily SADR tv and radio broadcasts to disseminating news of
these reports.574 Publicizing human rights violations through satellite and radio media aims to
constitute and maintain transnational “witnessing” publics not only in places like New York, but
among refugees in the camps in Algeria. As described in the opening scene to Chapter 1 of this
dissertation, Sahrawi nationalists in Moroccan-occupied territory even rely upon SADR tv
broadcasts, via satellite, for news of protests that may have taken place in an adjacent
573
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neighborhood to their own in Laâyoune/El Aaiún.
In this way, certain forms of human rights activism are encouraged by Polisario/SADR in
order to promote the cause of national sovereignty. Polisario/SADR has, since its founding,
promoted – required, even – the active participation of women in the governance of the camps.
This governing practice has foregrounded an idealized “Sahrawi woman” whose role was
foundational to the formation and survival of the camps during the 1970s and 80s, and who
remains authorized to speak for an international audience.575 With the rise of human rights, and
the camps’ increasing reliance upon humanitarian aid from the West (and Spain, in particular),
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh notes the added dimension of international audience in eliciting the
discourse of a female Sahrawi “ideal refugee.”576 In other words, the particular political
rationality in the camps of humanitarianism, national sovereignty and international recognition
intersects with human rights discourse to produce a gendered citizen-activist, in certain contexts,
and a gendered victim of human rights violations, in others. In the rest of this section, I will
explore how human rights amplify certain dynamics of gender and publicity through, in
borrowing from Laura Bier, its intersection with what I am calling Polisario/SADR’s “state
feminism.”577
***
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One afternoon during my brief stay conducting research in the Sahrawi refugee camps,578
I was walking with an employee of SADR’s Ministry of Information through El Aaiún579 refugee
camp in order to meet a man who had taken part in the 1950s Moroccan Liberation Army in the
Sahara. Walking among the modest, mud brick homes and tents of the camp, we greeted an older
woman in passing. Before continuing on her way, the woman launched into a speech about how
she and other women of her generation had built the camps with their own hands and run them
throughout the 1970s and 80s. In the Sahrawi refugee camps as well as among Sahrawis living in
northern Mauritania, I regularly encountered women from the generation that had fled Morocco
in the 1970s who regaled me with this same narrative of the pivotal role that they played in
running the refugee camps while the men were at war. The similarities from one telling to the
next were apparent: I heard women recount how they built and ran the camps themselves,
constructing mud-brick houses, organizing medical care for the wounded, educating children,
and making military uniforms. In multiple instances, the exact phrase, that this prodigious effort
was undertaken “with one baby strapped [to the back], and another in the belly,” was repeated
verbatim.580
I took the repetition of this narrative to reflect the tremendous sense of pride, both
individually and collectively, that women of this generation maintain in having participated in
the collective epic of Sahrawi national struggle and exile, and the sense of solidarity fostered
from such hardship and sacrifice.581 The consistency of these statements indicated to me that
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members of a certain generation of women were authorized to speak of this experience as
representatives of the nationalist project, and that, with time, the narrative has become embedded
in popular Sahrawi national discourse. Through the construction of a courageous, strong woman
whose active participation in the revolution differentiated the “Sahrawi woman” from both the
recent colonial past and women in other Arab societies, the groundwork for this authorization
began at the level of Polisario official discourse dating back to the 1970s. As Joanna Allan has
noted in her archival research, this construction of women has served the revolutionary project in
multiple ways:
It reinforces and links to the POLISARIO’s leftist and socialist ideology, it works
with constructs of masculinity to recruit young men to the army and encourage a
strong defensive nationalism as well as promoting the active, powerful role of
women in order to ensure the effective organization and running of the nation in
exile, it differentiates Saharawi society from the usual Western conception of
Muslim, Arabic societies and it distinguishes the Sahara from Morocco.582
Complementing Allan’s insights, Alice Wilson’s ethnography set in the refugee camps confirms
that this revolutionary “Sahrawi woman” was the subject of both official discourse, and
structures of governance, in the form of active participation in the popular committees that ran
the camps during the war. In a telling account, Wilson notes that women were so heavily
involved in refugee camp committee work during the “revolutionary period” before 1988 that
two committees operating in the same district were effectively unable to meet at the same time,
as practically all of the women in a given camp were involved in both committees.583 In this way,
the mass participation of women in administrative and political governance of the refugee camps
reflects the centrality of “state feminism” to the project of sovereignty under Polisario/SADR.
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The terms of this “state feminism” have changed, however, with the increased role of human
rights in the political conflict.
What was particularly striking about the way in which this woman presented her story in
the El Aaiún camp that morning was its performative aspect. She initiated the story, unprompted
and at full volume, in the middle of the neighborhood following what was otherwise a passing
interaction. I could not help but be aware that my presence made the encounter propitious for this
particular kind of gendered political discourse, and an international audience, even of one, could
be the catalyst for this genre of impromptu speech. Nicola Cozza has shown that the Sahrawi
refugee camps have long constituted a technology of power that relies upon humanitarian
resources, mediated by state-like institutions, to produce a political rationality of nationalism.584
Since foreign aid workers, volunteers, Spanish solidarios, and other visiting delegations are
regularly cycling through the camps, this international presence is not an incidental or occasional
part of the camps’ public sphere, but a constitutive element, much the way that international
legal recognition is not only an aspiration for the people and institutions of the refugee camps,
but a constitutive element of the camps’ existence.585 Next, I move on to discuss how Elena
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s concept of the “ideal refugee” helps to grasp the degree to which the politics
of human rights and international publicity figure into everyday “state feminism” in the Sahrawi
refugee camps.
***
When not among residents of the refugee camps conducting interviews, I passed time
during my stay in the camps in the administrative center, known as Rabouni, (where SADR
governmental ministries, the Sahrawi Red Crescent, and NGOs such as the World Food Program,
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among others, are all located). Most of my time in Rabouni was spent waiting at the Association
of Families of Sahrawi Prisoners and Disappeared (AFAPREDESA) a Sahrawi NGO that
monitors Sahrawi political prisoners in Morocco, and records the number of disappeared people
who remain unaccounted for since the beginning of Morocco’s invasion and occupation. I
usually passed the time during these intervals with AFAPREDESA’s staff – predominantly
single men, known as multahiqin, (from al-iltihaq, meaning “enrollment,” or “joining”) who had
fled the repressive political climate in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and “joined” their
compatriots in the refugee camps. These men welcomed me cheerfully with conversation and tea
whenever my presence around AFAPREDESA’s office coincided with their downtime.
One morning, as I was hanging around AFAPREDESA’s office, a group of eight or ten
university students from Spain were in a nearby conference room, watching video clips of
Moroccan police attacks on Sahrawis in Moroccan-occupied territory. I recognized some of the
clips from having watched SADR tv via satellite when I was in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. The
montage depicted a familiar pattern of police violence in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara,
not unlike what Madeleine Bair showed the audience at Hunter College in New York City a year
later: plainclothes police and security people hitting, kicking and dragging women in the street;
police kicking at a house door; police in riot gear swarming a group of protesters and pushing a
woman around until her melhafa586 became unraveled. At one point in the presentation, when a
video clip appeared to depict a particularly brutal hit, a student in the group audibly gasped.
Because the student group was multinational, their Spanish-Sahrawi guide was narrating
in Spanish as the montage played, while a European woman dressed in melhafa provided
translation in English: “[The Moroccan police] are in plainclothes so that it is not reported that
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the military is hitting people, which would warrant MINURSO’s587 intervention - which doesn’t
happen anyway.” At one point a female student raised a question about the victims in the series
of video clips: “Why are they all women?” The narrator responded with a cultural generalization:
Sahrawi women feel particularly out of place in Moroccan society, he said, because of “their
openness and tolerance,” and so are more likely to protest. This cultural difference, he explained,
translates to the political realm of international support for Sahrawi nationalism: “[Sahrawi]
society is naturally open and democratic, and for this reason they don’t get very much support
from Arab countries." One of the female students asked for clarification on this last point, to
which the narrator responded: “These [Arab] countries, which are hierarchical and have different
roles for women, they do not want to see an open, democratic country like this succeed. 95% of
the aid [for the refugee camps] comes from Western countries. Of the eighty-five countries that
have recognized Western Sahara at any given time, only four (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and
Syria) have been Arab.”588
The heavy-handedness of this presentation seemed to elicit some skepticism even among
a student group still learning about the conflict. As Joanna Allan’s research shows, however, this
is a gendered discourse of Polisario/SADR’s that dates back to its founding in the 1970s. I
present it here to demonstrate that this “state feminism” intersects with the humanitarian
imperative to amplify the cultural difference, and victimization, of Sahrawi women, for the
purpose of documenting human rights violations in an attempt to elicit empathy from a
transnational witnessing public. The significance of an international audience adds another
dimension to this figure of the gendered Sahrawi citizen-activist. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh
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suggests that an international audience increasingly shapes the formation of this idealized,
Sahrawi gendered subject:
Fundamentally, the idealized Sahrawi women…are re/created for the audience as
'free' specifically through distancing them from (specific understandings of)
Muslim identities and practices. Beyond asserting the 'uniqueness' of Sahrawi
women through comparing them with Other Arab women (and at times with
Western women), the association that is thus strategically re/created is a
synecdochic relationship between the liberal, 'free' and 'secular' nature of Sahrawi
women and the liberal and 'secular' nature of the Sahrawi 'nation.’589
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh’s attention to the role of international audience implied by the promotion of a
particular “women’s role” in the Sahrawi national project, past and present, foregrounds the
mutual imbrication of the camps with international politics of humanitarian recognition.
***
In the Polisario/SADR-run refugee camps in southwest Algeria, human rights discourse is
driven by the imperative to publicize violations in Moroccan-occupied territory, both to the
international community, and to the citizen-refugees of the camps. As argued in Chapter 4, a
humanitarian discourse has been constitutive of Sahrawi nationalism since the establishment of
refugee camps in Algeria in 1975. This distinguishes Sahrawi nationalism from the anticolonial
nationalisms that emerged in the immediate post-World War II moment, which themselves were
distinct from the racialized, imperial nationhoods (Germany, France, Japan, United States) that
manifested themselves throughout the 19th century. As Manu Goswami notes in historicizing the
modularity of the nation form, each shift indicates that for emergent nationalisms at different
historical conjunctures “their temporal simultaneity, structural similarities, and competitive logic
was conditioned by their location within a single, increasingly interdependent, hierarchically
organized global space-time.”590 I assert that the logic of Sahrawi nationalism has been
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conditioned by its disjunctive location amidst the shift in “global space-time” between
anticolonial nationalism ascendant in the late-1960s, and the global ethics of humanitarianism
that emerged in the second half of the 1970s. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
emergence of Sahrawi nationalism in the late 1960s, and its “translation” into a state-in-exile
based in refugee camps following Morocco’s 1975 invasion, coincided with this shift.
As Fiddian-Qasmiyeh notes, this “ideal refugee” is emblematic of the Sahrawi national
project’s “politics of survival”591 given its increasing reliance upon humanitarian – and,
particularly, Spanish – aid. However, the rise of human rights as a terrain of struggle in the
Morocco-Sahrawi conflict has displaced the locus of this struggle from the camps to the
Moroccan-occupied territory.592 AFAPREDESA’s presentation to Spanish university students
visiting the Sahrawi refugee camps suggests that Polisario/SADR’s “state feminism,” which
emphasizes a politically active, culturally distinct Sahrawi woman, remains alive and well.
Where a previous generation demonstrated their courage by building, managing and provisioning
the refugee camps “with one baby strapped [to the back], and another in the belly,” today’s
“Sahrawi woman” is not in the camps but in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, and
demonstrates her commitment to nationalism by getting bloodied – or worse593 – by a Moroccan
security agent’s baton or steel-toed boot. In this way, the gendered victim of human rights
violations has in some ways displaced the gendered refugee as the “ideal” subject of Sahrawi
humanitarian nationalism. Both figures, however, foreground the importance of transnational
audience and publicity in shaping the gendered politics of human rights and humanitarianism in
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Western Sahara.

Section IV: Huquqiyyin in Laâyoune/El Aaiún
When I arrived in Laâyoune/El Aaiún in March 2014, protests were occurring within
view of my apartment window on Tan Tan Avenue on a regular basis. With the run-up to the
United Nations Security Council meeting to renew MINURSO’s mandate that April, most
afternoons a demonstration or confrontation of some kind took place. Occasionally, something
would transpire at night, taking the form of either rock throwing with the police, or a brief,
raucous rally of vehicles roaring up and down the avenue and waving the Sahrawi national flag.
Daytime protests, on the other hand, tended to unfold following a familiar pattern: kids walking
home from school for lunch gathered on a side street and, accompanied by some of their mothers
or other female relatives, began cheering and whistling. The women might ululate; the children,
usually middle school age or younger, might chant “La badil, la badil,” the slogan for the
Sahrawi independence movement.594 They do this to gather attention and prepare for the
culminating gesture: raising a Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic flag in the middle of the busy
avenue. The display is usually brief, however, because everyone knows that the police are
coming: if the protest is small, the kids will scatter after a few rocks are thrown. If a protest
attracts further attention, the confrontation might play out a while longer. In these instances, the
protesters toss trash barrels and chunks of concrete into the street to block both lanes of the
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avenue, and light scattered trash on fire for the same purpose.595 When the protest reaches this
level, Tan Tan Avenue, which serves as a central corridor connecting several popular
neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, comes to a halt. Shops up and down the street shutter their
metal doors until the confrontation has passed. Helmeted policemen, baton-wielding soldiers and
a handful of plainclothes men – members of Moroccan intelligence services such as the DST or
the Direction Générale d’Etudes et de Documentation (DGED)596 – emerge from the police vans,
rocks in hand, and return fire. In one instance, I saw police and soldiers turn on a group of young
men passing by, and arrest them.597
After the climax of the UNSC decision regarding MINURSO and human rights oversight
in Western Sahara, these protests became less frequent, and so, too, did my direct encounter with
the kinds of activism that I had been repeatedly warned – by friends and acquaintances – to
avoid. Although as time went on the frequency of protests on Tan Tan Avenue decreased, the
pervasiveness of human rights discourse never dissipated. Whether this involved the events,
people or places that I was told to avoid, or news of an arrest, protest, or, less directly, a
contingent of foreigners expelled from the territory, talk pertaining to human rights and the
activities of huquqiyyin – whether at the level of street protest of transnational connection – was
ubiquitous. Though spontaneous confrontations often broke out in various quarters of
Laâyoune/El Aaiún, the most regular street protests during my fieldwork took place on the 15th
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of every month. Organized by the Collective of Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA),
the Agdim Izik Coordination Committee, ASVDH, and other high-profile Sahrawi human rights
groups, this protest took place at Sahat al-Zemla, the site of the famous 1970 intifada that is
considered the birthplace of Sahrawi nationalism. Although I received word of these protests via
local online news sites and, occasionally, by word of mouth, I never witnessed them firsthand.
As I recounted in Chapter 1, the one time I walked toward Sahat al-Zemla on the 15th at the
appointed time, I found myself confronted by two security officers who appeared seemingly out
of nowhere, interrogated me, and then quickly ushered me away from the protest and into a
supermarket. I never witnessed the protest myself. As a result, I had to settle for second-hand
accounts, usually through the news.598 One activist I met who was regularly taking part in the
mid-month protests told me that the tactic evolved through training sessions in non-violent
resistance that had been hosted by Sahrawi human rights organizations, at which European
human rights lawyers presented. He also compared participation in the monthly protests on the
15th to the cathartic experience of playing in a soccer match: he would get a bit nervous in
advance, excited in the moment, and felt sore afterward from the physical beating, but also
cleansed by the experience.599
The pervasiveness of human rights discourse and its ethnographic inaccessibility meant
that, like the Moroccan security state, I only experienced this political terrain in mediated,
refracted, oblique form. One encounter with this discourse came in the form of the “taxi speech.”
Because a cabdriver’s views in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, as elsewhere, ran the gamut of political
persuasions, periodically I would hop into a cab and be greeted with something like “bienvenido
à Sahara occidental.” The choice of language (Spanish) indexed the driver’s affiliation with the
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nationalist cause, while the sovereign name staked a claim to independence (Western Sahara).
On one particularly memorable occasion, the driver launched into his background, which
included a year in prison following his involvement in the 2005 intifada. He continued to provide
a description of the activist group that he had been involved with, expressed his view on the
importance of receiving support from international NGO’s, primarily in Europe, and stressed the
need for more human rights monitoring in Morocco. The speech continued uninterrupted until
just before dropping me off, when he said, “this is the Sahara, not Morocco.” Moments like these
contributed to my sense, articulated in Chapter 1, of a city comprised of competing, if
overlapping, spaces of sovereignty. Though the taxis appeared uniform from the outside, once
inside the car, I could be in either of these sovereign spaces depending upon the driver’s political
persuasions. If I encountered a neutral driver, or a Moroccan-friendly one, I was in the “Southern
Provinces,” or “Moroccan Sahara.” Anyone discussing the importance of human rights, such as
the driver described above, meant that I was in the Sahara, i.e. Western Sahara – and for a short
ride I would fully be in occupied territory. In this way, the project of human rights discourse in
Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara carves out spaces – in taxi cabs, inside homes, on the
rooftops of buildings – that constitute a sovereign “field of force” for Western Sahara, within the
machinery of militarized Moroccan rule. Though these encounters, I came to see the huquqi as
creating these spaces through the display of symbols, private conversations, writing graffiti on
walls – or, occasionally, participating in and videotaping non-violent protests.
Given the pervasiveness, yet inaccessibility, of human rights discourse in Moroccanoccupied Western Sahara, when I finally met with huquqiyyin through interviews near the end of
my fieldwork, the experience was charged. The covert logistics created a sense of secrecy and
heightened risk – on one occasion, a friend drove me to meet with an activist on his family’s

335

property outside of Laâyoune/El Aaiún, under the premise that this man, whose arm had been
injured during a recent protest, was under too tight surveillance to conduct an interview inside
city limits. In the very last week of my research, I met with huquqiyyin on the outskirts of
Laâyoune/El Aaiún, in a neighborhood known as Hay al-Raha. There, a group of a dozen or so
young activists had gathered in the second floor of a home. Many of them had participated in the
2005 intifada, which led some of them to be expelled from school. All remained involved in
Sahrawi nationalist activism. Some had just recently been released from prison. One of them was
part of a group that had renounced their Moroccan citizenship, torn up their documentation and
unsuccessfully sought asylum in the Spanish embassy. In addition to recounting their
experiences of torture in prison, these activists described the process of receiving doctored
charges in Moroccan court that avoid any legal reference to political activity:
Munadil1: [The Moroccan state] knows that Sahrawis are not going to retreat
from their political positions or to the right of self-determination for the Sahrawi
people. To the extent that even if [Moroccans] put them in prison, they are not
retreating from their political positions. The militants [munadilin], they always
want to hear “liberation.” They’ll bring charges against you that don’t have
anything to do with you: vandalism, or arson. You stand there peacefully, and you
even have proof on the internet Munadil2: They don’t prosecute you for your political position, they prosecute
you with hypocritical accusations/charges [al-tuhma al-munafaqa]. Criminal
charges. Like arson.
Munadil3: For participating in protests [al-waqafat].
Me: Now I understand: in the court proceedings, they announce a non-political
charge/accusation so that it is not apparent in the court records that Munadila1: That there is a political position (involved).
Aside from the charged atmosphere of these encounters with huquqiyyin, it increasingly struck
me that what we were discussing had less to do with a practice specifically tied to human rights,
and more to do with their commitment to Sahrawi nationalism. Unlike the activists who related
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the experience of “conscientization” of human rights during the 1990s – many of whom were
considered the “elites” in the world of Sahrawi nationalist activism – for this group that was
indoctrinated into the conflict through the intifada of 2005, human rights are less of a privileged
political tool than the idiom into which their political struggle has been translated in order to
overcome Moroccan media isolation.
In this sense, huquqiyyin in the Sahrawi national struggle has become synonymous with
munadilin, or militants. Huquqi is a figure of the partisan (which is why Moroccans call them
“separatists” [infissaliyin]): Sahrawis committed to the nationalist struggle. For these munadilin
described to me as the “foundation of the resistance” to Moroccan occupation, their engagement
with human rights protest and documentation leaves them at the very center of conflict. As
engaging as this sounds, one young media activist recounted once getting flushed out of a
building from which he was filming by Moroccan security forces. The story of the close escape
sounded exhilarating and dangerous, epitomizing the high-stakes confrontation between two
competing sovereignties, until he simply stated that “really, filming the same thing every time,
seeing people getting beaten up, is boring,” adding “I’d rather go back to war.”600
***
I am back at Batimat, where I was dining in the scene described to open Chapter 1. This
time, I have returned by daylight, and am visiting a neighboring building in the complex, to see
Mohamed Salek. In the 1990s, when the conflict between Morocco and Polisario shifted from
war to political negotiations with a focus on carrying out a referendum for self-determination, the
demographics of Laâyoune/El Aaiún shifted dramatically yet again, with a major influx of
settlers from the interior of Morocco. In addition to these settlers, some of whom were drawn by
economic opportunity, Morocco also organized the resettlement of Sahrawi people living just to
600
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the north in a region that since 1958 was part of Morocco, known as Wed Nun. Many of these
people were resettled under the premise that they would be eligible to participate in the planned
referendum. Those coming from further north underwent “re-education” about their identity by
Moroccan school teachers and other functionaries in an awkward attempt for them to pass before
the UN identification panels as Sahrawi. In Laâyoune/El Aaiún, however, the vast majority of
these settlers coming from Wed Nun were themselves from Sahrawi tribes such as Reguibat as
well as the group of tribes known as Tekna. This has had far-reaching ramifications on the
geography of Laâyoune/El Aaiún as a center for the political struggle over the future of Western
Sahara: whereas many Moroccans who came in what is sometimes called the Second Green
March in the 1990s later moved back north, a great many of those settled in tents in what became
known as Khaymat al-Wahda, or Tents of Unity, stayed in Laâyoune/El Aaiún. Benefiting from
free basic goods such as flour, sugar and oil, and with the promise of future free housing (which
was ultimately provided during the 2000’s) these families stayed in Laâyoune/El Aaiún and
effectively doubled the city in size. Meanwhile, in an attempt to lure Sahrawi’s living in the
Polisario-run refugee camps following the ceasefire, Morocco built a series of large concrete
housing projects in anticipation of what Morocco termed “returnees” or people defecting from
Polisario. Among these projects were Batimat, which, because the large number of returnees
initially did not materialize, became housing for whoever was opportunistic and needed housing.
This includes Sahrawis coming from Khaymat al-Wahda who occupied apartments in Batimat
when they were living in tents during a particularly rainy winter and the rains washed their free
provisions away.
Mohamed Salek’s in-law’s occupied their apartment during the rains that winter in 1992,
and have stayed ever since. When I visit them one day over lunch, Mohamed Salek speaks
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excitedly about the high-profile human rights activist, Aminatou Haidar, who is scheduled
speech before US Congress the next day. The UN Security Council’s annual meeting regarding
MINURSO is coming up, (this was in 2014) and the push to introduce human rights oversight is
going strong. Aminatou Haidar’s speech is seen as an important diplomatic intervention as part
of this campaign. In his excitement, Med Salek mentions that in an online poll for the greatest
woman in the Arab world, Aminatou Haidar had been in the lead, outpolling Queen Noor of
Jordan, before internet was cut off across the region on the last day of voting. He says,
admiringly of Haidar’s diplomatic campaign in the US, “human rights, those are life.” But as we
continue talking and the subject of the protests, which are bound to escalate over the coming
month, comes up, Med Salek suggests that these protests are all “propaganda” put on by
organizations representing the “Sahrawi regime,” or Polisario, which he considers as corrupt as
Morocco.601
Mohamed Salek’s ambivalence touches on a tension underlying the Sahrawi nationalist
movement’s strategic use of human rights, and the figure of the huquqi in Western Sahara. In
deploying human rights as a strategy to further their cause of gaining national independence, the
campaign seeks to expose the ongoing torture, abuses and violations of political rights taking
place in the occupied territory. And, indeed, Morocco has long deployed these repressive policies,
charging anyone believed to have Sahrawi nationalist sympathies with treason, torturing political
prisoners, and refusing them fair trial. They are, in effect, treated as enemies within the state. In
their attempt to make these violations visible, however, human rights activists come to be seen as
not simply suffering abuse, but in actively seeking to instigate violations for the sake of publicity
and the escalation of conflict. Many of the protests that I observed while in Laâyoune/El Aaiún
(which were only those that took place outside of my apartment window), were led by women
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and children. This increasingly appears to be part of a strategy to capture a more acute sense of
violation and suffering, whether for an international audience, or for the viewership of Polisariorun SADR tv, which play these tapes in heavy rotation, broadcasting them from the refugee
camps and back into the Occupied Territories via satellite.
In addition to the aspect of publicity and audience, Sahrawi’s who are as suspicious of
Polisario as they are of Morocco suggest that becoming a human rights activist in the service of
Sahrawi nationalism is the easiest way to get paid in a context where political economic
processes are dominated by the logics of political conflict. (Or, in some cases, get a visa and gain
asylum to live somewhere else.) As one man put it, anybody who gets caught with hashish can
raise two fingers (the “victory” sign serves as an emblem of the Sahrawi nationalist movement),
claim to be a political prisoner, and get paid. While these claims about payment by Polisario are
difficult to substantiate – most militants will emphasize that given the risks of torture,
imprisonment and surveillance, payment is irrelevant to what they are doing – the
association of human rights activism with publicity for a specific political end means that, for
some, the figure of the huquqi in Western Sahara signifies, as one Sahrawi from the Wed Nun
region put it, a “mercenary making a profit off of other people’s blood.”602
***
In this sense, the rise of human rights in Western Sahara – and its potential fall, should
the conflict continue to get more volatile – provides a case study in the use of human rights as a
strategy within a collective political struggle for self-determination. The use of human rights as
an “instrument” to instantiate conflict toward broader political (and sovereign) ends, does not
relate to conceptions of human rights as an ethical ideal in social practice. Far from transcending
nationalist conflict, human rights remain embedded within political terrain, adding a dimension
602
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of visibility and publicity to the displaced politics of decolonization, and to the diplomatic
struggle over publicity. Nor, conversely, do they inherently constitute a form of depoliticizing
governmentality. However, its specific uses in the context of the conflict over Western Sahara
may lead to a certain cynicism, precisely because the proliferating figure advocating for human
rights, the huquqi, can blur the distinction of what those rights stand for, politically. As in the
context of Palestine, where human rights also feature in the production of both legitimacy and
illegitimacy of competing projects of sovereignty, this can lead to cynicism surrounding human
rights activism more generally.603 In giving rise to multiple, competing practices and figures,
human rights in Western Sahara reflects what Daniel Goldstein – in building upon Sally Merry’s
concept – terms “plural vernaculars,” which “emanate from different sources with different,
sometimes competing, sets of agendas, resulting in a vernacular plurality that is highly contested
and strained.”604 In considering the “plural vernaculars” that emerge across different settings in
the Western Sahara conflict, human rights practice appears as a means through which Sahrawis
make the political visible – to themselves, to each other, and to transnational “witnessing”
publics.
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Conclusion: An Anthropology of Decolonization
Every spring, the intensity of demonstrations across Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara
increases, as does Moroccan state repression. Flag-waving, and, sometimes, rock-throwing,
protests pop up across the different neighborhoods of Laâyoune/El Aaiún “Thulathi” – the
neighborhoods that, through resettlement, expansion and coercion, have doubled the city’s size
since the 1991 ceasefire – on an almost daily basis. But so, too, do pre-emptive efforts by
Moroccan state police and Auxiliary Forces to swarm intersections and prevent Sahrawi activists
from assembling. The state’s coercive apparatuses operate with even greater impunity than
during the rest of the year, targeting for arrest media operatives suspected of broadcasting
protests, and violently breaking up those protests that do arise in the cracks of this machinery.
Concurrently, the diplomatic machinery that drives the conflict’s political maneuvering at the
level of international community shifts into overdrive: New York-based events that attempt to
draw attention to human rights abuses in Moroccan-occupied territory usually take place in
March and April in an attempt to make the conflict visible to a public audience. As noted in
Chapter 1, diplomatic maneuvering constitutes a constant terrain of struggle, but in the spring
months these efforts on both sides intensify. The timing for this intensification, as mentioned in
Chapter 5, relates to the United Nations Security Council’s annual debate to renew the mandate
for MINURSO, the UN’s peacekeeping body based in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara as
well as the refugee camps since 1991.
In a certain sense, the seasonal temporality of intensified conflict serves as just another
example of the apparently unusual, if not even peculiar, status of the Western Sahara conflict
relative to global politics. News reports from the Sahrawi refugee camps that depict nationalist
leaders in military green uniforms organizing a flag-waving march through the desert draw
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attention to a national liberation movement seemingly out of the 1970s. Likewise, the prolonged
nature of the conflict between Morocco and Polisario/SADR, combined with the absence of
state-sponsored armed conflict, renders it largely invisible. When the dispute does become
visible, particularly during these spring months, its relative obscurity easily plays into the
narrative of a “forgotten” conflict, neglected by global politics and world history.605 In the first
instance, the conflict appears to be out of step with a post-World War II global geopolitics
stabilized through a grid of territorial nation-states. In the second image, Western Sahara simply
appears to be outside of the movement of history, making an appearance only when instensified
conflict between competing projects of sovereignty become heated, rendering it, in the words of
George Joffé a “relic from a realist past.”
As argued in the Introduction to this dissertation, however, Western Sahara only appears
anomalous in this way through the optic of methodological nationalism. Seen as two nations
contesting a single territory, the dispute appears as the remainder of a bygone era of
decolonization that has otherwise been resolved into a global community of nation-states.
Alternatively, an overemphasis on globalization is also prone to rendering Western Sahara as out
of step with the “now” of global political space-time, under the assumption that the dispute over
nation-state sovereignty appears from this perspective as the pursuit of a political form that has
already been superseded by the processes of globalization. Disorderly Histories argues, by
contrast, that Western Sahara is irreducible to nationalist conflict, globalization, or the “ruins” of
colonial empire.606 By contrast, I suggest that the contemporary political situation in the Western
Sahara is best understood through the framework of decolonization.
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Decolonization has been characterized as a transfer of power from colonizers to the
colonized that resulted in a set of newly independent nation-states in the 1950s and 60s.607 More
recent histories that focus on structural upheaval during the post-World War II period suggest
that the outcome of decolonization was less overdetermined than the above approach would
suggest. Greater critical attention to the dynamics of empire, global political economy, and the
intellectual history of anticolonial political leaders has focused on the range of outcomes
considered possible at this conjuncture. Frederick Cooper, for example, has examined how labor
movements in post-World War II West Africa seized upon wage labor demands to challenge
universalist values of citizenship and equality espoused under French empire.608 Gary Wilder has
noted how the “untimely” politics of Leopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire challenged both
national autarchy and liberal internationalism through political practices that were both
pragmatic and utopian in their aims for a transformative, interdependent end to European
empire.609 And in his detailed study of the decolonization of French Algeria, Todd Shepard notes
that the historical category of “decolonization” signifying a “break” or division between the
colonizer and colonized only emerged retrospectively as part of French society’s “renarration” of
“the Algerian history of France.”610
Disorderly Histories contributes to this critical history by revisiting the historiography of
decolonization and questioning the methodological nationalism that its outcome has engendered.
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In building upon this intervention, however, it notes that the study of Saharan decolonization
need not be confined to a specific post-World War II period. Even Wilder’s work, in opening up
a host of questions about the futures past of decolonization and their relevance to the present,
states that “by [1955] the UN-US order had already defined and circumscribed the political field
on which decolonization would play out.”611 From the standpoint of the Sahara, by contrast,
decolonization at this point (not to mention colonialism, in Western Sahara) was only just
starting in earnest. This is not to say that the processes of decolonization in the Sahara were
exempt from the structural constraints of the Cold War, US hegemony, UN internationalism and
the politics of Third World national sovereignty that had become entrenched by the mid-1950s.
Rather, it is to suggest that decolonization has been producing new forms of political space, time
and subjectivity well beyond the post-World War II conjuncture.
Some of this may become more evident if we pivot between African postcolonialism,
framed largely by the end of European empire, and the political imaginary of the Middle East,
framed largely by anti-Zionism and anti-imperialism. As Omnia El Shakry notes:
I underscore the need to denaturalize the dominant categories and dystopic
narratives of Middle Eastern social and cultural history, narratives of awakening
followed by catastrophe or triumph followed by despair. Rather than search for
the root causes of a present postcolonial melancholia, as tempting as that might
be, we might be better served by the reconstruction of the disparate ‘horizons of
expectation’ and ‘indeterminate futures’ that decolonization, as a complex series
of both historical experiences and ongoing events, offers up. This will require that
we attend to archives both shadow and real, and conditions both intellectual and
material, as we look to the textured local debates and endogenous forces, and
minor literatures of the period of decolonization.612
I quote from El Shakry at some length here because western Sahara would seem to speak rather
directly to this call for an examination of the “ongoing events” of decolonization.
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By conceptualizing decolonization as an ongoing process and horizon of expectation, rather than
a single event, this framework also draws our attention to how the process has ushered in a series
of unresolved political projects with afterlives that continue to haunt the region’s political
present. The lasting effects of these projects have produced political formations and
subjectivities that continue to structure the region’s fragmented political geography. For this
reason, I have labeled this study an “anthropology of decolonization.”
Through the framework of decolonization, certain features of Western Sahara no longer
appear anomalous, at all. The anticolonial political project that galvanized bidanis and
Moroccans to briefly join forces in the 1950s are indicative of complex relations of autonomy
and dependence that do not conform to liberal notions of territorially bounded, sovereign,
independent peoples. Likewise, the constellation of anti-imperalist political movements that
emerged across the Maghrib and Sahara in the 1970s is suggestive of a moment of
decolonization when the future horizon of imminent change animated a political formation that
briefly transcended boundaries and notions of national belonging. And, finally, the mobility in
confinement of ‘a’idin serves as a reminder that contemporary crises surrounding migrants and
refugees return to the border-making processes that began during the period of post-World War
II decolonization, and that continually fail to “fix” the locations and identities of nation-state
subjects in ways presumably envisioned.
When viewed through the framework of decolonization rather than methodological
nationalism, the Western Sahara conflict brings to mind a range of other political formations.
Israel/Palestine, for example, serves as an inescapable point of reference, as it has for Sahrawi
nationalists since at least 1971 when, in the Marxist-Leninist Moroccan journal Ila al-Amam, a
piece was published with the headline “A New Palestine in the Land of the Sahara.” Particularly
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when thought of as a geopolitical space that is “simultaneously shared and divided,”613
Israel/Palestine bears striking parallels to Western Sahara in the sense of both a site of ongoing,
violent occupation, but also a political formation that defies neat separation into clearly defined
national containers. Or, perhaps, Western Sahara might be understood in relation to Cuba, where
a number of my interlocutors were educated, sometimes from primary through postgraduate
levels of education as part of a longstanding agreement between Fidel Castro’s regime and the
Sahrawi national liberation movement which runs the refugee camps in Algeria. Like Cuba, this
“refugee nation,” as it is sometimes called, has transformed society through a revolutionary
politics defined by political solidarities combined with a kind of controlled isolation from global
political economic processes. A third point of comparison for the Western Sahara would be other
trans- and subnational struggles over autonomy and dependence, such as East Timor, Kashmir,
West Papua, Tibet, or, even Catalonia and Crimea, each of which raise questions about the
contradictions of territorial sovereignty that have been heightened, but left unresolved, by
decolonization. In this way, the ongoing conflict over Western Sahara appears as what might be
thought of as an archipelago of “frictional surfaces,”614 irreducible to nation-state sovereignty,
that trouble the seemingly stable grid of nation-states.
***
If I have focused on the relevance of decolonization as an analytical framework for
Disorderly Histories, the use of “anthropology” warrants some commentary, as well. As should
be evident from the structure of this dissertation, I do not mean to conflate anthropology with
ethnography, and the presentist focus that this method sometimes entails. Rather, in borrowing
from Talal Asad, I use “anthropology” here to suggest a broader inquiry into the grammar of
613

Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2005), 80.
614
Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities, 177.

347

concepts – sovereignty, self-determination, autonomy and dependence – involved in the process
of decolonization:
In my view anthropology is more than a method, and it should not be equated – as
it has popularly become – with the direction given to inquiry by the
pseudoscientific notion of ‘fieldwork’…What is distinctive about modern
anthropology is the comparison of embedded concepts (representations) between
societies differently located in time or space. The important thing in this
comparative analysis is not their origin (Western or non-Western), but the forms
of life that articulate them, the powers they release or disable.615
Asad’s formulation of anthropology as the “comparison of embedded concepts” correlates to this
project’s approach to disembed understandings of decolonization by examining how this process
articulated, in practice, with “forms of life” in and across the Sahara.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Mohamed Ibrahim and Bachir ould Sid Ahmed ould Sidi
composed a poem together, sometime between 1956 and 1958, that expresses a sense of longing
for Tiris. The translation of this longing across multiple registers – from the 1950s when the
poem was composed, through post-1975 exile and nationalist conflict, to today – requires a
translation of concepts of political space, time and subjectivity. The moral geography of “Tiris”
longed for by the brothers in the 1950s, for example, is not necessarily commensurable to the
“Tiris” imagined in relation to the space of national exile, of the 1970s. Nor is a hierarchical,
genealogical bidani identity equivalent to Sahrawi nationalist belonging. Though the concepts
change, however, their overlapping resonance at multiple levels suggests that these different
meanings remain sedimented and overlapping in the poem’s ongoing circulation and reception.
In this sense, the poem is a cultural artifact of decolonization, and its circulation in the present
reflects the region’s disaggregated political geography.
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In a modest house in the southern Moroccan city of Tan Tan, father and son pause before
reciting the poem that was originally composed by two relatives in the late 1950s. The pause is
not for lack of familiarity: both father and son have the poem memorized. Indeed, the son, who
initially introduced me to this poem in Laâyoune/El Aaiún, has accompanied me on the day-long
trip north specifically to consult with his father. For additional reference, a recording in the voice
of one of the two brothers who originally composed the poem had been uploaded to the internet a
year earlier by cousins living in Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria. The son keeps this recording
downloaded on his phone, and here in Tan Tan it serves to supplement the collective memory in
case there is lingering doubt or uncertainty over a specific word. From my introduction to the
poem in Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, to the voice recording uploaded to YouTube from
refugee camps in Algeria, to the father and son reciting its meaning to me in Tan Tan, in
southern Morocco, my encounter with this poem in 2014 was also an encounter with the
disaggregated geopolitical space of western Sahara.
As an object of cultural production that both traces the region’s disaggregated political
geography in its contemporary circulation, and contains the sedimented layers of past political
projects in the present, the poem represents many of the qualities of political time and space
engendered by decolonization in this region. And, as just mentioned, in its expression of longing,
transformations from bidani to Sahrawi subjectivity can be translated through the poem’s
multiple layers of meaning. As an example of the “textured local debates…and minor literatures”
of decolonization mentioned by El Shakry, through which the qualities of political space, time
and subjectivity engendered by decolonization in the Sahara are embedded, this poem is also
illustrative of what I mean, then, by an anthropology of decolonization. For this reason, I will
leave the final words of longing to Mohamed Ibrahim:
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Return me, without any dissembling
To my land, oh God
Until I see the mouths of the riverbeds
And I’ll stop and pull up with a tin can/metal barrel
A kettle of water from Bir Inzaran
To break, if [only] I were [there], a bit of wood
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Appendix: Western Sahara (1975) and the Limits of “Orderly Decolonization”
It might be surprising that Western Sahara (1975) – a non-binding legal document that
was essentially disregarded by the concerned parties as soon as it was issued – is given a
prominent place in the historiography of international law. International legal scholarship
considers Western Sahara (1975) integral to a larger corpus of UN-based decisions and
resolutions during decolonization that contributed to the development of an international legal
doctrine defining the right to “external” self-determination.616 The operative part of the decision
reads:
Thus the court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the
application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and,
in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine
expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.617
One scholar, writing soon after the decision was published, asserted “the Western Sahara case
marks the clearest judicial statement to date with regard to self-determination as a legal right.”618
A more recent analysis lists Western Sahara (1975) first among “the major international
decisions on the meaning of self-determination.”619 In this vein, Catriona Drew suggests that
Western Sahara (1975) helped to define self-determination as a legal doctrine specifically in
formal, rather than substantive, terms. According to Drew, Western Sahara (1975)’s operative
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decision guarantees a people’s right to the exercise of free and fair choice over their political
destiny.620 Seen as a sort of capstone to several decades of the customary practice of
decolonization by self-determination, Western Sahara (1975) gave definition to this customary
law as the right to a formal process (such as a referendum or plebiscite) enabling the expression
of “free will” during the process of decolonization.621
On the other hand, historiography of the Western Sahara conflict reduces the decision to
a tactic wielded amidst an escalating power struggle between regional powers, Morocco and
Algeria.622 In this historicization, Western Sahara (1975) is typically characterized as “a brilliant
time-buying stratagem”623 masterminded by the savvy Hassan II. The genesis of Western Sahara
(1975) – as a tactic of realpolitik that forestalled a UN-referendum on self-determination – and
its subsequent failure to impact the outcome of Western Sahara’s decolonization, makes for a
seemingly contradictory lesson in legal and political terms. The decision’s contributions to the
definition of self-determination in international law can be difficult to reconcile with the
conflict’s complete departure from this legal definition at the moment of its promulgation.
Writing in the immediate aftermath of the ICJ Opinion, and amidst ongoing armed
conflict between Polisario, Morocco and Mauritania, Thomas Franck decried the yawning gap
between the legal decision and the unfolding political events. For Franck, Western Sahara (1975)
affirmed “the paramountcy” of the right to self-determination as legal means of decolonization.
And yet, the conflict over Western Sahara supplanted the exercise of this formal right and, in
doing so, departed from “a clear pattern of orderly decolonization.”624 As mentioned in the
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Introduction, Catriona Drew captures the bitter irony of this seeming contradiction while
referencing Franck’s article (entitled “The Stealing of the Sahara”) three decades later:
The Western Sahara Advisory Opinion of 1975 did more for the legal fortunes of
the right of self-determination of peoples than it did for the political fortunes of
the people of the Western Sahara.625
If Franck saw the order of decolonization ruptured by the outbreak of armed conflict in Western
Sahara, Drew retrospectively situated Western Sahara (1975) in “a more certain legal past,” one
before the end of the Cold War caused the principle of self-determination to descend into “legal
indeterminacy.”626
In this sense, Western Sahara (1975) emerges as pivotal to both the consolidation and
disruption of the “pattern of orderly decolonization.” A broader reading of Western Sahara
(1975), along with a broader contextualization of the history of Western Sahara’s decolonization,
however, raise questions about this “orderly” decolonization. What constituted this “pattern,” or
process? And why do the conflict and Court decision appear to mark its end? By questioning the
assumed historical complementarity between the end of “orderly decolonization” and the origin
of the Western Sahara conflict, this appendix will discuss some implications of Western Sahara
(1975) based on a reading of the case that goes beyond the conclusion quoted above, by
engaging with the operative text of the advisory opinion, as well dissenting opinions, and certain
oral pleadings by lawyers representing the parties to the case: Morocco, Mauritania, Spain and
Algeria.627 In doing so, I argue that Western Sahara (1975) provides important insights into the
conceptual dilemmas that have served to produce Western Sahara as a geopolitical object of
dispute. These dilemmas revolve around sovereignty, constructions of the political subject, and
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temporality. Throughout Western Sahara (1975), Jurists repeatedly encounter, discuss and
sometimes evade theoretical dilemmas concerning the relationship between past, present and
future, on the one hand, and between people, polity and territory, on the other. The remainder of
this appendix will address these questions in much the same order as Western Sahara (1975)
itself: first, by discussing terra nullius, jurisdiction and the Court’s deliberation over whether to
take up the questions as presented; and, second, by considering the Court’s treatment of
Morocco’s and Mauritania’s distinct claims to pre-colonial sovereign ties in Western Sahara.

Western Sahara (1975): terra nullius, legal ties, sovereign “entities”
Western Sahara (1975) deserves both contextualization and a closer reading because
some of the unresolved dilemmas of sovereignty underpinning the Western Sahara conflict
emerge through the legal language of reasoning and argumentation from the Case’s operative
and dissenting opinions, as well as international legal scholarship surrounding the Case. Take,
for example, the questions posed by UN General Assembly Resolution 3292, which framed the
ICJ’s response:
I. Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco
and the Mauritanian entity?628
Two central doctrines of international law – terra nullius and sovereignty (implicit in the
question about legal ties) – serve to frame the Advisory Opinion. Underlying these questions,
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however, remain theoretical dilemmas about time, evidence and authority that keep cropping up
throughout the text’s operative and dissenting opinions.629
Given the contested nature of the matter, the Court first had to justify taking up the
questions proposed by Morocco and Mauritania, and presented by the UN General Assembly.
Because they are framed in terms of Western Sahara’s status “at the time of colonization by
Spain” in 1884 it was suggested that neither question had any bearing on the territory’s
decolonization, circa 1975. By this argument, the Court had been presented with academic
questions of no legal significance that were therefore unrelated to its jurisdiction. To this, the
Court responded that the questions pertain to “a broader frame of reference than the settlement of
a particular dispute and embrace other elements. These elements, moreover, are not confined to
the past but are also directed to the present and the future.”630 In grappling with the broader
significance of the Case, the Court brings questions of pre-colonial authority within the purview
of decolonization, implying that colonialism does not cause complete rupture with pre-existing
legal and sovereign ties. In asserting the Court’s jurisdiction, Western Sahara (1975) articulates a
relationship between past, present and future that leaves open the possibility for the need to
historicize legal ties in order to determine sovereignty.
Spain objected to the Court’s involvement on the premise that sovereignty, concerning
the past and present, and decolonization, concerning the future, involve separate sets of facts,
concern distinct legal-temporal frameworks, and should be treated as such. Any attribution of
sovereignty by international law, Spain contended, would inherently violate its own sovereignty
629
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over Western Sahara.631 Spain objected that the questions posed to the ICJ invite the Court to
determine Western Saharan sovereignty when “[t]he attribution of territorial
sovereignty…usually centres on material acts involving the exercise of that sovereignty.”632 In
this sense, Spain’s position echoes that of Carl Schmitt, for whom the founding act of
sovereignty is the “material act” of land occupation.633 As the constitutive means of naming,
legitimating, and ordering, sovereignty (or what Schmitt terms nomos) derives from a material
act of occupation, and therefore can be supported, but never attributed, by law. For Spain, the
fact of the matter, in the Schmittian sense, was materially self-evident: Spain exercised
sovereignty over Western Sahara, and had done so since 1884 through an occupation sanctioned
by international law.
The resonance between Spain’s objection and Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty draws
our attention to the relationship between sovereignty, international law and imperialism. For
Schmitt, international law was generated by European imperial expansion, first in the New
World and then elsewhere.634 Founded on the acts of discovery and occupation, jus inter gentes
served to establish equilibrium between imperial powers (for Schmitt, a self-evident category
based primarily on criteria of European civilization). In this sense, international law facilitated
imperial expansion through the mitigation of warring powers, but it could not preempt or alter
the sovereign order of states. By the late-19th century, however, Schmitt considered the principle
of legitimacy irreparably compromised by various uses of international law to establish
sovereignty. Spain’s position on Western Sahara (1975) parallels Schmitt’s critique in this sense.
In addition to distinguishing the “material acts” of sovereignty from international law, Spain’s
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objection seeks to ensure that the question of past sovereignty remains separate from the present
question of decolonization.
Interestingly, however, Spain’s argument rests not only on bracketing late-19th century
sovereignty from informing questions of mid-20th century decolonization; it also calls for the
application of self-determination as positive law. Spain’s position before the Court, supported by
Algeria, was that, by 1975, the UN Charter and subsequent resolutions had already established a
legal doctrine for decolonization by self-determination, obviating the need for any historical
considerations.635 Taking up questions of historical ties, Spain argued, would undermine an
already existing legal framework governing the transfer of power under the framework of
decolonization. Spain’s position was supported by Algeria’s representative before the ICJ,
Mohamed Bedjaoui, whose oral arguments asserted that, by 19th century standards, Western
Sahara would be considered terra nullius. As such, Spain’s colonial borders remain the salient
markers of the territory. By mid-20th century standards, Algeria argued, self-determination had
displaced terra nullius as the operative means of establishing new sovereign entities under
international law. According to Algeria, any reference beyond these two doctrines – terra nullius
for demarcating the territory, self-determination for establishing its present and future status –
would be superfluous.636 Bedjaoui’s argument is premised on the application of intertemporal
law, “which applies in cases where the governing legal rules have changed over time so that the
original rules and the later rules require different results.”637 In allowing for the applicability of
terra nullius “at the time of colonization by Spain,” intertemporal law upholds a separation
635
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between past and present, implying a kind of rupture between “classic” and “modern”
international law.
Although the Court ultimately agreed that the decolonization of Western Sahara
warranted the application of self-determination, it did not follow Spain’s or Algeria’s reasoning
in order to arrive at this conclusion. As a reminder, in Western Sahara (1975), the Court was
asked first to apply terra nullius as a kind of legal test:
I. Was Western Sahara (Río de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
If Western Sahara “belonged to no one” at the time of Spanish colonization in 1884, it would
follow that legal ties could not have existed – with Morocco, Mauritania or any other political
entity – because the territory lacked any form of political or social organization. Some judges
were clearly uncomfortable that the concept of terra nullius even had to be addressed, remarking
in their individual opinions on the inapplicability of such a Eurocentric standard in postcolonial
times.638 Regardless, the prompt led the Court to find that Spain’s agreements with Sahrawi
tribes from “the time of colonization” served as proof of social and political organization in the
region: “Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic, were socially and
politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to represent them.”639 In a sense, then,
terra nullius provided a clear – if discomfiting – test case against which the Court discerned that
the existence of some form of political organization in Western Sahara predated colonization.
Deciding that Western Sahara in 1884 could not be classified as terra nullius brought the
Jurists to the second question:
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II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco
and the Mauritanian entity?640
Devising legal tests to positively determine the more complex claims posed by this second
question proved elusive. Unlike the concept of terra nullius that framed Question I, the Court
noted that an answer to Question II hinged on the understanding of “legal ties,” which “was not a
term having in itself a very precise meaning.”641 Despite the term not being a part of
international law’s lexicon, one scholar has noted that this question “stimulated a whole range of
competing perspectives about the extent to which international law can recognise non-European
forms of rule over territory.”642 Based on the basic threshold of terra nullius that some kind of
political organization existed in pre-colonial Western Sahara, Question II asked the Court to
determine the qualitative nature of this organization.
Conceptually, the inquiry revolved around the analytical gap between legal ties and
sovereign ties. If the Court found that Morocco’s and Mauritania’s separate claims to the
Western Sahara constituted pre-colonial sovereign ties, then it could recommend that the process
of decolonization reconstitute these ties. As one judge wrote in an individual response separate
from the operative opinion, this required “a specific criterion by which to differentiate one kind
of tie from another.”643 What, then, constitutes a legal tie: a mode of authority, a sense of duty or
obligation, a shared sense of ethics? Furthermore, what is it that the tie binds? Is a legal tie the
basis for a sovereign tie, or are sovereignty and the law constituted by qualitatively different
relations to authority? As we will see, these questions presented fundamental challenges to the
regimes of evidence and modes of reasoning upon which the Court relied.
640
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The operative decision in Western Sahara (1975) remarks upon the “the very special
characteristics” of the territory “which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely determined
the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it.”644 In its brief
summary of these conditions, the Court cites the desert conditions and nomadic routes that
encompassed a region much larger than the boundaries of Spanish Sahara.645 Though by no
means unique in this regard, the Sahara historically defies fixed territorial boundaries which,
whether literally or figuratively, are largely incompatible with a way of life predicated on long
distance movement, and a natural environment of shifting sands. Whether conceptualized as a
barren wasteland that divides civilizations,646 or as a sea of many passages that ties them
together,647 the social and political relations of the Sahara have been predicated on
“connectivity” and genealogical “encompassment” more than territorial boundedness.648
Nevertheless, in following the phrasing of Question II, Western Sahara (1975) focused on
political and social organization in territorial terms, even when observing that territorial
boundaries had rarely been decisive when it came to organizing political relations in the Sahara.
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In addressing Morocco’s claims to sovereign ties, Western Sahara (1975) acknowledged
the “special characteristics” of the pre-colonial Moroccan state:
That the Sherifian State at the time of the Spanish colonization of Western Sahara
was a State of a special character is certain. Its special character consisted in the
fact that it was founded on the common religious bond of Islam existing among
the peoples and on the allegiance of various tribes to the Sultan, through their
caids or sheikhs, rather than on the notion of territory.649
The legitimacy of this state was based on shared religious authority affirmed through the
expression of allegiance, known as al-bay‘a, rather than land occupation. As with its
observations about the Sahara, the Court’s remarks on the Sherifian State are also supported by
scholarship, in this case on Moroccan sources of pre-colonial political authority.650 In a
comparative study on pre-modern sources of political authority, Clifford Geertz noted that the
values attributed to sovereign authority were constantly being renewed – not through fixed
borders and territorial occupation, but through movement. Referring specifically to a caravan
undertaken in 1893 by the Moroccan Sultan Hassan, Geertz suggested that the Sherifian court’s
peripatetic nature was crucial to legitimating the Sultan’s political authority: “the realm was
unified…by a restless searching out of contact, mostly agonistic, with literally hundreds of lesser
centers of power within it.”651
The significance of this insight forces us to rethink the basis of authority, and the spatial
distribution of power, in a pre-modern political entity. The conception of sovereignty in the
modern, territorial sense assumes uniform and total occupation. With the divine ruler replaced by
the abstract secular authority of the state, the legitimating sovereign principle becomes,
649
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tautologically, the state’s ability to maintain control over its territory.652 In the pre-colonial
Moroccan context, political authority was concentrated in the religious figure of the Sultan, and
regularly renewed through the reinstantiation of sovereign ties with his subordinates. While this
entailed near-constant movement, the purpose of the Sultan’s caravan was not to establish,
defend or move a border, but to renew or establish the allegiance of a subordinate. A further
distinction is sometimes drawn between bilad al-makhzen and bilad al-siba,653 differentiating
between regions that paid taxes to the Sultan, and those that did not. Before the Court, Morocco
argued that groups in bilad al-siba enjoyed greater autonomy, but still paid allegiance to the
Sultan.654
As Western Sahara (1975) noted in passing, “legal ties are normally established in
relation to people.”655 Through the lens of international law, however, sovereign ties are a
territorial matter – and this is where the unstable relationship between people, polity and
authority becomes more apparent. After all, Question II asked for the legal ties “between this
territory” of Western Sahara, and Moroccan and Mauritanian political entities. This framework is
logical within the context of 1975 and an international state system based on territorial
sovereignty. However, the Court had set itself the task of analyzing legal ties in the historical and
political context of 1884, when neither the Moroccan nor Mauritanian political entities claim
territorial sovereignty as the basis of political authority. As one scholar noted in their analysis of
652
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the Case, the resulting “reliance on anachronism is startling” as terms such as “state” and
“border” are repeatedly utilized to describe 19th century Saharan social and political formations
for which these terms are ill-suited.656 In this sense, the relationship between past and present in
Western Sahara (1975) remains a disjunctive one, and the Court finds itself contending with two
regimes of evidence that are not necessarily commensurable. As a judge suggests in a dissenting
opinion, “the reply, as worded in the operative part…contains an internal contradiction. Mention
is made there of the territory of the Sahara, but it is immediately explained, by the crossreference, that it is the tribes that are meant.”657 The Court recognizes the “special
characteristics” of the Saharan territory and Sherifian State, but the categories that it has to work
with contribute to a fragmentary view of the past, producing an internal contradiction in its
conception of the present.
The confusion in terms involving people, territory and legal ties relates, then, to questions
about evidence, but also time. In addition to the anthropological knowledge that the Court
appears to draw from when discussing Saharan nomadic and Moroccan pre-colonial state
structure, the Opinion references a number of 18th and 19th century agreements between Morocco
and European countries and corporations.658 Particular attention, for example, is given to letters
exchanged between France and Germany in 1911, which discuss the limits of Moroccan rule in
geographical terms that refer to Rio de Oro (in Arabic, Wedi Dhahab), a river in present day
656
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Western Sahara. Morocco presented this exchange as proof of the external recognition of
Moroccan sovereignty. In addressing whether this could be taken as definitive evidence of
Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara, the Court noted that the geographical description in
letters from 1911 contradicted the terms of a French agreement with Spain from 1904, which
fixed Morocco’s border by latitude at a point further north. Of course, the function of these
diplomatic exchanges, from the standpoint of competing imperial powers, was precisely to keep
Moroccan territory vague, so as for each of these powers to maximize their own interests in the
region. As Western Sahara (1975) notes:
The various international agreements referred to by Morocco and Spain are of
concern to the Court only in so far as they may contain indications of such
recognition [of sovereignty]. These agreements, in the opinion of the Court, are
of limited value in this regard; for it was not their purpose either to recognize an
existing sovereignty over a territory or to deny its existence. Their purpose, in
their different contexts, was rather to recognize or reserve for one or both parties a
‘sphere of influence’ as understood in the practice of that time.659
In this sense, Moroccan attempts to provide proof of territorial sovereignty faced a double bind.
The precolonial basis of Moroccan Sherifian authority was not constituted exclusively by
territory, and ties of allegiance refer to people more than places. Moreover, as Geertz’s account
illustrates, neither the Moroccan Sultan, nor the groups whose allegiance he sought were fixed in
place, making pre-colonial territorial ties not only difficult to ascertain, but beside the point.
Documentation with Western powers, meanwhile, often purposely avoided making careful
geographic references, specifically to undermine Moroccan sovereignty and reserve, as broadly
as possible, imperial “spheres of influence.”
Legal Ties, Sovereign Ties II: the Mauritanian “entity”
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In discussing Morocco’s Sherifian State, the Court was primarily concerned with the precolonial basis of authority and its spatial configurations, rather than legal ties per se.
Mauritania’s case, based on the tribe and the tribal confederation, or emirate, involved two,
decentralized political forms that entail a different conception of how we understand law itself.
In reference to a hub of trans-Saharan trade that also served as a base for the Emir of Adrar, the
Court called this entity Bilad Shinguitti, and its basis of political authority shared many of the
“special characteristics” used to describe Saharan social and political organization more
generally. Specifically, the Court referred to the jema‘a, an assembly of tribal sheikhs that reach
consensus based on shari‘a and customary law. In addition, the Court noted that confederations
formed between tribes “either of dependence or of alliance, which were essentially tribal rather
than territorial, ties of allegiance or vassalage.”660
As in the case of Morocco’s Sherifian State, Bilad Shinguitti highlighted certain defining
characteristics of pre-colonial political authority that share little in common with the modern,
territorial state structure. In determining the nature of legal ties between the territory and the
Mauritanian entity, Western Sahara (1975) focused on the word “entity” in an attempt to clarify.
For the authors of Western Sahara (1975), this term “expresses the essential test where a group,
whether composed of States, of tribes or of individuals, is claimed to be a legal entity distinct
from its members.”661 Here we have the antithesis to the earlier observation that legal ties are
usually between people. Taking the state to be an entity independent of society and the
individual, the Court sought proof of sovereign ties in this independent entity. The critical
criterion was whether Bilad Shinguitti constituted “an entity capable of availing itself of
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obligations incumbent upon its Members.”662 The tribes and emirates of Bilad Shinguitti with a
system of political authority based on an entirely different conception of law, were being
measured against the classic criteria deployed by Max Weber to differentiate the modern state
from a political association.663 Unsurprisingly, the Court determines that this pre-colonial set of
affiliations based on lineage, shared moral authority and cultural practices, “did not have the
character of a personality or corporate entity distinct from the several emirates and the tribes
which composed it.”664
Responses to Western Sahara (1975): The Imperial Limits of International Law, or the
Legal Limits of “Orderly” Decolonization?
In attesting to the Case’s canonical status, legal scholars continue to debate whether Western
Sahara (1975) contributed to a more inclusive international law of “overlapping consensus,” or
reaffirmed international law’s inability to surpass its exclusionary dependence upon European
imperial concepts.665 Antony Anghie’s Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International
Law takes the latter position in tracing international law’s exclusive structure through what he
terms “the dynamic of difference.” Like Schmitt, Anghie historicizes sovereignty in order to
examine the contradictions that arise amidst shifts in the criteria or normative principles used to
define the concept. Unlike Schmitt, however, Anghie suggests that international law has a much
662
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longer history of contributing to sovereignty’s indeterminacy through changing criteria of
recognition and exclusion that shift with the exigencies of European imperialism. Where Schmitt
emphasizes occupation, Anghie suggests that sovereignty is a legal concept and therefore
always-already relational. In historicizing the relationality of this concept, Anghie notes that the
legal categories and techniques that have come to define sovereignty developed through the
exclusion and disempowerment of non-Europeans through international law.666
While Anghie referenced Western Sahara (1975) in relation to a much broader genealogy
of international law and West/non-West encounters, Michelle Burgis reaches a more nuanced, if
similar, conclusion as part of an in-depth analysis of the Case. Engaging in detail with the oral
arguments, dissenting opinions, and operative decision of Western Sahara (1975), Burgis
recognized the relatively novel forms of reasoning deployed by the lawyers and judges in this
case. By taking up Morocco’s and Mauritania’s claims to legal ties, Burgis noted that the Jurists
were contending with “harmonies and dissonances between European and non-European
approaches to authority over territory.”667 In addressing these particular claims to sovereignty,
the case was implicitly critiquing the universal basis of international law and opening the
possibility for a more “cosmopolitan” international law.668 Despite this engagement, however,
Burgis suggested that Western Sahara (1975) should be read as “an ambivalent compromise”
that evaded the broader questions of authority by affirming a concept of self-determination “that
employed Western approaches of territoriality.”669
As important as the postcolonial critique has been for demonstrating how concepts of
Western modernity have legitimized and enabled the decimation of other forms of life, I suggest
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that it has limited purchase in this context. Take, for example, Anghie’s argument that the
presence of terra nullius in Western Sahara (1975) represents another example of international
law’s inescapably Eurocentric “legal grammar:”670
The doctrine of terra nullius is recognized as a fiction, and yet…These doctrines
are not so much confronted as evaded through reinterpretation of the relevant
facts…in the 1975 Western Sahara Case, the judges of the ICJ asserted that the
Western Sahara could not have been terra nullius because the people who lived
there did in fact have a form of political organization. Thus the doctrines
consolidated by nineteenth-century jurists continue to establish the framework
within which indigenous peoples struggle to assert their rights.671
The issue with Anghie’s assertion is that it overlooks the stakes in which terra nullius was
deployed in Western Sahara (1975). While Anghie might assert that the mere presence of the
term signifies international law’s irremediably Eurocentric essence, an analysis of the Oral
Pleadings suggests that the most anti-imperialist party to the Case, Algerian representative
Mohamed Bedjaoui, argued for the most expansive interpretation of terra nullius, in essence
legitimating Spain’s occupation of Western Sahara, and therefore, the territory. This, of course,
was a tactical move by Bedjaoui, but it nonetheless highlights an important relation between 19th
century imperialism and post-World War II anticolonial national liberation movements of the
mid-20th century – or, between the territorialization of Schmittian sovereignty and Third World
sovereignty. Bedjaoui’s argument, of course, was to assert that terra nullius applied to the
territory of Western Sahara in 1884 just as much as, by intertemporal law, self-determination
applied in 1975.672 Third World Sovereignty, for leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement such as
Algeria, was premised on the idea that positive international law ought to uphold uti posseditis,
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or the principle that successor regimes adopt the boundaries of their predecessors.673 The antiimperialism of self-determination and Third World Sovereignty depended upon the territorial
logic of international law and terra nullius to reinforce the sanctity of territorial borders.
Rather than reflecting the imperial limits of international law, I suggest that the
“harmonies and dissonances” that emerge from the legal reasoning in Western Sahara (1975)
indicate a Court confronted not only with the limits of international law, but with the limits of
“orderly decolonization.” Western Sahara (1975) illustrates certain dilemmas inherent in the
concept of territorial sovereignty, but it also shows that this problem lies in the replication of
territorial sovereignty through decolonization itself. From this perspective, the ICJ Opinion, and
the political crisis of which it was a part, emerge as a flashpoint when the process of “orderly
decolonization” encountered a region that has historically defied the territorialization of
sovereignty. At the same time, this pivotal moment in the 1970s decolonization of Western
Sahara foregrounds a convergence, of sorts, between the disaggregated authority of post-World
War II global politics, and the complex relations of autonomy and dependence that characterize
political authority in the Sahara.
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